Loutit v. BC Ministry of Environment and Parks, 2026 BCHRT 15
Date Issued: January 14, 2026
File: CS-010253
Indexed as: Loutit v. BC Ministry of Environment and Parks, 2026 BCHRT 15
IN THE MATTER OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS CODE,
RSBC 1996, c. 210 (as amended)
AND IN THE MATTER of a complaint before
the British Columbia Human Rights Tribunal
BETWEEN:
Wendy Loutit
COMPLAINANT
AND:
His Majesty the King in Right of the Province of British Columbia as represented by the Ministry of Environment and Parks
RESPONDENT
REASONS FOR DECISION
TIMELINESS OF COMPLAINT
Section 22
Tribunal Member: Steven Adamson
On her own behalf: Wendy Loutit
Counsel for the Ministry of Environment and Parks: Bobby Sangha
I. INTRODUCTION
[1] On August 21, 2023, Wendy Loutit filed a complaint of discrimination in employment based on mental disability, religion and political belief contrary to s. 13 of the Human Rights Code [Code], against His Majesty the King in Right of the Province of British Columbia as represented by the Ministry of Environment and Parks [the Ministry].
[2] The issue before me is whether to accept the late filed Complaint against the Ministry. I make no findings of fact regarding the merits of this complaint.
[3] For the reasons that follow, the Complaint is not a continuing contravention of the Code: s.22(2), and it is not in the public interest to allow the Complaint to proceed late filed: s. 22(3).
II. BACKGROUND
[4] Ms. Loutit is an employee of the Ministry. In early 2020 she worked at home for reasons related to the COVID-19 pandemic.
[5] In late 2021, the Ministry’s COVID-19 vaccination policy required Ms. Loutit to become vaccinated as a condition for retaining her job. Ms. Loutit alleges she decided not to receive the COVID-19 vaccination for reasons related to her mental disability, religion and political belief.
[6] In 2021, Ms. Loutit alleges that she sought a medical exemption from the Ministry regarding the vaccination policy, but says the employer denied her application as the exemptions were limited to persons with heart conditions and prior vaccine injury. She alleges the Ministry denied her medical exemption before she had an opportunity to seek a specialist’s opinion on whether her condition warranted an exemption.
[7] In November 2021, Ms. Loutit alleges that she applied to the Ministry for a vaccination exemption for reasons related to her political belief. She says the Ministry dismissed the legitimacy of her belief after accusing her of copying information about such a belief from a political party’s website. Ms. Loutit alleges that she did not receive an exemption and did not learn her request was denied until she participated in a union grievance arbitration approximately two years later.
[8] In early 2022, Ms. Loutit alleges being placed on leave without pay for reasons related to not complying with the Ministry’s COVID-19 vaccination requirement.
[9] In early 2022, Ms. Loutit alleges that she applied for a religious beliefs vaccination exemption. She alleges the Ministry eventually approved her application following an invasive process where she was asked deeply personal questions that went beyond the need to satisfy that her beliefs were sincerely held.
[10] In May 2023, Ms. Loutit alleges in her time limit reply submissions that she returned to work in a hostile environment where she faced stigma, exclusion and micromanagement. She also says that she was given contradictory information about remote-work arrangements. No further details of these allegations were provided.
[11] From 2023 to 2025, Ms. Loutit alleges in her reply submissions that she was excluded from committee work, faced ongoing privacy concerns, was not accommodated in her work, was given less duties. She alleges that the Ministry ignored her grievances which resulted in delays. Ms. Loutit alleges escalating health impacts continued until she went on medical leave. No other details of these allegations were provided.
III. ANALYSIS AND DECISION
[12] The time limit set out in s. 22 of the Code is a substantive provision which is intended to ensure that complainants pursue their human rights remedies diligently: Chartier v. School District No. 62, 2003 BCHRT 39.
A. Time Limit and Continuing Contravention
[13] The Complaint was filed on August 21, 2023. To comply with the one-year time limit under s. 22(1) of the Code, the alleged act of discrimination had to occur on or after August 21, 2022.
[14] Ms. Loutit’s allegations occurred in 2021 and early 2022 when she decided not to receive any COVID-19 vaccinations and was placed on leave without pay by the Ministry. In circumstances where Ms. Loutit acknowledges her complaint was late filed for events in early 2022, I conclude that the complaint allegations in the case occurred prior to the August 21, 2022, deadline.
[15] In deciding whether the allegations in this case were late filed, I acknowledge Ms. Loutit’s information that her political belief exemption went unanswered by the Ministry until she found out about it during the May 2023 union grievance arbitration. I further acknowledge Ms. Loutit’s information that her religious exemption application was eventually approved following an information gathering process. In my view, however, these later events are not allegations of discrimination capable of proceeding at the Tribunal.
