Tenant D v. Landlord A and another, 2026 BCHRT 154
Date Issued: July 16, 2026
File: CS-005059
Indexed as: Tenant D v. Landlord A and another, 2026 BCHRT 154
IN THE MATTER OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS CODE,
RSBC 1996, c. 210 (as amended)
AND IN THE MATTER of a complaint before
the British Columbia Human Rights Tribunal
BETWEEN:
Tenant D
COMPLAINANT
AND:
Landlord A and Landlord B
RESPONDENTS
REASONS FOR DECISION
Tribunal Member: Edward Takayanagi
On their own behalf: Tenant D
On their own behalf: Landlord A and Landlord B
Dates of Hearing: February 2-3, 2026
Location of Hearing: Via Videoconference
I INTRODUCTION
[1] Tenant D lived in a rental suite in a house owned by Landlords A and B. Tenant D alleges the Landlords discriminated against them in tenancy based on sexual orientation and family status contrary to s. 10 of the Human Rights Code. They say the Landlords refused to allow Tenant D’s siblings to move into the suite as additional occupants and the Landlords failed to maintain the property.
[2] The Landlords deny they did not maintain the property and say their decision not to allow additional occupants was not based on Tenant D’s sexual orientation or family status but rather on their occupancy limit policy which prohibits more than four individuals to reside in the rental suite.
[3] I heard this matter over a two-day hearing after which the parties made closing submissions in writing. To make my decision I have considered all the evidence and submissions of the parties. In these reasons, I only refer to what is necessary to explain my decision.
[4] The issue that I must decide is whether Tenant D’s sexual orientation or family status was a factor in the Landlords’ decision not to allow additional occupants in the rental suite or the maintenance of the rental property. For the reasons that follow, I find that it was not. Therefore, Tenant D has not established a breach of the Code, and I dismiss the complaint.
II Preliminary issue – anonymization
[5] At the outset of the hearing, Tenant D asked the Tribunal for an order that no one publish the names or identifying information of themselves or their family members. They say some members of their family are minors and there is a concern they will be subject to harassment if their names were made public. The Landlords consented to an anonymization order.
[6] Rule 5(7) of the Tribunal’s Rules of Practice and Procedure is clear that privacy interests of minors outweigh the public interest in access to the Tribunal’s proceedings. I find that naming Tenant D’s family members would impact their privacy interests, involving their place of residence and home life. I further find that naming any of the parties in this case could serve to identify the minors through association.
[7] I find that ordering a publication ban on the names of the parties and their family members has minimal impact on the openness of the proceedings. The public can understand the nature of the complaint, the parties’ arguments, and my decision without knowing the identities of the parties and their family members.
[8] For these reasons, I allow the anonymization application and order that no person shall publish the names or identifying information of the parties or their family members in any materials.
III Evidence
[9] The parties gave the following evidence.
[10] Tenant D is a pansexual man. They began occupying the rental unit in 2012. The rental unit is a four-bedroom suite on the main floor of a house. The house has two other units occupied by other renters.
[11] Tenant D became the rental unit’s sole tenant in February 2015. They signed a one-year fixed-term tenancy agreement with the owners. In addition to Tenant D, the other residents of the rental unit were their partner, and two other individuals. The other residents were not tenants under the tenancy agreement. A term of the tenancy was that the maximum number of occupants of the unit was four people.
[12] The Landlords purchased the property in May 2015 and took over the tenancy. The Landlords lived in a separate house in the same city. The Landlords and Tenant D met to sign a new tenancy agreement in February 2016. The new agreement also established that the maximum number of occupants of the unit was four people. At the time Tenant D and the Landlords signed the new agreement there were three residents of the suite: Tenant D, their partner, and an unrelated roommate.
[13] In June 2019, Tenant D placed a pride flag in the window of their suite. They say this was the first instance where they displayed their sexual orientation for the Landlords to see.
[14] Later in 2019, Tenant D planned to have two siblings move in with them. They requested the roommate vacate the rental unit to make space for their siblings. The roommate moved out and there were two occupants of the rental unit: Tenant D and their partner.
[15] In December 2019, one of Tenant D’s siblings moved into the rental unit.
[16] In early 2020, Tenant D allowed a roommate to move into the rental unit bringing the total number of occupants of the unit to four: Tenant D, their partner, their sibling, and the roommate.
