Alexander v. Schneider, 2026 BCHRT 151
Date Issued: July 7, 2026
File: CS-006432
Indexed as: Alexander v. Schneider, 2026 BCHRT 151
IN THE MATTER OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS CODE,
RSBC 1996, c. 210 (as amended)
AND IN THE MATTER of a complaint before
the British Columbia Human Rights Tribunal
BETWEEN:
Jeremy Alexander
COMPLAINANT
AND:
Aaron Schneider
RESPONDENT
REASONS FOR DECISION
Tribunal Member: Edward Takayanagi
Agent for the Complainant: Rabbit Richards
For the Respondent: No one appearing
Date of Hearing: June 1, 2026
Location of Hearing: Videoconference
I INTRODUCTION
[1] Jeremy Alexander is a person with mobility-related disabilities for which he uses a wheelchair. Mr. Alexander was a tenant in a suite owned by Aaron Schneider. Mr. Alexander alleges Mr. Schneider discriminated against him on the basis of disability contrary to s. 10 of the Human Rights Code, by failing to maintain the rental property in a way that it was accessible to him as a person with disabilities.
[2] I heard this matter in a one-day hearing where Mr. Alexander called witnesses and introduced evidence. While I do not refer to it all in my decision, I have considered all of the evidence and submissions. This is not a complete recitation of that information, but only that which is necessary to come to my decision.
[3] For the reasons that follow, I find that Mr. Alexander was negatively impacted in his tenancy in connection with his disabilities. Therefore, Mr. Schneider discriminated against him based on a physical disability contrary to s. 10 of the Code. As a result of this discrimination, Mr. Alexander is entitled to compensation for expenses and injury to his dignity, feelings, and self-respect.
II Procedural matters
[4] Mr. Schneider did not appear at the hearing of the complaint.
[5] The Tribunal served Mr. Schneider with the Notice of Complaint Proceeding on November 17, 2022, by registered mail. The mail was received and signed for by Mr. Schneider. Mr. Schneider did not file a Response to the Complaint. Since that time, Mr. Schneider has not participated in the Tribunal process and has not communicated with the Tribunal.
[6] The Tribunal sent a Notice of Hearing dated June 4, 2025, to the parties by email. While Mr. Schneider had not participated in the Tribunal’s process, a courtesy copy was sent to him by email on that date. The Notice states that if a party does not attend, the hearing would still be held, and the Tribunal could make an order against the absent party. Mr. Schneider was deemed to have been served pursuant to the Tribunal’s Rules of Practice and Procedure, Rule 11(3).
[7] Mr. Schneider did not attend the hearing. I did not hear submissions or evidence until 15 minutes after the hearing was scheduled to start. I monitored the videoconference for any parties attempting to join the call for the full duration of the hearing. I confirmed the videoconference software was functioning normally.
[8] Under the circumstances, I am satisfied Mr. Schneider received notice of the hearing and find no breach of the principles of procedural fairness to proceed in his absence in accordance with Rule 32(1).
III Evidence
[9] Because Mr. Schneider did not attend the hearing, the following evidence is undisputed.
[10] Mr. Alexander has physical disabilities for which he uses a wheelchair.
[11] Mr. Alexander signed a tenancy agreement on February 20, 2020, to rent a suite from Mr. Schneider with three other roommates. The rental unit is the main floor of a house. Mr. Schneider and his family lived in the upstairs unit. The rental unit has one door, located at the back of the building which opens up to a driveway. There is one step down from the driveway to reach the door. The driveway connects to a back alley. The driveway also connects to a walkway that leads to the front of the property and an exit through a front gate.
[12] The rental unit was advertised as being wheelchair accessible. At the time the parties entered into the tenancy agreement Mr. Schneider was performing repair work on the walkway and it was not usable. Mr. Alexander advised Mr. Schneider of his accessibility needs including needing a traversable driveway and walkway to access the building and a ramp to enter the unit. Mr. Schneider assured Mr. Alexander that repairs to the walkway would be finished in two weeks, and the rental unit was accessible.
