BC Human Rights Tribunal

Chambers v. The Vancouver Maritime Museum Society (No.2), 2026 BCHRT 120

Date Issued: May 13, 2026
File(s): CS-003363

Indexed as: Chambers v. The Vancouver Maritime Museum Society (No.2), 2026 BCHRT 120

IN THE MATTER OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS CODE,
RSBC 1996, c. 210 (as amended)

AND IN THE MATTER of a complaint before
the British Columbia Human Rights Tribunal

BETWEEN:

Carla Chambers

COMPLAINANT

AND:

The Vancouver Maritime Museum Society

RESPONDENT

REASONS FOR DECISION

Tribunal Member: Ijeamaka Anika

On their own behalf: Carla Chambers

Counsel for the Respondent: Iman Hosseini and Chris Pang (articling student) and Andrea Vulinovic-Zlatan (articling student)

Dates of Hearing: July 14-18, 2025

Location of Hearing: Via Videoconferencing

I          INTRODUCTION

[1]               This was a difficult hearing for Ms. Chambers. She came before this Tribunal not only to seek redress for what she alleges was racial discrimination in her employment, but also to do so as a woman who has experienced a shattering personal loss. During the hearing, Ms. Chambers was required to give evidence about events in the summer of 2019, a period that culminated in the tragic motor vehicle collision on August 7, 2019, in which her son was killed, and in which she, her husband Mr. Jeffreys, and their two children were seriously injured. I acknowledge the strength and dignity with which Ms. Chambers represented herself throughout these proceedings, and the courage it took to do so.

[2]               The issue in this complaint is whether Ms. Chambers experienced discrimination in her employment based on her race and colour, contrary to s. 13 of the Human Rights Code. Where required for efficiency in this decision, I will refer to Ms. Chambers’ race and colour as “race.”

[3]               Ms. Chambers is a Black woman. Between February and July 2019, she provided marketing services to the Vancouver Maritime Museum Society [the Museum] as an independent contractor, through a partnership called Cambra Arts Management [CAM] that she operated together with her white co-contractor, Maia Gibb. At the end of the engagement, the Museum did not pay Ms. Chambers’ outstanding invoices totalling $9,724.05. Ms. Chambers says her race was a factor in that non-payment. The Museum says it was not.

[4]               Ms. Chambers makes three allegations:

a.    At the start of her employment, a Board Member made a discriminatory comment based on race [the Comment],

b.    She was excluded from collaboration, alienated, and mistreated by two Museum staff for reasons connected to her race [the Alleged Mistreatment],

c.     She was not paid for work on account of her race [the Invoice Dispute].

[5]               The Museum denies discriminating against Ms. Chambers in all three allegations. The Museum says the Board Member’s comment stemmed from his personal interest in names and family history rather than racial bias, and that any harm was addressed through apologies. It argues that the Alleged Mistreatment was professional conflicts and communication issues unrelated to Ms. Chambers’ race. Regarding the Invoice Dispute, the Museum cites budget overruns, uncertainty about who completed the graphic design work, concerns about the quality of Ms. Chambers’ work, and Ms. Chambers’ decision not to attend the July 4, 2019, meeting [the July 4 meeting]where her cheque was available.

[6]               For the reasons that follow, I find that Ms. Chambers has not established, on a balance of probabilities, that the Museum breached the Code. The Comment, though racialized and genuinely adverse in its impact on Ms. Chambers, was a single, isolated remark by a non‑supervisory Board member, apologized for and not repeated. It does not meet the threshold for discrimination under the Code. The Alleged Mistreatment was not shown to be race‑related but instead reflected mutual miscommunication and performance issues. Regarding the unpaid invoices, the Museum provided credible, corroborated, non‑discriminatory reasons for non‑payment, and the allegation that the cheque was withheld because of Ms. Chambers’ race is unsupported by the evidence.

[7]               This decision proceeds as follows. I begin by setting out the relevant social context and the anti‑Black stereotypes I have taken notice of in conducting this analysis. I then outline the parties’ respective positions, followed by a brief overview of the decision. Next, I address the witnesses and the approach I have taken to assessing credibility, before summarizing the evidence and making findings of fact. I then set out the applicable legal principles and conclude with my analysis and findings in relation to each of the three allegations of discrimination.

II       PRELIMINARY ISSUE

[8]               At the hearing, the Tribunal confirmed with the parties that the complaint is confined to the allegations set out in Ms. Chambers’ Form 1.1. In her Closing Submissions, Ms. Chambers sought to expand the complaint to include allegations of systemic anti-Black racism through a “Workplace-to-Exit Pipeline” framework, misuse of solicitor-client privilege, and breaches of the Societies Act and Code of Professional Conduct, as well as remedies not included in her amended remedy form. These expanded allegations and remedies are outside the scope of this complaint and are not addressed in this decision.

[9]               Next, at a pre-hearing conference, I told the parties that the Tribunal may take notice of the social context of anti-Black systemic racism and does not require expert evidence on this subject. In her written closing submissions, Ms. Chambers sought to rely on research materials regarding “racial mobbing” and “policy weaponization.” I find that it would be procedurally unfair to rely on materials submitted after the close of the hearing, and I decline to do so. The social context of anti-Black racism in this decision is drawn from the Tribunal’s jurisprudence, as set out in Part III. 

[10]           Finally, the Museum does not dispute that s. 13 of the Code applies to Ms. Chambers’ engagement as an independent contractor, and I am satisfied that it does. The Tribunal interprets the meaning of employment for the purposes of s.13 broadly and purposively: British Columbia Human Rights Tribunal v. Schrenk, 2017 SCC 62 at para. 31. On this broad definition of employment, independent contractors are employees under the Code.

III     SOCIAL CONTEXT AND STEREOTYPES

[11]           This case alleges anti-Black racism in an employment relationship, in a predominantly white workplace. Ms. Chambers is a Black woman who alleges that her race was a factor in the Museum’s conduct. The social context of anti-Black racism in Canada – and the particular ways in which anti-Black stereotypes may operate in the exercise of economic authority over a Black woman – is a critical element of this complaint. I set it out before turning to the evidence.

[12]           This racism manifests in many ways, including in the subconscious application of negative stereotypes, which can seep into the “interstices of our institutions”: R v. Parks (1993), 1993 CanLII 3383 (ON CA), 15 OR (3d) 324 (CA). In R. v. Parks, the Ontario Court of Appeal described anti-Black racism as a feature of our collective psyche, noting at para. 54 that:

Racism, and in particular anti-Black racism, is a part of our community’s psyche. A significant segment of our community holds overtly racist views. A much larger segment subconsciously operates on the basis of negative racial stereotypes. Furthermore, our institutions, including the criminal justice system, reflect and perpetuate those negative stereotypes. These elements combine to infect our society as a whole with the evil of racism. Blacks are among the primary victims of that evil.

[13]            This passage was cited with approval by the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Spence, 2005 SCC 71 at paras. 31–33.

[14]           More recently, the Ontario Court of Appeal reaffirmed its position, stating in R. v. Morris, 2021 ONCA 680, at para. 1:

It is beyond doubt that anti-Black racism, including both overt and systemic anti-Black racism, has been, and continues to be, a reality in Canadian society, and in particular in the Greater Toronto Area. That reality is reflected in many social institutions, most notably the criminal justice system. It is equally clear that anti-Black racism can have a profound and insidious impact on those who must endure it on a daily basis: see R. v. Le, 2019 SCC 34, [2019] 2 S.C.R. 692, at paras. 89-97; R. v. Theriault, 2021 ONCA 517, at para. 212, leave to appeal to S.C.C. requested, 39768 (July 19, 2021); R. v. Parks (1993), 1993 CanLII 3383 (ON CA), 15 O.R. (3d) 324 (C.A.), at p. 342, leave to appeal refused, [1993] S.C.C.A. No. 481; see also Ontario Human Rights Commission, A Collective Impact: Interim report on the inquiry into racial profiling and racial discrimination of Black persons by the Toronto Police Service (Toronto: Government of Ontario, 2018), at p. 19; Ontario Association of Children’s Aid Societies, One Vision One Voice: Changing the Child Welfare System for African Canadians (Toronto: Ontario Association of Children’s Aid Societies, 2016), at p. 29. Anti-Black racism must be acknowledged, confronted, mitigated and, ultimately, erased. This appeal requires the court to consider how trial judges should take evidence of anti-Black racism into account on sentencing.

[15]           Human rights tribunals have similarly recognized that anti-Black stereotypes continue to seep into our collective psyche whether consciously or unconsciously, rooted in centuries of Black slavery, segregation, colonialism, and other gross inequalities founded on racism: Perry v. Honu Boat Charters and another (No. 2), 2022 BCHRT 68 at paras. 67-68; Young Worker v. Heirloom and another, 2023 BCHRT 137 at paras. 53-58; Mema v. City of Nanaimo (No. 2), 2023 BCHRT 91 at paras. 6-7, 20, and 288 at paras. 6-12; Balikama obo others v. Khaira Enterprises and others, 2014 BCHRT 107 at paras. 585-586; Turner v. Canada Border Services Agency, 2020 CHRT 1 at para. 49-50, 128-130.

[16]           Among the persistent anti-Black stereotypes recognized by courts and tribunals is the stereotype of Black people as less honest, less trustworthy, or prone to dishonesty and financial impropriety: Turner at para. 49; Mema at para. 342. I take notice of these stereotypes and their potential operation in this complaint, which involves the Museum’s refusal to pay Ms. Chambers’ invoices in circumstances where the Museum expressed doubt about the legitimacy and value of her work.

[17]           Human rights law recognizes that anti-Black stereotypes or biases may manifest as a Black person being singled out for heightened scrutiny, suspicion, or disproportionately harsh treatment. This has been recognized across a range of contexts. In Wickham v. Hong Shing Chinese Restaurant, 2018 HRTO 500, an Afro-Caribbean customer was required to pay for his food in advance. The Tribunal confirmed that a propensity towards criminal activity or deviance is a pernicious and prevailing stereotype applied to Black people: paras. 38, 41, and 47. The Tribunal found that the restaurant relied on racial stereotypes about Black people to presume Mr. Wickham was a potential thief without any evidence to that effect: para. 45. In McCarthy v. Kenny Tan Pharmacy Inc., 2015 HRTO 1303, a store employee’s treatment of a Black female customer was also found to have been influenced, “consciously or unconsciously, by the stereotype that Black people are thieves”: at para. 83. The Tribunal found that this stereotype caused the employee to treat the customer with a level of suspicion that was illogical and with rudeness that was unwarranted: at para. 90. In Francis v. BC Ministry of Justice (No. 3), 2019 BCHRT 136, at para. 374, the Tribunal found that Mr. Francis was stereotyped as “slow and lazy” and singled out for criticism and heightened scrutiny that was disproportionate and unwarranted given Mr. Francis’ actual work performance, finding these aspects of his supervisors’ conduct to be strong indicators of racial discrimination: at paras. 300–304, 374. Finally, in Young Worker v. Heirloom and another, 2023 BCHRT 137, this Tribunal was alert to the ways anti-Black stereotypes may manifest when a young Black girl was singled out, unduly suspected of theft, and treated in an overly punitive manner disproportionate to the conduct at issue: at paras. 52.

