Tu v. B.C. Indigenous Housing Society and another, 2026 BCHRT 150
Date Issued: July 3, 2026
File(s): CS-010411
Indexed as: Tu v. B.C. Indigenous Housing Society and another, 2026 BCHRT 150
IN THE MATTER OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS CODE,
RSBC 1996, c. 210 (as amended)
AND IN THE MATTER of a complaint before
the British Columbia Human Rights Tribunal
BETWEEN:
Jie Tu
COMPLAINANT
AND:
B.C. Indigenous Housing Society and Richard George
RESPONDENTS
REASONS FOR DECISION
TIMELINESS OF COMPLAINT
Section 22
Tribunal Member: Steven Adamson
On their own behalf: Jie Tu
Counsel for the Respondents: Chanelle Wong
I INTRODUCTION
[1] Ms. Tu filed her human rights complaint on September 13, 2023. She alleges the B.C. Indigenous Housing Society [the Society] operating under a previous name and the former chair of the Society’s board of directors, Richard George, [together the Respondents] discriminated in employment based on race, ancestry, colour, and sex contrary to s. 13 of the Human Rights Code [Code].
[2] The Tribunal identified that some or all of the allegations in the complaint appear to fall outside the one-year time limit for filing a complaint. The Tribunal invited the parties to make submissions about whether to accept the complaint under s. 22 of the Human Rights Code. The parties provided submissions and I considered them in making this decision. I note the Respondents applied to provide further submissions in response to new evidence and argument raised by Ms. Tu in her reply submission. Given the outcome of my decision below I decided it was unnecessary for me consider the Respondents further submissions.
[3] While Ms. Tu states in her complaint initiating form that the most recent allegations occurred within the last year, the evidence on file indicates the latest allegation occurred when the Respondents terminated her employment on January 6, 2022. As such, the only issue I must decide is whether to exercise my discretion to accept the complaint because it is in the public interest to do so, and no substantial prejudice will result to any person because of the delay: s. 22(3).
[4] For the following reasons, I do not accept the late-filed complaint because I am not persuaded that it is in the public interest to do so. The complaint will not proceed.
II DECISION
[5] There is a one-year time limit for filing a human rights complaint: Code, s. 22. Allegations are timely if they occurred within one year of filing the complaint, or if they form part of a timely continuing contravention of the Code: s. 22(1) and (2). The time limit set out in s. 22 of the Code is a substantive provision that is intended to ensure that complainants pursue their human rights remedies diligently: British Columbia (Ministry of Public Safety and Solicitor General) v. Mzite, 2014 BCCA 220 at para. 59. Its purposes are “to require allegations of discrimination to be brought forward in a timely way so that remedial steps can be taken if appropriate” and to protect respondents from having to address dated complaints: School District v. Parent obo the Child, 2018 BCCA 136 at para. 79; Kamloops (City) v Spina, 2021 BCSC 723 at para. 80. The Tribunal has discretion to accept untimely allegations of discrimination if it is in the public interest to do so and no substantial prejudice will result to any person because of the delay: Code, s. 22(3).
[6] Ms. Tu filed this complaint on September 13, 2023. Any allegations of discrimination after before September 13, 2022, will be untimely unless they are part of a continuing contravention.
A. Allegation of discrimination within one year of complaint
[7] The first issue I must decide is whether the complaint sets out any allegations of discrimination within the one year before the complaint was filed. An allegation of discrimination must set out facts that could, if proven, establish that the complainant had characteristics protected by the Code, experienced an adverse impact in a protected area, and the protected characteristics were a factor in the adverse impact: Moore v. BC (Education), 2012 SCC 61 at para. 33; Chen v. Surrey (City), 2015 BCCA 57 at para. 32; School District at para. 68. This is often referred to as an “arguable contravention” of the Code.
[8] As noted above, Ms. Tu states her complaint was timely despite the latest allegation she makes being her termination on January 6. 2022. Later she explained that she believes the time limit should start from mid-September 2023, when she realized that other Asian female employees had also been let go by the Society for reasons related to their race, ancestry, colour and sex.
[9] If Ms. Tu is arguing that the principle of discoverability applies to the time limit under s. 22 of the Code, I disagree with her since section 22 clearly states that a complaint must be filed within one year of the alleged contravention, and there is nothing in the statute which deals with the postponement of the running of that time: ICBC v. Yuan, 2008 BCSC 1703 at paras. 21-23. The question of whether the Ms. Tu’s discovery that other Asian women were fired by the Society in the months after she was terminated on January 6, 2022, is properly considered as a factor under s. 22(3) of the Code and will be discussed below. As such, I have decided that all the allegations in this case a late filed.
