Matembe v. South Coast British Columbia Transportation Authority (TransLink) (No.2), 2026 BCHRT 152
Date Issued: July 14, 2026
File: CS-006121
Indexed as: Matembe v. South Coast British Columbia Transportation Authority (TransLink) (No.2), 2026 BCHRT 152
IN THE MATTER OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS CODE,
RSBC 1996, c. 210 (as amended)
AND IN THE MATTER of a complaint before
the British Columbia Human Rights Tribunal
BETWEEN:
Gilbert Matembe
COMPLAINANT
AND:
South Coast British Columbia Transportation Authority (TransLink)
RESPONDENT
REASONS FOR DECISION
APPLICATION TO DISMISS A COMPLAINT
Section 27(1)(d)(ii)
Tribunal Member: Devyn Cousineau
On his own behalf: Gilbert Matembe
Counsel for the Respondent: Adriana F. Wills
I INTRODUCTION
[1] In 2021, Gilbert Matembe was hired to work for TransLink on a 13-month contract. Six weeks into his contract, TransLink implemented a COVID-19 Safety Employee Vaccination Policy [Policy], which required all employees to be vaccinated against COVID-19. Mr. Matembe refused to be vaccinated, because of his religious beliefs. He sought an exemption from the Policy. TransLink denied the exemption, on the basis that Mr. Matembe had not given TransLink enough information about his religious objection to the vaccine. Further to the Policy, TransLink put Mr. Matembe on an unpaid leave of absence for the balance of his contract.
[2] In this human rights complaint, Mr. Matembe alleges that TransLink discriminated against him in his employment based on his religion, in violation of s. 13 of the Human Rights Code. TransLink denies discriminating, arguing that Mr. Matembe obstructed any possible accommodation by refusing to provide important information. The complaint is scheduled for a four-day hearing, beginning September 28, 2026.
[3] TransLink has offered to settle Mr. Matembe’s human rights complaint. Its settlement offer includes a payment to make Mr. Matembe whole for any wages lost during his contract, a payment of $15,000 as damages for injury to dignity, a letter of regret, and a commitment to revisit its processes and policies if it is necessary to implement a similar vaccination policy in the future. Mr. Matembe has refused this offer.
[4] TransLink applies to dismiss the complaint on the basis that it does not further the purposes of the Code to proceed to a hearing in the face of its settlement offer: Code, s. 27(1)(d)(ii). Mr. Matembe argues that the settlement offer is not a reasonable resolution of his complaint and that a hearing is necessary to fulfill the purposes of the Code.
[5] For the reasons that follow, I am satisfied that TransLink’s offer to settle the complaint is a reasonable resolution of this complaint. It satisfies the Code’s purposes of providing Mr. Matembe with a remedy, preventing discrimination, and fostering a climate of mutual respect, while preserving the responsiveness and efficiency of the human rights system: Code, s. 3. A hearing is not necessary. The complaint is dismissed.
[6] To consider this application, I have assumed that Mr. Matembe would succeed in proving his complaint at a hearing. However, there is no guarantee that he would. It is possible that the Tribunal would accept TransLink’s defence and dismiss the complaint, in which case Mr. Matembe would not be entitled to any remedy. I encourage Mr. Matembe to see TransLink’s offer in this light. The offer provides him a certain outcome and remedy for the wrongs he alleges he experienced in his employment. It spares him from the time, expense, and stress of an adversarial legal proceeding whose outcome is not guaranteed.
[7] I remind Mr. Matembe that TransLink’s offer remains open for acceptance for two weeks.
II DECISION
[8] Section 27(1)(d)(ii) allows the Tribunal to dismiss a complaint where proceeding with it would not further the purposes of the Code. These purposes include both private and public interests: s. 3. Deciding whether a complaint furthers those purposes is not only about the interests in the individual complaint. It may also be about broad public policy issues, like the efficiency and responsiveness of the human rights system, and the expense and time involved in a hearing: Dar Santos v. UBC, 2003 BCHRT 73 at para. 59.