[18]           A further dimension of anti-Black stereotyping recognized by human rights adjudicators concerns the expectation of deference and docility from racialized persons in interactions with white people in authority. In Abbott v. Toronto Police Services Board, 2009 HRTO 1909, the Tribunal found that a white officer’s conduct towards a Black woman was consistent with a manifestation of racism “whereby a white person in a position of authority has an expectation of docility and compliance from a racialized person and imposes harsh consequences if that docility and compliance is not provided”: at para. 46. The Tribunal in Abbott recognized that such an expectation, and the punitive response to its non-fulfillment, may operate without conscious racial intent and yet remain discriminatory in its effect.

[19]           This social context must be understood through an intersectional lens. Ms. Chambers is a Black woman, and race and gender cannot be disaggregated in analyzing her experience. This Tribunal has recognized that intersecting characteristics compound the forms of discrimination a person may face and require an analysis that attends to the combined effect of those characteristics, not their separate operation: Baylis-Flannery v. DeWilde (Tri Community Physiotherapy), 2003 HRTO 28 at para. 145; Heirloom at para. 48-51; Radek v. Henderson Development (Canada) and Securiguard Services (No. 3), 2005 BCHRT 302 at para. 463. An intersectional analysis is particularly required where, as here, the alleged discrimination involves the exercise of economic authority by a white male executive over a Black woman contractor – a configuration in which the stereotypes noted above, including those relating to trustworthiness, work value, and the expectation of compliance, may converge.

[20]           I also take notice of the nature of subtle and cumulative discrimination. Racial discrimination in the workplace is rarely expressed in overt language or explicit racial references. It more often operates through everyday behaviour that may be individually ambiguous but takes on clearer meaning when viewed as part of a larger picture and against the backdrop of the social context described above: Francis at para. 284; Campbell v. Vancouver Police Board (No. 4), 2019 BCHRT 275 at para. 104-105; Mema at para. 289. As this Tribunal stated in Francis at para. 288, citing the Ontario Human Rights Commission’s Policy and Guidelines on Racism and Racial Discrimination:

Individual acts themselves may be ambiguous or explained away, but when viewed as part of the larger picture and with an appropriate understanding of how racial discrimination takes place, may lead to an inference that racial discrimination was a factor in the treatment an individual received. […] It is not necessary for language or comments related to race to be present in the interactions between the parties to demonstrate that racial discrimination has occurred.

[21]           Relatedly, the Ontario Human Rights Commission’s Guidelines, as cited in Mema at para. 292, recognize that racism in its more entrenched forms is often unconsciously applied and its operation is often unrecognized by even those practising it. It should not be treated as aberrant behaviour by a deviant individual. Failing to recognize the complex, subtle, and systemic nature of racism impedes effective action against it.

[22]           I have applied this social context – including the recognition by courts and tribunals of anti-Black stereotypes relating to honesty, trustworthiness, work value, and compliance with authority, as well as the intersectional dimensions of Ms. Chambers’ experience as a Black woman – in considering whether the evidence as a whole supports an inference that, on a balance of probabilities, Ms. Chambers’ race was a factor in the Museum’s conduct.

[23]           At the same time, I also consider the fact that the subtlety of prejudice, and the availability of inference, does not create a presumption of discrimination: Zhou v. Copper Mountain Mine (BC), 2017 BCHRT 22 at para. 51. The social context of anti-Black discrimination is not enough, on its own, to prove that Ms. Chambers was discriminated against. In other words, the fact that she is Black and had negative interactions in the workplace does not mean she was discriminated against. An inference of discrimination must be drawn “reasonably and logically … from a fact or group of facts established by the evidence”: Smith v. Mohan (No. 2), 2020 BCHRT 52 at para. 188; Québec (Commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse) v. Bombardier Inc. (Bombardier Aerospace Training Center), 2015 SCC 39 [Bombardier] at para. 88.

IV    THE PARTIES POSITIONS

[24]           I heard this complaint over five days. Seven witnesses testified. The parties each filed written closing submissions. What follows is a summary of the positions advanced, not a recital of every argument raised. The positions are addressed in detail in the analysis below.

[25]           Ms. Chambers argues that she experienced discrimination based on her race contrary to s. 13 of the Code, across three categories of conduct during her engagement with the Museum. First, a Board member made the Comment, a racialized comment about her name at an Executive Committee meeting in March 2019. The Comment was not a mere expression of curiosity; it was intrusive, presumptuous about her identity, and insufficiently addressed by the Museum. Second, operations staff Nicola Clur and Lindsay De Vera alienated Ms. Chambers in the workplace and engaged in the Alleged Mistreatment. Ms. Chambers argues they excluded, and “ganged up on” her, creating an unsafe work environment and contributing to her decision to stop attending the Museum premises. Third, and most centrally, regarding the Invoice Dispute, Ms. Chambers argues that the Museum refused to pay $9,724.05 in outstanding invoices for work she completed, while paying her white co-contractor Ms. Gibb and her white husband Bob Jeffreys for their work (the Invoice Dispute). Ms. Chambers says race was a factor in the non-payment.

[26]           Ms. Chambers submits that the non-payment of her invoices must be understood against the backdrop of the Comment, the Alleged Mistreatment, and the power dynamics of her position as the only Black contractor in a white-led organization that was financially dependent on her continued work. She argues that she was subjected to disproportionate scrutiny of her invoices and work product that was not applied to comparable work by white contractors, and that her physical absence from the July 4, 2019, meeting – driven by legitimate safety concerns about attending the Museum – was used as a pretext to withhold payment that had already been earned.

[27]           The Museum denies discriminating against Ms. Chambers in any respect. Regarding the Comment, the Museum submits that the Board Member’s inquiry was an expression of his longstanding personal interest in names and genealogy, not a racialized remark, and that any adverse impact was promptly acknowledged through apologies from Board members and the Executive Director. As for the Alleged Mistreatment, the Museum submits that the workplace tensions that arose were the product of professional friction and communication difficulties on both sides, wholly unconnected to Ms. Chambers’ race, and that no verbal altercation of the kind alleged by Ms. Chambers took place. On the Invoice Dispute, the Museum advances a set of particularized, non-discriminatory explanations for the non-payment: a significant and unauthorized budget overrun; confusion about who performed the graphic design work billed in the disputed invoices; the submission of those invoices without prior notice or approval; serious quality deficiencies in Ms. Chambers’ deliverables that left the Museum with no usable assets to justify payment; and Ms. Chambers’ own decision not to attend the July 4, 2019 meeting at which a signed cheque for her June Marketing Fee was prepared and ready for collection.

[28]           The Museum submits that Ms. Chambers has not met her burden of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination. It argues that the evidence does not establish, on a balance of probabilities, that Ms. Chambers experienced adverse treatment based on race, and that in any event, its conduct is fully explained by non-discriminatory reasons that rebut any inference of discrimination. The Museum asks that the complaint be dismissed in its entirety.

V       SUMMARY OF DECISION

[29]           Ms. Chambers is a Black woman who was not paid for work she performed. The people who were paid were white. The Comment she received at the outset of her engagement was racialized. And the workplace was one in which she was the only Black contractor, navigating a professional environment that grew increasingly tense as her engagement deteriorated. Against that backdrop, Ms. Chambers’ suspicion that race played a role in how she was treated is not unreasonable, and I did not dismiss it lightly.

[30]           Having considered all of the evidence, however, I am not satisfied on a balance of probabilities that Ms. Chambers’ race was a factor in any of the three forms of alleged adverse treatment. My reasons are set out fully in Part VIII of this decision. In summary:

a.    On the Comment: I find that the Board Member’s question was racialized in nature and that it had a genuine adverse impact on Ms. Chambers. However, it was a single isolated remark from a Board member who was not in Ms. Chambers’ supervisory chain, was apologized for by multiple Board members, was not repeated, and does not on its own establish discrimination in employment under s. 13 of the Code. I treat it as relevant contextual evidence.

b.    On the Alleged Mistreatment: I find that the workplace tensions were real but are not established as race-related. The alleged verbal altercation is not proven on the evidence. The broader tensions are attributable to professional friction and communication difficulties that were bilateral in nature.

c.     On the Invoice Dispute: I accept that the Museum had legitimate, pre-existing, corroborated concerns about budget overruns, work quality, and the circumstances of the disputed invoices. These concerns are not a post-hoc rationalization – they are documented in contemporaneous emails predating any conflict. The facts on which the discrimination case rests, that Dr. Schokkenbroek withheld Ms. Chambers’ cheque upon learning from Ms. Gibb that Ms. Chambers felt unsafe as a Black woman, is not established on a balance of probabilities. It was based on hearsay and was contradicted by Ms. Gibb’s own evidence. Ms. Gibb was present at the meeting on July 4, 2019, and her evidence is consistent and corroborated. I prefer her direct account over the hearsay.

[31]           For these reasons, the complaint is dismissed.

[32]           Below are my reasons in full. I begin with the evidence and my findings of fact. I then set out the applicable law and apply it to those findings.

VI    WITNESSES

[33]           I may believe none, part, or all of a witness’ evidence and may attach different weight to various parts of their evidence: R. v. D.R., [1996] 2 SCR 291 at para. 93. In assessing credibility, I have considered whether each witness’ evidence was in “harmony with the preponderance of the probabilities which a practical and informed person would readily recognize as reasonable in that place and in those conditions”: Faryna v. Chorny, [1952] 2 DLR 354 (BCCA) at 357. Where there are disputes in the evidence about material facts, I have applied the principles in Bradshaw v. Stenner, 2010 BCSC 1398, aff’d 2012 BCCA 296, leave to appeal refused, [2012] SCCA No. 392 at para. 186, and explain why I prefer certain evidence over others.

