Carnes v. Trans Mountain Canada Ltd. and others (No.2), 2026 BCHRT 14
Date Issued: January 8, 2026
File: CS-009179
Indexed as: Carnes v. Trans Mountain Canada Ltd. and others (No.2), 2026 BCHRT 14
IN THE MATTER OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS CODE,
RSBC 1996, c. 210 (as amended)
AND IN THE MATTER of a complaint before
the British Columbia Human Rights Tribunal
BETWEEN:
Lindsay Carnes
COMPLAINANT
AND:
Trans Mountain Canada Ltd. and Trans Mountain Pipeline ULC and Trans Mountain Corporation and Adecco Employment Services Ltd dba Roevin
RESPONDENTS
REASONS FOR DECISION
APPLICATION TO DEFER A COMPLAINT
Section 25
Tribunal Member: Devyn Cousineau
Counsel for the Complainant: Ian Kennedy
Counsel for Trans Mountain: Emily MacKinnon
Counsel for Adecco Employment Services: Paul S. Schwartzman
I INTRODUCTION
[1] Lindsay Carnes filed a human rights complaint against Adecco Employment Services Ltd dba as Roevin [Roevin], Trans Mountain Ltd., Trans Mountain Pipeline ULC and Trans Mountain Corporation [collectively, Trans Mountain].[1] In a decision dated October 15, 2025, I dismissed the complaint against Trans Mountain on the basis that it was a federal undertaking and outside the jurisdiction of this Tribunal: Carnes v. Trans Mountain Canada Ltd. and others, 2025 BCHRT 243 [Dismissal Decision]. I said that the Tribunal’s jurisdiction over the remaining complaint against Roevin was an “open question”, which would be decided following further submissions.
[2] On October 28, 2025, Ms. Carnes filed (1) an amendment to her complaint, and (2) an application for reconsideration of the Dismissal Decision based on the new information set out in the amendment. On November 12, she filed an application to defer the Tribunal’s process pending the resolution of her complaints to the Canadian Human Rights Commission [CHRC Complaints]. That is the application currently before me.
[3] Ms. Carnes argues that the CHRC Complaints are capable of appropriately dealing with the substance of the complaint: Human Rights Code, s. 25. She says that it is fair and efficient for this Tribunal to await a resolution of those complaints, to avoid inconsistent decision making and duplication of resources. Both Roevin and Trans Mountain oppose deferral.
[4] For the reasons that follow, the application to defer is denied. The Tribunal’s process will continue.
II Decision
[5] The Tribunal has discretion under s. 25(2) of the Code to defer further consideration of a complaint if it is satisfied that another proceeding is capable of dealing appropriately with its substance. The burden of establishing that another proceeding is capable of appropriately dealing with the substance of the complaint is on the party seeking the deferral – here, Ms. Carnes: Copeland v. B.C. (Min. of Public Safety and Solicitor General), 2006 BCHRT 383 at para. 17.
[6] The Tribunal’s authority to defer a complaint under s. 25(2) arises out of a legislative intent that its resources should not be expended if it would result in needless duplication of the other proceeding’s adjudicative resources: Young v. Coast Mountain Bus Company Ltd., 2003 BCHRT 28 at para. 21.
[7] Deferral of a complaint is a temporary measure. After the outcome of the other proceeding, the Tribunal determines whether the substance of the complaint has, in fact, been appropriately dealt with. At that time the Tribunal decides whether the complaint should proceed or whether it should be dismissed, either in whole or in part: Young at para. 20.
[8] In deciding whether to exercise its discretion under s. 25(2), the Tribunal considers factors including the nature and subject matter of the other proceeding, the adequacies of the remedies available in the other proceeding, the status of the other proceeding in relation to the status of the complaint, fairness to the parties, and the public interest: Young at para. 19.
[9] In this case, Ms. Carnes asks the Tribunal to defer submissions and adjudication of two applications pending “further developments” in parallel complaints she has filed with the CHRC. Those applications are (1) her application to reconsider the Tribunal’s decision to dismiss the complaint against Trans Mountain, and (2) Roevin’s application to dismiss her complaint for lack of jurisdiction. Ms. Carnes says that her CHRC Complaints may render one or both applications moot, presumably if the CHRC accepts jurisdiction and allows those complaints to proceed.
[10] At a high level, I accept that parallel human rights proceedings at the CHRC may be capable of dealing with the substance of Ms. Carnes’ human rights complaint: Olawa v. Loxterkamp and others (No. 3), 2007 BCHRT 216. While Ms. Carnes did not attach her CHRC Complaints with her application (as required by Rule 16(3)), she did so in her reply. It is apparent that the nature and subject matter of the CHRC Complaints overlap entirely with this human rights complaint. Both arise out of the same employment, cover the same facts and time period, and make the same allegations of discrimination. Proceedings under the Canadian Human Rights Act offer adequate remedies to address any discrimination.