[13] Mr. Schneider never installed a ramp for Mr. Alexander during the tenancy. Instead, he provided a single piece of plywood that was propped up to the door. Mr. Alexander used this piece of plywood to access the rental unit door.
[14] The repairs to the walkway did not finish until July 2020. During that time Mr. Alexander was not able to exit the property using the walkway without assistance. When the walkway repairs were completed Mr. Alexander discovered that Mr. Schneider had placed a lock on the front gate of the property. Mr. Alexander found he could not reach the lock because it was at a height that was inaccessible when he was in his wheelchair. Mr. Alexander was unable to open the front gate to exit the property without assistance. He requested Mr. Schneider remove the lock, explaining that the position of the lock made it inaccessible when using a wheelchair. Mr. Schneider did not remove the lock.
[15] In or about August 2020, Mr. Schneider began renovation work on the rear of the property by digging up the driveway. During the renovation work Mr. Alexander could not get through the driveway, which was filled with construction debris, without assistance. The driveway work was completed in December 2020. The driveway was made into a gravel driveway with a retaining wall without a ramp. Mr. Alexander could no longer use the driveway to access the alley.
[16] In or about January 2021, Mr. Schneider sold the property to a purchaser who assumed the tenancy. In or about March 2021, Mr. Alexander moved out of the rental unit.
IV ANALYSIS AND DECISION
[17] Section 10 of the Code applies to tenancies. Section 10(1) says:
10 (1) A person must not
….
(b) discriminate against a person … regarding a term or condition of the tenancy of the space,
because of the…physical or mental disability…of that person ….
[18] To prove his complaint under s. 10 of the Code, Mr. Alexander must show (1) he has a disability; (2) he suffered an adverse impact in relation to his tenancy; and (3) his disability was a factor in the adverse impact: Moore v. British Columbia (Education), 2012 SCC 61 at para 33.
[19] Based on the evidence before me, I am satisfied Mr. Alexander has established he has disabilities within the meaning of the Code. He testified he has permanent mobility issues and requires a wheelchair to move. Further, Mr. Alexander submitted into documentary evidence notes from his treating physician setting out his physical limitations. His evidence was undisputed.
[20] I also find Mr. Alexander experienced adverse impacts regarding a term or condition of the tenancy. Mr. Alexander testified that due to the condition of the driveway, walkway, and front gate of the property he was unable to come and go from the property freely. The plywood ramp made it difficult and unsafe to get in and out of the house. Mr. Alexander’s testimony is supported by the documentary evidence, including photographs of the condition of the rental property, and the testimonies of his roommates. The evidence before me is that Mr. Alexander was unable to use the walkway when it was being renovated, was unable to open the front gate without assistance, and was unable to access the driveway during and after it was renovated. I am persuaded by the evidence before me and easily find that not being able to enter or exit one’s rental unit is an adverse impact related to tenancy.
[21] Finally, I find that the adverse impact was connected to Mr. Alexander’s disability. The barriers to being able to access the rental unit freely, safely, and with dignity arose because of Mr. Alexander’s wheelchair use. I accept that for Mr. Alexander a narrow plywood ramp, an unfinished walkway, a gravel driveway only accessible by stepping up over a retaining wall, and a gate with a lock placed at an inaccessible height are obstacles connected to his disability.
[22] I find that Mr. Alexander has successfully established the elements of his complaint.
[23] A respondent can justify their conduct in tenancy complaints as a bona fide reasonable justification: British Columbia (Public Service Employee Relations Commission) v. British Columbia Government and Service Employees’ Union (Meiorin Grievance), 1999 CanLII 652 (SCC), [1999] 3 SCR 3 at para. 54 and British Columbia (Superintendent of Motor Vehicles) v. British Columbia (Council of Human Rights), 1999 CanLII 646 (SCC), [1999] 3 SCR 868 at para. 20, and Alexander v. PAL Vancouver (No. 4), 2006 BCHRT 461 at para. 44. After a complainant has made out their case the burden shifts to the landlord to justify the adverse impact. Here, because Mr. Schneider did not participate to argue that the impact is justified, the inquiry ends here on the merits of the case. I find that Mr. Schneider discriminated against Mr. Alexander in tenancy contravening s. 10 of the Code.