[16] A complaint is filed in time if the last allegation of discrimination happened within one year, and older allegations are part of a “continuing contravention”: Code, s. 22(2); School District v. Parent obo the Child, 2018 BCCA 136 at para. 68. A continuing contravention is “a succession or repetition of separate acts of discrimination of the same character” that could be considered separate contraventions of the Code, and “not merely one act of discrimination which may have continuing effects or consequences”: Chen v. Surrey (City), 2015 BCCA 57at para. 23; School Districtat para.50.
[17] Here, Ms. Loutit did not comply with the Ministry’s COVID-19 vaccination requirement policy in 2021, and she was, therefore, placed on leave without pay in early 2022. While acknowledging that she has also provided information regarding her attempts to seek exemptions to mitigate the effects of being put off work after early 2022, in my view these occurrences are appropriately characterized as continuing effects or consequences of the Ministry’s decision to place her on leave for not complying with the vaccination policy mandate. I appreciate that Ms. Loutit says that the Ministry took its time to address her exemption requests and notify her of the outcome, however, she has not set out new allegations apart from the Ministry confirming its previous decision to send her home without pay for failing to get vaccinated until such time as she was given a religious exemption.
[18] Ms. Loutit also describes further harms from the time she returned to work in May 2023 until 2025. While she alleges this negative treatment worsened her mental health to point where she had to go off work on medical leave, I do not see any connection between these alleged harms and her mental disability, religion and political belief associated with her 2021 decision not to get vaccinated.
[19] As such, Ms. Loutit’s complaint was late filed and I proceed to an analysis of whether the Tribunal should exercise its discretion to accept the complaint outside the one-year time limit because it is in the public interest to do so, and no substantial prejudice will result to any person because of the delay: Code s. 22(3). I begin with the public interest determination.
B. Public Interest
[20] Whether it is in the public interest to accept the late-filed complaint is a multi-faceted analysis. The enquiry is fact and context specific and assessed in accordance with the purposes of the Code: Hoang v. Warnaco and Johns, 2007 BCHRT 24 at para. 26. The Tribunal considers a non-exhaustive list of factors, including the length of the delay, the reasons for the delay, and the public interest in the complaint itself: British Columbia (Ministry of Public Safety and Solicitor General) v. Mzite, 2014 BCCA 220 [Mzite] at para. 53. These are important factors, but they are not necessarily determinative: Goddard v. Dixon, 2012 BCSC 161 at para. 152; Mzite at para. 55.
[21] I have first considered the length of the delay in filing. The latest allegation in this complaint occurred in early 2022 when Ms. Loutit was placed on leave without pay. In my estimate the end of March 2022 is the latest date associated with being early in the year. As such, the delay in this case is over four months, which is significant, but not inordinate if other factors militate in favour of acceptance: Attew v. Ministry of Public Safety and Solicitor General (Corrections Branch) and another, 2021BCHRT 170 at para. 19.
[22] Ms. Loutit provided several reasons for her delay in filing. First, she submits that even though the allegations began in 2021, she was unable to file until 2023 because of the trauma associated with losing income, suffering emotional distress and receiving minimal union support. Ms. Loutit describes her situation as destabilizing and unprecedented. She claims that after receiving the arbitrator’s decision confirming that her human rights had been violated, she finally had the professional validation she needed to support moving forward with making her complaint.
[23] Where delay is due to a disabling condition, the Tribunal has observed that it may be in the public interest to accept a late-filed complaint: MacAlpine v. Office of the Representative for Children and Youth, 2011 BCHRT 29 at para. 42. Disabling conditions can include physical and mental ailments resulting in great trouble coping with even the basic daily tasks of life: Naziel-Wilson v. Providence Health Care and another, 2014 BCHRT 170, at para. 21.
[24] Without doubting the existence of Ms. Loutit’s various traumas associated with the Ministry’s actions related to her refusal to get vaccinated and her attempt to return to work in May 2023, the evidence in this case does not rise to the level of disability precluding her from filing necessary to attract the public interest. The evidence indicates that despite her mental health challenges, Ms. Loutit was able to seek exemptions from vaccination under various categories and file and participate in union grievances for mistreatment during the relevant timeframe. Given this level of participation in other avenues of redress, I am not convinced that Ms. Loutit was precluded from filing a complaint with the Tribunal due to her mental disability. As a result, I do not find this reason for late filing particularly compelling.
