BC Human Rights Tribunal

Lloyd v. Fernanda Almeida and others (No.2), 2026 BCHRT 12

Date Issued: January 8, 2026
File(s):CS-000722

Indexed as: Lloyd v. Fernanda Almeida and others (No.2), 2026 BCHRT 12

IN THE MATTER OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS CODE,
RSBC 1996, c. 210 (as amended)

AND IN THE MATTER of a complaint before
the British Columbia Human Rights Tribunal

BETWEEN:

Catherine Lloyd

COMPLAINANT

AND:

Fernanda Almeida and Diana Rosso and Wayne Rosso

RESPONDENTS

REASONS FOR DECISION

Tribunal Member: Laila Said Alam

Counsel for the Complainant: Laura Track

Agent for the Respondents: Wayne Rosso

Date of Hearing: January 13-16, 2025

Location of Hearing: Via videoconference

I          INTRODUCTION

[1]               Catherine Lloyd is a senior person with mobility and arthritis-pain related disabilities. Ms. Lloyd was a tenant in the basement suite of a home owned by Fernanda Almeida. Ms. Lloyd says that issues arose in the tenancy when Ms. Almeida’s daughter, Diana Rosso, and son in law, Wayne Rosso, moved into the upstairs suite in the house four years into her tenancy. In this decision, I refer to Ms. Almeida and the Rossos together as the Respondents.

[2]               Ms. Lloyd alleges she was discriminated against in tenancy, in violation of s. 10 of the Human Rights Code, when Ms. Rosso and Mr. Rosso moved into the upstairs suite. She alleges the Rossos began restricting her use of parking, storage, laundry, and outdoor space, and that these restrictions adversely impacted her in connection with her disability. Ms. Lloyd further alleges that she was subject to retaliation by the Respondents after she filed her human rights complaint, in violation of s. 43 of the Code, when they terminated her laundry access, turned off the heat in her suite, attempted to evict her on multiple occasions, refused to address mold in her suite, engaged in surveillance, harassment, and intimidation, and listed the house for sale during the COVID-19 pandemic.

[3]              The Respondents deny that they discriminated against Ms. Lloyd or retaliated against her. They say that her allegations are fabricated. They also say their eviction attempts and the restrictions placed on parking, storage, and laundry were non-discriminatory and justified; they needed to take possession of her suite to meet their needs as a family and followed the laws of tenancy and human rights in doing so. They say their actions were further justified as a means to protect their family and property from Ms. Lloyd, who they alleged posed a safety risk to both. In addition, they say that the retaliation allegations are fabricated because their behaviour was consistent throughout Ms. Lloyd’s tenancy and not connected to her human rights complaint. Finally, they submit that the Tribunal’s jurisdiction is restricted to the interior of Ms. Lloyd’s suite and argue the Tribunal may not make any orders concerning the use of other areas of the property.

[4]               I find Ms. Lloyd has succeeded in proving her case. Landlords have a duty to accommodate their tenants by taking all reasonable steps to avoid a negative effect based on a tenant’s protected characteristic under the Code. In this decision I explain my findings that Ms. Lloyd was negatively impacted in her tenancy, in connection with her disabilities, by the Respondents’ actions. The heart of this case is whether the Respondents have justified their adverse treatment of Ms. Lloyd. The evidence is clear that their conduct is not justified. Ms. Lloyd has requested remedies and an order for costs for improper conduct. She is entitled to both.

II       Evidence

[5]               I base my findings on the evidence given at the hearing by the 5 witnesses. Ms. Lloyd testified by affidavit on consent of the Respondents. She supplemented her evidence with sworn oral testimony. She also called Michelle Beda, her legal advocate, Caleb Tiessen, her support worker from Progressive Housing, and Brian MacKenzie, the certified, licensed professional who inspected and assessed her home for mold remediation. Mr. Rosso testified on his own behalf and that of Ms. Rosso and Ms. Almeida. Neither Ms. Rosso nor Ms. Almeida testified in this proceeding.

[6]               In giving their evidence, each witness testified and relied on various documents, which were entered as exhibits during the hearing. I do not refer to all the evidence of every witness. However, I have carefully considered all their evidence in reaching my conclusions in this decision.

