Siddall v. Daajing Giids Thrift Shop Society and others, 2026 BCHRT 131
Date Issued: May 28, 2026
File(s): CS-007087
Indexed as: Siddall v. Daajing Giids Thrift Shop Society and others, 2026 BCHRT 131
IN THE MATTER OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS CODE,
RSBC 1996, c. 210 (as amended)
AND IN THE MATTER of a complaint before
the British Columbia Human Rights Tribunal
BETWEEN:
Alma-Rose Siddall
COMPLAINANT
AND:
Daajing Giids Thrift Shop Society and Heather George and Joan Wilson
RESPONDENTS
REASONS FOR DECISION
APPLICATION TO DISMISS A COMPLAINT
Section 27(1)(c)
Tribunal Member: Ijeamaka Anika
For the Complainant: No submissions
Counsel for the Respondents: Anil Aggarwal
I INTRODUCTION
[1] On June 17, 2022, Alma-Rose Siddall filed a complaint against Daajing Giids Thrift Shop Society, Heather George, and Joan Wilson [the Respondents]. In her complaint she alleges that the Respondents discriminated against her in employment based on mental disability contrary to s. 13 of the Human Rights Code. Ms. Siddall alleges she volunteered at the Daajing Giids Thrift Shop Society [the Society] in 2021. She says the Respondents created a disrespectful environment toward people with disabilities and dismissed her from her volunteer role for disability-related reasons.
[2] The Respondents deny discriminating and apply to dismiss Ms. Siddall’s complaint.
[3] This decision relates to the Respondents’ application to dismiss Ms. Siddall’s complaint without a hearing because they say there is no reasonable prospect it can succeed against them: Code, s. 27(1)(c). The Respondents also apply to dismiss the complaint against Ms. George and Ms. Wilson [the Individual Respondents] under s. 27(1)(d)(ii) of the Code. They argue that proceeding against the individual respondents would not further the purposes of the Code.
[4] Despite written directions from the Tribunal, Ms. Siddall did not respond to this application. The deadline for her response was May 29, 2025. On June 3, 2025, the Respondents asked the Tribunal whether Ms. Siddall had filed a response. On June 9, 2025, Ms. Siddall replied to the Respondents and the Tribunal stating that she had not, without seeking an extension or explaining the delay. That same day, the Tribunal wrote to the parties confirming the deadline had passed for Ms. Siddall’s response to the dismissal application and informing Ms. Siddall that if she wished to file a late response, she would need to seek permission and explain the delay. She has not done so. I am satisfied, on the materials before me, that Ms. Siddall had notice of the complaint response, the Tribunal’s Case Path Pilot letter setting out the parties’ positions, and the dismissal application, and that she had the opportunity to respond.
[5] I find that I can efficiently decide the Respondents’ application under s. 27(1)(c). For the following reasons, I grant the application and dismiss the complaint. To make this decision, I have considered all the information filed by the parties. In these reasons, I only refer to what is necessary to explain my decision. I make no findings of fact.
[6] Before I explain my decision, I address a preliminary issue. Under the Case Path Pilot, the Tribunal permitted the Respondents to file their dismissal application under s. 27(1)(c) and/or s. 27(1)(d)(ii). The Respondents filed their application under s. 27(1)(b), (c) and (d)(ii). The Tribunal will generally not consider dismissal on grounds other than those it permitted under the Case Path Pilot. There may be a narrow exception if the Tribunal decides it promotes the fair and timely resolution of the complaint to do so. The Tribunal exercises this discretion sparingly: Ibrahim v. The Owners, Strata Plan LMS 1222 and another, 2024 BCHRT 183 at para. 5. I decline to exercise that discretion here and have not considered the Respondents’ submissions on s. 27(1)(b).
II BACKGROUND
[7] This background is taken from the materials filed by the parties. Where there are disputes in the evidence, I indicate it below.
