Shim v. UBCP/ACTRA and another, 2026 BCHRT 156
Date Issued: July 17, 2026
File(s): CS-009294
Indexed as: Shim v. UBCP/ACTRA and another, 2026 BCHRT 156
IN THE MATTER OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS CODE,
RSBC 1996, c. 210 (as amended)
AND IN THE MATTER of a complaint before
the British Columbia Human Rights Tribunal
BETWEEN:
Melissa Shim
COMPLAINANT
AND:
UBCP/ACTRA and Production Town Inc. – Grease
RESPONDENTS
REASONS FOR DECISION
TIMELINESS OF COMPLAINT
Section 22
Tribunal Member: Steven Adamson
On their own behalf: Melissa Shim
Counsel for UBCP/ACTRA: Heather Kennedy
No submissions: Production Town Inc. – Grease
I INTRODUCTION
[1] The Complainant, Melissa Shim, filed this human rights complaint on April 5, 2023. She alleges that her former employer, Production Town Inc. – Grease [the Employer] and UBCP/ACTRA [the Union] discriminated in employment based on race, ancestry and sex contrary to s. 13 of the Human Rights Code [Code].
[2] The Tribunal’s May 8, 2024, screening decision allowed the complaint to proceed against both the Union and Employer, subject to timeliness submissions. In particular, the Tribunal found Ms. Shim’s allegations against the Employer appeared to be late filed after determining the latest such allegations occurred when she was terminated on March 31, 2022.
[3] The Tribunal invited the parties to make submissions about whether to accept the complaint under s. 22 of the Human Rights Code. The Complainant and the Union provided submissions, and I considered them in making this decision. The Employer did not provide any submissions despite being provided the opportunity to do so.
[4] The Union argues Ms. Shim’s allegations against it are not arguable contraventions of the Code. In the alternative, they argue any late filed allegations against it should not proceed as part of a continuing contravention of the Code or because it is not in the public interest to allow them to proceed late filed. As such, the issues I must decide are whether Ms. Shim’s allegations against the Union are arguable contraventions: s. 22(1), form part of a continuing contravention: s. 22(2) or were late filed and should proceed for reasons related to the public interest: s. 22(3).
[5] The sole issue with respect to the Employer, is whether to exercise my discretion to accept the complaint because it is in the public interest to do so, and no substantial prejudice will result to any person because of the delay: s. 22(3).
[6] For the following reasons the complaint will not proceed. First, I have determined that Ms. Shim has not provided any allegations capable of proceeding against the Union. Second, I do not accept the late-filed complaint against the Employer because I am not persuaded that it is in the public interest to do so.
II DECISION
[7] There is a one-year time limit for filing a human rights complaint: Code, s. 22. Allegations are timely if they occurred within one year of filing the complaint, or if they form part of a timely continuing contravention of the Code: s. 22(1) and (2). The time limit set out in s. 22 of the Code is a substantive provision that is intended to ensure that complainants pursue their human rights remedies diligently: British Columbia (Ministry of Public Safety and Solicitor General) v. Mzite, 2014 BCCA 220 at para. 59. Its purposes are “to require allegations of discrimination to be brought forward in a timely way so that remedial steps can be taken if appropriate” and to protect respondents from having to address dated complaints: School District v. Parent obo the Child, 2018 BCCA 136 at para. 79; Kamloops (City) v Spina, 2021 BCSC 723 at para. 80. The Tribunal has discretion to accept untimely allegations of discrimination if it is in the public interest to do so and no substantial prejudice will result to any person because of the delay: Code, s. 22(3).
[8] Ms. Shim filed this complaint on April 5, 2023. Any allegations of discrimination before April 5, 2022, will be untimely unless they are part of a continuing contravention.
A. Allegation of discrimination within one year of complaint
[9] The first issue I must decide is whether the complaint sets out any allegations of discrimination within the one year before the complaint was filed with respect to the Employer and the Union. An allegation of discrimination must set out facts that could, if proven, establish that the complainant had characteristics protected by the Code, experienced an adverse impact in a protected area, and the protected characteristics were a factor in the adverse impact: Moore v. BC (Education), 2012 SCC 61 at para. 33; Chen v. Surrey (City), 2015 BCCA 57 at para. 32; School District at para. 68. This is often referred to as an “arguable contravention” of the Code.