[17] In August 2020, Tenant D let a second sibling move into the rental unit. The total number of occupants of the unit was five people.
[18] On August 20, 2020, Tenant D informed the Landlords that there were five occupants of the rental unit. The Landlords said this was a breach of the tenancy agreement because there were more than four occupants in the unit. The Landlords asked Tenant D to comply with the tenancy agreement and have one person move out. The Landlords said they did not care which occupant moved out. Landlord A told Tenant D that who would remain in the unit was a “you people problem”.
[19] One of Tenant D’s siblings moved out of the rental unit. The tenancy continued with four occupants: Tenant D, their partner, one sibling and the roommate.
[20] On or about February 13 and 14, 2021, there was heavy snowfall. The Landlords did not shovel the sidewalks of the rental property. Tenant D emailed the Landlords and said this was fine and they would shovel the sidewalks themself.
[21] In August 2021, Tenant D discovered a wasp’s nest inside the walls of the rental unit. They texted the Landlords to ask them to deal with the infestation. When the Landlords attended at the rental unit, approximately two hours after Tenant D texted, Tenant D had already hired a third-party exterminator.
[22] The Tenancy ended in March 2022, when the Landlords sold the property to new owners who assumed the tenancy.
IV ANALYSIS AND DECISION
A. General Legal Principles
[23] Section 10 of the Code applies to tenancies. Section 10(1)(a) prohibits landlords from denying a person the right to occupy, as a tenant, space that is represented as being available because of their family status or sexual orientation. Section 10(1)(b) prohibits discrimination regarding a term of condition of the tenancy because of family status or sexual orientation.
[24] To succeed in their claim of discrimination under s. 10 of the Code, Tenant D must prove, on a balance of probabilities, that: (1) they have the protected characteristics of sexual orientation and family status; (2) they experienced an adverse impact in tenancy; and (3) their protected characteristics were a factor in the adverse impact: Moore v. British Columbia (Education), 2012 SCC 61 at para. 33.
[25] If Tenant D successfully establishes their complaint, the burden then shifts to the Landlords to justify the adverse impact as a bona fide reasonable justification. If the impact is justified there is no discrimination.
[26] The Tribunal has held that the existence of an occupancy limit clause in a tenancy agreement is not a complete defence. Under human rights law, a landlord will have to justify an occupancy limit that adversely affects people because of their family status: Abernathy v. Stevenson, 2017 BCHRT 239 at para. 20.
[27] The Landlords do not dispute that Tenant D’s sexual orientation and family status are protected characteristics. Therefore, the issue I must determine is whether Tenant D has established, on a balance of probabilities, that they experienced an adverse impact in their tenancy and if so, whether their protected characteristics was a factor in that adverse impact. If I find they have established a prima facie case, I will then turn to the Respondents’ justification defense.
B. Was Tenant D Adversely Impacted in Tenancy?
[28] There is no dispute that the Landlords refused to waive the maximum occupancy clause of the tenancy agreement. I accept that this was an adverse impact regarding a tenancy. Because the Landlords enforced the maximum occupancy clause, one of the four people living with Tenant D in 2020 had to move out. This was an adverse impact in how Tenant D could use the space they were renting.
[29] The parties agree that on February 14, 2021, the Landlords did not clear the snow from the rental property sidewalks which they did for other rental buildings they owned. I accept that differential treatment from other tenants constitutes an adverse impact in tenancy.
[30] I reach a different conclusion regarding the other incidents Tenant D cites as adverse impacts. Tenant D alleges the Landlords did not maintain the rental property. Tenant D submitted some photographs showing areas they say were not maintained including the paint flaking on exterior doors, a walkway they say was not maintained, and fixtures they say needed to be replaced, however much of the evidence appears to be the ordinary wear and tear that could be expected of an occupied rental unit. Neither Tenant D nor their partner gave evidence about how the wear and tear affected their use of the rental property. I am not convinced on the evidence that failing to paint or improve the rental property amounts to an adverse impact under the Code. Moreover, both Tenant D and their partner testified that they did not ask the Landlords to paint or perform repairs or maintenance to the property. Even if I had found failing to maintain the property was an adverse impact, it would be difficult to find the Landlords breached the Code by failing to attend to something they had no reason to know needed to be done.