[34]           I do not refer to all of the evidence adduced at the hearing, though I have considered all of it. I refer only to what is necessary to explain my decision.

A.    Ms. Chambers witnesses

[35]           Ms. Chambers testified on her own behalf. She was self-represented throughout the proceeding and conducted herself with composure and dignity under difficult personal circumstances. I found Ms. Chambers to be a partially credible witness. She was corroborated on several crucial points: the content of the Board Member’s comment, her financial distress as a result of the non-payment, and the existence of interpersonal tensions in the workplace. I accept that her experience of the Comment was genuinely adverse and that she experienced the end of her engagement with the Museum as deeply unfair.

[36]           I approach several aspects of Ms. Chambers’ evidence with care, however. Her account of the verbal altercation between Ms. Gibb and Ms. Clur is based on overhearing from an adjacent room; both direct witnesses deny it, and I do not accept her account. Her account of the “core act of discrimination” at the July 4 meeting is hearsay and is directly contradicted by the direct evidence of Ms. Gibb, the witness on whose account Ms. Chambers relies. I also note that her affidavit dated April 2021 incorrectly stated that non-payment caused her family to move “earlier” rather than “later” than planned – an error she corrected under cross-examination, but one that has some bearing on the damages picture she advanced. More generally, Ms. Chambers’ framing of the complaint expanded significantly between her Form 1.1 and her Closing Submissions, with arguments and frameworks – including “racial mobbing,” systemic racism, and breaches of the Societies Act – that were not part of the complaint as filed. The tendency to reach for expansive framing where the evidence is ambiguous is a factor I have borne in mind in assessing her overall reliability as a narrator of events.

[37]           Ms. Chambers called Ms. Harland as a witness. Ms. Harland is a registered clinical social worker in Alberta. Her credentials are linked to processing trauma, systemic racism, oppression, and decolonisation. I find Ms. Harland to be a forthright and reliable witness. Her evidence was consistent across direct examination and cross examination.

[38]           The Museum objected to Ms. Harland giving evidence in the nature of expert opinion on anti-Black racism and its connection to Ms. Chambers’ experience at the Museum. I allowed Ms. Harland’s evidence for the purpose of documenting the therapeutic impact of the Museum experience on Ms. Chambers. As I acknowledged to Ms. Chambers during the pre-hearing conference, the Tribunal is able to address social context evidence of anti-Black racism and regularly does so through its own jurisprudence and the principle of judicial notice as I did in Part III of this decision.

[39]           Ms. Harland testified that, as she worked with Ms. Chambers on accident-related trauma, Ms. Chambers’ experience at the Museum emerged as a barrier to her healing and a block to returning to work as a creative. Ms. Harland testified that Ms. Chambers reported feeling not honoured, isolated, not remunerated, and treated differently from colleagues. Ms. Harland testified that these experiences were typical of anti-Black racism and that Ms. Chambers experienced anxiety, low moods, depression, and a sense of hopelessness related both to the accident and to the Museum experience. Ms. Harland described the Museum experience as creating a “template” for how Ms. Chambers might expect future institutional interactions involving race.

[40]           In cross-examination, Ms. Harland stated that she was asked by Ms. Chambers to write a report about anti-Black racism and how it connected to her experience; that the Museum and the human rights complaint came up in sessions once or twice; and that the primary focus of the sessions was family-of-origin issues, Ms. Chambers’ current family dynamics, and personal resilience. Ms. Harland acknowledged that she could not formally diagnose Ms. Chambers.

[41]           I accept Ms. Harland’s evidence for the limited purpose for which it was admitted. Her insights are based entirely on information disclosed to her by Ms. Chambers in a therapeutic context; they are not independent observations. Ms. Chambers specifically asked her to connect her experience to anti-Black racism, which creates a potential framing effect. The sessions were primarily concerned with accident trauma; the Museum experience was a secondary and an occasional topic. I accept, as a matter of general context, that Ms. Chambers’ experience at the Museum had ongoing emotional consequences, compounded by the tragedy of the accident. However, Ms. Harland’s evidence does not assist me in determining whether the Museum’s conduct was discriminatory, as it adds no independent factual content beyond what Ms. Chambers herself testified to.

B.     The Museum’s witnesses

[42]           Dr. Joost Schokkenbroek, the Museum’s Executive Director at the relevant time, was a credible witness. His contemporaneous email record is substantially consistent with his testimony. His concerns about the contractors’ hours overruns are documented in emails from as early as April 2019 – before any conflict arose. He acknowledged that the Board Member’s Comment “was not a nuanced way to address people.” His account of preparing a signed cheque for Ms. Chambers for the July 4 meeting, and his confusion about the authorship of the graphic design work in the disputed invoices, is corroborated by Ms. Kwan’s contemporaneous correspondence.

[43]           Maia Gibb was called as a witness for the Museum. She is Ms. Chambers’ former co-contractor. I find Ms. Gibb to be a forthright and reliable witness. Ms. Gibb had a close personal relationship with Ms. Chambers – she described her as “a sister”. Ms. Gibb also candidly acknowledged her own professional failures, including an incident involving a key sponsor, Concord Pacific, in which its logo was omitted from event invitations on two occasions. She described the incident as career‑ending. Her evidence was consistent across direct examination and cross-examination. She had no motive to shield the Museum at Ms. Chambers’ expense; if anything, the personal dynamic would have inclined her to support Ms. Chambers. She did not want to be a witness for the Museum because of her past relationship with Ms. Chambers and the Museum applied for an order to attend which compelled Ms. Gibb to appear as a witness. On the questions that matter most – what she said to Dr. Schokkenbroek about Ms. Chambers’ absence at the July 4 meeting, her evidence was direct, unequivocal, and corroborated by the overall account of the meeting she described. I prefer her direct evidence over Ms. Chambers’ hearsay account on those points.

[44]           The Museum also called Kelina Kwan, its former Director of Finance and Administration. Ms. Kwan was a credible witness. Her contemporaneous emails, particularly her June 28, 2019, email to Dr. Schokkenbroek analyzing the contractors’ total invoicing against the approved budget, corroborate her testimony about the reasons the disputed invoices raised concerns. Her explanation of the Museum’s standard payment process, and the requirements for e-transfer authorization, is detailed and consistent.

[45]           Mr. Duncan MacLeod, former Museum Curator, was a credible witness who acknowledged gaps in his memory readily. His independent recollection of seeing Ms. Chambers visibly upset following an interaction with Ms. Clur is consistent with the existence of interpersonal tensions.

[46]           Nicola Clur, the Museum’s Assistant Director of Operations, testified for the Museum. She was forthright about the communication difficulties that arose with Ms. Chambers and Ms. Gibb and gave specific examples. Her evidence is corroborated by Ms. Gibb’s recollection.

[47]           Tom Beasley testified for the Museum. His evidence about the Board Member’s longstanding personal interest in genealogy and the history of names provided relevant context for the Comment, without negating the adverse impact Ms. Chambers experienced. He also provided evidence regarding the Board’s involvement in the Invoice Dispute.

[48]           David Jordan, the Museum’s current Executive Director, testified on the Museum’s behalf regarding the steps the Museum has taken to foster a more diverse environment. He was not a Museum employee at the time of the incidents at the center of this complaint.

VII  EVIDENCE AND FINDINGS OF FACT

[49]           In this section I set out the evidence before the Tribunal and my findings of fact. I do not refer to all of the evidence adduced at the hearing, though I have considered all of it. I refer only to what is necessary to explain my decision. Where facts are disputed, I make findings and explain my reasons.

A.    The Parties and Workplace Context

[50]           The Museum is a non-profit arts and cultural institution located in Vancouver. Ms. Chambers is a Black woman and arts administrator with a professional background in marketing and fund development for arts and cultural institutions. She has experience developing inclusive marketing strategies, driving fundraising growth, and fostering community engagement. At the relevant time, she was the primary income-earner for her family of five, which had planned to relocate from Vancouver to Alberta by mid-2019.

[51]           Ms. Chambers first met Dr. Schokkenbroek and Ms. Clur when Ms. Chambers was working for the Georgia Strait Alliance on an event held at the Museum in early 2019. I accept Dr. Schokkenbroek’s evidence that he was impressed with Ms. Chambers’ performance at that event and stood up for her when the Georgia Strait Alliance CEO expressed some concerns about it. I accept Ms. Clur’s evidence that she recommended Ms. Chambers to Dr. Schokkenbroek for the Director of Marketing role.

[52]           The 2019 calendar year was a significant one for the Museum. Dr. Schokkenbroek was planning several major events and initiatives: the Museum’s Annual General Meeting, a 60th Anniversary celebration on June 8, 2019, a “Night at the Museum” Gala Fundraiser in July, and summer programming to increase public engagement. The Museum was also in discussions with Concord Pacific about a potential relocation to Coal Harbour – a multimillion-dollar project that made maintaining the Concord Pacific sponsorship relationship particularly significant.

[53]           The Museum’s marketing budget, as established in the Board-approved annual budget, was approximately $10,080 each for Ms. Chambers and Ms. Gibb. Ms. Kwan’s role included monitoring departmental expenditure against their budgets and ensuring invoices were properly authorized before payment. She testified, and I accept, that the Museum operated under fiscal constraints typical of a small non-profit, with heightened scrutiny of expenditures ahead of its annual financial audit. Invoices were typically paid within thirty days of receipt, or following approval if clarification was needed. E-transfer was not the Museum’s standard payment method at the time; its use required the same approval process as cheque payment.

B.     The Contract

[54]           Following negotiations between Ms. Chambers, Ms. Gibb, and Dr. Schokkenbroek, the Museum entered into a services contract [the Contract] dated February 28, 2019, with CAM. Ms. Chambers signed the Contract on behalf of CAM. Ms. Gibb was a contractor under CAM. Dr. Schokkenbroek testified, and I accept, that there was no separate signature block for Ms. Gibb because the Contract was with CAM, of which Ms. Gibb was a member.

[55]           Under the Contract, CAM agreed to provide Fund Development and Marketing Services between March and December 2019 for a combined 30 hours per week, 15 hours each for Ms. Chambers for marketing and Ms. Gibb for fund development at a rate of $42 per hour. The Contract provided that CAM would not be entitled to payment above $42.00 per hour for services in excess of the contracted hours without prior written authorization from the Executive Director. An appendix to the Contract set out deliverables and anticipated challenges in the performance of the Contract, including Ms. Chambers’ planned move to Alberta on June 17, 2019.

