Child R (by Mother R) v. Girl Guides of Canada, 2026 BCHRT 123
Date Issued: May 20, 2026
File(s): CS-005431
Indexed as: Child R (by Mother R) v. Girl Guides of Canada, 2026 BCHRT 123
IN THE MATTER OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS CODE,
RSBC 1996, c. 210 (as amended)
AND IN THE MATTER of a complaint before
the British Columbia Human Rights Tribunal
BETWEEN:
Child R (by Mother R)
COMPLAINANT
AND:
Girl Guides of Canada
RESPONDENT
REASONS FOR DECISION
APPLICATION TO DISMISS A COMPLAINT
Section 27(1)(c)
Tribunal Member: Ijeamaka Anika
Advocate for the Complainant: Mother R
Counsel for the Respondent: Dionne H. Liu
I INTRODUCTION
[1] This decision is about whether to dismiss Child R’s human rights complaint without a hearing.
[2] Child R was a member of Girl Guides of Canada for nine years, including as a member of the Trex program, which focuses on outdoor activities such as hiking, camping, and wilderness skills. In October 2021, Girl Guides implemented a national COVID-19 vaccine policy requiring all members aged 12 and older to be fully vaccinated against COVID-19 in order to participate in in-person activities. Child R was 12 years old at the time. Because she was not vaccinated and did not provide documentation of a qualifying medical exemption, she was unable to continue participating in Girl Guides’ in-person activities. Her mother, Mother R, filed this complaint on her behalf.
[3] This complaint alleges that Girl Guides’ vaccine policy discriminated against Child R in services customarily available to the public on the basis of her physical disability, religion, and age, contrary to s. 8 of the Human Rights Code.
[4] Girl Guides denies discriminating. It applies to dismiss the complaint on the basis that it has no reasonable prospect of success: Code, s. 27(1)(c). It submits that the adverse impact Child R experienced was not connected to any protected characteristic. It further submits that even if discrimination were established, it had a bona fide reasonable justification for its vaccine policy and could not reasonably accommodate Child R without incurring undue hardship.
[5] For the following reasons, I am satisfied that this complaint has no reasonable prospect of success. The application to dismiss is granted, and the complaint is dismissed.
[6] To make this decision, I have considered all the information filed by the parties. In these reasons, I only refer to what is necessary to explain my decision. I make no findings of fact.
II ANONYMIZATION
[7] No party sought an order to limit publication. I have decided to exercise my discretion under the Tribunal’s Rules of Practice and Procedure [Rules], Rules 2(1) and 5(6), to limit publication of the names of Child R and Mother R.
[8] Complaints at the Tribunal are presumptively public: Mother A obo Child B v. School District C, 2015 BCHRT 64 at para. 7. This openness serves four main goals: maintaining an effective evidentiary process, ensuring that Tribunal Members act fairly, promoting public confidence in the Tribunal, and educating the public about the Tribunal’s process and development of the law: Edmonton Journal v. Alberta (Attorney General), 1989 CanLII 20 (SCC), [1989] 2 SCR 1326 at para. 61; JY v. Various Waxing Salons, 2019 BCHRT 106 at para. 25. These goals align with the purposes of the Code, which include fostering a more equitable society and identifying and eliminating persistent patterns of inequality: Code, s. 3. The main way that the Tribunal furthers these purposes is through its public decisions: A. v. Famous Players Inc., 2005 BCHRT 432 at para. 14.
[9] The Tribunal has discretion to limit publication of identifying information where a person can show their privacy interests outweigh the public interest in full access to the Tribunal’s proceedings: Rule 5(6); Stein v. British Columbia (Human Rights Tribunal), 2020 BCSC 70 at para. 64(a). The Tribunal may consider factors like the stage of the proceedings, the nature of the allegations, private details in the complaint, harm to reputation, or any other potential harm: JY at para. 30.