[7]               There were instances where two or more witnesses provided conflicting evidence on significant issues. As such, I have considered the credibility and reliability of each witness’ evidence to make findings of fact. Credibility and reliability require different considerations. Credibility involves the veracity or truthfulness of a witness. It is about whether a witness is telling the truth. Reliability involves the accuracy of a witness’ testimony: Bradshaw v. Stenner, 2010 BCSC 1398, affirmed in 2012 BCCA 296, leave to appeal refused, [2012] S.C.C.A. No. 392, at para. 186; Hardychuk v. Johnstone, 2012 BCSC 1359 at para. 10; R. v. S.A.S., 2021 BCPC 69 at paras. 21-27.

[8]               For all witness testimony, I start from the presumption that the witness is telling the truth: Hardychuk v. Johnstone, 2012 BCSC 1359 at para. 10. After considering the testimony on a ‘stand alone’ basis, I consider whether the story is accurate and inherently believable: Bradshaw v. Stenner, 2010 BCSC 1398 [Bradshaw]. To do so, I consider various factors such as:

[the witness’] ability and opportunity to observe events, the firmness of [their] memory, the ability to resist the influence of interest to modify [their] recollection, whether the witness’ evidence harmonizes with independent evidence that has been accepted, whether the witness changes [their] testimony during direct and cross-examination, whether the witness’ testimony seems unreasonable, impossible, or unlikely, whether a witness has a motive to lie, and the demeanour of a witness generally.

              Bradshaw at para. 186.

[9]               The evidence of a witness’s story must be assessed for its “harmony with the preponderance of the probabilities which a practical and informed person would readily recognize as reasonable in that place and in those conditions”: Faryna, at 357; Jahanian v Jahanian, 2021 BCSC 1890, at para. 8; Gichuru v. Smith, 2013 BCSC 895 at para. 130, aff’d 2014 BCCA 414. Generally, I rely on documentary evidence and the testimony of disinterested witnesses as a reliable yardstick for comparison with other witness’ testimony.

[10]           In this decision, I will explain my reasons for preferring one witness’ testimony over another. However, it bears stating at the outset that, overall, I found Ms. Lloyd, Ms. Beda, Mr. Tiessen and Mr. MacKenzie gave their evidence in a forthright manner. Their evidence was consistent with external evidence. Ms. Lloyd and Mr. Tiessen were unshakable on cross examination. Neither Ms. Beda nor Mr. MacKenzie’s evidence was challenged by the Respondents, and I accept their testimony as offered.

[11]           I found Mr. Rosso’s evidence to be less than forthright. Mr. Rosso displayed a propensity to lie and manipulate testimony and the evidence in response to the questions asked. This caused his evidence to be both internally and externally inconsistent. For instance, he mislead evidence on multiple occasions and when confronted with obvious facts or video recordings that directly contradicted his evidence, he either denied the obvious evidence or changed his evidence to put forward incredible claims that were not in “harmony with the preponderance of the probabilities which a practical and informed person would readily recognize as reasonable in that place and in those conditions.” One example of this is when he claimed there was no room in the garage for Ms. Lloyd’s scooter because he stored his ATVs there and offered photos as evidence of this submission. It was later discovered that the ATVs were not stored at the property until many months after Ms. Lloyd was asked to remove her scooter. Another example is when he said the Respondents never entered Ms. Lloyd’s home without notice. During the hearing, Ms. Lloyd’s counsel confronted Mr. Rosso with a video showing Ms. Rosso entering Ms. Lloyd’s suite. Despite the obvious video evidence, he continued to deny what was readily apparent. Another instance is when he said under oath that Ms. Lloyd’s laundry access was limited because the COVID-19 pandemic necessitated the Respondents’ daily use of the machines. However, the COVID-19 epidemic did not arrive in Canada for more than a year after the Respondents restricted Ms. Lloyd’s laundry. Another time he claimed he never knew that their loud music was bothering Ms. Lloyd because she never complained about it. When confronted with a police report in response to Ms. Lloyd’s noise complaint that stated, “[Mr. Rosso] advises that he does play his music but it is not loud and he will continue to do so because he is the owner of the house and is free to do as he wishes”, he alleged the police officer lied in his notes that Mr. Rosso reported he was the owner of the home. However, throughout the hearing Mr. Rosso claimed he was the owner of the home even though he had no title or ownership rights over his mother-in-law’s home.