[56]           Ms. Chambers presented the CAM engagement to Dr. Schokkenbroek as offering the Museum the “whole package” of marketing, development, and design. Dr. Schokkenbroek testified that he understood this to include design work as part of the overall offering. However, as I will address in the section on the Invoice Dispute, the question of whether separate design invoices were contemplated under the Contract, as distinct from design work embedded in the marketing hours, was a genuine source of confusion and consequences. I return to this in my findings.

[57]           There was a dispute at the hearing about the scope of Ms. Chambers’ role. Ms. Chambers testified that she was engaged as a strategic director who would not undertake day-to-day operational tasks. Dr. Schokkenbroek testified that given the small size of the Museum, he expected the contractors to be involved in operational activities as well as strategy. The Museum’s Marketing Coordinator resigned approximately two weeks after Ms. Chambers began her engagement. Ms. Chambers testified, and I accept, that his departure shifted the scope of her work and required her to absorb day-to-day marketing coordinator tasks in addition to her strategic role, which she had not anticipated. Dr. Schokkenbroek acknowledged a conversation about redirecting the coordinator’s salary into the Contract budget. However, no written authorization for increased hours above the Contract rate was given, as required under the Contract, and that both parties proceeded without formalizing the revised scope, a failure that contributed significantly to the dispute that followed.

C.     The Comment (March 2019)

[58]           In or around March 2019, shortly after she joined the Museum, Ms. Chambers and Ms. Gibb attended an Executive Committee meeting at the Museum to meet the Board members. The meeting was attended by the Board Member, described by witnesses as being in his eighties and in poor health. The Board Member passed away later that year and did not testify. After Ms. Chambers introduced herself, the Board Member stated to her: “Chambers? That’s not West African. How did you get a name like that?” or words to that effect.

[59]           Ms. Chambers’ found the question racialized, intrusive, and disrespectful, and it caused her genuine distress. She testified she could distinguish between curiosity and intrusiveness, and that this question was the latter. She responded in a way that diffused the perceived tension in the room and the meeting continued. Ms. Chambers also testified that when she entered the meeting room, the Board Member did not acknowledge her presence but acknowledged Ms. Gibb when she entered shortly after. I accept Ms. Gibb’s explanation that the Board Member sought her out specifically because he was considering withdrawing his donation and wanted to discuss his concerns with the new Fund Development.

[60]           That evening, Ms. Chambers contacted Dr. Schokkenbroek regarding the Comment. She explained why she found it improper and put him on notice that similar comments from Board members would need to be addressed going forward. At their next meeting, Dr. Schokkenbroek acknowledged to Ms. Chambers that the Comment “was not a nuanced way to address people” and said he understood how it made her feel. He provided context about the Board Member’s age and his view that the remark was likely not intended as offensive.

[61]           Mr. Beasley testified that the Board Member had a longstanding personal interest in genealogy and the history of names – on a prior occasion the Board Member had inquired about Mr. Beasley’s own surname and its origin. Mr. Beasley testified that he felt awkward when the Comment was made and did not know what to say at the time but described Ms. Chambers as composed in her reaction. I accept this evidence as context.

[62]           At the Museum’s Annual General Meeting in May 2019, Mr. Beasley and at least one other Board or Executive Committee member apologized to Ms. Chambers for the Comment. I accept that these apologies were genuine. I find that the Comment was racialized in nature and had an adverse impact on Ms. Chambers. I also find that the adverse impact, while real, was at the lower end of the spectrum: it was a single remark, the Board Member was not in Ms. Chambers’ supervisory chain, at least two members of the Board apologized for the Comment and Dr. Schokkenbroek acknowledged it as improper.

D.    The Workplace Relationship and the Alleged Mistreatment (May–July 2019)

[63]           Multiple witnesses described the start of the Contract warmly. Dr. Schokkenbroek called it “quite a beautiful start of something.” Ms. Gibb said Ms. Chambers brought a “beautiful vision.” Ms. Chambers described her initial relationship with Ms. Clur as having “hit it off,” the two often conversing in each other’s offices. I accept all of these accounts as consistent and credible.

[64]           That atmosphere deteriorated as the Contract progressed, most acutely in the lead-up to the Museum’s 60th Anniversary event. Stress levels were elevated across the Museum. Ms. Chambers testified that the relationship breakdown began around issues with signage in late April and May 2019. She testified that Ms. De Vera, the Operations Associate, would perform tasks that fell within the marketing function without consulting her, and that she felt this undermined her strategic authority. During cross-examination, Ms. Chambers did not dispute that her email exchange with Ms. De Vera regarding the issue started out tense but ended with a conciliatory tone; one email from Ms. De Vera expressed a desire to collaborate.

[65]           While I accept that Ms. Chambers experienced these interactions as exclusionary, I find that the more probable explanation for the difficulties is a genuine structural ambiguity – it was unclear, in a small and under-resourced Museum without a marketing coordinator, who was responsible for which operational and logistical tasks – rather than deliberate exclusion or mistreatment of Ms. Chambers.

[66]           Ms. Chambers testified that Ms. Clur gradually stopped communicating with her beyond a “bare minimum.” She acknowledged at the hearing, however, that she attributed this to “the stress of her situation” and was “not faulting her.” Ms. Chambers did not, at the time, connect Ms. Clur’s withdrawal to her race. She described it as a personal response to a stressful period. The reframing of the same events as race-related emerged in the context of Tribunal proceedings.

[67]           Ms. Chambers also testified that she found Ms. Clur’s behaviour on the day of the 60th Anniversary to be cold. She testified that Ms. Clur made no eye contact with her and did not fulfil certain logistical responsibilities (including receiving the photographer and providing a content list). I accept that Ms. Chambers found this hurtful. However, Ms. Clur testified that she had numerous moving parts to manage on the day of the event and was occupied with troubleshooting on the spot. I find it more likely that Ms. Clur’s behaviour on that day is more plausibly explained by the pressure of the event than by any deliberate exclusion of Ms. Chambers based on her race.

[68]           Ms. Chambers testified to a culminating incident on June 17, 2019, when she says, she overheard from a different room, a “verbal altercation” between Ms. Gibb and Ms. Clur, during which Ms. Clur asked Ms. Gibb to leave her office. She testified that this incident made her feel unsafe and led her to work remotely.

[69]           I find that the alleged verbal altercation is not established on a balance of probabilities. Ms. Gibb does not recall a verbal altercation. She recalled a conversation about catering in which Ms. Clur was frustrated but does not recall shouting. Ms. Clur testified that she did not have a verbal altercation with Ms. Gibb. I prefer the direct evidence of Ms. Gibb and Ms. Clur over Ms. Chambers’ account of what she believes she overheard from another room. Ms. Chambers relies on this incident as evidence of race‑related hostile treatment by Museum staff and in support of her stated safety concern regarding attendance at the July 4 meeting. As I find the altercation is not proven, this reliance is not made out on the evidence. I return to this later in my decision.

[70]           I accept that genuine workplace tensions existed between Ms. Chambers and the Operations Department. Dr. Schokkenbroek and Ms. Clur both described communication difficulties with Ms. Gibb and Ms. Chambers. A specific example was Ms. Chambers dismissing Ms. Clur’s suggestion for pirate-themed birthday party advertising as “stupid” in the presence of others. Ms. Clur testified she was “taken aback” as this was not her prior experience of Ms. Chambers, and Ms. Chambers apologized during the hearing. Both sides acknowledged tensions and apologies. Mr. MacLeod recalled overhearing a conversation between Ms. Chambers and Ms. Clur after which Ms. Chambers appeared visibly upset, which is consistent with interpersonal friction, though he said he knew Ms. Chambers was feeling pressure and had some sense it concerned Ms. Clur. He testified that he was not aware of the broader context at the time and though he described the tensions as “one-sided coming from Ms. Clur,” he acknowledged that he only knew what Ms. Chambers felt from speaking to her after the fact.

[71]           On June 24, 2019, Ms. Chambers raised her concerns at a meeting with Dr. Schokkenbroek, describing the Operations staff as having “alienated” and “ganged up on” her, and requesting mediation. This was the first time she formally raised with Dr. Schokkenbroek her concerns that Operations staff had alienated her and ganged up on her, and that she required mediation. It is not in dispute that, at this time, she did not characterize the mistreatment as connected to her race. Dr. Schokkenbroek’s response was to suggest that Ms. Chambers speak with Ms. Clur directly. He testified that this was consistent with his management style of giving people freedom and expecting issues to be resolved between staff. Ms. Chambers found this response insufficient. She stopped working three days later, on June 27, 2019.

E.     The Work Product

[72]           Since the Museum’s explanation for the non-payment of the Disputed Invoices rests in significant part on purported deficiencies in Ms. Chambers’ work product, I address the evidence on that point in some detail. I do not do so to pass judgment on Ms. Chambers’ professional abilities; I do so because the credibility and consistency of the Museum’s quality of work-based explanation is material to the discrimination analysis.

1.      The Annual Report

[73]           Ms. Chambers worked on the Museum’s annual report in April and May 2019. Dr. Schokkenbroek described the annual report as a key document reviewed by the Board and presented at the AGM; it was also, as Ms. Gibb testified, a fundraiser’s primary tool for corporate sponsorship. The report was due for the AGM in mid-May 2019. I accept Dr. Schokkenbroek’s evidence that the report was delivered late and contained multiple errors, including missing sponsors, typographical errors, and problems with the financial section. Ms. Kwan testified that she provided Ms. Chambers with a draft income statement to be converted into a graphic, and that instead Ms. Chambers left the raw income statement in the report. She testified that this was a departure from prior practice and led to adverse comments from Board members. A second version had to be produced.

[74]           Ms. Chambers disputes sole responsibility for the annual report errors. She testified that the report required data from multiple departments; that Dr. Schokkenbroek provided late edits and additional content requests; that Ms. Kwan was slow to provide financial data; and that the previous year’s report had simply been the raw working document rather than a designed publication. I accept that there were genuine logistical difficulties and competing demands during the annual report process. However, I am satisfied on the evidence before me, including Ms. Chambers’ invoice, that she was primarily responsible for preparing the report. I further find that the Museum’s dissatisfaction with the report was genuine. That dissatisfaction is corroborated by Ms. Kwan’s contemporaneous records and by Ms. Gibb’s evidence, and it predated the conflict over payment.

2.      The May Newsletter

[75]           On or around May 12, 2019, Ms. Chambers sent the Museum’s May newsletter. It contained a grammatical error and formatting issues. The newsletter was a routine marketing deliverable.