[10] As concerns Ms. Shim’s allegations against the Employer, I agree with the Tribunal’s May 8, 2024, screening decision that all such allegations were late filed. Ms. Shim specializes in driving vintage cars on camera in movies. In March 2022, she alleges the person overseeing car filming, Mr. K, failed to provide her with proper guidance or a run through, which he gave to male drivers, and later reported her to the Employer for unsafe operation of a vehicle. At the end of March 2022, Ms. Shim alleges the Employer terminated her from the production based on Mr. K’s report that she was unsafe. She alleges the Employer’s decision to terminate her without seeking any substantiating evidence is related to her being an Asian woman.
[11] In deciding Ms. Shim’s allegations against the Employer are all late filed, I acknowledge her timely allegations on August 3, 2022, which claim the Employer lied about what transpired in March 2022 when she was fired. She says the Employer told the Union incorrectly that a stunt coordinator had briefed her for the scene in question and that Mr. K had spoken to her about his safety concerns. In my view, Ms. Shim’s allegations that the employer made false statements to the Union about events leading to her termination do not form separate allegations capable of proceeding. Here, Ms. Shim has not connected the Employer’s alleged lies to her race, ancestry, sex or any of her other personal characteristics. While allegedly fabricating a justification for the decision to terminate Ms. Shim appears to be unsavoury, she has not provided any information indicating doing so was related to her personal characteristics. As such, I agree with the Tribunal’s screening decision that the allegations against the Employer were all late filed and the issue I must decide is whether to accept the late-filed complaint under s. 22(3) of the Code.
[12] As concerns Ms. Shim’s allegations against the Union, after reviewing the complaint information and the parties’ submissions I have determined that none of her allegations can proceed as timely arguable contraventions under s.22(1) of the Code.
[13] On September 15, 2022, Ms. Shim alleges the Union decided not to pursue a grievance against the Employer concerning the termination of her employment at the end of March 2022. She claims the Union failed to provide her with fair representation or due process. Ms. Shim alleges the Union sided with Mr. K’s version of events without reviewing her witnesses’ evidence or any other documentary evidence she had gathered. In her view, if the Union had done its job and not simply relied on the Employer’s version of events, it would have sided with her and grieved the termination. In March 2023, Ms. Shim further alleges the Union failed to revisit its previous decision despite her pointing out to it that a male performer engaged in exactly the same position as her at the relevant time who was also let go, was supported by the Union and received a settlement from the Employer negotiated by the Union.
[14] The Union argues Ms. Shim’s complaint is made on the bare assertion that it is her belief that discrimination occurred. In its view, such an assertion is not sufficient to ground an allegation of discrimination. The Union submits that it decided not to pursue a grievance, negotiate a settlement with the Employer on Ms. Shim’s behalf or reconsider its earlier decision because there was no basis to pursue a grievance. Crucially, the Union submits that Ms. Shim’s sex, race or ancestry, did not factor in its decision making, nor did any other prohibited ground.
[15] While appreciating the subject matter of Ms. Shim’s dispute with the Employer involves discrimination in employment based on her race, ancestry and sex, this does not create the necessary connection between the Union’s handling of her grievance and her personal characteristics. Put another way, just because Ms. Shim’s potential grievance was about race, ancestry and sex discrimination, it does not automatically follow that her complaint about how the Union handled the matter includes the type of relatedness necessary to form an arguable contravention of the Code against the Union. In my view, Ms. Shim’s dissatisfaction with how the Union managed her grievance does not include any information indicating the actions the Union took were related to Ms. Shim’s race, ancestry, sex or any of her other personal characteristics. In reaching this conclusion, I appreciate Ms. Shim may have felt she was being treated differently from her male co-worker, but in this case differential treatment does not form the basis of an arguable contravention when the information provided fails to indicate Ms. Shim’s co-worker was similarly found to be engaged in unsafe driving. The information indicates the Union did not support Ms. Shim because it agreed with the Employer that her termination was justified. This is not the case of allegations that the Union took different approaches to terminations occurring for the same reasons based on the race, ancestry and sex of the affected member.