[9] One circumstance where it may not further the purposes of the Code to proceed is where the respondent has made a reasonable offer to resolve the complaint. In the words of the Court of Appeal:
… If the redress offered by a respondent approximates the relief sought by the complainant that would otherwise have been obtained if the complaint went to hearing, then the aim of the legislation is satisfied. Proceeding with the hearing of the claim would be pointless.
Carter v. Travelex Canada, 2009 BCCA 180 [Carter BCCA] at para. 38
In this situation, the remedial purposes of the Code can be fulfilled through the settlement, with the public benefit of preserving the Tribunal’s scarce resources to focus on other complaints: Dar Santos at para. 59.
[10] The burden is on TransLink in this application.
[11] There are two pre-requisites for the Tribunal to consider dismissing a complaint based on a reasonable settlement offer. First, the settlement offer must be made “with prejudice” because the Tribunal cannot rely on information about settlement discussions that is inadmissible based on privilege: Dar Santos para. 64. Second, the offer must remain open for the complainant’s acceptance regardless of the outcome of the application to dismiss: Issa v. Loblaw, 2009 BCHRT 264at para. 35. There is no dispute that both pre-requisites are met in this case. TransLink’s offer is with prejudice and remains open for two weeks after the Tribunal dismisses the complaint under s. 27(1)(d)(ii) of the Code.
[12] Next, to determine whether it furthers the purposes of the Code to proceed, the Tribunal considers two things. First, it determines whether the offer is reasonable. Generally, it will not further the purposes of the Code to proceed where the respondent has made a reasonable, with prejudice, settlement offer: Dar Santos at para. 59. Second, even if the offer is reasonable, the Tribunal may consider whether there are considerations that weigh in favour of proceeding with the complaint, considering the purposes set out in s. 3 of the Code.
[13] I begin by briefly setting out the background to Mr. Matembe’s complaint and TransLink’s offer. I then consider whether TransLink’s offer is reasonable. Given my finding that it is, I also consider whether there are any other factors that weigh in favour of proceeding with the complaint. I conclude there are not.
A. Background
[14] The background to Mr. Matembe’s complaint was set out in a previous decision of the Tribunal, denying TransLink’s earlier dismissal application: Matembe v. South Coast British Columbia Transportation Authority (TransLink) and another, 2025 BCHRT 279.
[15] In brief, Mr. Matembe is Christian. He says that he was led by the Holy Spirit not to receive the vaccination against COVID-19. He asked for an exemption from the Policy. TransLink initially denied his request but said it would reconsider if Mr. Matembe provided more information about his religious beliefs and how they connected to his refusal to take the vaccine. Mr. Matembe expanded on his religious beliefs but did not provide the information that TransLink was asking for. As a result, TransLink did not grant Mr. Matembe an exemption. He was placed on an unpaid leave of absence for the balance of his employment contract.
[16] In this complaint, Mr. Matembe seeks the following remedies:
a. $215,635.42 as compensation for wage loss,
b. $2,964 for expenses incurred because of discrimination,
c. $5,000,000 as compensation for injury to his dignity, feelings, and self-respect, and
d. Orders that TransLink rescind his Record of Employment, apologize, and commit to reviewing its processes if it is required to implement a similar policy in future.
[17] In its settlement offer, TransLink proposes to give Mr. Matembe:
a. $75,208.62 as compensation for wage loss,
b. $15,000 as compensation for injury to dignity, feelings, and self respect,
c. A letter of regret, and commitment to review its process if it is required to implement a similar policy in future.
The offer does not include an apology, compensation for expenses, or a change to Mr. Matembe’s Record of Employment.
B. Is the settlement offer reasonable?
[18] In assessing whether a settlement offer is reasonable, the Tribunal assumes that the complainant will prove their allegations and considers what the Tribunal would likely order. The offer does not need to mirror exactly what the Tribunal would order: Carter v. Travelex Canada and Travelex UK (No. 3), 2007 BCHRT 275 [Carter BCHRT] at para. 30, upheld in Carter BCCA. However, the offer must fully address the allegations and available remedies, both monetary and non-monetary. The Tribunal will consider:
· Whether the respondent’s remedial actions adequately remedied the alleged violation and are consistent with the types of orders the Tribunal might make if the complaints were successful; and
· Whether the monetary settlement offered is within the reasonable range that the Tribunal might award if found the complaint was justified.