[31] Tenant D says the Landlords failed to attend the rental unit to deal with a wasp nest in the rental property and they incurred costs to hire an exterminator themselves. The evidence does not support Tenant D’s assertion. On the contrary, the text messages in evidence show Tenant D requested the wasps be dealt with the next day, but the Landlords said they would deal with it that same evening. The parties agree the Landlords arrived at the rental unit two hours after Tenant D texted. I find that any expense incurred by Tenant D for extermination services is not attributable to the Landlords as the Landlords attended the rental unit to deal with the wasp nest sooner than Tenant D requested. I find this is not an adverse impact in tenancy.
[32] Tenant D says Landlord A saying who remained in the rental unit was a “you people problem”, was a disparaging reference to their sexual orientation. They say the Landlords’ use of the phrase is evidence that there is a nexus between their sexual orientation and the adverse impacts they experienced in tenancy. I do not agree.
[33] I am not persuaded these specific words, “you people” is a reference to Tenant D’s protected characteristics. The Tribunal has found that the term “you people” can indicate discrimination when it is used in relation to a marginalized group: Clarke v. City of Vancouver and another, 2024 BCHRT 298 at para. 107(f) and 108(f). There is often contextual evidence to support an inference that the phrase refers to a complainant’s protected characteristics. Here, in the context of the conversation, which was a discussion about the occupants of the rental unit, I find Landlord A’s explanation that he was referring to the five occupants of the rental unit, and saying the decision of who would move out should be determined among the occupants, to be more persuasive. I appreciate that Tenant D took offense at the words, but they have not provided arguments about how this phrase on its own supports an inference of discrimination.
[34] Further, even if I had found the phrase “you people” was a reference to Tenant D’s sexual orientation, the Tribunal has said “not every negative comment that is connected to a protected characteristic will be discriminatory harassment contrary to the Code”: Brito v. Affordable Housing Societies and another, 2017 BCHRT 270 at para. 41. When determining whether discriminatory harassment has occurred, the Tribunal considers many factors, including, the egregiousness of the behaviour, the context of the interactions, and the impact the behaviour had on the complainant: Pardo v. School District No. 43, 2003 BCHRT 71 at para. 12.
[35] Even if the comment is connected to Tenant D’s sexual orientation, I find the comment does not rise to the level of discrimination within the meaning of the Code. The words are not egregious or virulent. On their own, they do not communicate a message that Tenant D is less worthy of respect or dignity because of their protected characteristic. Tenant D testified that the words upset them because they were not being permitted to add a fifth occupant to the tenancy rather than identifying the words as a slur or derogatory comment connected to their sexual orientation.
[36] Under the circumstances, I am not persuaded that the comment was a reference to Tenant D’s protected characteristic, and even if it were I do not find it rises to the level of an adverse impact.
[37] Finally, Tenant D alleges the Landlords reported their vehicle as illegally parked to the municipal authorities so that they received a violation ticket. The parties agree this incident occurred in August 2022, five months after the tenancy ended. I do not find that the Landlords reporting a parked vehicle months after a tenancy has ended to be an adverse impact in tenancy.
[38] I have found that being refused a fifth occupant and being treated differently than other tenants by not removing the snow from the sidewalks are adverse impacts in tenancy. I next consider whether Tenant D’s protected characteristics were a factor in these adverse impacts.
C. Was Tenant D’s protected characteristics a factor in the adverse impacts?
[39] I begin with the allegation that the Landlords refused to allow Tenant D to have five occupants in the rental suite. Tenant D says this was discrimination based on family status and sexual orientation because two of the other occupants were their siblings and one their same-sex partner. For the following reasons, I find that it was not.
[40] A person’s family status includes the size and composition of their family: Fakhoury v. Las Brisas Ltd (1987), 1987 CanLII 8549 (ON HRT). In the housing context, the protection from discrimination based on family status “exists precisely to protect families, and others who may be screened out of tight housing markets, from being unjustifiably excluded from safe and secure housing”: Abernathy v. Stevenson, 2017 BCHRT 239 at para. 15.