[12]           Overall, Mr. Rosso lacked candor and was evasive and misleading when putting forward his evidence. To his detriment, these inconsistencies and his evasiveness not only undermined his evidence but undermined his justification arguments. I conclude that Mr. Rosso lied under oath. Mr. Rosso was not a credible witness, and I do not give any weight to his evidence where it contradicts documentary evidence and the evidence of the witnesses I found credible and reliable.

III     Preliminary issues

[13]           Before turning to the analysis, I address the Respondents’ jurisdiction argument and Ms. Lloyd’s estoppel argument.

A.    Jurisdiction

[14]           A foundational issue that underpins the Respondents’ submission is that the Tribunal does not have the jurisdiction to hear a complaint of discrimination in tenancy occurring in areas of the property that are outside of Ms. Lloyd’s basement suite.

[15]           Section 10 of the Code prohibits a person from discriminating against a person regarding a term or condition of tenancy because of their disability. The Supreme Court of British Columbia has guided this Tribunal to view “s. 10 of the Human Rights Code as prohibiting discrimination against a person whenever that discrimination has a sufficient nexus with the tenancy context” because “tenancy is a situation where a person or class of persons may be particularly vulnerable to the effects of discriminatory conduct”: McCulloch v British Columbia (Human Rights Tribunal), 2019 BCSC 624 at para. 126, applying the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in British Columbia Human Rights Tribunal v. Schrenk, 2017 SCC 62. I am satisfied that use of parking, laundry, common areas, and storage are a provision of services that are a term or condition of tenancy, and any discrimination in respect of them would be caught by s. 10 of the Code: Tenant A v. Landlord and Manager (No. 2), 2007 BCHRT 321, at para 12. To narrowly interpret s. 10 to exclude the use of common amenities would unduly frustrate the Code’s purpose to protect vulnerable occupants: McCulloch at para. 123-126. Ms. Lloyd’s complaint clearly engages s. 10 of the Code and the Tribunal’s jurisdiction to enforce it.

[16]           I also briefly address the Rossos’ role in this complaint. In this complaint, and the matters before the Residential and Tenancy Board [RTB], Ms. Almeida was the landlord, and the Rossos were her agents. During the period that gave rise to the complaint, the Rossos were, like Ms. Lloyd, also tenants of the home, and Ms. Almeida was the homeowner. I note for completeness that s. 10, when read in line with the purposes of the Code, is similar to the interpretation of s. 13 in Schrenk. In particular, that “discrimination and the tenancy relationship may be found where the co-tenant has the ability to negatively affect the term or condition of the complainant’s tenancy”: McCulloch, at para. 133, citing, Tenant A, at para. 27. Whether the Rossos were the landlord’s agents or themselves tenants, or whether at times they were both or alternated between the two in their dealings with Ms. Lloyd, I am satisfied that they had the power to negatively effect Ms. Lloyd’s living conditions. They had the authority to deal with the RTB, city by-law officers, and law enforcement on behalf of the landlord, and attend to inspections of her home. The Respondents do not dispute that they chose to cut-off Ms. Lloyd’s access to storage, laundry, parking, outdoor space, and heat. I take judicial notice that the province of British Columbia has a shortage of affordable housing. Ms. Lloyd was in a vulnerable position as a senior, disabled renter with few options for affordable housing that met her distinct needs. As in McCulloch, this seems to me to be the type of vulnerability that the Code intended to protect.

[17]           In conclusion, the Tribunal has the jurisdiction to hear the complaint of discrimination in tenancy as it relates to the property, whether the alleged perpetrator of discrimination is the landlord, another tenant, or the landlord’s agent.

[18]           I now consider Ms. Lloyd’s submission that issue estoppel applies to the RTB decisions in evidence.

B.     Issue Estoppel

[19]           A great deal of litigation about the facts at issue in this complaint were brought before the RTB. Ms. Lloyd asks that the doctrine of issue estoppel applies with respect to specific facts at issue in this complaint. They submit that certain findings made by the RTB give rise to issue estoppel with respect to specific facts at issue in this complaint.