See Issa at para. 35
[19] Mr. Matembe argues that TransLink’s offer is unreasonable. He says the offer simply reflects what he is already entitled to, and fails to address the serious impacts that the discrimination had on him. I will consider each element of the offer separately below.
[20] As a preliminary matter, however, I must address Mr. Matembe’s arguments that this is a case about his rights under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.
[21] Throughout his arguments, and in his request for remedy, Mr. Matembe emphasizes that his complaint “is submitted under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms” and not simply the Code. As such, he says that the assessment of appropriate remedies must consider s. 24 of the Charter and not s. 37 of the Code. Respectfully, these arguments do not assist Mr. Matembe.
[22] This Tribunal can only exercise the powers given to it through legislation. It expressly does not have jurisdiction to apply the Charter. This is set out in s. 45 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, which applies to this Tribunal by operation of s. 32(i) of the Code:
Tribunal without jurisdiction over Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms issues
45(1) The tribunal does not have jurisdiction over constitutional questions relating to the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.
[23] In this decision, I do not consider the reasonableness of TransLink’s offer in relation to Mr. Matembe’s Charter rights. Rather, I consider the offer in light of the remedies that the Tribunal may award if Mr. Matembe were able to prove his claim of discrimination in employment. These remedies are set out in s. 37(2) of the Code, as interpreted and applied by this Tribunal and the courts.
[24] I turn now to the specific elements of TransLink’s offer.
1. Compensation for lost wages
[25] Section 37(2)(d)(ii) of the Code gives the Tribunal discretion to compensate the person discriminated against for “all, or a part … of any wages or salary lost … by the contravention”. The object of an award for wage loss is to put the person in the position they would have been in had the discrimination not occurred: Gichuru v. The Law Society of British Columbia (No. 9), 2011 BCHRT 185 at para. 300.
[26] The starting point for assessing a complainant’s wage loss is to establish a causal connection between the discrimination and those losses: Gichuru at para. 301. This is a question of fact.
[27] There is no dispute that Mr. Matembe was hired on a fixed term contract, from September 13, 2021 to October 14, 2022. In its offer of employment, TransLink explained:
The assignment is expected to end on October 7, 2022. We anticipate this temporary assignment will be for 13 months; however, it is contingent on operational need. Should your services no longer be required, you will be provided written notice or compensation in lieu, based on length of service, according to BC Employment Standards Act.
[28] Mr. Matembe was placed on an unpaid leave of absence on December 20, 2021. On October 7, 2022, TransLink wrote to Mr. Matembe to confirm that his assignment would conclude as scheduled on October 14.
[29] The alleged discrimination in this case is TransLink’s decision to place Mr. Matembe on unpaid leave from December 20, 2021 to October 14, 2022. If Mr. Matembe had not been placed on unpaid leave, he would have worked for the balance of his contract and earned $75,208.62. TransLink’s offer proposes to make Mr. Matembe whole for all wages lost during this period. As such, TransLink’s offer puts Mr. Matembe in the financial position he would have been in but for the alleged discrimination. In my view, this is most likely what the Tribunal would award if Mr. Matembe were successful in his human rights complaint.
[30] Mr. Matembe argues that the offer is not reasonable, because it does not fully account for the wages he lost. He argues that, as a result of TransLink’s conduct, he was unable to work for over two years. He seeks wage loss from December 20, 2021 until May 17, 2024.
[31] In support of his position, Mr. Matembe says that his employment record was tarnished by TransLink’s indication on his Record of Employment that he had been “suspended for misconduct”. He says that he applied for jobs but was unsuccessful after the prospective employer completed reference checks. He suspects that he was denied these jobs because of “reference checks with TransLink as a former employer and my record of employment with TransLink, especially for public sector jobs”.