3.      The Vinyl Graphics

[76]           On May 30, 2019, Ms. Chambers approved the installation of vinyl graphics for the Museum’s windows. The graphics spelled “Maritme” instead of “Maritime.” The graphics had to be reprinted and reinstalled at a cost of approximately $2,170. Ms. Chambers deducted 10 hours ($420) from her invoices to account for the error.

[77]           Ms. Chambers testified that she sent the proof for review; that it was reviewed by several individuals without the error being identified; and that Dr. Schokkenbroek himself approved it through Mr. MacLeod. I accept that the proofing process involved others and that the error was an honest one. I also find that the Museum’s reliance on the vinyl error as a quality concern was genuine. The Museum’s response of deducting the reprint cost from a future invoice was a contemporaneous response to the error, not a justification developed after the fact.

[78]           I note one further feature of the vinyl incident. Mr. MacLeod testified that Ms. Chambers, on discovering the error, asked him not to tell Ms. Clur about it. This detail suggests that by late May 2019, Ms. Chambers was already concerned about Ms. Clur’s reaction to mistakes and was seeking to manage the Museum’s discovery of her mistakes rather than address errors transparently – a dynamic that Dr. Schokkenbroek had raised as inconsistent with the full transparency he had asked for from the outset.

4.      The 60th Anniversary Event Posters

[79]           Event posters for the 60th Anniversary did not include the Museum’s address. When this was raised, Ms. Chambers reportedly responded to Ms. Clur that “people can just Google it.” Ms. Chambers disputes that this was inadequate, noting that approximately 1,200 people attended the event and most would Google the location regardless. I accept that event attendance was not materially affected. However, I find that omitting the institution’s address from a promotional poster and responding to the concern by dismissing the importance of accuracy, was consistent with the pattern of communication difficulties described by multiple witnesses.

5.      The Concord Pacific Invitations

[80]           The most serious errors involved the invitations for the 60th Anniversary event. The invitations did not include the logo of the main sponsor, Concord Pacific. Given the Museum’s discussions with Concord Pacific about the Coal Harbour relocation project, Dr. Schokkenbroek testified that this was a high-stakes omission. Concord Pacific threatened to withdraw its sponsorship. Ms. Gibb called her contact at Concord Pacific and persuaded them to give the Museum one more chance, on the condition that there be “no more mistakes.” Ms. Gibb then went to Ms. Chambers and relayed this warning.

[81]           Within half an hour of that conversation, Ms. Chambers sent a second round of invitations again omitting Concord Pacific’s logo. Ms. Gibb testified that this was the incident that led her to decide to leave the Museum because she believed her professional reputation as a development director was finished.

[82]           Ms. Chambers disputes that she was provided with the sponsorship assets and logo prior to sending the invitations. I accept that there was a communications breakdown about which assets had been provided and by whom. However, I find that the cumulative pattern; the annual report, the newsletter errors, the vinyl typo, the poster without an address, and the repeated omission of the key sponsor’s logo after an explicit warning constitute a credible and corroborated record of work quality issues that predated the conflict over payment.

[83]           Ms. Gibb confirmed that the contract deliverables included items that were not usable as assets by the Museum. She testified that Dr. Schokkenbroek “was put in such an impossible situation because “there was nothing he could use.” I accept this assessment.

F.      The Hours Overruns, Invoices, and Payment Dispute

[84]           Both contractors exceeded their contracted hours from early in the Contract. In April 2019, Ms. Chambers invoiced 96 hours ($4,233.60) and Ms. Gibb invoiced close to 100 hours. Both were paid. Dr. Schokkenbroek raised concerns at that point and asked both contractors to keep their hours within the 30 combined hours per week contracted going forward, noting that the Museum had a limited budget. He also specified that any additional hours would need to be approved in advance, as required by the Contract.

[85]           Ms. Chambers testified that she had a conversation with Dr. Schokkenbroek in which she told him she would need to front-load her hours in advance of her planned June move, working more heavily in the early months and less in the summer. She says he assured her there were reserve funds. Dr. Schokkenbroek acknowledged a conversation about the marketing coordinator’s salary being redirected to the Contract. I find that there was some discussion about adjusting the workload distribution. However, I also find that no written authorization for increased hours above the Contract was provided, as required, and that the Museum’s contemporaneous emails show a consistent and genuine concern about the budget from April onward.

[86]           In around June 2019, Ms. Chambers informed Dr. Schokkenbroek she had worked approximately 110 hours in May. By June 12, 2019, Dr. Schokkenbroek had again expressed concern about the hours in an email, noting that the Museum had spent nearly twice the budgeted amount on marketing and development over April and May combined. He asked again to be informed in advance of additional hours and asked about the extent to which Mr. Jeffreys’ hours were included in Ms. Chambers’ billing. Ms. Chambers did not answer this question in her reply.

[87]           On June 13, 2019, Ms. Gibb emailed Dr. Schokkenbroek advising she would stop all work. She stated that Ms. Kwan had informed her that she was authorized to pay each contractor for 60 hours of work in May (15 hours per week), and that the additional hours would need to be discussed with Dr. Schokkenbroek upon his return from overseas. On or around June 27, 2019, Ms. Kwan paid Ms. Chambers’ Invoice 118 for the first 60 hours of May ($2,318.40) by e-transfer. This was the first and only e-transfer payment made to Ms. Chambers. Ms. Kwan testified that e-transfer was not the Museum’s standard payment method, but that it was used in this instance because Dr. Schokkenbroek was overseas and the cheque signing process would have caused additional delay. I accept this evidence.

[88]           By June 27, 2019, Ms. Chambers had submitted five additional invoices totalling $9,724.05 [the Disputed Invoices] as follows:

a.    Invoice 120: 32 hours, $1,411.20 — graphic design for the 60th Anniversary (dated June 20, due July 4, 2019).

b.    Invoice 122: 27 hours, $1,190.70 — graphic design for banners and advertisements (dated June 20, due July 17, 2019).

c.     Invoice 123: 57.5 hours, $2,535.75 — graphic design for vinyl design and membership cards (dated June 20, due July 17, 2019).

d.    Invoice 124: 49 hours, $2,160.90 — graphic design for the annual report (dated June 20, due July 17, 2019); and

e.    Invoice 125: 55 hours, $2,425.50 — “Marketing Director June Fee” (dated June 27, due June 28, 2019).

[89]           In an email dated June 28, 2019, Ms. Kwan set out her analysis of the contractors’ invoicing for Dr. Schokkenbroek. She noted that Ms. Gibb had invoiced a total of $13,944 from March to June — an amount “not extremely far off” the budgeted amount — while Ms. Chambers had invoiced a total of $23,618, including $3,675 for Mr. Jeffreys’ curator work, against a budget of $10,080.

[90]           Ms. Kwan raised several specific concerns about the Disputed Invoices. First, she noted that Invoices 120–124 were submitted as separate “design” invoices, which she had not been told to expect; her understanding was that design work fell within the marketing deliverables already covered by the monthly fee. Second, she was not told that Ms. Chambers had performed the design work; she understood from context that Mr. Jeffreys was doing graphic design for the Museum. Third, the invoices had been submitted without prior notice. Fourth, regarding Invoice 121 for $3,675 listed as “Curator — 60th Anniversary Exhibition”, she did not recognize it and asked questions. I accept all of this as consistent with her role and as corroborated by the contemporaneous email record.

[91]           I accept Dr. Schokkenbroek’s evidence that he was also confused about who had performed the design work. He testified he had understood from Ms. Chambers that the Museum was getting the “whole package” including design but had understood the design component to be part of the marketing hours, not billed separately. I find this confusion was genuine and not manufactured after the fact: the Contract does not refer to Mr. Jeffreys, and Ms. Chambers had not disclosed to the Museum that she was subcontracting design work to Mr. Jefferys outside of the contracted scope.

[92]           There is one further issue I address here regarding the graphic design work. When Ms. Chambers was asked at the hearing whether the graphic design work in Invoices 120–124 was performed in June, she stated: “No, most of the work would have been done in April and May — the event was June 8th, so a lot of the work would have been done in advance.” At this point, Ms. Chambers had already invoiced 96 hours in April and 110 hours in May — hours for which she had been paid at least in part. The Museum was being asked to pay again, through the Disputed Invoices, for work that on Ms. Chambers’ own account was substantially performed during months when she was already billing heavily.

[93]           Regarding Mr. Jeffreys’ Invoice 121 for $3,675 for curatorial work, Mr. MacLeod confirmed to the Museum that Mr. Jeffreys had satisfactorily completed the exhibition design work that the invoice described, working under his supervision using the curatorial budget. Ms. Kwan paid this invoice by e-transfer once the questions about it were resolved. I find this was consistent with the Museum’s standard process of paying invoices after obtaining confirmation of satisfactory completion.

G.    The July 4, 2019, Meeting

[94]           The events surrounding the July 4 meeting are at the centre of Ms. Chambers’ discrimination case on the Invoice Dispute. I set them out below.

[95]           On June 28, 2019, the parties exchanged emails about arranging a meeting. Dr. Schokkenbroek proposed meeting at a restaurant. Ms. Gibb emailed that she would commence court proceedings if payment were not made by July 4. On July 2, Dr. Schokkenbroek then proposed a “without prejudice” meeting at the law firm of one of the Board Members, asking that neither party record the conversation and requesting return of Museum property at the meeting. Both Ms. Gibb and Ms. Chambers declined attendance of the meeting.

[96]           On July 3, 2019, Dr. Schokkenbroek wrote to both contractors inviting them to the Museum on July 4 to return Museum property and collect their cheques. Ms. Chambers replied that she would not attend the Museum and that Ms. Gibb would collect her cheque and return items on her behalf. Ms. Chambers testified that she felt unsafe attending the Museum, that she feared that an emotional reaction on her part might lead to police being called, and that she anticipated being asked to sign a non-disclosure agreement. I accept that Ms. Chambers experienced genuine emotional distress at this point in the relationship.

[97]           On July 4, 2019, Ms. Gibb attended the meeting with Dr. Schokkenbroek. I rely on Ms. Gibb’s direct evidence about what occurred at the meeting. Dr. Schokkenbroek showed Ms. Gibb two envelopes and gave her one, which contained payment for her June work. The meeting was emotionally charged. Dr. Schokkenbroek expressed how upset and disappointed he was with how things had unfolded. Ms. Gibb felt “humbled and terrible” and said she would have done “anything” to resolve the situation at that point. She also delivered a partial development assessment at the meeting, an audit of the Museum’s development function, and Dr. Schokkenbroek told her before paying her that other staff had to confirm this work could be used. I find that Ms. Gibb’s payment was made after: (a) she attended in person; (b) she explained her work; and (c) Dr. Schokkenbroek received confirmation from others that her deliverable was usable.