[41] Family status is not defined in the Code. As with other sections of the Code, the Tribunal interprets the term broadly to better achieve the purposes of the Code: British Columbia Human Rights Tribunal v. Schrenk, 2017 SCC 62 at para. 31. Family status includes the status of being in a parent and child relationship, including being associated with children: Stephenson v. Sooke Lake Modula Home Co-operative Association, 2007 BCHRT 341 at paras. 29-30. It also encompasses adults who are in a marriage-like relationship.
[42] There is no dispute the Landlords refused to waive the maximum occupancy clause of the tenancy agreement to allow five occupants to reside in the unit. I am not satisfied that Tenant D’s sexual orientation or family status was a factor in the Landlords’ decision. This is apparent from the evidence that Landlord A told Tenant D he did not care who moved out provided the total number of occupants was under the occupancy limit.
[43] Tenant D suggests their sexual orientation was a factor because the refusal occurred after they displayed a pride flag. However, the refusal occurred over a year after the pride flag was hung. I find the significant gap in time does not reasonably support a connection between Tenant D’s sexual orientation and the Landlords’ refusal. Further, while Tenant D says Landlord A’s remark that this was a “you people problem” was a reference to their sexual orientation, I have found above that it was not and instead referred to the occupants of the rental unit.
[44] Tenant D argues that their family status was a factor in the adverse impact because three of the four additional occupants were their family members. Tenant D says their situation is comparable to the circumstances in Zarei and another v. Austeville Properties Ltd, 2023 BCHRT 70, where the Tribunal found that a landlord refusing permission to a tenant to allow their sister to move in as a co-occupant was discrimination based on family status.
[45] I find the present circumstances distinguishable from Zarei. There, the tenancy agreement contemplated a way that an additional co-occupant could be added to the tenancy, but the landlord refused to grant permission based on the identity and familial relationship of the proposed co-occupant. Here, the tenancy agreement had an occupancy limit which Tenant D exceeded. A neutral rule, such as an occupancy limit, that adversely affects a person based on their protected characteristics will be discriminatory: Abernathy at para. 16. However, the evidence is the Landlords explicitly informed Tenant D they did not care which of the five occupants moved out so long as they did not exceed the occupancy limit. I find that it was not the identities or the familial relationships that the Landlords took issue with but solely the number of occupants in the unit.
[46] There were five occupants of the rental unit: Tenant D, their two siblings, their partner, and an additional roommate. In my view the protections of the Code are not triggered simply because some, though not all, of the occupants are family members. Protection from discrimination based on family status exists to prevent individuals from having to forego secure housing because of the composition of their families. I do not find that was the case here. Tenant D was not denied permission to have additional occupants in the unit because of their relationship with them or their identities, rather they were told they could not have five occupants in the rental unit and some of them happened to be family members.
[47] In so far as Tenant D argues that the additional roommate was a member of their “chosen family” I have little evidence to support such an assertion. Both Tenant D and their partner characterized this person as a friend. Tenant D testified that they asked this person to move in when Tenant D was unemployed and could not afford to pay rent. They said the additional roommate residing in the unit “was meant to be temporary.” They said they were financially supported by this roommate. I appreciate that economic dependency may be an aspect of a familial relationship. However, without more I can not conclude that there is a relationship between Tenant D and the additional roommate that would bring them within the definition of family status for the purposes of the Code.
[48] I find Tenant D’s sexual orientation and family status were not factors in the Landlords’ refusal to allow five occupants in the rental unit.
[49] Finally, I consider the allegation that the Landlord’s failure to shovel snow on February 14, 2021, was because of Tenant D’s sexual orientation or family status. I find Tenant D has not established a nexus between their sexual orientation and this incident. Tenant D says the failure to shovel occurred after they hung a pride flag in June 2019, and after they were refused to have five occupants in the rental unit in August 2020. This may be so, however, the span of time between the preceding events is either 20 months or 6 months, both of which is significant and does not reasonably support a connection. The Landlords confirm they did not shovel the snow from Tenant D’s property but say it was because they ran out of time and Tenant D stated they would shovel themselves. This is reflected in the contemporaneous correspondence between the parties on the day of the snowfall. Given this evidence I find that there is insufficient evidence to infer that the Landlord’s failure to shovel was because of Tenant D’s sexual orientation or family status.
V CONCLUSION
[50] I find the Landlords did not violate the Code and discriminate against Tenant D. Accordingly, the complaint is dismissed.
Edward Takayanagi
Tribunal Member