[24] I next turn to what remedies are appropriate.
V Remedies
A. Section 37(2)(a) Cease the Contravention
[25] Having found the complaint is justified, I order Mr. Schneider to cease and refrain from committing the same or similar discrimination, pursuant to s. 37(2)(a) of the Code.
B. Section 37(2)(b) Declaratory Order
[26] Under s. 37(2)(b) of the Code, the Tribunal may make a declaratory order that the conduct complained of, or similar conduct, is contrary to the Code. In the circumstances of this case, I consider it appropriate to make such an order. I declare that Mr. Schneider’s conduct in failing to provide accommodations for Mr. Alexander’s disability was discrimination contrary to s. 10 of the Code.
C. Section 37(2)(c)(ii) Ameliorate the conditions of the discriminatory practice
[27] Under s. 37(2)(c) of the Code,the Tribunal may order a respondent to take steps to ameliorate the effects of the discriminatory practice and order a Respondent to adopt and implement a special program to ameliorate the conditions of disadvantaged individuals or groups. However, I decline to do so in this case.
[28] Mr. Alexander provided limited evidence on this issue. The evidence before me is that Mr. Schneider had one rental unit in his primary residence. Mr. Schneider sold the building in or about January 2021 and ceased to be a landlord. I am not persuaded that an order that Mr. Schneider take mandatory steps or implement a program is necessary to ameliorate the effects of the discrimination Mr. Alexander experienced above and beyond the other remedies ordered.
D. Section 37(2)(d)(ii) Compensation – Out of Pocket Expenses
[29] Section 37(2)(d)(ii) of the Code gives the Tribunal discretion to compensate a person for expenses incurred because of discrimination. The purpose of compensation is to restore a complainant, to the extent possible, to the position they would have been in had the discrimination not occurred. There must be a causal connection between the loss claimed and the discriminatory conduct: Gichuru v. Law Society of British Columbia (No. 9), 2011 BCHRT 185 at para. 298-303, upheld in 2014 BCCA 396.
[30] Mr. Alexander seeks an award of $1,500 which he says he incurred for meal and grocery delivery, transportation costs, and the purchase of furniture for the home. Mr. Alexander provided no invoices in support of the amount claimed but has provided calculations on how he arrived at the amount sought.
[31] He says that due to the discrimination he was unable to leave the rental unit to buy food and he had groceries and prepared meals delivered at a cost of approximately $105 monthly for the 10-month duration during the tenancy when the driveway, walkway, or gate was inaccessible to him. He says he needed to rely on private taxis and Ubers during his tenancy because the condition of the driveway and walkway prevented HandyDART, the accessible bus service he previously used, from being able to pick up or drop him off. He estimates that the cost was $40 monthly for the duration of his tenancy. He says his occupational therapist recommended he use special ergonomic furniture because he was spending more time at home and was unable to leave the unit to exercise. He estimates he spent $50 for furniture.
[32] Mr. Alexander also put before me notes from his social worker, treating physician, and occupational therapist who state that Mr. Alexander was unable to access HandyDART due to the condition of the rental property and required specially made furniture to manage his pain at home when he is unable to leave the property.
[33] I am satisfied on the evidence before me that Mr. Alexander incurred the expenses he is claiming for food delivery, transportation, and furniture in the home. I am also satisfied that these expenses were the result of the discrimination. I therefore award the amount sought of $1,500 for out-of-pocket expenses.
E. Section 37(2)(d)(iii) Injury to Dignity, Feelings and Self-Respect
[34] Mr. Alexander seeks an award of $30,000 for injury to his dignity, feelings, and self-respect.