[98]           Dr. Schokkenbroek asked Ms. Gibb at the meeting why Ms. Chambers had not attended. Ms. Gibb testified that she told Dr. Schokkenbroek that Ms. Chambers was “dealing with other things,” that the situation was “emotionally fraught,” that there was “a lot of anger,” and that Ms. Chambers was “waiting for things to tone down” and “it was not a good time for her to come.” Ms. Gibb also testified that she offered to do some additional work if that would release Ms. Chambers’ cheque, but that the meeting concluded without the second envelope for Ms. Chambers being released.

[99]           Ms. Chambers’ account of this meeting is entirely based on what Ms. Gibb told her at a coffee shop afterwards. Ms. Chambers alleges that Ms. Gibb told her: (a) that Ms. Gibb explained Ms. Chambers’ absence by reference to her being a Black woman and the hostility from operations staff and the Comment from the Board Member; and (b) that in response, Dr. Schokkenbroek took the cheque and said, “I’ll keep this a little longer.”

[100]       I do not accept Ms. Chambers’ account on a balance of probabilities. It is hearsay. Ms. Gibb contradicts both components. On the first component, Ms. Gibb is explicit and unambiguous: she did not mention Ms. Chambers’ race, the Comment, or the operations hostility to Dr. Schokkenbroek. On the second component, Ms. Gibb does not recall the “I’ll keep this a little longer” statement. I give significant weight to Ms. Gibb’s evidence on this point. She had strong personal reasons to support Ms. Chambers. She was the only witness present. Her account of the meeting is internally consistent and detailed. I prefer it over the hearsay account that Ms. Chambers attributes to her.

[101]       I note that Ms. Chambers did not put the “I’ll keep this a little longer” allegation to Ms. Gibb during her cross-examination of Ms. Gibb at the hearing. An allegation of this gravity, on which the discrimination case substantially depends, would ordinarily be put directly to the witness on whose evidence the account is based. The failure to do so has some bearing on the weight I give to Ms. Chambers’ account of that exchange.

[102]       Ms. Gibb testified that she understood from the meeting that Dr. Schokkenbroek was prepared to have a conversation with Ms. Chambers if she showed up. I accept this. I further find that the reason Ms. Chambers’s cheque was not released on July 4 was that she did not attend the meeting.

H.    Post-Termination Events

[103]       On July 15, 2019, Ms. Chambers emailed Dr. Schokkenbroek demanding payment of all Disputed Invoices by e-transfer by July 17, failing which she threatened legal action. In response, Dr. Schokkenbroek confirmed on July 16 that payment for June had been prepared and available at the July 4 meeting and that he had still not received the marketing component of the strategic plan which was one of the major deliverables contemplated under the Contract. At the hearing, Ms. Chambers asked Dr. Schokkenbroek why he did not just mail the cheque to her. He testified that he wanted to end the engagement properly, by meeting with both contractors. Given that Ms. Gibb was required to justify her charges before receiving payment at the July 4 meeting, I accept that Dr. Schokkenbroek’s expectation was for a similar discussion with Ms. Chambers before releasing her payment. Ms. Chambers replied on July 17 reiterating her intention to commence legal action.

[104]       On August 5, 2019, Ms. Chambers and her family left Vancouver to drive to Northern Ontario. On August 7, 2019, the family was involved in a tragic motor vehicle collision where she lost her son. Ms. Chambers, Mr. Jeffreys, and their other two children were seriously injured. I acknowledge the devastating personal consequences of that collision, which created a context in which Ms. Chambers subsequently had to pursue this complaint while bearing profound grief and injury.

[105]       Dr. Schokkenbroek testified that following the accident, he did not release the cheque because by that point there were ongoing legal proceedings and Ms. Chambers had instructed him not to contact her. I accept his evidence on this point. I note, as I did in my analysis of the Invoice Dispute, that the question of the cheque was live and unresolved at the time of the accident.

[106]       In her April 2021 affidavit filed in this proceeding, Ms. Chambers stated that the Museum’s failure to pay caused her family to move “earlier” than planned. Under cross-examination, she acknowledged this was an error and that the non-payment had in fact caused the move to be delayed; they stayed in Vancouver past their planned June 17 departure. I accept the correction. I note that the Contract itself, signed in February 2019, had already contemplated Ms. Chambers’ planned move on June 17, 2019, well before the Invoice Dispute arose.

[107]       The Invoice Dispute was subsequently pursued in Small Claims Court. On January 25, 2022, the parties reached a settlement, and on February 14, 2022, Ms. Chambers signed a full release of the claims in that action. The release did not extinguish this human rights complaint, which was filed separately and raises distinct legal claims under the Code. The parties do not dispute this.

VIII           APPLICABLE LAW

[108]       The burden of establishing that discrimination has taken place rests with the complainant. A complainant must prove discrimination on a balance of probabilities. If the complainant establishes a case of discrimination, the burden shifts to the respondent to justify its conduct. If the complainant fails to prove discrimination, there is no breach of the Code: Rai v. Shark Club of Langley (No. 2), 2013 BCHRT 204 at para. 361; Heyman v. Saunders (No. 2), 2010 BCHRT 88 at para. 6.

[109]       To establish discrimination under s. 13 of the Code, Ms. Chambers must prove that she has the protected characteristic of race, experienced an adverse impact in her employment, and that her race was a factor in that adverse impact: Moore v. British Columbia (Education), 2012 SCC 61 at para. 33. There is no requirement to prove discriminatory intent. The Code is concerned with the effect of the respondent’s conduct, not its motivation: s. 2 of the Code; Radek v. Henderson Development (Canada) and Securiguard Services (No. 3), 2005 BCHRT 302 at paras. 474.

[110]       Ms. Chambers’ protected characteristic need not be the sole or even the overriding factor in the adverse impact she experienced; it need only be a factor Bombardier at para. 52; Stewart v. Elk Valley Coal Corp., 2017 SCC 30 at para. 50.

[111]       In this case, there is no dispute that Ms. Chambers has the protected characteristics of race under which she filed her complaint. She is a Black woman. There is also no dispute that the non-payment of the Disputed Invoices constituted adverse impact. She was not paid for her work, and it caused her and her family financial hardship. The issue I must decide is whether there is a connection between Ms. Chambers’ protected characteristics and the Museum’s conduct across the three allegations she advances: the Comment, the Alleged Mistreatment, and the non-payment of the Disputed Invoices.

[112]       On the Invoice Dispute specifically, Ms. Chambers argues that race operated through the comparator evidence that white contractors were paid while she was not; her payment was conditioned on in-person attendance not applied to earlier payments; and through disproportionate scrutiny of her invoice claims relative to comparable claims by white contractors.

[113]       Racial discrimination is rarely proven by direct evidence. It is more often proven by circumstantial evidence from which an inference is drawn. This Tribunal has expressly acknowledged that subtle, unconscious beliefs, biases, and prejudices usually inform racial stereotyping and can be inferred from circumstantial evidence: Radek at para. 302; Campbell at para. 102; Francis at para. 280.

[114]       An inference of discrimination may arise “where the evidence offered in support of it renders such an inference more probable than the other possible inferences or hypotheses”: Vestad v. Seashell Ventures Inc., 2001 BCHRT 38 at para. 44; Campbell at para. 103. The question is whether an inference of discrimination is more likely than the respondent’s explanation for its conduct. It is not necessary that the respondent’s conduct be consistent only with discrimination and with no other rational explanation: Campbell at para. 103.

[115]       Individual acts may themselves be ambiguous or explicable by reference to non-discriminatory reasons. But when viewed as part of the larger picture, and with an appropriate understanding of how racial discrimination takes place, individual acts may collectively support an inference that discrimination was a factor in the treatment a person received: Campbell at para. 105; Francis at para. 284. A contextual examination of all relevant circumstances is required to identify the “subtle scent of discrimination”: Kennedy v. British Columbia (Energy and Mines) (No. 4), 2000 BCHRT 60 at para. 168, cited in Francis at paras 284 – 289.

[116]       If Ms. Chambers establishes a prima facie case, that is, a case that is sufficient to raise an inference of discrimination, the burden shifts to the Museum to provide a reasonable, non-discriminatory explanation for its conduct. The question at that stage is whether the Museum’s explanation, if accepted, is more probable than the inference of discrimination: Bombardier at paras. 64–65. If the Museum’s explanation is accepted on a balance of probabilities, the inference of discrimination is rebutted and the complaint fails.

[117]       I am also mindful of the myths and misconceptions that can arise when race discrimination is alleged, which I identified in Part III of this decision. Of particular relevance to this case are: the myth that a racialized person is “too sensitive” or is overreacting; the myth that past acceptable treatment forecloses discriminatory treatment in the future; and the myth that acceptable non-racial explanations for conduct preclude an inference of discrimination. I have guarded against each of these in my analysis: Francis at para. 289.

[118]       Finally, I approach this complaint through an intersectional lens. Ms. Chambers is a Black woman. An intersectional analysis requires the Tribunal to address the ways in which overlapping characteristics compound and shape a person’s experience of discrimination: Baylis-Flannery at para. 145; Young Worker at para. 51; Radek at para. 463. This intersectional lens is particularly apt in the context of the Invoice Dispute. The alleged discriminatory conduct involved the exercise of economic authority by a white male Executive Director over a Black woman contractor. Anti-Black stereotypes relating to work ethic, professional competence, financial credibility, and the expectation of compliance with authority, as discussed in Part III of this decision, may converge and compound in precisely such configurations of power. I have dealt with this in my analysis.

[119]       At the same time, the availability of racial inference does not create a presumption of discrimination. Any inference of discrimination must be rooted in the evidence of a particular case: Bombardier at para. 88; Batson-Dottin v. Forensic Psychiatric Hospital (No. 2), 2018 BCHRT 246 at para. 82. I agree with the Museum that the social context of this interaction is not enough, on its own, to prove that Ms. Chambers was discriminated against. The fact that Ms. Chambers has a protected characteristic and experienced adverse treatment does not, without more, establish that the treatment was connected to her race: Campbell at paras. 104. The question in each case is whether the inference of discrimination is more probable than the available non-discriminatory explanations, assessed against the evidence as a whole.