[10] The Tribunal presumes that a minor’s privacy interests outweigh the public interest in accessing the Tribunal’s proceedings: Rule 5(7). This presumption recognizes the “unique vulnerability for people in their formative years” and protects the ability of a young person to control their sensitive personal information: Johnson Sr. and AB (by Johnson Sr.) v. Vancouver Police Board, 2021 BCHRT 102 at para. 35; Sherman Estate v. Donovan, 2021 SCC 25 at para. 65. In Mother obo Child B., the Tribunal explained:
… It is difficult enough growing up in the face of existing peer pressure without having the additional burden of adult-driven issues being superimposed in a public way in their formative years. Moreover, these issues may not be readily understood by other children and used as a tool of ridicule and hurt. While some public exposure is inevitable, broad public exposure through unrestricted publication is neither necessary nor in the Child’s best interests. [at para. 21]
[11] I am satisfied that this presumption applies here to protect the privacy interests of Child R in this decision. The issues in this complaint arose when Child R was young and concern her private medical information. She should be the one to choose, when she is old enough, whether she wants her name to be associated with this complaint. I am also satisfied that in order to ensure Child R’s privacy interests are protected, it is necessary to also anonymize and restrict publication of Mother R’s name as Child R’s representative in this proceeding.
[12] I anonymize and order a ban of publication of Child R and Mother R’s name in connection with this complaint, unless or until Child R identifies herself as a party to this complaint after she is 19 years old, in which case the publication ban will cease.
[13] In making this determination, I stress that I am protecting only the “sliver of information” that is the name of the individuals involved: CS v. British Columbia (Workers’ Compensation Appeal Tribunal), 2019 BCCA 406 at para. 37. In that sense, an order limiting publication minimally restricts the public’s access to information about the complaint, if at all.
[14] I have made this anonymization order out of an abundance of caution, recognizing that once privacy is lost, “it can seldom be regained”: R. v. O’Connor, [1995] 4 S.C.R. 41 at para. 119. If any party objects to this approach, they may raise their objection within 14 days, and I will consider submissions about whether to re-issue the decision using the parties’ names.
III BACKGROUND
[15] Girl Guides is a non-profit volunteer organization that provides girls from ages 5 to 17 with opportunities to develop confidence, leadership, and practical skills in a safe environment. Girl Guides units typically run from September to May or June, tracking the school year, and meet on a weekly basis. All unit leaders are volunteers, comprising parents, caregivers, former Girl Guides members, and community members.
[16] Child R had been a Girl Guides member since the age of 4. She was a member of the Trex program, a Girl Guides branch for members ages 12 to 17 that focuses on camping and outdoor activities. Trex units meet regularly throughout the year, sometimes indoors and sometimes outdoors, and members interact closely with each other during activities. Trex activities can include camping with shared accommodation. Child R’s family is Christian. Her private emergency record member profile [ePACT member profile],which was completed by her parents prior to the vaccine policy and available to Girl Guides, states that she has a medication allergy to NSAIDs with a notation that NSAIDs cause kidney damage and identifies Tylenol-based products as an appropriate alternative.
1. The COVID-19 Vaccine Policy
[17] A state of emergency concerning the COVID-19 pandemic was declared in March 2020, and as a result, Girl Guides suspended its in-person programs. When programs resumed in the fall of 2020, Girl Guides implemented a number of precautions, including limiting group sizes, in accordance with provincial health orders. It required masks except where members were unable to wear one for medical reasons. It also implemented physical distancing protocols, prohibited the sharing of snacks, and required completion of a COVID-19 waiver and self-assessment checklist before attending in-person activities.