[35] Under s. 37(2)(d)(iii) of the Code, the Tribunal has the discretion to award compensation for injury to dignity. The purpose of these awards is compensatory, not punitive. The amount of compensation depends on the specific facts and circumstances in a given case: Gichuru v. Law Society of British Columbia (No.9), 2011 BCHRT 185, aff’d in 2014 BCCA 396, at para. 260. At the same time, for the purposes of consistency and fairness, it is often helpful to consider the range of awards made in similar cases.
[36] The Tribunal generally considers several factors including the nature of the discrimination; the complainant’s social context or vulnerability; and the specific effect the discrimination had on the complainant: Oger v. Whatcott (No. 7), 2019 BCHRT 58 at para. 225. I will consider each of these factors in turn.
[37] Discrimination in tenancy can be particularly egregious, marked by a power imbalance between the landlord and tenant: Biggings obo Walsh v. Pink and others, 2018 BCHRT 174 at para. 156. I find the nature of the discrimination in this case was severe, prolonged, and continuous. Mr. Schneider failed to accommodate Mr. Alexander’s disability for the duration of the 10-month tenancy. Mr. Alexander’s roommates testified that they each advocated for Mr. Alexander and explained the urgent need for accommodations to Mr. Schneider, but he did not provide the necessary accommodations. Rather, the evidence is that there was a succession of disability related barriers that negatively affected Mr. Alexander’s ability to come and go from the rental property. The walkway repairs that were promised to be completed in two weeks in February 2020, were not completed until July 2020, five months later. When Mr. Alexander could use the walkway after the repairs had been completed, he found he could not exit the rental property because Mr. Schneider installed a lock on the front gate. Next, in August 2020, Mr. Schneider dug up the rear driveway so Mr. Alexander could not leave the property through either the front or the rear of the property by himself.
[38] I find that Mr. Alexander was particularly vulnerable to the discrimination as a person with disabilities. The Tribunal has noted that the ongoing housing crisis in the province makes it particularly difficult for many Code-protected groups to access safe and secure rental housing: Abernathy v. Stevenson, 2017 BCHRT 239 at para. 15. Mr. Alexander testified that he and his roommates struggled to find appropriate rental housing as his particular disabilities limits the pool of rental housing that would be appropriate for him.
[39] Finally, I consider the effect of the discrimination on Mr. Alexander. The impact was profound. This was apparent from his testimony. Mr. Alexander said he felt like a prisoner in his own home, unable to venture outside of the property without the assistance of others. This made him feel like a lesser person who had to rely on others simply to access his home. His roommates testified that they would receive text messages from Mr. Alexander asking for someone to come home so he could be let inside the property, or for someone to come out to open the gate and help him maneuver through the obstacles to enter the rental unit.
[40] Further, the evidence before me is that Mr. Alexander’s disabilities were exacerbated from being unable to venture outside regularly. He testified that in addition to his mental health getting worse, he was in more physical pain and that he would sometimes be unable to attend medical appointments if someone could not help him leave the rental unit. The medical documents before me support Mr. Alexander’s evidence and not that he reported increased pain and discomfort and was observed to be struggling with his mental health.
[41] Mr. Alexander’s roommates testified. Each said they had a pre-existing friendship with Mr. Alexander before moving into the rental unit together. They observed that Mr. Alexander was in physical discomfort more often during the tenancy. They described Mr. Alexander as a very nice man who was in good spirits before the tenancy. They observed Mr. Alexander’s demeanor and mood change for the worse over the course of the tenancy. Mr. Alexander would express frustration and anger more often. They said it was shocking to see the change in Mr. Alexander because he was a good-natured person.
[42] Mr. Alexander testified that he had no choice but to move out of the rental unit because it was inaccessible to him. The renovations to the property performed by Mr. Schneider, such as replacing the paved driveway with gravel and building steps made the property more inaccessible for Mr. Alexander. Mr. Alexander said he felt embarrassed and unworthy after residing in the rental property and approached subsequent rental units with trepidation. He says the experience instilled in him the belief that he cannot manage without the active assistance of others.