[20]           Though the Respondents did not make direct submissions on the law of issue estoppel, at the hearing Mr. Rosso claimed that everything in the RTB decisions were lies. At the same time, I understand from the Respondents’ submission that they, too, rely on the RTB decisions as justification for their actions. For example, the Respondents submit with respect to parking along the road:

We did make the accommodations we were able to, and they were refused. If walking was a concern anyone would use the spot closer to the home provided. I am not responsible for Ms. Lloyd’s decisions and unfounded reasons why she refused [accommodations offered]. This has been decided in multiple RTB hearings. It’s so wrong the council [sic] wants all RTB results they think are in their favor followed, but all against them they refuse to follow and sue in other tribunals.”

[21]           With this in mind, I consider whether issue estoppel would be appropriate in this case. In Danyluk v. Ainsworth Technologies Inc., [Danyluk]2001 SCC 44, the Supreme Court of Canada affirmed the elements of issue estoppel:

(1) the same question has been decided;

(2) the judicial decision which is said to create the estoppel was final; and

(3) the parties to the judicial decision or their privies were the same persons as the parties to the proceedings in which the estoppel is raised or their privies.

Danyluk, para 25, aff’d in Penner v. Niagara (Regional Police Services Board, 2013 SCC 19, para 31.

[22]           Once it is decided that the above elements of issue estoppel are met, I must also decide whether to exercise my discretion to apply the doctrine to this complaint.

[23]           I begin with the first element for estoppel, which is whether the same issue has been decided by the RTB. The RTB decided several issues which overlap with this complaint. In this case, the parties have already litigated issues about Ms. Lloyd’s tenancy, including the Respondents’ reasons for seeking to evict her.

[24]           I easily dispense of the last two elements of issue estoppel. The RTB decisions were final and the parties to each of the actions were the same as in this complaint.

[25]           The question now is whether to exercise my discretion to apply the doctrine of issue estoppel to this complaint. The RTB, as a specialized administrative tribunal, is statutorily mandated to resolve residential tenancy disputes. In this case, it held six oral hearings, during which both parties had full opportunity to present evidence, make arguments, and respond to each other’s claims. There is nothing before me to indicate that the process was anything but procedurally fair.

[26]           Both parties initiated and actively participated in the RTB proceedings, and each had the right to seek judicial review of the RTB’s decision. No exceptional circumstances have been presented that would render it unjust to hold the parties to the outcomes of that process. To disregard the RTB’s findings would undermine the principles of finality and consistency in administrative justice, and risk duplicative litigation over matters already adjudicated.

[27]           The RTB determined that the Respondents attempted to unilaterally change the terms and conditions of Ms. Lloyd’s tenancy by removing services such as flexible laundry access and parking for her scooter, and they attempted to evict her to avoid these obligations and the RTB’s previous order to reinstate these services. The RTB also made a number of other important findings on issues the Respondents have attempted to relitigate in these proceedings: the RTB found that Ms. Lloyd did not cause any health or safety issues; did not cause mold or any other damage to her unit; and did not engage in any illegal activity with respect to where and how she parked her car (and in fact it was the Rossos who had engaged in illegal activity by locking her out and harassing her guests). The RTB also found that it was the Rossos’ actions that were the source of the difficulty in the landlord-tenant relationship, and that the Rossos had infringed on her right to quiet enjoyment.

[28]           There is nothing before me to suggest that it would be unfair to hold the parties to the outcomes of the RTB proceedings—especially given that both parties initiated and actively participated in them. To allow the same factual issues to be re-litigated here would undermine the principles of finality and consistency in administrative decision-making and would be contrary to the efficient use of public resources: Toronto (City) v. CUPE Local 79, 2003 SCC 63 at para. 37.

[29]           Further to all of the above, there is no basis for me to accept the Respondents’ argument that the RTB decisions are “all lies.”