[8] The Society is a non-profit society that operates a thrift shop. On June 17, 2022, Ms. Siddal filed her complaint against the Queen Charlotte Thrift Shop Society. The Society says that on October 30, 2022, it changed its name from the Queen Charlotte Thrift Shop Society to the Daajing Giids Thrift Shop Society. The Tribunal accepted the complaint as properly filed against the Society. A Board of Directors governs the Society, and its mandate is carried out with the assistance of volunteers.
[9] At the time of the alleged discriminatory incidents, Ms. George was the Society’s chairperson and secretary-treasurer in 2021, and Ms. Wilson was the Society’s volunteer co-ordinator.
[10] Ms. Siddal identifies as a person with mental. Ms. Siddall volunteered at the Society’s thrift shop. However, there is a dispute about when she volunteered and specifically, whether she was a volunteer in 2021 when she says the Respondents discriminated against her.
[11] Ms. Siddall says that on or around October 28, 2021, Ms. Wilson telephoned her after her shift and dismissed her as a volunteer because she was “challenging to work with” and because the Respondents had decided to prioritize other volunteers.
[12] Ms. Siddall says that on the same day, after her conversations with Ms. Wilson, she called Ms. George to find out more information about her dismissal. She says Ms. George told her that “it takes somebody special to work with someone like you” and that Ms. Siddall was overly social and chatty at the store.
[13] The Respondents dispute that Ms. Siddall was a volunteer at the Society in 2021. They say that Ms. Siddall was a volunteer at the Society between 2015 and 2016, but she has not volunteered since then. They say that Ms. Siddal attended the store from time to time as a customer after her volunteer position ended. The Respondents do not address Ms. Siddall’s account of the October 28, 2021, telephone calls or the circumstances that led to the end of Ms. Siddall’s volunteer work at the thrift shop.
III DECISION
[14] The Respondents apply to dismiss Ms. Siddall’s complaint on the basis that it has no reasonable prospect of success: Code, s. 27(1)(c). The onus is on the Respondents to establish the basis for dismissal.
[15] Section 27(1)(c) is part of the Tribunal’s gate-keeping function. It allows the Tribunal to remove complaints which do not warrant the time and expense of a hearing.
[16] The Tribunal does not make findings of fact under s. 27(1)(c). Instead, the Tribunal looks at the evidence to decide whether “there is no reasonable prospect that findings of fact that would support the complaint could be made on a balance of probabilities after a full hearing of the evidence”: Berezoutskaia v. British Columbia (Human Rights Tribunal), 2006 BCCA 95 at para. 22, leave to appeal ref’d [2006] SCCA No. 171. The Tribunal must base its decision on the materials filed by the parties, and not on speculation about what evidence may be filed at the hearing: University of British Columbia v. Chan,2013 BCSC 942 at para. 77.
[17] A dismissal application is not the same as a hearing: Lord v. Fraser Health Authority,2021 BCSC 2176 at para. 20; SEPQA v. Canadian Human Rights Commission,[1989] 2 SCR 879 at 899. The threshold to advance a complaint to a hearing is low. In a dismissal application, a complainant does not have to prove their complaint or show the Tribunal all the evidence they may introduce at a hearing. They only have to show that the evidence takes their complaint out of the realm of conjecture: Workers’ Compensation Appeal Tribunal v. Hill, 2011 BCCA 49 [Hill] at para. 27.
[18] To prove her complaint at a hearing, Ms. Siddall will have to prove that she has a characteristic protected by the Code, she was adversely impacted in employment, and her protected characteristic was a factor in the adverse impact: Moore v. British Columbia (Education), 2012 SCC 61 at para. 33. If she did that, the burden would shift the Respondents to justify the impact as a bona fide reasonable justification. If the impact is justified, there is no discrimination.
[19] For the reasons that follow, I am persuaded that there is no reasonable prospect that Ms. Siddall can prove at a hearing that she was discriminated against based on disability in employment.