[11] In this case, Ms. Carnes is not seeking the wholesale deferral of her complaint pending the resolution of her CHRC Complaints on their merits. Rather, as I understand it, she wants the Tribunal to wait for the CHRC to decide whether it will take jurisdiction over her complaints against Roevin and/or Trans Mountain. If it does, then I understand she may no longer want to pursue parallel proceedings at the BC Tribunal. This narrower view of the issue supports that proceedings at the CHRC may be capable of dealing with the substance of the human rights complaint – if it takes jurisdiction.
[12] However, on balance, I agree with the Respondents it would not be fair or in the public interest to defer the Tribunal’s proceedings indefinitely, pending “developments” in the CHRC Complaints (which I take to mean decisions about jurisdiction). A significant consideration is the public and private interest in the timely resolution of human rights complaints: Complainant X v. BC (Ministry of Children and Family Development) and another (No. 2), 2012 BCHRT 98 at para. 24; Kempling v. Quesnel School District No. 28, 2005 BCHRT 134 at para. 74.
[13] The CHRC Complaints are at a much more preliminary stage than proceedings before this Tribunal. This is not surprising, given that Ms. Carnes filed her complaints as follows:
a. March 8, 2023: complaint to BC Human Rights Tribunal,
b. March 4, 2024: complaint to CHRC against Trans Mountain, and
c. December 2, 2025: complaint to CHRC against Roevin.
[14] When it filed its response, Roevin had not even seen the CHRC Complaint against it. It is unclear whether Trans Mountain had seen the complaint against it; possibly not. Neither of the Respondents have been invited to participate in the CHRC process yet. Ms. Carnes says that she has been asking the CHRC for “timelines”, but the CHRC has not yet responded.
[15] In contrast, this Tribunal has already decided that it does not have jurisdiction against Trans Mountain. This decision is final, subject to Ms. Carnes’ application for reconsideration. Reconsideration is a narrow power, which will not involve the re-litigation of issues that were before the Tribunal, or could have been before the Tribunal, when it made the Dismissal Decision: Ramadan v. Kwantlen Polytechnic University and another (No. 2), 2018 BCHRT 56 at para. 13. I appreciate that Ms. Carnes is seeking to avoid the costs of filing a reply in this application if the CHRC takes jurisdiction over her complaint against Trans Mountain. However, I am not persuaded this is a basis to delay this potentially final step in the Tribunal’s process for an indefinite time. Doing so would undermine the timely resolution of the complaint in this forum.
[16] Regarding Roevin, the Tribunal has decided it will seek submissions about its jurisdiction. Given that Ms. Carnes only recently filed her CHRC Complaint against Roevin, it seems reasonable to expect that this Tribunal will decide this jurisdictional issue well before the CHRC. Waiting for an indefinite period for the CHRC to decide its jurisdiction would inject unnecessary delay into this Tribunal’s process. This would undermine the public interest in timely resolution of human rights complaints.
[17] In support of her application, Ms. Carnes cites cases where the Tribunal has deferred its process pending the outcome of parallel federal human rights proceedings: Olawa and Sjoblom v. Seabird Island Indian Band, 2012 BCHRT 80. The principles in those decisions are uncontroversial, and I accept them. However, they cannot be taken to stand for the proposition that this Tribunal will always defer its proceedings where there are parallel federal proceedings. Deferral is assessed on a case-by-case basis, with a goal to the just and timely resolution of human rights complaints. In this case, given the relative status of Ms. Carnes’ federal and provincial human rights complaints, deferral at this stage would undermine rather than support the just and timely resolution of the complaint. In my view, Ms. Carnes’ concerns about duplicative proceedings, judicial economy, and costs can be addressed just as effectively in the CHRC’s process, taking into account the earlier resolution of jurisdictional issues in this forum. Ms. Carnes does not suggest otherwise.
[18] Ms. Carnes has not persuaded me to defer this complaint process.
III Conclusion
[19] The application to defer the Tribunal’s process is denied. In reaching this conclusion, I have not found it necessary to address Trans Mountain’s arguments about the Tribunal’s jurisdiction to decide the deferral application.
[20] The Tribunal will proceed with submissions on Ms. Carnes’ application for reconsideration, and Roevin’s application to dismiss the complaint.
Devyn Cousineau
Vice Chair
[1] Trans Mountain says there is no entity called “Trans Mountain Corporation”. I do not need to address or resolve this issue in my decision.