[18] In September 2021, the Girl Guides Board approved a COVID-19 vaccine policy [vaccine policy]. Girl Guides says it relied on the guidance of federal and provincial health authorities regarding the utility and importance of vaccination in combatting COVID-19. According to the vaccine policy, Girl Guides required members aged 12 and older to attest that they were fully or partially vaccinated with a Health Canada approved COVID-19 vaccine by October 22, 2021. As of November 1, 2021, full vaccination was required. Members who were not vaccinated had the option of joining a virtual Girl Guides unit. Members who provided documentation of a medical exemption were exempt from the vaccination requirement. This vaccine requirement was lifted on August 31, 2022.
2. Child R and Her Family’s Interactions with Girl Guides
[19] On September 29, 2021, Girl Guides sent an email to families advising of the vaccine policy. On the same day, Mother R responded to Girl Guides stating that the vaccine policy was not lawful and that Girl Guides could be held liable for forcing a medical procedure on a child.
[20] Girl Guides received a vaccination status declaration for Child R indicating that she was exempt from vaccination. On October 6, 2021, Girl Guides wrote to Mother R advising that members claiming a medical exemption were required to provide proof of exemption documentation and requested that she provide the relevant documentation.
[21] On October 7, 2021, Mother R responded. Her email made a number of arguments about the lawfulness of the vaccine policy and the safety and efficacy of COVID-19 vaccines.
[22] On October 15, 2021, Girl Guides restated its position to Mother R that valid proof of medical exemption was required and that non-medical exemptions could not be considered. Mother R responded that Child R was at risk due to kidney disease and the vaccine ingredients and that “[Child R] is also against some of the ingredients due to religion as they do use aborted fetuses in it.” Mother R requested that Girl Guides sign a notice of liability, stating that if Girl Guides agreed to accept responsibility for any harm that might come to Child R from vaccination, the family could proceed with vaccination. Later that same day, Mother R sent two further emails. In the first, she requested that Girl Guides sign the notice of liability, reiterated safety, and efficacy concerns about the vaccine, and mentioned kidney disease and a family history of myocarditis. In the second, Mother R wrote as follows:
I am not requesting a review of an exemption under any protected grounds indicated by Health or Human Rights Acts of any kind. I am notifying Girl Guides of Canada that they have violated the supreme law of Canada… I am demanding my child attend per law. Any other requirement is breach of Canadian Law.
[23] On October 22, 2021, Mother R sent a further email stating that “Child R’s exemption is simple. This is assault,” and disputing the safety and lawfulness of the vaccine policy.
[24] On December 13, 2021, Mother R wrote to Girl Guides asking why Child R had not been reimbursed for her membership fees and stating that Child R was being discriminated against based on her religious beliefs and medical reasons, that a complaint had been filed with the Tribunal, and that no response had been received regarding exemptions on either ground. On December 15, 2021, Mother R followed up asking: “So you still don’t allow religious exemptions?” Girl Guides responded the same day confirming that the refund had been queued for processing. Girl Guides did not address the religious exemption question.
IV DECISION
[25] Girl Guides applies to dismiss this complaint on the basis that it has no reasonable prospect of success: Code, s. 27(1)(c) The onus is on Girl Guides to establish the basis for dismissal.
[26] Section 27(1)(c) is part of the Tribunal’s gate-keeping function. It allows the Tribunal to remove complaints which do not warrant the time and expense of a hearing.
[27] The Tribunal does not make findings of fact under s. 27(1)(c). Instead, the Tribunal looks at the evidence to decide whether “there is no reasonable prospect that findings of fact that would support the complaint could be made on a balance of probabilities after a full hearing of the evidence”: Berezoutskaia v. British Columbia (Human Rights Tribunal), 2006 BCCA 95 at para. 22, leave to appeal ref’d [2006] SCCA No. 171. The Tribunal must base its decision on the materials filed by the parties, and not on speculation about what evidence may be filed at the hearing: University of British Columbia v. Chan,2013 BCSC 942 at para. 77.