[20] Before turning to the analysis, I observe that the parties have placed limited materials before me on which to decide this application. The Respondents rely on a brief unsworn statement from Ms. George that does not address the conversations Ms. Siddall alleges took place on October 28, 2021. Ms. Siddall, on the other hand, has filed no response to this application. The only material on the record from her is her complaint.
[21] While the Tribunal may prefer sworn statements, there is no strict requirement for such in respect of a preliminary application: Larssen v. City of Port Coquitlam and others (No. 2), 2005 BCHRT 548, at para. 18. It is up to the parties to submit the information they consider important in the form they consider appropriate: Bell v. Dr. Sherk and others, 2003 BCHRT 63, at paras. 25-26. The Tribunal will not disregard a party’s materials solely because they are unsworn: Wright v. Coast Mountain Bus Company and others, 2014 BCHRT 73, at para 15.
[22] As stated above, Ms. Siddall received notice of the Respondents’ materials in this dismissal application, and I am satisfied that she had an opportunity to put forward any evidence or arguments she considered relevant to meet the low threshold required at this stage. She did not. Beyond the allegations in her complaint, she has not provided any particulars regarding her allegations.
[23] To succeed at the hearing, Ms. Siddall would need to show that her mental disability was a factor in the alleged adverse impact: Moore, at para. 33. On the low threshold required at this stage, I accept that Ms. Siddall may be able to prove that she has a disability and experienced an adverse impact.
[24] The issue I have to decide is whether Ms. Siddall has a reasonable prospect of proving her disability was a factor in the alleged adverse impact. The adverse impact Ms. Siddall alleges are twofold. First, she says that Ms. Willson telephoned her after her volunteer shift and dismissed her from her volunteer position, citing that she was “challenging to work with and that the Society was prioritizing other applicants.” Second, she says that when she telephoned Ms. George about the dismissal, Ms. George told her that “it takes somebody special to work with someone like you” and suggested that Ms. Siddall had been overly social and chatty at the thrift store.
[25] Ms. Siddall does not explain how disability was a factor in Ms. Wilson and Ms. George’s comments to her. The comments do not, on their face, refer to her disabilities, and Ms. Siddall has not explained how being perceived as “challenging to work with” or overly social and chatty is connected to her disabilities. Ms. Siddall does not say whether she disclosed her disabilities to the Respondents, whether her disabilities were visible or otherwise apparent to them, other that there were any other circumstances that should have alerted them to a possible disability.
[26] I do not accept that this type of connection can be inferred without additional evidence or explanation. For such an inference to hold based on the information before me, I would need to make assumptions about how people with disabilities behave. The Tribunal cannot make this type of stereotypical assumption: Harris v. Rize Alliance Properties and another, 2019 BCHRT 223 at para. 40; Scott v. BFI Constructors Ltd., 2025 BCHRT 286, at para 14; see also Stewart v. Elk Valley Coal Corp., 2017 SCC 30 at para. 39.
[27] On the materials before me, there is no reasonable prospect that Ms. Siddall could prove at a hearing that her mental disability was a factor in the alleged adverse impact.
[28] I make one closing observation about the materials the Respondents filed in support of this application. The Respondents bore the onus on this application. However, the materials they submitted, consisting only of a brief unsworn statement from one named Respondent, did not address the conversations Ms. Siddall alleges occurred on October 28, 2021, and were materially less than what the Tribunal would ordinarily expect on a dismissal application of this nature. The result I have reached reflects Ms. Siddall’s failure, having received the dismissal application, to respond or develop her case beyond the allegations in her complaint. As I stated above, I must only consider the evidence before me and cannot speculate about what evidence might be called at hearing: Chan at para. 77 This should not be read as endorsing the sufficiency of the materials the Respondents put before me.
[29] Accordingly, on the materials before me, I am satisfied that Ms. Siddall’s complaint has not reasonable prospect of success.
IV CONCLUSION
[30] The Respondents’ application is granted. The complaint is dismissed under s. 27(1)(c).
Ijeamaka Anika
Tribunal Member
Human Rights Tribunal