Friss v. Provincial Health Services Authority and another, 2026 BCHRT 157
Date Issued: July 17, 2026
File(s): CS-005768
Indexed as: Friss v. Provincial Health Services Authority and another, 2026 BCHRT 157
IN THE MATTER OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS CODE,
RSBC 1996, c. 210 (as amended)
AND IN THE MATTER of a complaint before
the British Columbia Human Rights Tribunal
BETWEEN:
Noams Friss
COMPLAINANT
AND:
Provincial Health Services Authority and His Majesty the King in Right of the Province of British Columbia as represented by the Ministry of Health (Office of the Provincial Health Officer)
RESPONDENTS
REASONS FOR DECISION
APPLICATION TO DISMISS A COMPLAINT
Section 27(1)(c)
Tribunal Member: Jonathan Chapnick
On his own behalf: Noams Friss
Counsel for PHSA: Annie Olson
Counsel for the PHO: Alexandra MacCarthy
I INTRODUCTION
[1] Noam Friss alleges that the Respondents, Provincial Health Services Authority [PHSA] and the Office of the Provincial Health Officer [PHO], discriminated against him in the area of employment based on the ground of religion in contravention of s. 13 of the Human Rights Code. Mr. Friss was employed as a paramedic by BC Emergency Health Services [BCEHS], which is part of PHSA. His complaint arises from his non-compliance with PHO orders that required PHSA/BCEHS employees to be vaccinated against COVID-19 and provide proof of vaccination to their employer by October 26, 2021.
[2] The Respondents deny discriminating and apply to dismiss the complaint under s. 27(1)(c) of the Code. They say the complaint has no reasonable prospect of success and does not warrant the time and expense of an oral hearing.
[3] For the reasons that follow, I agree with the Respondents. It is not that I question the validity of Mr. Friss’ stated religion or the sincerity of his stated beliefs and experiences. Rather, I simply find, based on the materials before me, that he has no reasonable prospect of proving that the PHO engaged in employment discrimination, and that PHSA is reasonably certain to establish a defence against his claim.
[4] To make my decision, I have considered all the arguments and evidence filed. In my reasons, I only refer to what is necessary to explain what I decided. I make no findings of fact.
II BACKGROUND
[5] The following information is drawn from the materials before me and is set out here as background. It is not meant to be exhaustive, and it is not in dispute.
[6] Information regarding the relevant PHO orders and their application to staff members at PHSA and other health employers is outlined in several recent Tribunal decisions regarding COVID-19 vaccination: see, e.g., Lavoie v. Fraser Health Authority, 2025 BCHRT 8; Thompson v. Interior Health Authority, 2025 BCHRT 188; Zhou v. Fraser Health Authority, 2025 BCHRT 226; Sharp v. Vancouver Island Health Authority, 2025 BCHRT 227; Card v. Fraser Health Authority and another, 2025 BCHRT 231; Mondejar v. Provincial Health Services Authority, 2026 BCHRT 7; Maatz v. Interior Health Authority, 2026 BCHRT 27; Robert v. Vancouver Coastal Health Authority, 2026 BCHRT 95; Gillespie v. BC Ministry of Health (Office of the Provincial Health Officer), 2026 BCHRT 134; Jenkins v. Interior Health Authority, 2026 BCHRT 147. I will not repeat all of that information here.
[7] In September 2021, the PHO announced that all employees in the health sector needed to get vaccinated. PHSA subsequently notified its employees of the vaccination requirements, and warned them that failure to comply could result in the termination of their employment. On October 14, 2021, the PHO issued the Hospital and Community (Health Care and Other Services) COVID-19 Vaccination Status Information and Preventative Measures order [Order], which required PHSA employees, including Mr. Friss, to provide proof of vaccination by October 26. In a letter to Mr. Friss dated October 22, 2021, PHSA confirmed that, under the Order, he would not be allowed to work as of October 26 if he did not comply with the applicable vaccination requirements.
[8] Mr. Friss did not get vaccinated or provide proof of vaccination by October 26.
[9] In a letter to Mr. Friss dated October 26, 2021, PHSA advised that, since it could not confirm that he was vaccinated, he was no longer permitted to work. PHSA stated that Mr. Friss was being placed on an unpaid leave of absence for three weeks, after which he could be terminated on November 15, 2021 if he did not comply with the applicable vaccination requirements.
[10] Mr. Friss did not comply with the applicable vaccination requirements by November 15.
[11] In a letter to Mr. Friss dated November 15, 2021, PHSA advised that, since it could not confirm that he was vaccinated, it was terminating his employment.
[12] Mr. Friss never told PHSA that he had a religious objection to the applicable vaccination requirements. He filed his complaint to the Tribunal on December 15, 2021.
III DECISION
[13] Under s. 27(1)(c) of the Code, the Tribunal can dismiss complaints that have no reasonable prospect of success and therefore do not warrant the time and expense of a hearing. This is part of the Tribunal’s gatekeeping function. The Tribunal’s task under s. 27(1)(c) is to look at the evidence provided to decide whether “there is no reasonable prospect that findings of fact that would support the complaint could be made on a balance of probabilities after a full hearing of the evidence”: Berezoutskaia v. British Columbia (Human Rights Tribunal), 2006 BCCA 95 at para. 22, leave to appeal ref’d [2006] SCCA No. 171. The onus is on the Respondents to establish that Mr. Friss’ complaint against them should be dismissed. To meet this onus, they must each persuade the Tribunal that either Mr. Friss has no reasonable prospect of making his case against them, or they are reasonably certain to establish a defence: Lado v. Hardbite Chips and others, 2019 BCHRT 134 at para. 25.