[16] Having found no arguable contraventions of the Code against the Union, Ms. Shim’s complaint does not proceed against the Union pursuant to s. 22(1).
[17] Having found Ms. Shim has late filed allegations against the Employer, the next issue I must decide is whether to accept the late-filed complaint against the Employer under s. 22(3) of the Code.
B. Discretion to accept late filed complaint
[18] The Tribunal has discretion to accept a late-filed complaint where it is in the public interest to do so and there is no substantial prejudice to any person because of the delay: Code, s. 22(3). The burden is on Ms. Shim to persuade the Tribunal to accept the complaint.
[19] I begin with the public interest. This factor is assessed in light of the purposes of the Code, which include identifying and eliminating persistent patterns of inequality, and providing a means of redress for persons who are discriminated against: s. 3. The Tribunal may consider factors including the length and reason for the delay in filing, and the public interest in the complaint itself: British Columbia (Ministry of Public Safety and Solicitor General) v. Mzite, 2014 BCCA 220 at paras. 53-81. These are important factors, but they are not necessarily determinative and not every factor will be relevant in every case: Goddard v. Dixon, 2012 BCSC 161 at para. 152; Mzite at para. 55. The inquiry is always fact and context specific.
[20] In this case, the delay in filing is approximately one week, which supports the public interest in accepting the late-filed complaint, in circumstances where the explanation given by the complainant for the delay was a reasonable one: Andrus v. First Canada ULC and another, 2011 BCHRT 120 at para. 43.
[21] I turn next to Ms. Shim’s reasons for the delay. She submits that she did not know where to file a complaint because her union representative did not talk about the Tribunal when she asked them if there was any other way to address what had occurred. Ms. Shim further submits that that she spent many hours researching other possible avenues that could address her situation on her own. In the end, Ms. Shim states she discovered the Tribunal when communicating with supportive colleagues.
[22] Ignorance of the Code, or the time required to become aware of one’s rights, is generally not an acceptable reason, on its own, for the delay in filing: Rashead v. Vereschagin (No. 2), 2006 BCHRT 74 at para. 12; Ferrier v. BCAA, 2009 BCHRT 412at para. 31. In this case, Ms. Shim has not provided any evidence that would take this case out of the general rule that ignorance of the Code is not an acceptable reason for a delay in filing. Ms. Shim’s explanation of how she learned about the Tribunal indicates she was capable of researching the necessary information on her own or by canvasing the help of others to do so. As such, I do not find any public interest attracts to Ms. Shim finding out about the Tribunal some time later. In reaching this decision I recognize Ms. Shim stated the Union failed to inform her about the Tribunal’s existence, however, her information does not include anything about the response from the Union putting her off doing her own research or reaching out to others to find out more about what she do in response to being let go.
[23] Finally, I consider the public interest in the complaint itself. Where a complaint raises a unique or novel issue, it may further the Code’s purposes for the Tribunal to allow it to proceed: Mzite at paras. 65-66. The Tribunal may consider, for example, whether the complaint raises issues that have already been addressed in its jurisprudence, and/or whether the complaint seeks to advance a systemic or understudied issue on behalf of a vulnerable group: Mzite at paras. 66-67.
[24] Ms. Shim is seeking equity for racialized workers and women in the film industry. She hopes allowing her case to proceed will create an inclusive environment that rights these historical wrongs.
[25] The Union submits Ms. Shim’s case is not unique, novel or unusual since the Tribunal has considered similar arguments multiple times.
[26] I acknowledge Ms. Shim is seeking justice for what occurred to her while also wanting to prevent others from having similar experiences working in the film industry. However, I do not find this case is unique for the purposes of attracting the public interest in allowing the complaint to proceed late. The case involves allegations of discrimination in employment based on race, ancestry and sex, which is routinely considered by the Tribunal and the law in this area is fairly settled.
[27] I am not persuaded it is in the public interest to accept this late-filed complaint against the Employer. It is therefore unnecessary for me to consider whether accepting the complaint would cause substantial prejudice. The complaint against the Employer is not accepted for filing.
III CONCLUSION
[28] The complaint is not accepted against the Union and the Employer. The file is now closed.
Steven Adamson
Tribunal Member