[30]           While I exercise my discretion to accept the factual findings of the RTB, this Tribunal is tasked with considering the complaint under the Code. The RTB does not have the jurisdiction to decide human rights matters under the Code. Finding that issue estoppel applies does not prevent this Tribunal from addressing human rights issues: Residential Tenancy Act, SBC 2002, c 78, [RTA] s. 5.1(1)(d); Administrative Tribunals Act, SBC 2004, c 45, s. 46.3. Accepting that issue estoppel applies in this case simply means that factual findings already made by the RTB—after a fair and comprehensive process—should not be revisited. I therefore rely on those findings where they are relevant, while remaining mindful of the distinct legal framework that governs this Tribunal’s jurisdiction.

IV    BACKGROUND

[31]           Ms. Lloyd has had progressive knee osteoarthritis for over 20 years, with functional decline.

[32]           Ms. Lloyd provided credible documentary evidence and supporting testimony about her arthritis, and the pain it causes to her knees and back. She started using a cane in 2008 and a mobility scooter in 2015. She has difficulty climbing stairs; she does so slowly with frequent breaks. When she lived at the Respondents property, it was difficult to walk the gentle slope of the driveway to her home. She described how she needed to “crab walk” or sidestep slowly with the support of her cane to safely maneuver the slope. Walking any slant is slow and painful and causes residual pain in her knees. The arthritis in her hands make it hard for her to grasp, twist knobs, hold handles, and carry items. She has a SPARC BC parking permit for her car, which she hangs on her rearview mirror. The parking permit ensures that people with mobility limitations can park in designated spots with optimal accessibility to buildings and services.

[33]           Ms. Lloyd’s symptoms are exacerbated by stress, tension, exposure to cold, and overexertion. Flare-ups of her disability cause pain and can leave her exhausted such that she has difficulty performing routine household tasks. She is frequently bedridden and unable to leave her home for days at a time due to pain and extreme fatigue.

[34]           As a result of her disability, she had to stop working in 2018 as a medical laboratory assistant and cardiology technician. She lives on a fixed income.

[35]           Ms. Lloyd rented a 2-bedroom basement suite in a single-family home owned by Ms. Almeida. The top floor of the home was rented by another tenant.

[36]           Ms. Lloyd’s month-to-month tenancy began on December 1, 2014. She paid Ms. Almeida a $450 security deposit and paid her rent on the first day of each month. The tenancy was by oral agreement. By the end of her tenancy, her monthly rent was $948.13. At no time during her six-year tenancy was she presented with a written tenancy agreement.

[37]           The basement suite and the upstairs suite were self contained. Attached to the outside of the house was a garage that could not be accessed from the inside of either unit. The back of the garage had a door that led into a laundry room, which the tenants shared. The laundry room was in a shed-like space in a connecting room at the back of the garage, separate from the main house. It had a door that led to the garage and another door that led to the entry level of Ms. Lloyd’s home, which faced the backyard.

[38]           Ms. Lloyd accessed the entry level of her home by traversing one step up between the driveway and a sidewalk along the length of the curtilage of the garage and laundry room to the backyard.

[39]           The backyard had a lawn and patio area. From the patio, 3 stairs led down to a subterranean paved area with a retaining wall. This area was a few feet in width. From this sunken area, Ms. Lloyd could access her front door and the laundry room. To access the living area of her suite, Ms. Lloyd had to step down another 3 stairs once she entered the suite.

[40]           Ms. Lloyd gave unchallenged testimony that for the first four years of her tenancy, Ms. Almeida was a hands-off landlord, directing her to “work things out with the main floor tenant as needed.” Ms. Lloyd had the following arrangement worked out with the upstairs tenant:

a.      Parking on the driveway that led up to the garage: Ms. Lloyd parked in the spot closest to the garage. She left the home less frequently than the upstairs tenant and, on occasions she was blocked in, she’d call the upstairs tenant to move her car.

b.      Keeping a chair and table in the backyard so that she could rest after using the stairs or walking from her car to her unit.

c.       Storing her mobility scooter in the garage.

d.      Storing belongings in the crawl space.

e.      Accessing the laundry room.