[10] The next issue I must decide is whether to accept the late-filed complaint under s. 22(3) of the Code.
B. Discretion to accept late filed complaint
[11] The Tribunal has discretion to accept a late-filed complaint where it is in the public interest to do so and there is no substantial prejudice to any person because of the delay: Code, s. 22(3). The burden is on Ms. Tu to persuade the Tribunal to accept the complaint.
1. Public interest
[12] I begin with the public interest. This factor is assessed in light of the purposes of the Code, which include identifying and eliminating persistent patterns of inequality, and providing a means of redress for persons who are discriminated against: s. 3. The Tribunal may consider factors including the length and reason for the delay in filing, and the public interest in the complaint itself: British Columbia (Ministry of Public Safety and Solicitor General) v. Mzite, 2014 BCCA 220 at paras. 53-81. These are important factors, but they are not necessarily determinative and not every factor will be relevant in every case: Goddard v. Dixon, 2012 BCSC 161 at para. 152; Mzite at para. 55. The inquiry is always fact and context specific.
[13] In this case, the delay in filing is over seven months. Seven months is a significant delay and weighs against accepting the complaint for filing: Paneswar v. Future Shop and others, 2012 BCHRT 297 at para 27.
[14] I turn next to Ms. Tu’s reasons for the delay. Ms. Tu states that she was devastated after being fired from her senior management position of more than five years at the Society. She reports that she prided herself in being an honest, dedicated, and hardworking employee. At the time the Society let her go she had recently passed her CPA certification, just relocated her parents to Canada from overseas and was getting her teenage son through high school and off to university. Ms. Tu states that being fired for the first time completely undermined all her accomplishments and left her desperate to find a new job to support her extended family. She says that she had to put the very traumatic experience of being terminated behind her and focus on the single goal of getting a new job. By September 2023, Ms. Tu submits that she had sufficiently recovered from the emotional and psychological fallout from being let go by the Society to start a complaint.
[15] The Respondents argue that Ms. Tu’s explanation for the delay related to putting the experience of working at the Society behind her and focusing on the goal of finding a new job is an entirely inadequate explanation. They note that Ms. Tu found a new job in January 2022, which was the same month that she was terminated. The Respondents further submit that Ms. Tu had the ability to consult a lawyer to question her dismissal in the weeks after she was dismissed. They noted that on March 3, 2022, the parties negotiated a settlement agreement on all Ms. Tu’s claims.
[16] Where delay is due to a disabling condition, it may be in the public interest to accept a late-filed complaint: MacAlpine v. Office of the Representative for Children and Youth, 2011 BCHRT 29 at para. 42; Naziel-Wilson v. Providence Health Care and another, 2014 BCHRT 170 at para. 21.
[17] I appreciate that Ms. Tu found the experience of being fired for the first time for no apparent reason, apart from being Chinese and a woman, to be traumatic. I further accept her claim of vulnerability related to being the sole breadwinner in her household who needed to focus on getting a new job to support a number of dependents. However, in my view Ms. Tu’s ability to get a new job within weeks of leaving the Society, a job she is still in it appears, demonstrates her capacity to rapidly turn around the situation in her favour. With this in mind, I am not convinced that the traumatic experience of being fired or having to focus on finding a new job indicates Ms. Tu had any disability from filing a complaint capable of attracting the public interest. I further note that Ms. Tu was able to retain counsel and secure a settlement agreement with the Society within two months of her termination. My conclusion does not question Ms. Tu suffered as a result of being dismissed, however, her subsequent actions indicate an ability to file a complaint.
[18] Ms. Tu also states her delay in filing was associated with a not being aware of her rights under the Code at the time she was fired.
[19] Ignorance of the Code, or the time required to become aware of one’s rights, is not an acceptable reason for filing a late complaint: Rashead v. Vereschagin (No. 2), 2006 BCHRT 74 at para. 12.