[28] A dismissal application is not the same as a hearing: Lord v. Fraser Health Authority,2021 BCSC 2176 at para. 20; SEPQA v. Canadian Human Rights Commission,[1989] 2 SCR 879 at 899. The threshold to advance a complaint to a hearing is low. In a dismissal application, a complainant does not have to prove their complaint or show the Tribunal all the evidence they may introduce at a hearing. They only have to show that the evidence takes their complaint out of the realm of conjecture: Workers’ Compensation Appeal Tribunal v. Hill, 2011 BCCA 49 [Hill] at para. 27.
[29] Many human rights complaints raise issues of credibility. This is not, by itself, a sufficient reason to deny an application to dismiss: Evans v. University of British Columbia, 2008 BCSC 1026 at para. 34. However, if there are foundational or key issues of credibility, the complaint must go to a hearing: Francescutti v. Vancouver (City), 2017 BCCA 242 at para 67.
A. Is there no reasonable prospect that Child R will prove her case?
[30] Girl Guides argues that there is no reasonable prospect that Child R would be able to prove that her protected characteristics were a factor in the alleged adverse impacts she experienced.
[31] To prove her complaint at a hearing, Child R will have to prove that she has the characteristics protected by the Code, she was adversely impacted in services, and her protected characteristics were a factor in the adverse impact: Moore v. British Columbia (Education), 2012 SCC 61 at para. 33. If she does that, the burden will shift to Girl Guides to justify the impact as a bona fide reasonable justification. If the impact is justified, there is no discrimination.
[32] I will consider each allegation of discrimination in turn. As I explain below, I am satisfied that the complaint has no reasonable prospect of establishing discrimination on any of the three grounds advanced. However, in respect of the disability and religion grounds, I address bona fide reasonable justification as an alternative finding.
1. Age
[33] The Code defines “age” as a person who is 19 years of age or older: s. 1. Child R was 12 years old at the time of the alleged adverse impact.
[34] Child R argues that the vaccine policy’s age cutoff at 12 was arbitrary and medically unjustified, noting that younger children were also eligible for vaccination by November 2021 but were not subject to the same requirement. This does not engage a protected characteristic under the Code. A complainant cannot establish age discrimination under the Code without first establishing that they are 19 years of age or older. On this basis, Child R did not have the protected characteristic of age at the relevant time.
[35] The age ground has no reasonable prospect of success and is dismissed.
2. Discrimination based on physical disability
[36] The Code protects against discrimination on the basis of physical disability. In the reasons that follow, Girl Guides has persuaded me that Child R has no reasonable prospect of proving that she had a disability within the meaning of the Code that was connected to her decision to refuse the COVID-19.
[37] A person alleging disability-based discrimination arising from a requirement to be vaccinated must prove they have a disability under the Code: Maatz v. Interior Health Authority, 2026 BCHRT 27, at para 25. The Code does not protect people who refuse to get vaccinated as a matter of personal preference, because they do not believe in the efficacy of vaccinations, or because they disagree with the requirement to be vaccinated: Lavoie v. Fraser Health Authority, 2025 BCHRT 8 at para. 16.
[38] To establish discrimination on this ground, Child R must show a reasonable prospect of proving that she has a physical disability within the meaning of the Code which was connected to her decision not to take the vaccine.
[39] There is no dispute at this stage that Child R may have a disability. The issue is whether Child R can prove at the hearing that her physical disability prevented her from receiving the COVID-19 vaccine. In this complaint, that requires evidence capable of connecting Child R’s kidney condition to her decision not to receive the COVID-19 vaccine. In my view, she has not provided such evidence.
[40] On the materials before me, Child R did not produce any documentation or other evidence to Girl Guides at the time, or in this proceeding to demonstrate that how her kidney condition impacted her decision not to receiving the COVID-19 vaccine. Child R asserts that there was limited or no research on the effects of the COVID-19 vaccine on children with kidney disease, and that her parents consulted with healthcare professionals about the risk-to-benefit ratio. These assertions are not supported by any documentation in the materials before me capable of taking a complaint out of the realm of conjecture. In this application, I can only base my decision on the materials filed by the parties, and not on speculation about what evidence may be filed at the hearing: Chan, at para. 77.