[32] The difficulty with this argument is that the evidence could not support it. I begin with the Record of Employment.
[33] The parties have submitted two Records of Employment issued by TransLink for Mr. Matembe. The first one, issued January 13, 2022, indicates that Mr. Matembe is on a “Leave of Absence”. The second one, issued October 27, 2022, indicates that the notice was issued because of “Shortage of work/End of contract or season”. TransLink says these are the only two Records of Employment that it issued for Mr. Matembe. There is no Record of Employment before me that says Mr. Matembe was suspended for misconduct.
[34] Rather, it appears that Mr. Matembe is referring to a note found in the records of the Social Security Tribunal. This note, dated February 17, 2022, seems to summarize a conversation between a Service Canada employee and a representative of TransLink, who reported that “the client is suspended without pay for non-compliance of the mandated vaccination policy”. In this conversation, the employer agreed to change the “RFS” on the Record of Employment to reflect a suspension instead of a leave of absence. If this change was made, any revised Record of Employment is not before me.
[35] Even if there is another Record of Employment which says that Mr. Matembe was suspended for misconduct, it is not clear how prospective employers would see it. A Record of Employment is a record created for the worker and Service Canada. It is not publicly available. TransLink says it never told any prospective employer that Mr. Matembe was suspended for misconduct. There is no evidence before me to suggest otherwise.
[36] Next, Mr. Matembe’s suggestion that he did not get jobs because TransLink gave him a poor reference appears to be based on speculation. I understand that he says that he attended job interviews where he was “assured of a position with reference checks as a formality” and then was not awarded the job. But he does not explain how many jobs he applied for, how many went to the point of reference checks, whether he gave TransLink as a reference, whether he also gave other employers as references, or anything other than timing to support that these opportunities were spoiled by TransLink. At a hearing, the Tribunal would not infer – without evidence – that the reason Mr. Matembe was not hired for work within the 19 months after his contract ended was because TransLink gave him a poor reference, based on discrimination.
[37] Mr. Matembe makes two further arguments about why TransLink’s offer for wage loss is unreasonable.
[38] First, Mr. Matembe argues that TransLink’s offer does not account for lost opportunities and missed earning potential. This argument is not developed. I do not know what financial value Mr. Matembe says should be attributed to these alleged losses, or on what basis the Tribunal might make such an award. As TransLink points out, the Tribunal only awards compensation for future loss of earnings in extraordinary circumstances, and only “in the clearest of cases”: Student D v. Selkirk College, 2025 BCHRT 178 at para. 25, citing Francis v. BC Ministry of Justice (No. 5), 2021 BCHRT 16 at para. 124-125. There is no evidence before me to explain how TransLink’s decision to place Mr. Matembe on a leave of absence for ten months during the pandemic affected Mr. Matembe’s opportunities or earning potential over the long term. In my view, this is not a remedy that Mr. Matembe would get if he were successful after a hearing.
[39] Finally, Mr. Matembe argues that the offer is not reasonable because it does not account for inflation or interest. I accept that the payment of $75,000 today may be worth slightly less than if Mr. Matembe had received that money four years ago. However, the Tribunal’s wage loss awards never account for inflation, and so that is not something that he would get at a hearing. The Tribunal does often award interest, but there is no information before me about how much that would be or how the failure to account for interest renders the offer unreasonable. In my view, it does not.
[40] Ultimately, the most likely outcome if Mr. Matembe were to succeed in this complaint is that the Tribunal would order TransLink to make him whole for wages he would have earned for the balance of his contract. This is the same outcome proposed in TransLink’s offer. This part of the offer is reasonable.
2. Injury to dignity, feelings, and self-respect
[41] The parties disagree about whether $15,000 is a reasonable resolution of Mr. Matembe’s claim for compensation for injury to his dignity, feelings, and self-respect. Mr. Matembe is seeking an award of $5,000,000.