IX     ANALYSIS AND DECISION

A.     The Comment

[120]       I am satisfied that Ms. Chambers experienced an adverse impact as a result of the Comment. The Board Member’s question – “Chambers? That’s not West African. How did you get a name like that?” – is, on its face, a racialized inquiry. It presupposes that Ms. Chambers’ name should track her race and colour, that a “West African” surname would be expected of a Black woman, and that a name that departs from that expectation requires explanation. This is a form of racial presumption about identity. I accept that Ms. Chambers experienced the Comment as intrusive and disrespectful, and that it caused her genuine distress.

[121]       I find that race and colour were a factor in the Comment. The Comment was directed at the perceived mismatch between Ms. Chambers’ surname and her race. The Board Member’s inquiry about Mr. Beasley’s own surname – whether it was of Huguenot origin – was different in character: it was a neutral genealogical observation about a European name rooted in the Board Member’s established interest in history. The Comment to Ms. Chambers, by contrast, expressed a racial expectation about what her name ought to be. The Museum’s explanation that the Board Member was motivated by genealogical curiosity does not alter this analysis. Discriminatory impact does not require discriminatory intent: Radek (No. 3) at para. 482.

[122]       However, in circumstances where alleged discrimination arises from a single comment, the Tribunal will consider all of the circumstances to determine whether it violates the Code. Those circumstances include, “the egregiousness or virulence of the comment, the relationship between the involved parties, the context in which the comment was made, whether an apology was offered, and whether or not the recipient of the comment was a member of a group historically discriminated against”: Pardo v. School District No. 43, 2003 BCHRT 71 at para. 12. Because the Code focuses on effects, the impact of the incident is an important consideration.

[123]       The Tribunal is also aware that:

[…] not every negative comment that is connected to a protected characteristic will be discriminatory harassment contrary to the Code. It is certainly undesirable for people to treat each other rudely, disrespectfully, or inappropriately. However, it is not the Tribunal’s purpose to adjudicate disputes other than where a person’s protected characteristic has presented as a barrier in their ability to fully, and with dignity, access an area of life protected by the Code. In performing this function, the Tribunal is cognizant that the disputes brought to it arise between human beings, with all the imperfection that entails. Not every failure to be kind or professional requires state intervention. This includes failures with discriminatory overtones – and therefore highlights a distinction between comments that may be “discriminatory” in the everyday sense of that word, and comments that amount to discrimination, within the meaning and scope of human rights legislation.

Brito v. Affordable Housing Societies and another, 2017 BCHRT 270 at para. 41.

[124]       In essence, the context of the comment is critical: Brito at para. 43. The Comment, while hurtful to Ms. Chambers, was not particularly egregious or virulent. It did not involve, for example, an egregious racial slur: see Sarba v. Ruskin Construction Ltd. and others, 2022 BCHRT 35 at para. 52. The Board Member was not in Ms. Chambers’ supervisory chain, and she had minimum interaction with him thereafter. In fact, Ms. Chambers did not say she had any further interactions with him after the meeting and the Comment or further similar comments were not repeated. Further, the context in which it was said does not demonstrate any particular virulence towards Ms. Chambers. Within days, Ms. Chambers was able to speak with Mr. Schokkenbroek, who acknowledged the Comment was “not a nuanced way to address people.” Board members apologized at the May 2019 AGM. I accept those apologies as genuine.

[125]       Regarding the Comment, I find that it does not on its own rise to the threshold of a contravention of the Code.

[126]       I do not dismiss the Comment lightly. I treat it as relevant social context for the analysis that follows, particularly the Invoice Dispute, as evidence that Ms. Chambers’ engagement with the Museum was initiated in an environment in which her racial identity had already been the subject of an uninvited and presumptuous inquiry. However, the Comment standing alone does not constitute discrimination under the Code.

B.     The Alleged Mistreatment

[127]       I accept that Ms. Chambers experienced interpersonal tensions with Ms. Clur and Ms. De Vera that she found upsetting, and that those tensions contributed to her decision to stop attending the Museum premises in June 2019. The gradual cooling of what had initially been a warm working relationship with Ms. Clur, the communication difficulties with the Operations Department, and the incident on the day of the 60th Anniversary when Ms. Clur made no eye contact with her, cumulatively had an adverse effect on Ms. Chambers’ experience of the workplace.

[128]       As I found above, the alleged verbal altercation between Ms. Gibb and Ms. Clur is not established on a balance of probabilities. Ms. Chambers relies on this incident as part of her race-based mistreatment case, as evidence that the operations staff created a hostile environment directed at her, and as the basis for her stated safety concern about attending the July 4 meeting. The difficultly here is that the event which Ms. Chambers identifies as the moment she felt unsafe in the workplace, and which she relies on as evidence of mistreatment directed at her, is a finding of fact that is unsupported by the evidence. Ms. Chambers was not in the room. Both direct witnesses deny it. I do not accept Ms. Chambers’ account of what she believes she overheard. Even if the verbal altercation were proven, however, Ms. Chambers did not connect the behaviour of the operations staff to her race. She attributed Ms. Clur’s conduct to personal stress and did not raise her race at her June 24 meeting with Dr. Schokkenbroek. The racial framing of the mistreatment emerged only in the context of these proceedings.

[129]       On the broader workplace tensions, I am not satisfied on a balance of probabilities that race was a factor. My reasons are as follows.

[130]       First, Ms. Chambers did not, at the time, frame the workplace tensions as connected to her race. In her June 24, 2019, meeting with Mr. Schokkenbroek, at which she raised her concerns formally for the first time, she described the Operations staff as having “alienated” and “ganged up on” her. She framed it as an interpersonal and professional conflict.

[131]       Second, the tensions were bilateral. Both sides acknowledged difficulties, both sides raised concerns about the other’s communication style, and both sides issued apologies. Ms. Chambers dismissed Ms. Clur’s suggestion for pirate-themed birthday party advertising as “stupid” in the presence of another staff member, an incident Ms. Clur described as “taken aback” because it was inconsistent with her prior experience of Ms. Chambers. The contemporaneous emails between Ms. Chambers and Ms. De Vera ended with a conciliatory in tone, expressing a desire to work things through. The evidence does not demonstrate deliberate hostility or an exclusion campaign based on race. Rather, they are signs of a deteriorating professional relationship under significant pressure.

[132]       Third, Ms. Gibb, who shared Ms. Chambers’ professional environment throughout this period and who had strong personal reasons to support Ms. Chambers, contemporaneously observed the workplace dynamics. She testified that staff were “reacting to putting trust in someone and believing in a vision and being badly let down,” and were “being really angry about bad work.” I give her evidence weight. Ms. Gibb was embedded in the same workplace, was working at the Museum under the Contract, and had no incentive to protect the Museum’s interests at Ms. Chambers’ expense.

[133]       I find that the workplace tensions are more plausibly explained by the following: the pressure of a significant event calendar in a small and under-resourced organization; the departure of the marketing coordinator that left Ms. Chambers responsible for tasks she had not anticipated; communication difficulties and clashes in working style between Ms. Chambers and the Operations team; and the accumulating strain created by the quality issues and invoice disputes. I am not satisfied that race was a factor in those tensions.

[134]       I therefore find that the Alleged Mistreatment does not establish discrimination under s. 13 of the Code. This allegation is dismissed.

C.     The Invoice Dispute

[135]       The Invoice Dispute is the central and most difficult allegation. The non-payment of the Disputed Invoices caused Ms. Chambers and her family real financial harm. The people who were paid, Ms. Gibb and Mr. Jeffreys, were white. The engagement had begun in an environment in which a racialized comment had already been made about Ms. Chambers’ identity. Against that backdrop, Ms. Chambers’ suspicion that race played a role is not unreasonable.

[136]       As in the analysis above, the legal question is not whether Ms. Chambers’s suspicion was understandable, but whether an inference of racial discrimination is more probable on a balance of probabilities than the Museum’s non-discriminatory explanations.

[137]       I am satisfied that the non-payment of $9,724.05 in outstanding invoices constituted adverse impact in Ms. Chambers’ work. Ms. Chambers was not paid for work she performed as the Museum’s Marketing Director. The non-payment caused her and her family financial hardship and contributed to the delay of their planned relocation. I also accept Ms. Harland’s evidence, for the purpose of documenting impact, that the Museum experience had ongoing emotional consequences for Ms. Chambers, compounded by the tragedy of the accident. Adverse impact is established.

[138]       Next, I turn to the evidence that Ms. Chambers says supports an inference that race was a factor in the non-payment.

[139]       Ms. Gibb and Mr. Jeffreys, both white, were paid for their work. Ms. Chambers, a Black woman, was not. This is a relevant circumstance. Comparative evidence, that white contractors were treated more favourably than a Black contractor, is an indicator that may support an inference of racial discrimination. However, this comparison is less straightforward than it first appears. Ms. Gibb’s payment was also withheld initially. Her May invoices were not paid in full until after she attended the July 4 meeting in person and justified her hours to Mr. Schokkenbroek’s satisfaction. She was not simply paid as a matter of course while Ms. Chambers was not. The differential treatment between Ms. Chambers and Ms. Gibb was not “paid versus not paid,” it was “attended the meeting and justified the work versus did not attend.” That framing, as I address below, matters.

[140]       As for Mr. Jeffreys, his Invoice was paid after Mr. MacLeod confirmed to the Museum that the curatorial exhibition design work it described had been satisfactorily completed and fell within the curatorial budget, a separate budget from the marketing budget under which Ms. Chambers was contracted. The circumstances of his invoice, its source of funding, and the manner in which it was confirmed are materially different from those of Ms. Chambers’ Disputed Invoices. This comparison does not generate a straightforward racial inference.

[141]       Ms. Chambers’ first May fee payment was paid by e-transfer without requiring her to appear in person. Invoice 125 (her June Marketing Fee) required in-person collection at the Museum on July 4. Ms. Chambers argues this distinction was imposed on her alone and is unexplained by the Museum’s non-discriminatory reasons.

[142]       I accept that this distinction requires scrutiny. However, it does not sustain a racial inference. Invoice 118 was paid by e-transfer in the specific circumstances of Mr. Schokkenbroek being overseas, a payment queue that had fallen behind, and the need to keep Ms. Chambers working. The July 4 meeting was not simply a cheque delivery, it was a wind-down meeting organized for both contractors to return Museum property, justify their outstanding invoices, receive final payments, and discuss the end of the engagement. Ms. Gibb received her cheque in person at that meeting. The requirement that Ms. Chambers attend in person was not imposed on her alone; it was the requirement for that specific meeting for both contractors.