[41] Child R further argues that Girl Guides had effective notice of her disability through the ePACT member profile and should have accepted that information in lieu of formal exemption documentation. I acknowledge that Girl Guides was aware of the NSAID allergy notation prior to implementing its vaccine policy. The problem is that this evidence could not support a finding that Child R’s disability was connected to her decision not to take the vaccine.
[42] Although decided in the employment context, the Tribunal’s jurisprudence on the viability of a disability‑based refusal to vaccinate is illustrative on this point. In Sharp v. Vancouver Island Health Authority, 2025 BCHRT 227, the Tribunal declined to dismiss the disability ground because the complainant provided medical evidence to Vancouver Island Health Authority in the form of a detailed letter from her treating physician explaining her rare and serious vascular condition, the precarious nature of her cerebral circulation, her profound fear of catastrophic consequences from vaccination, and a specific request for deferral pending further study. By contrast, in Bruneau v. Port Coquitlam Senior Citizens’ Housing Society, 2025 BCHRT 22, the Tribunal found that a complainant with a severe arterial malformation had not produced evidence capable of establishing a connection between her disability and her decision not to take the COVID-19 vaccine and that complaint was dismissed. Likewise, in Maatz, the Tribunal found that the medical information did not support the complainant’s position that she had a Code-protected disability that was connected to her decision to refuse the COVID-19 vaccine.
[43] Like the complainants in Bruneau and Maatz, Child R has not produced evidence capable of establishing a connection between her condition and her refusal to receive the vaccine. What the materials contain is a medication allergy notation on Child R’s ePACT member profile, a series of parental assertions in correspondence about kidney risk and vaccine safety, and Mother R’s submissions about the absence of research on pediatric kidney conditions and COVID-19 vaccines. None of this supports a finding that Child R had a Code-protected disability that was connected with her decision to refuse the vaccine.
[44] The evidence could not support a finding that she had a disability that was connected to her decision not to comply with the vaccine policy. This means that Child R has no reasonable prospect of proving discrimination connected to her physical disability.
3. Discrimination based on religious-belief
[45] The Code protects against discrimination on the basis of religion. To establish discrimination based on religion, the complainant must show a reasonable prospect of proving: the belief that informed their decision not to take the vaccine has a connection to religion, and the belief is sincerely held: Syndicat Northcrest v. Amselem, 2004 SCC 47 at paras. 56 and 69. A complainant need not prove that their belief is objectively required by their religion, or that it is recognized as valid by other members of the same faith. The freedom encompasses both obligatory and voluntary expressions of faith, and a sincerely held personal belief is sufficient: Amselem at paras. 43 and 47. The focus of the analysis is on the complainant’s beliefs at the time of the alleged interference with their religious freedom, rather than on their past practices or beliefs: Amselem at para. 53.
[46] The Tribunal has also recently stated that a religious objection to the COVID-19 vaccine founded on a belief that it was developed using fetal cells is capable of constituting a Code-protected religious belief, notwithstanding that the factual premise may be disputed or that mainstream Christian leadership has not endorsed vaccine refusal on those grounds: Sharp, at para 21and Mondejar v. Provincial Health Services Authority, 2026 BCHRT 7 at para 34. Both decisions also state that mixed motivations do not defeat a claim of discrimination based on religious belief because it is not necessary for religious belief to be the only reason a complainant refused the vaccine: Mondejar at para. 27; Sharp at para 26.
[47] The question in this application is whether, on the materials before me, it is more than conjecture that Child R’s religious belief was a factor in the adverse impact she experienced.
[48] I am not satisfied that the materials support that conclusion, for the reasons that follow.