[25] I have also considered Ms. Loutit’s comment that she felt sufficiently validated by the arbitrator’s mid 2023 decision to file a complaint. While appreciating Ms. Loutit’s honesty in waiting to file a complaint until after an arbitrator found discrimination under the Code, this is not a compelling reason to allow her complaint to proceed late filed. The Tribunal has repeatedly said that pursuing another process does not suspend the time limit under the Code, on its own, to relieve against the time limit: Sones v. District of Squamish, 2016 BCHRT 99 at para. 44 and Devitt and Hargrove obo others v. School District No. 43 and another, 2011 BCHRT 218 at paras. 20-21. While recognizing that the outcome of Ms. Loutit’s grievance gave her confidence to bring this complaint, that is not an appropriate reason to depart from this principle in this complaint.
[26] Ms. Loutit also claims that she was confused by the various processes available to her to seek redress for the negative effects related to deciding not to get the COVID-19 vaccination. Without explaining why, Ms. Loutit says that she thought she had to wait for the outcome of the grievance arbitration before starting this complaint. She notes that little guidance was provided to her by the employer or union regarding disputing the Ministry’s decision to put her on leave without pay for not getting vaccinated.
[27] Ignorance of the Code, or the time required to become aware of one’s rights, is generally not an acceptable reason, on its own, for the delay in filing: Rashead v. Vereschagin (No. 2), 2006 BCHRT 74 at para. 12; Ferrier v. BCAA, 2009 BCHRT 412at para. 31. In this case, Ms. Loutit appears to admit that she was ignorant of the Code and timeline for filing a complaint. However, she had not provided any evidence indicating an inability to access information about her rights under the Code and the Tribunal’s process should she have decided to pursue this complaint in tandem with her grievance. While acknowledging a lack of guidance from the employer and union about filing with the Tribunal, in my view such guidance is not for someone capable of learning about her rights on her own. Without more information from Ms. Loutit as to how being self-represented affected her ignorance of his rights under the Code, I do not find this reason attracts the public interest in allowing her late filed complaint to proceed.
[28] Ms. Loutit further submits that the fear of losing her job as reprisal for filing a complaint was a reason for her late filing. I am not persuaded that it is in the public interest to accept this late-filed complaint because of Ms. Loutit’s fear of the consequences of filing. Section 43 of the Code protects individuals against retaliation for filing a complaint. With this protection in place, I do not find absent exceptional circumstances the fear of a potential retaliation can generally be considered as being in the public interest to accept a late-filed complaint: Mullholland v. City of Vancouver, 2015 BCRHT 170 at para 52; Fehr and another v. Alexander Laidlaw Housing Co-operative, 2012 BCHRT 232 at para 16; and Kafer v. Sleep Country Canada and another, 2013 BCHRT 137 at para 29. In this case, Ms. Loutit has not provided any reasons for fearing retaliation by the Ministry if she filed a complaint with the Tribunal. Such a fear does not seem to have deterred her from filing a grievance and appealing the arbitrator’s award to the Labour Relations Board.
[29] In determining whether acceptance of a late-filed complaint is in the public interest, the Tribunal also considers whether there is anything particularly unique, novel, or unusual about the complaint that has not been addressed in other complaints: Hau v. SFU Student Services and others, 2014 BCHRT 10 at para. 22; Bains v. Advanced Air Supply and others, 2013 BCHRT 74 at para. 22; Mathieu v. Victoria Shipyards and others, 2010 BCHRT 224 at para. 60. Where a complaint raises a novel issue on behalf of a vulnerable group, which advances the purposes of the Code, this factor may weigh in favour of finding a public interest in accepting the complaint: Mzite at paras. 65-66. The Tribunal has considered gaps in its jurisprudence, on the one hand, and the existence of good precedents, on the other hand, in determining whether to permit a complaint to proceed: Mzite at para. 67.
[30] Ms. Loutit argues the public interest is strongly engaged because her complaint involves serious issues involving political belief, religion and disability. She also references privacy breaches and the union’s failure to fulfil its obligations as further harms. I appreciate Ms. Loutit’s concerns about access to justice for alleged harms in this case, however, I am not satisfied that her complaint raises a novel issue that should be heard by the Tribunal to advance the purposes of the Code. Complaints involving various personal characteristics in the context of COVID-19 vaccinations in the employment setting are being heard at the Tribunal in significant numbers, see for example: Sharp v. Vancouver Island Health Authority, 2025 BCHRT 227.
[31] I have also considered the public interest in allowing this complaint to proceed where a decision concerning discrimination under the Code in this matter has already been rendered by an arbitrator with jurisdiction over this issue. While appreciating Ms. Loutit does not believe the human rights issues were fully canvassed in the previous decision, in my view she has already received justice in this matter which diminishes the prospect of there being any public interest in allowing this complaint to proceed late filed.
[32] For these reasons, I do not find that it is in the public interest to accept the late-filed complaint, and I need not address the issue of whether substantial prejudice would result.
IV. CONCLUSION
[33] For these reasons, the complaint is not accepted for filing.
Steven Adamson
Tribunal Member