Rogers v. Vancouver Island Health Authority and another, 2026 BCHRT 121
Date Issued: May 14, 2026
File(s): CS-008059
Indexed as: Rogers v. Vancouver Island Health Authority and another, 2026 BCHRT 121
IN THE MATTER OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS CODE,
RSBC 1996, c. 210 (as amended)
AND IN THE MATTER of a complaint before
the British Columbia Human Rights Tribunal
BETWEEN:
Ruth Rogers
COMPLAINANT
AND:
Vancouver Island Health Authority and Unknown Nurse
RESPONDENT
REASONS FOR DECISION
APPLICATION TO DISMISS A COMPLAINT
Section 27(1)(d)(ii)
Tribunal Member: Devyn Cousineau
For the Complainant: No submissions
Counsel for the Respondents: Karen Orr
I INTRODUCTION
[1] Ruth Rogers went to an emergency room in the Vancouver Island Health Authority [VIHA]. She alleges that, while she was there, a nurse forced her to sit in a chair, which causes her extreme pain because of her disabilities. She says that she asked the nurse if she could lie on the floor instead, but the nurse accused her of lying and asked if she was “psych”. She says a second nurse threatened to call the police and ban her from the hospital for life, causing her to leave the hospital without receiving treatment. She says that this treatment was discrimination based on her disability, in violation of s. 8 of the Human Rights Code.
[2] This complaint has proceeded against VIHA and an “Unknown Nurse”. Though the nurse is unnamed, she and VIHA are both represented by the same counsel. They have both filed a response to the complaint, disputing Ms. Rogers’ allegations. They say that it was reasonable not to allow Ms. Rogers to lie on the floor, and that she was accommodated with a stretcher. They deny that Ms. Rogers was physically forced to sit in a chair.
[3] The Respondents now apply to dismiss the complaint against the Unknown Nurse on the basis that it does not further the Code’s purposes to proceed against her as an individual: Code, s. 27(1)(d)(ii). Ms. Rogers did not respond to the application.
[4] For the following reasons, the application is denied.
II DECISION
[5] There are strong policy reasons that favour complaints against individual respondents. As the Supreme Court of Canada has acknowledged, “the aspirational purposes of the Code require that individual perpetrators of discrimination be held accountable for their actions”: British Columbia Human Rights Tribunal v. Schrenk, 2017 SCC 62 at para. 56.This is especially true for allegations of discrimination with a high degree of personal culpability, like sexual or racial harassment: Daley v. BC (Ministry of Health), 2006 BCHRT 341 at para. 53.
[6] On the other hand, naming individual respondents can complicate and delay the resolution of complaints, exacerbate feelings of personal animosity, and cause needless personal distress to individuals who are accused of discrimination: Daley at para. 54. Because employers and institutional respondents are liable for the acts of their agents, they will be responsible for any remedy ordered by the Tribunal: Code, s. 44(2); Robichaud v. Canada, [1987] 2 SCR 84. In those situations, the remedial aims of the Code may be most fairly and efficiently fulfilled without holding individuals liable.
[7] The Tribunal balances all these considerations to decide whether the purposes of the Code are best served by having a complaint proceed against individuals as well as an institutional respondent, or against the institutional respondent only. It has identified the following factors as relevant:
a. whether the complaint names an institutional employer as a respondent and that respondent has the capacity to fulfill any remedies that the Tribunal might order;
b. whether the institutional respondent has acknowledged the acts and omissions of the individual as its own and has irrevocably acknowledged its responsibility to satisfy any remedial orders which the Tribunal might make in respect of that individual’s conduct; and
c. the nature of the conduct alleged against the individual, including whether:
i. their conduct took place within the regular course of their employment;
ii. the person is alleged to have been the directing mind behind the discrimination or to have substantially influenced the course of action taken; and
iii. the conduct alleged against the individual has a measure of individual culpability, such as an allegation of discriminatory harassment.
Daley at paras. 60-62.
[8] The burden is on the Respondents in this application.
[9] To begin, VIHA has acknowledged the acts of the Unknown Nurse as its own, and is capable of satisfying any remedial orders the Tribunal might make. These factors support dismissing the complaint against the Unknown Nurse.
[10] However, in my view, the nature of conduct alleged against the Unknown Nurse has a measure of individual culpability such that it furthers the Code’s purposes to continue the complaint against her.
[11] I stress in this decision that Ms. Rogers’ allegations against the Unknown Nurse are disputed and unproven. However, if the Tribunal accepts Ms. Rogers’ version of the facts, then it may find that the Unknown Nurse:
a. Shouted at Ms. Rogers and accused her of lying about a disability, saying “there was no medical condition ‘in this world’ that would prevent [Ms. Rogers] from sitting”;
b. Asked Ms. Rogers if she was “psych”, which Ms. Rogers took to mean a psychiatric patient;
c. Grabbed Ms. Rogers by the wrists and forced her into a chair, while she was shrieking and falling and other patients were pleading to stop because the Unknown Nurse was hurting Ms. Rogers;
d. Refused the offer from a different nurse to provide Ms. Rogers a stretcher, saying “Ruth is not getting a stretcher” because there “nothing wrong with Ruth” and “Ruth needs to stop lying to us”; and
e. In response to Ms. Roger’s request to explain her medical condition, told her that she was “not allowed to talk” because “no one gets to talk but me”.
[12] Though these allegations did arise in the course of the Unknown Nurse’s employment, they go beyond what a nurse would be expected to do in the normal course of their work. In that regard, I disagree with VIHA that the allegations against the Unknown Nurse are solely about her implementation of a policy that prohibits patients from laying on the floor. Rather, Ms. Roger’s allegations amount to a form of harassment and mistreatment which – if proven – may warrant personal accountability.
[13] Finally, I am not persuaded that allowing the complaint to proceed against the Unknown Nurse would unduly complicate and delay any resolution of the complaint. The Respondents are represented by the same counsel. Given the allegations, the Unknown Nurse would be expected to testify in the hearing. There is nothing to suggest that her participation as a party would prolong or extend the hearing or the resolution of the complaint.
[14] In my view, it furthers the Code’s purposes for the complaint to proceed against the Unknown Nurse. The application to dismiss this part of the complaint is denied.
III CONCLUSION
[15] The application to dismiss the complaint against the Unknown Nurse is denied.
[16] The complaint must now proceed against a named respondent. Within 21 days of this decision, I order the Respondents to file an amended Form 2 which identifies the Unknown Nurse in this complaint.
Devyn Cousineau
Vice Chair