[20] I appreciate Ms. Tu’s forthright statement that she did not understand her rights until later on when she decided to file her complaint. However, without a further explanation from her as to why she was unable to find out about the Code and the deadlines for filing earlier, I do not find that this reason attracts any significant public interest in allowing the complaint to proceed late. As noted above, Ms. Tu demonstrated an ability to find a new job within weeks of being dismissed. She further demonstrated that she could secure representation from a lawyer and negotiate a settlement agreement within two months of being let go by the Society. With this in mind, I see no reason why Ms. Tu could not have made herself aware of the Code, including the deadlines for filing a complaint, and filed within the allotted timeframe.
[21] Ms. Tu also provided what appears to be a new evidence reason for late filing her complaint. She alleges that just before filing her complaint she learned from her former co-workers that approximately 20 people were let go during the year after she was fired. Of that total, Ms. Tu alleges at least five were Asian women. Ms. Tu claims it only then dawned on her that there was a pattern of discriminatory terminations at the Society involving Asian women. She also felt motivated to seek justice after learning at that time the other employees let go got more favourable severance packages. Ms. Tu states she also recognized that the Society’s board members, who were all Indigenous, had a long-standing unwritten rule to place Indigenous people in leadership roles. While she understood why the Society wanted to do this, Ms. Tu felt it was discriminatory for the board to make room for Indigenous leaders by letting someone like her, a Chinese female, go. She also believes the Respondents did not think she would fight back against the termination because of her personal characteristics.
[22] The Respondents argue Ms. Tu’s realization that others got a better severance than the one she negotiated does not attract the public interest. They submit that this evidence actually weighs heavily against allowing the complaint to proceed late filed.
[23] I agree with the Respondents that Ms. Tu’s learning her severance package was inferior to others is not a reason to accept the complaint late filed and actually weighs against allowing it to now proceed.
[24] I also consider whether learning other Asian women were let go by the Society attracts the public interest. Prior to receiving this new evidence, it appears that Ms. Tu was aware of the Society’s longstanding rule aimed at placing Indigenous people into leadership roles in the organization. She also felt that she was a good employee and was not dismissed for any performance related reason. Ms. Tu further reports that on the day she was dismissed Mr. George told her that she was being let go for reasons related to “leadership change”. From my review of the complaint information, the basis for Ms. Tu’s complaint allegations existed at the time she was terminated, and it was not necessary for her to hear about other Asian women being fired to conclude that the alleged discrimination occurred. I appreciate that receiving the evidence that other Asian women were also forced out of the organization may have highlighted the strength of Ms. Tu’s case against the Respondents, however, in my view this is not a case of evidence related to the discovery of the discrimination at a later date relevant to the exercise of discretion under s. 22(3) of the Code: Fullerton v. Rogers Foods, 2015 BCHRT 49 at para. 24 https://www.canlii.org/en/bc/bchrt/doc/2015/2015bchrt49/2015bchrt49.html.
[25] Finally, I consider the public interest in the complaint itself. Where a complaint raises a unique or novel issue, it may further the Code’s purposes for the Tribunal to allow it to proceed: Mzite at paras. 65-66. The Tribunal may consider, for example, whether the complaint raises issues that have already been addressed in its jurisprudence, and/or whether the complaint seeks to advance a systemic or understudied issue on behalf of a vulnerable group: Mzite at paras. 66-67.
[26] Ms. Tu is seeking justice for alleged wrongs by the Respondents who she feels have a duty to perform in a moral, ethical and non-discriminatory manner because they receive public funding. When such organizations fail to meet such obligations, they must be held accountable. Ms. Tu also filed the complaint for the benefit of co-workers similarly affected by the Society’s firings. While recognizing her case may be like many others involving race and gender in an employment setting, she hopes allowing it to proceed will contribute to the broader public understanding of this type of discrimination. Further, Ms. Tu submits that her case is an example of the real barriers that working-class women of colour face in the workplace.
[27] The Respondents argue this is nothing unique or novel in this case involving race and colour in an employment setting.
[28] While appreciating Ms. Tu’s vulnerabilities as a female Chinese worker, I do not find this case is unique for the purposes of attracting the public interest in allowing the complaint to proceed late. The case involves allegations of discrimination in employment based on race, ancestry, colour and sex, which are commonly heard by the Tribunal and the law in this area is fairly settled.
[29] I am not persuaded it is in the public interest to accept this late-filed complaint. It is therefore unnecessary for me to consider whether accepting the complaint would cause substantial prejudice. The complaint is not accepted for filing.
III CONCLUSION
[30] The complaint is not accepted. The file is now closed.
Steven Adamson
Tribunal Member