[49] Child R’s response to this application describes the family’s religious beliefs and practices in some detail. It states that Child R is a Junior Soldier of Christian faith within the Salvation Army, that she has taken an oath to honour her parents, that the family prays together and prayed specifically about the vaccine, that God directed them not to vaccinate, and that taking the vaccine would violate the sanctity of the body as God’s temple and would implicate them in conduct they regard as equivalent to murder.
[50] I accept, as a general matter, that Child R’s religious belief could engage religious protection under the Code. The difficulty is with whether Child R has a reasonable prospect of proving her religious belief was a factor in the adverse treatment she experienced. On the materials before me, I am not satisfied that she is.
[51] In Sharp, the Tribunal stated that a religious objection to the COVID-19 vaccine founded on a belief that it was developed using fetal cells is capable of triggering the protection of religious freedom. In that case, the complainant did not have to prove that declining the vaccine was “objectively required” by her religion for her belief to be sincerely held: para. 19. The freedom of religion encompasses “both obligatory as well as voluntary expressions of faith”: para 19 citing Anselem at para 47. I accept those principles and apply them here. The difficulty here is that the details about Child R’s religious objection to taking the vaccine appear for the first time in the complaint filings. In the context of the entire communication between Child R’s parents and Girl Guides in September and October 2021, regarding the exemption for Child R, the religious reference consists of a single line in the October 15, 2021, email, in which Mother R states that Child R “is also against some of the ingredients due to religion as they do use aborted fetuses in it.” That statement, offered alongside extensive safety, efficacy, and legal arguments in the same email, is the whole of what was communicated to Girl Guides regarding religion at the material time.
[52] I note that Mother R raised religion more explicitly in December 2021, stating in her December 13 email that Child R was being discriminated against based on her religious beliefs, and asking on December 15 whether Girl Guides still did not allow religious exemptions. Girl Guides did not respond to the religious exemption question. However, these communications were framed as a complaint and refund request rather than a contemporaneous claim for accommodation.
[53] In Sharp, the complainant had filed a formal religious exemption request form with her employer at the time of the adverse impact and raised religious objections consistently and specifically throughout her dealings with Vancouver Island Health Authority. The complainant in Mondejar had also emailed her employer explicitly requesting an exemption base on “religious reasons,” provided letters from Catholic priests to her employer at the time, and asked her employer why religious exemption could not be granted for people sincerely practicing their faith. In both cases, religious belief was raised contemporaneously and consistently at the material time. In the present case, the evidentiary foundation is a single line in a single email, offered in passing within communications dominated by other arguments.
[54] Girl Guides has also asked me to consider the implications of the contemporaneous email correspondence where Mother R stated that she was not seeking an exemption based on health or human rights grounds. It argues that that contemporaneous statement is contrary to Child R’s claim in the context of this complaint that her religion was a factor in the alleged discrimination.
[55] In the application response, Child R argues that “Her parents never stated they were not seeking exemption per human rights. When they stated law, she was meaning human rights.” The existence of this statement does not itself take the nexus element out of the realm of conjecture when the thrust of Mother R’s contemporaneous communication with Girl Guides overwhelmingly points to her perceptions of the safety, necessity, and efficacy of the COVID-19 vaccine. These opinions are not protected under human rights legislation: Lavoie v. Fraser Health Authority, 2025 BCHRT 8 at para. 16.
[56] Given the above context, I find Child R’s claim of discrimination based on religious belief is distinguishable from the claims in Sharp and Mondejar. The evidence before me on this application is insufficient to take Child R’s claim of religious discrimination out of the realm of speculation and conjecture, and it therefore has no reasonable prospect of success.
[57] In the alternative, I also consider whether Girl Guides is, in any event, reasonably certain to establish a justification at the hearing.