[43] I find the nature of the discrimination, Mr. Alexander’s vulnerability and social context, and the effects on him of the discrimination favours an award for injury to dignity on the high end of the scale. Mr. Alexander cites the following cases as being analogous to his situation Biggings ($35,000), James obo James v. Silver Campsites and another (No. 3), 2012 BCHRT 141 ($10,000), Redmond v. Hunter Hill Housing Co-op (No. 2), 2013 BCHRT 276 ($10,000).
[44] I distinguish the circumstances of this case from James because that was a complaint about being refused rental of a pad at a manufactured home park. I also distinguish the present case from Redmond as that was a case about failure to accommodate a tenant’s allergy to mould. Further, I note that both of those cases are over a decade old and are of limited assistance in determining an appropriate quantum: Biggings at para. 163.
[45] I note that Biggings, which was decided in 2018, was until recently the high-water mark for an injury to dignity award in a tenancy case. There, the Tribunal awarded $35,000 where a complainant requested a ramp so they could access their rental property with a wheelchair and the landlord argued that installing a wheelchair ramp was not feasible. Unlike in Biggins where the landlord engaged with the tenant and offered some accommodations, here the evidence is that Mr. Schneider ignored all requests by Mr. Alexander and instead installed further obstacles to accessibility.
[46] I find the nature of the discrimination here to be analogous to that of the Tribunal’s recent case of Lloyd v. Fernanda Almeida and others (No. 2), 2026 BCHRT 12. There the Tribunal awarded $60,000 for injury to dignity for a tenant who was repeatedly refused accommodations for their disability by a landlord over a multi-year tenancy. I also find the case of Elderton v. Knudsen and another (No. 2), 2026 BCHRT 72, to be instructive. There the Tribunal awarded more than $60,000 in injury to dignity for a tenant who relied on a wheelchair and was refused certain accommodations and repairs to her rental unit. The Tribunal also identified that there is an upwards trend in injury to dignity awards.
[47] I have considered all of the circumstances of this case and the awards issued by the Tribunal in similar cases. Mr. Alexander seeks an award of $30,000 for injury to dignity. In the context of the evidence before me, I have no hesitation in awarding the full amount sought.
F. Interest
[48] The Tribunal has the discretion to award interest on awards. An award of interest is part of the compensatory nature of the Tribunal’s awards, recognizing that but for the discrimination a complainant would have had use of the money now awarded. The interest places the complainant in the economic position they would have been in but for the discrimination: Vasil v. Mongovius and another (No. 3), 2009 BCHRT 117.
[49] While Mr. Alexander has not specifically requested an award of interest, I find it appropriate to exercise my discretion and order pre-judgment interest on the out-of-pocket expenses and post-judgment interest on all the amounts awarded as part of an attempt to fully compensate Mr. Alexander for the loss and injury. The interest is to be paid based on the rates set out in the Court Order Interest Act.
VI CONCLUSION
[50] I find that Mr. Schneider discriminated against Mr. Alexander contravening s. 10 of the Code. I make the following orders:
a. I order Mr. Schneider to cease and refrain from committing the same or a similar contravention of the Code: s.37(2)(a).
b. I declare that Mr. Schneider’s conduct failing to provide accommodations contravened s. 13 of the Code: s. 37(2)(b).
c. I order Mr. Schneider pay Mr. Alexander $1,500 for out-of-pocket expenses incurred because of the discrimination: s. 37(2)(d)(ii).
d. I order Mr. Schneider pay Mr. Alexander $30,000 as compensation for injury to dignity, feelings, and self-respect: s.37(2)(d)(iii).
e. I order Mr. Schneider pay Mr. Alexander pre-judgement interest on the out-of-pocket expenses award until paid in full, based on the rates set out in the Court Order Interest Act.
f. I order Mr. Schneider pay Mr. Alexander post-judgment interest on all awards until paid in full, based on the rates set out in the Court Order Interest Act.
Edward Takayanagi
Tribunal Member