[42] To assess a claim for injury to dignity, the Tribunal considers three broad factors: the nature of the discrimination, the complainant’s social context or vulnerability, and the effect on the complainant: Torres v. Royalty Kitchenware Ltd., 1982 CanLII 4886 (ON HRT); Gichuru v. Law Society of British Columbia (No. 2), 2011 BCHRT 185, upheld in 2014 BCCA 396 at para. 260. The quantum is “highly contextual and fact-specific”, and the Tribunal has considerable discretion to award an amount it deems necessary to compensate a person who has been discriminated against: Gichuru (No. 2) at para. 256; University of British Columbia v. Kelly, 2016 BCCA 271 at paras. 59-64.
[43] In this case, the nature of the alleged discrimination is that Mr. Matembe was placed on a leave of absence for about ten months. I accept that a loss of income for ten months is serious. Mr. Matembe was the sole breadwinner for his family of four, and the loss of this income was significant for his family. At the same time, however, the evidence at the hearing could not support Mr. Matembe’s allegations that the employer’s conduct was callous or cruel, or that TransLink acted from a “malicious intent”. Rather, it is apparent that TransLink was trying to implement its vaccine policy during a global pandemic and navigate the complexities of a request for religious accommodation. Whether or not they got it right, there is nothing before me to support Mr. Matembe’s assertion that the alleged discrimination in this case is more serious because TransLink acted maliciously.
[44] Next, there is not much information before me about Mr. Matembe’s vulnerability or the social context of the discrimination. I accept that employees are vulnerable in the context of their work.
[45] The most significant factor in this case is the impact that Mr. Matembe says TransLink’s discrimination had on him. For the purpose of this application, I accept that it was significant. Mr. Matembe says that the loss of income and employment had a devastating impact on his family and his own mental health. Mr. Matembe says that they had to sell their home, drain their savings, and pull their young children (ages 3 and 5) out of extra-curricular activities. He felt helpless and vulnerable because he could not provide for his family, and his relationships were strained. While accepting that Mr. Matembe and his family suffered these hardships, it is not apparent that they all flowed from the loss of ten months’ employment with TransLink, as opposed to the 19 months of unemployment that followed. The Tribunal’s award would be focused on the impact of losing ten months of work with TransLink.
[46] I turn next to quantum.
[47] Neither party referred to any similar Tribunal cases to ground this assessment. TransLink cites Tribunal statistics, arguing:
Between 2015 and 2025, 25% of the Tribunal’s damages awards were below $5,000; 26% were between $5,000 and $10,000, and 21% were between $10,000 and $20,000. The Respondent’s offer falls within the range of 72% of awards made by the Tribunal for general damages.
[48] I accept that these statistics offer some perspective on the financial range of awards by this Tribunal. But their utility in the analysis is limited. They cover a ten-year period, over the course of which the Tribunal’s damage awards were rising. More importantly, there is no analysis of the types of cases that attracted awards in each range, or how the circumstances in those cases compare to those here.
[49] On the other end of the spectrum, Mr. Matembe is seeking $5,000,000. In support of his request, he refers to articles about awards in the US, made to employees who were terminated after they refused to comply with a mandatory vaccine policy for religious reasons. For example, he cites:
a. A jury award in Michigan, which awarded $12.5 million to an employee who was terminated for non-compliance with a mandatory vaccine policy. According to a blog about the case, the award included $10 million in punitive damages, $1.375 million in lost future wages, and $1 million for emotional distress.
b. A jury award of $1 million each to seven employees of the San Francisco Bay Area Rapid Transit District who were terminated for non-compliance with a mandatory vaccine policy.
c. A $2.8 million settlement in a class complaint with the US Equal Employment Opportunity Commission for employees who were denied a religious exemption from a mandatory vaccine policy.
[50] Respectfully, these amounts are far beyond what this Tribunal has ever ordered or would order in this case. They reflect circumstances in a different legal system, applying different legal principles, and different remedial frameworks. The highest amount ever awarded for injury to dignity in an individual complaint, by this Tribunal, was $176,000, in uniquely egregious circumstances not comparable to those presented by this case: Francis v. BC Ministry of Justice (No. 5), 2021 BCHRT 16.