[14] I will begin with the PHO.
A. No reasonable prospect of complaint succeeding against PHO
[15] Mr. Friss alleges that the PHO discriminated against him in the area of employment in contravention of s. 13 of the Code. He says the PHO issued the Order, the Order effectively made vaccination mandatory in his employment, he was unable to comply with this mandate because of his religion, and consequently his employment was terminated.
[16] The PHO argues that the complaint against it cannot succeed because, among other things, it was not involved in terminating Mr. Friss’ employment. Based on the information and evidence before me, I agree with this argument.
[17] To engage the Code’s protection under s. 13, a complainant must show that the respondent’s impugned conduct fell within the scope of the prohibition against “discrimination in employment.” The PHO’s impugned conduct in the present case is issuing the Order. Mr. Friss does not claim and the evidence does not support that the PHO mandated the termination of his employment: Gillespie v. BC Ministry of Health (Office of the Provincial Health Officer), 2026 BCHRT 134 at para. 28. The Order did not require PHSA to terminate Mr. Friss, nor is there evidence of the PHO otherwise imposing such a requirement: see Vancouver Island Health Authority (Cowichan Home Support), 2024 BCLRB 81 at para. 141. As a result, even if the termination of Mr. Friss’ employment with PHSA violated s. 13 of the Code, there is no reasonable prospect of the Tribunal finding the PHO liable for the violation.
[18] The PHO’s dismissal application is therefore granted and the complaint against it is dismissed.
B. PHSA is reasonably certain to establish defence
[19] Mr. Friss’ complaint against PHSA is similar to his complaint against the PHO. He says he was unable to comply with the applicable vaccination requirements because of his religion, and consequently PHSA terminated his employment. He says this was discrimination.
[20] Mr. Friss says there were “proven safety policies in place, which the employer could have continued to use” instead of taking “coercive measures that … infringed on [his] basic human rights and freedoms.” I understand this to be an assertion that PHSA failed to do everything reasonable and practical to avoid terminating his employment, which goes to the question of whether its conduct was justified: Moore at para. 49. More specifically, Mr. Friss’ assertion goes to whether PHSA met its duty to accommodate him, such that “it could not have done anything else reasonable or practical to avoid the negative impact” of the vaccination requirements: British Columbia (Public Service Employee Relations Commission) v. BCGSEU, 1999 CanLII 652 (SCC), [1999] 3 SCR 3 [Meiorin] at para. 38.
[21] At a hearing, even if Mr. Friss made his case by proving an adverse impact in his job with a nexus to his religion, there would be no discrimination if PHSA could establish a justification defence. To do so, PHSA would need to prove that (1) it applied the vaccination requirements to Mr. Friss for a purpose rationally connected to the job; (2) it did so in an honest and good faith belief that it was necessary to fulfil that purpose; and (3) doing so was reasonably necessary to accomplish the purpose, which would involve consideration of the concept of accommodation to the point of undue hardship: Meiorin at para. 60.
[22] On the materials before me, I am satisfied that PHSA would be reasonably certain to prove the first two elements of this defence at a hearing. It is indisputable that PHSA applied the vaccination requirements to comply with the Order, and there is nothing before me to support that, in doing so, it was “motivated by discriminatory animus”: Meiorin at para. 60.
[23] This would leave the third element of the justification defence – specifically the question of whether PHSA fulfilled its duty to accommodate. In its response to the complaint, PHSA says it could not accommodate Mr. Friss because it “would have constituted an undue hardship for [it] to breach the PHO Order by permitting Mr. Friss to work when he was prohibited from doing so under the terms of the PHO Order.” In addition, it asserts that it was not obligated to place Mr. Friss on an indefinite leave of absence, and that requiring it “to allow employees to remain on indefinite leaves of absence due to lack of compliance with the PHO Order would constitute an undue hardship.”
[24] Further, PHSA stresses in its dismissal application – and Mr. Friss does not dispute – that Mr. Friss did not disclose that he had a religious objection to the vaccination requirements and PHSA was unaware of his religious beliefs when it terminated his employment. While PHSA highlights this point in arguing that Mr. Friss cannot make his case, it is properly considered in the analysis of whether PHSA is reasonably certain to prove that it met its duty to accommodate: see Klewchuk v. City of Burnaby (No. 6), 2022 BCHRT 29 at paras. 366-373. Regardless, “the underlying principle and outcome remains the same” – a respondent is not responsible for accommodating religion-related needs that it was not, or could not reasonably have been, aware of: see Student (by Parent) v. School District, 2023 BCHRT 237 at para. 89. On the undisputed information before me, I am satisfied that PHSA is reasonably certain to establish a justification defence on this basis at a hearing. As a result, Mr. Friss’ complaint against PHSA has no reasonable prospect of success.
[25] PHSA’s dismissal application is therefore granted and the complaint against PHSA is dismissed.
IV CONCLUSION
[26] The Respondents dismissal applications are granted. The complaint is dismissed in its entirety: Code, s. 27(1)(c).
Jonathan Chapnick
Tribunal Member