[143]       I turn to Ms. Chambers’ argument that the Museum scrutinized her design invoices with a level of suspicion that was not applied to comparable work, and that this disproportionate scrutiny is consistent with the anti-Black stereotype of dishonesty and financial impropriety recognized in McCarthy and Francis.

[144]       This is the strongest thread in the circumstantial case. I accept that there is an asymmetry in how the Museum responded to the different invoices. Mr. Jeffreys’ curator invoice was paid after a relatively straightforward confirmation from Mr. MacLeod. Ms. Chambers’ design invoices attracted detailed questioning about who did the work, what budget they fell under, whether they had been authorized, and whether the work was performed in the months they were invoiced for. On a surface reading, this asymmetry could be consistent with a stereotype that treats a Black contractor’s financial claim with greater suspicion than those of a white man.

[145]       However, I am not satisfied on a balance of probabilities that the asymmetry in scrutiny was driven by racial stereotype rather than by the objectively different circumstances of the two invoices. Mr. Jeffreys’ invoice was a single invoice for a defined piece of curatorial design work under a separate budget, confirmed by the staff member who commissioned it. Ms. Chambers’ design invoices were five separate invoices submitted simultaneously, totalling nearly $10,000, submitted without prior notice, for work she acknowledged at the hearing had mostly been performed in April and May, months for which she had already invoiced under a budget that was already significantly overrun. The Museum’s questions about those invoices were neither illogical nor disproportionate given those circumstances. I find that the scrutiny applied to Ms. Chambers’ invoices was driven by the legitimate complexity and irregularity of those invoices, not by racial bias.

[146]       I now turn to the Museum’s non-discriminatory explanations for the non-payment of the Disputed Invoices.

[147]       The Museum argues that by the end of June 2019, Ms. Chambers had invoiced $23,618 against a budget of $10,080, more than double the contracted amount. This concern is documented in Mr. Schokkenbroek’s emails as early as April 2019, repeated in May, and again in June. This was the backdrop to the Invoice Dispute. Ms. Kwan’s June 28 email provides a contemporaneous analysis of the invoicing position. I accept this explanation as genuine and corroborated.

[148]       Next, I turn to the issue of the confusion about the design work. Ms. Kwan testified that she had not been told Ms. Chambers was performing the graphic design work billed in Invoices 120–124 and had understood from context that Mr. Jeffreys or someone else was doing it. Mr. Schokkenbroek testified to the same confusion. Ms. Chambers had described the Contract as offering “the whole package” including design but had not disclosed that she was subcontracting design work to Mr. Jefferys and billing it separately from her marketing hours. I accept that this confusion was genuine. The Contract does not mention Mr. Jeffreys, and the invoice descriptions gave no indication of who performed the work or under what arrangement.

[149]       I also consider that the design invoices were submitted without prior notice. Ms. Kwan’s contemporaneous email notes that the design invoices arrived without prior notice. Under the Contract, additional services outside the agreed hours required prior written authorization. The submission of five previously undisclosed design invoices simultaneously, totalling nearly $10,000, without prior approval, was a reasonable reason for the Museum to pause and seek clarification before paying.

[150]       Further, Ms. Chambers acknowledged at the hearing that most of the graphic design work billed in Invoices 120–124 had been performed in April and May — not in June. By that point, Ms. Chambers had already invoiced 96 hours for April and 110 hours for May. The Museum was being asked to pay again, through separately submitted design invoices, for work embedded in months it had already partially paid for. I accept that this is a reasonable basis for scrutiny.

[151]       Next, I also consider the issue of the quality of the work product. The Museum’s evidence about the quality of Ms. Chambers’ deliverables was corroborated by Ms. Gibb who had no reason to protect the Museum at Ms. Chambers’ expense. The annual report required a second edition; the vinyl graphics required reprinting; event posters omitted the Museum’s address; the Concord Pacific logo was omitted from invitations twice, the second time after a warning. Ms. Gibb testified that the Museum was left with “nothing usable” and that Mr. Schokkenbroek “was put in such an impossible situation.” I accept this assessment. The quality of the deliverables is the Museum’s primary explanation for the non-payment of Invoices 120-124, the design invoices, which billed for work whose value and authorship were disputed. A small non-profit organization that relies on donations and Board oversight has a reasonable basis for declining to pay invoices for work it cannot confirm was completed, authorized, or usable.

[152]       Next, I turn to the July 4, 2019, meeting. The Museum had a signed cheque for Ms. Chambers’ June Marketing Fee (Invoice 125) prepared for the July 4 meeting. Unlike the design invoices, Invoices 125 was for Ms. Chambers’ monthly Marketing Director’s fee, not for disputed design work. The Museum’s explanation for not releasing that cheque is that Ms. Chambers did not attend the July 4 meeting. Ms. Gibb attended and received her cheque after justifying her work to Mr. Schokkenbroek’s satisfaction. Ms. Chambers did not attend. I find that Ms. Chambers’ non-attendance, rather than her race, is the more probable explanation for why Invoice 125 was not released on July 4. The Museum’s explanation that it needed an opportunity to discuss the invoices and work before releasing payment is consistent with its contemporaneous conduct and with how it handled Ms. Gibb’s payment at the same meeting. I also note that the marketing component of the strategic plan, one of the deliverables under the Contract, remained outstanding at the time of the July 4 meeting. On this basis, I find that had Ms. Chambers attended the July 4 meeting with the outstanding deliverables, there was at minimum a genuine prospect of payment.

[153]       The central factual allegation on which the racial inference in the Invoice Dispute ultimately rests is Ms. Chambers’ account that Mr. Schokkenbroek stated, regarding her cheque, “I’ll keep this a little longer”, after Ms. Gibb explained Ms. Chambers’ absence by reference to her being a Black woman who felt unsafe because of the hostility from operations staff and the Comment from the Board Member. If established, this could lead to an inference of a racialized decision to withhold payment.

[154]       I find that this allegation is not established on a balance of probabilities for the reasons that follow.

[155]       The allegation is based entirely on hearsay. Ms. Chambers was not at the July 4 meeting. She recounts what she says Ms. Gibb told her at a coffee shop afterwards. The Tribunal can, and frequently does, take a more relaxed stance to the admission of hearsay evidence than do the courts: Code, s. 27.2. However, its weight is affected by factors such as whether the source of the hearsay evidence testifies, and whether the other party has the opportunity to test hearsay information during cross-examination: Francis at para 20. In this case, Ms. Gibb’s direct evidence contradicts the account on essential elements. She testified unequivocally that she did not tell Mr. Schokkenbroek that Ms. Chambers’s race was a factor in her absence. She did not mention the Comment. She did not mention the hostility from operations staff. She said only that Ms. Chambers was “dealing with other things,” that the situation was “emotionally fraught,” and that “it was not a good time for her to come.” She also does not recall Mr. Schokkenbroek making the “I’ll keep this a little longer” statement.

[156]       I give Ms. Gibb’s evidence on this point significant weight. She had every personal reason to support Ms. Chambers. She described Ms. Chambers as “a sister.” She did not want to be a witness for the Museum and had to be compelled by an order to attend. She acknowledged her own professional failures candidly. She had no motive to shield Mr. Schokkenbroek. Her account of the meeting is detailed, internally consistent, and plausible in the circumstances she described, a heated but ultimately transactional meeting focused on her own work and payment. I find her evidence reliable.

[157]       I also note that Ms. Chambers did not put the “I’ll keep this a little longer” statement to Ms. Gibb during her cross-examination of Ms. Gibb at the hearing. The Tribunal has endorsed the rule in Browne v. Dunn, (1893), 1893 CanLII 65 (FOREP) 6 R. 67 (H.L) which provides that a party’s failure to cross-examine an opposing party on a point, after which the first party calls contradictory evidence, may affect the weight given to the contradictory evidence: Mann v. JACE Holdings, 2012 BCHRT 234 at para. 70. Ms. Chambers’ failure to do so has some bearing on the weight I can give to her version of the conversation.

[158]       I have also considered, as part of my obligation to examine all reasonable inferences from the evidence in light of the social context of anti‑Black racism set out above, whether the non‑payment of the Disputed Invoices may have been unconsciously influenced by racial bias. This possibility must be considered even though Ms. Gibb did not explicitly reference race in her communications with Mr. Schokkenbroek. As the Tribunal has recognized, stereotypes can operate without awareness on the part of those who hold them: Campbell at para. 105; Francis at para. 284. A contextual examination of all relevant circumstances is required to identify the “subtle scent of discrimination”: Kennedy at para. 168 cited in Francis at paras 284 – 289. I have undertaken that examination here.

[159]       I have considered this possibility, applying the social context framework I set out above. However, I am not satisfied that the evidence supports a finding of unconscious racial bias in this case to the standard required. In Mema, there was a thick evidentiary record that included a written misconduct report that could be analysed point by point for the racial narrative woven through it, multiple staff witnesses whose suspicion of Mr. Mema extended to his Black co-worker simply because he was also a Black man from Zimbabwe, and a pattern of conduct that the Tribunal found could not be explained by the respondent’s non-discriminatory narrative. Here, the record is different. The Museum’s concerns about the budget, the invoice irregularities, and the work quality are documented in contemporaneous emails that predate the conflict and that track a non-discriminatory narrative. There is no pattern of conduct directed at Ms. Chambers’ alone. There is no evidence that the Museum’s treatment of her differed from Ms. Gibb in their materially identical circumstances.

[160]       Having considered the whole evidence, I am not satisfied on a balance of probabilities that Ms. Chambers’ race was a factor in the Museum’s decision not to pay the disputed invoices.

[161]       I find that the Invoice Dispute does not establish discrimination under s. 13 of the Code. The complaint on this allegation is dismissed.

X       CONCLUSION

[162]       I acknowledge again that this was a difficult case. Ms. Chambers is a Black woman who was not paid for work she performed. The people who were paid were white. Her engagement began with a racialized comment about her identity. She experienced a workplace that became increasingly hostile as her engagement deteriorated. I do not dismiss any of this lightly. The circumstances, viewed through the social context framework called for careful analysis of the Museum’s explanations, and I have conducted that analysis.

[163]       The outcome I have reached is not a finding that the Museum behaved well, or that its management of the Contract was exemplary.

[164]       However, the question this Tribunal must answer is not whether the Museum was a model employer. It is whether Ms. Chambers’ race was a factor in her adverse treatment. On that question, the evidence taken as a whole, assessed against the social context, and weighed carefully, does not satisfy me on a balance of probabilities that it was. The complaint is dismissed.

Ijeamaka Anika

Tribunal Member