[51] TransLink’s offer is within the range of many recent awards this Tribunal has made in cases finding discrimination resulting in a loss of employment. For example, in Christensen v. Caretenders Financial Services Inc. and others (No. 3), 2025 BCHRT 212, the Tribunal awarded $15,000 to a complainant who was terminated during a medical leave. In K v. RMC Ready Mix Ltd and another (No. 4), 2022 BCHRT 108, the Tribunal awarded $20,000 to a complainant who was terminated when he refused to agree to random drug testing. In Chen v. La Brass Foods, 2019 BCHRT 111, the Tribunal awarded $10,000 to a complainant whose employer failed to accommodate her, leading her to be hospitalized. In Singh v. Dodd’s Furniture (No. 2), 2021 BCHRT 85, the Tribunal awarded $10,000 to a complainant who was demoted following a medical leave.
[52] It is not necessary that TransLink’s offer mirror exactly what the Tribunal would order; the offer just has to be within a reasonable range. It is possible that, after a hearing, the Tribunal could award Mr. Matembe more than $15,000. But, in my view, any award would not be significantly higher and would certainly not be $5,000,000. In the circumstances, an offer of $15,000 as compensation for injury to dignity in this case is reasonable.
3. Non-monetary remedies
[53] TransLink’s offer also includes non-monetary remedies which are responsive to the non-monetary remedies Mr. Matembe is seeking in this complaint.
[54] First, TransLink offers to provide Mr. Matembe:
… a letter of regret acknowledging that its decision to not grant you an exemption on the basis of your religious beliefs created distress and disruption in your life, including financial distress. The letter will also express a commitment to a more rigorous review of requests for exemptions from the application of relevant policies on religious and other protected grounds, should the same or similar event occur in the future.
[55] This is directly related to Mr. Matembe’s request that TransLink:
… provide me with a letter of apology and regret acknowledging that its decision to not grant me an exemption on the basis of my religious beliefs created distress and disruption in my life, including but not limited to financial distress. The letter will state that they take responsibility for this distress and disruption and express a commitment to a more rigorous review of requests for exemptions from the application of relevant policies on religious and other protected grounds, should the same or similar events occur in the future.
[56] The only difference is that TransLink is not offering to apologize and take responsibility for the distress. Mr. Matembe argues that “If this was truly an in-faith offer, the respondent would have taken the step to acknowledge that they are at fault, even though they don’t have to”. However, it is not always necessary for a respondent to admit liability in a reasonable settlement offer: Frick v. University of British Columbia, 2009 BCHRT 85 at para. 54. Rather, the important consideration is whether the offer presents a reasonable resolution of the complaint.
[57] In this case, I do not find that TransLink’s failure to apologize and admit liability renders its offer unreasonable. At a hearing, TransLink would not admit fault. The Tribunal would not order it to apologize or write a letter acknowledging Mr. Matembe’s distress: Employee R v. B.H. Allen Building Centre Ltd. dba RONA and others, 2026 BCHRT 105 at para. 75. TransLink proposes to give Mr. Matembe most of what he is asking for in its letter, which in my view is a reasonable outcome.
[58] Next, although the Policy at issue in this complaint was withdrawn in 2022, TransLink offers to:
… [commit] to reviewing its processes and consideration of factors should it be required to implement the same or a similar policy in the future, in response to another pandemic or health emergency.
[59] This is responsive to, and completely addresses, Mr. Matembe’s remedial request that:
TransLink … commit, in writing to the Tribunal to reviewing its processes and consideration of all factors should it be required to implement the same or a similar policy in the future, in response to another pandemic or health emergency.
[60] These aspects of TransLink’s offer meaningfully address almost all of the non-monetary remedies Mr. Matembe is seeking and go beyond what Mr. Matembe could be awarded at a hearing.
4. Remedies not included
[61] There are only two outstanding remedies which Mr. Matembe is seeking, which the offer does not include.
[62] First, Mr. Matembe is seeking $2,964 as expenses incurred because of discrimination. This amount includes:
a. $500 to compensate Mr. Matembe for wages he lost to attend a mediation, and
b. $2,464 to compensate Mr. Matembe for wages he will lose to attend the four-day hearing.