B. Is Girl Guides reasonably certain to establish a justification?
[58] To establish a bona fide reasonable justification, Girl Guides must demonstrate that: (a) its vaccine policy was adopted for a purpose rationally connected to its function; (b) it adopted the vaccine policy in an honest and good faith belief that it was necessary; and (c) the policy was reasonably necessary, in the sense that it could not accommodate unvaccinated members without undue hardship: British Columbia (Public Service Employee Relations Commission) v. British Columbia Government and Service Employees’ Union (Meiorin Grievance), [1999] 3 SCR 3 [Meiorin] at para. 54.
[59] Child R accepts that Girl Guides acted in good faith during the pandemic and sought to follow public health guidance. Her argument is that Girl Guides failed to consider her physical disability and sincerely held religious beliefs. Child R argues that accommodation was possible through a combination of masking, outdoor-only programming, and COVID-19 rapid testing before each session, and that the virtual participation option offered by Girl Guides was not reasonable accommodation because it failed to provide the equivalent of the in-person Girl Guides experience.
[60] I address the virtual participation argument first. The Tribunal has stated that a complainant is entitled to reasonable accommodation, not a perfect one: Coelho v. Lululemon Athletica Canada Inc., 2021 BCHRT 156, at para 32; Ratchford v. Best Buy Canada Ltd., 2022 BCHRT 19 at para. 14; Forbes v. Habitat for Humanity Mid-Vancouver Island, 2024 BCHRT 18 at para 35. The question is whether Girl Guides is reasonably certain to prove that what was offered constitutes a genuine and meaningful opportunity to participate.
[61] Girl Guides argues that its virtual programming provided unvaccinated members with continued access to Girl Guides programming, including age-appropriate activities, the organizational community, and ongoing membership for the duration of the guiding year. Child R disputes this and argues that virtual programming could not replicate the in-person experience including camping, outdoor skills, face-to-face social connection and that this is particularly significant given the Trex program’s outdoor focus. I accept that virtual programming is not equivalent to in-person programming and that the loss of in-person participation was a meaningful one for Child R. But the fact that the accommodation is less than what Child R would have preferred, or that it does not fully replicate the experience from which she was excluded, does not make it unreasonable within the meaning of the Code.
[62] I turn to Child R’s proposed alternatives. The suggestion that Girl Guides could have maintained masking and outdoor-only programming as an accommodation is not supported by the evidence. Based on the materials before me, one of the stated purposes of the vaccine policy was to allow Girl Guides to move away from COVID-19 mitigation measures including masking and physical distancing that many unit leaders found difficult to enforce in the context of close-contact youth activities. Requiring Girl Guides to maintain those measures for unvaccinated members would have undermined the policy’s purpose of improving program delivery and would have imposed an ongoing administrative burden on volunteer unit leaders. The Trex program, while outdoor-focused, also involved indoor meetings and camping activities with shared accommodation, where outdoor-only programming would not have been feasible.
[63] Child R also argues that free rapid tests were accessible to members of the public. However, the availability of free tests does not resolve the undue hardship question. Girl Guides argues that implementing a COVID-19 testing requirement in the place of vaccination would have imposed a significant operational burden on Girl Guides’ volunteer unit leaders, who are not trained health professionals and who serve in an unpaid capacity. The whole point of adopting a nationalized vaccine policy was to take the burden of COVID-19 risk management off the shoulders of individual volunteer unit leaders, who were already navigating the demands of delivering programming during a pandemic. Requiring unit leaders to coordinate, administer, and verify rapid test results before each weekly session, and to manage the logistical and interpersonal difficulty of turning away members who had not tested, or whose results were unclear would have placed an unreasonable operational burden on volunteers. I am satisfied that, at the hearing, Girl Guides is reasonably certain to prove that this constitutes undue hardship in the context of a volunteer-run organization.
[64] On the materials before me, I am satisfied that it is reasonably certain that Girl Guides would establish a bona fide reasonable justification at a hearing.
V CONCLUSION
[65] The complaint has no reasonable prospect of success and is dismissed in its entirety.
Ijeamaka Anika
Tribunal Member
Human Rights Tribunal