[63] In my view, it is reasonable that TransLink’s offer does not include a payment for these expenses. If the offer is accepted, and in light of my decision to dismiss the complaint, Mr. Matembe will not lose wages to attend a hearing. The only potential loss is $500. In light of the other, more significant, elements of the offer, the failure to account for $500 does not render the offer unreasonable.
[64] Second, Mr. Matembe is asking that TransLink “rescind the Record of Employment” saying he was suspended for misconduct. As I have said, there is no evidence that this Record of Employment exists. TransLink says it does not. This is not an order the Tribunal would make at a hearing, and it is reasonable that TransLink’s offer does not address it.
5. Conclusion on reasonableness
[65] TransLink’s offer fully addresses Mr. Matembe’s allegations and available remedies. It offers monetary compensation within the reasonable range of what the Tribunal might order. It fulfills the Code’s purpose of providing a means of redress for people who experience discrimination: Code, s. 3(e). Its non-monetary remedies address the Code’s purposes of preventing discrimination and fostering a climate of mutual respect: Code, ss. 3(a), (b), (c). It is a reasonable offer.
[66] The next issue is whether there are other factors that favour proceeding with the complaint.
C. Will it serve the purposes of the Code to proceed despite the reasonable settlement offer?
[67] Mr. Matembe argues that it furthers the purposes of the Code for his case to proceed to address “the unique characteristics of this claim, i.e., the Covid-19 vaccination mandates”. He points to other examples of cases across Canada, which have considered mandatory vaccination policies and concluded they were discriminatory or unreasonable: e.g. Air Canada v. Air Line Pilots’ Association, 2026 CanLII 16803 (CA LA); Union of Postal Communications Employees (PSAC) v. Canada Post Corporation, 2024 CanLII 38829 (CA LA); Public Health Sudbury& Districts v. Ontario Nurses’ Association, 2022 CanLII 48440 (ON LA).
[68] I accept that complaints about the mandatory vaccine mandates instituted by employers during the pandemic raise unique issues. Final decisions by this Tribunal about these issues can serve the Code’s purposes of identifying patterns of inequality and preventing future discrimination: Code, ss. 3(c) and (d). However, the Tribunal is considering many complaints of discrimination arising from mandatory vaccine mandates and can address these issues through other complaints where parties are not able to reach a resolution themselves or where the respondent has not made a reasonable settlement offer.
[69] The public purposes of the Code are furthered by encouraging parties to resolve complaints and concentrating the Tribunal’s limited resources on those complaints where resolution is not possible: Carter BCCA at para. 42. For this reason, the Tribunal promotes settlement at all stages of its process: Nguyen v. Prince Rupert School District No. 52, 2004 BCHRT 20 at para. 15. Negotiated resolutions promote the “efficiency and responsiveness of the human rights system”, while also ensuring individuals receive a remedy: Dar Santos at para. 59. Where the respondent offers a remedy that is consistent with what the complainant might receive if they were successful after a hearing, then the Code’s purposes have been satisfied. In the words of the Court of Appeal, “[p]roceeding with the hearing of the claim would be pointless”: Carter BCCA at para. 38; Karen Grant v. FortisBC Inc, 2009 BCHRT 336 at para. 71. In my view, that is the case here. I am not persuaded that there are any other factors which would support proceeding with this complaint in the face of a reasonable offer to settle it.
III CONCLUSION
[70] Though Mr. Matembe may not perceive it this way now, TransLink’s offer represents a positive resolution of his human rights complaint. He has the benefit of substantial financial and non-financial remedies, without the uncertainty, stress, and expense of an adversarial hearing where it is possible he could lose and receive nothing.
[71] The purposes of the Code are fulfilled by the offer that TransLink has made to settle this complaint. In this situation, a hearing is not necessary. The complaint is dismissed under s. 27(1)(d)(ii).
[72] I remind Mr. Matembe that TransLink’s offer remains open for acceptance for two weeks.
Devyn Cousineau
Vice Chair