[41]           Ms. Lloyd enjoyed these arrangements for the first four years of her tenancy. It is not in dispute that Ms. Lloyd generally enjoyed living there prior to the Rossos moving in. She had friends who lived nearby, and they would frequently gather at her home. She liked sitting in her chair outside her door listening and watching the birds in the hedge and the creatures that came through the yard. A friend would bring a dog and they played with the dog in the yard. The home was close to all the amenities she needed, and she knew the neighbourhood well. She was happy living there.

[42]           In November 2018, Ms. Almeida informed Ms. Lloyd that the new upstairs tenants would be her daughter and son in law, Ms. Rosso and Mr. Rosso. She asked Ms. Lloyd to remove her belongings from the crawlspace, patio, and laundry room as soon as possible to make the area available for the Rossos’ use. Ms. Almeida subsequently told Ms. Lloyd to remove her belongings from the garage. The parties agree Ms. Almeida offered to keep Ms. Lloyd’s mobility scooter in the garage over the winter but told Ms. Lloyd she would need to find alternative permanent storage for it.

[43]           The Rossos moved into the upstairs suite on December 31, 2018. There is no dispute that Ms. Lloyd met Mr. Rosso and disclosed that she had a disability. In fact, Mr. Rosso said it was obvious to him from that encounter that she had a mobility disability.

[44]           Immediately after the Rossos moved in, the Respondents restricted Ms. Lloyd’s access to the driveway and laundry room. The Rossos parked their car in the driveway and told Ms. Lloyd she was no longer permitted to park her car there. They said they would exclusively control use the driveway from that point forward because they were the owners. They directed her to park on a gravel area between the road and the front lawn, near the end of the driveway. Ms. Lloyd testified that the Respondents changed the locks on the laundry room on January 2, 2019, and restricted her use to the laundry room to Mondays only.

[45]           It was difficult work for Ms. Lloyd, but she moved all the stored items into her unit, except for the patio furniture and potted plants. The Respondents then told her she was not permitted to keep her patio furniture and potted plants outside.

[46]           On January 16, 2019, the Rossos inspected her home. Three days later they informed her she had 40-days to clear up the clutter, citing health and safety hazards, writing in part:

We respect your disability and instead of the usually 10 days to clean we are going to give you more than reasonable and sufficient time to clean this up. We are giving you 40 days to have the suite fully clean, disinfected, and all concerns addressed to an acceptable standard for the suite. Such as, Boxes removed, suite safe, furnace door accessible, the suite free of any hazards, and all dirt removed. The next inspection will be on Feb. 28 at 12:00 noon to see that all these safety and cleaning concerns are met. We will provide a written notice of inspection 24 hours prior. Failure to meet these concerns will result in a 30-day eviction notice.  We also would like to stress that no further time or extensions will be given, as we have provided way more than sufficient time to address all of these concerns. We really need someone to look after the suite in a respectful and clean manner. 

[47]           Ms. Lloyd made attempts to sort through her belongings and clear out the apartment.

[48]           On the 40-day deadline, the Rossos inspected the house again and decided little had been done to clear the clutter. The same day, the Respondents filed a one month notice to end tenancy for cause with the RTB for:

a.      Seriously jeopardizing the health or safety or lawful right of another occupant or the landlord;

b.      Putting the landlord’s property at significant risk;

c.       Causing extraordinary damage to the unit or property;

d.      Not doing required repairs of damage she caused to the unit;

e.      Non-compliance with an order under the Residential Tenancies Act.

[49]           On March 12, 2019, the Respondents sought a separate order to end Ms. Lloyd’s tenancy and take possession early.

[50]           The parties agree on March 14, 2019, Ms. Rosso gave Ms. Lloyd a letter stating she had 48 hours to remove a table from the laundry room, which she had previously said Ms. Lloyd could keep there. The Respondents inspected Ms. Lloyd’s home again on April 9 and found the unit was “still in utter chaos”: RTB Decision, April 12, 2019, File No: 31039877.

[51]           On April 12, 2019, the RTB decided the Respondents’ application requesting an early eviction. They found that Ms. Lloyd’s belongings did not seriously jeopardize the health and safety of the landlord or put the property at significant risk. They also found the landlord’s concern that the quantity of boxes or items in the rental unit might attract insects or rodents was speculative. The arbitrator also said the landlord’s fear of a spark accidently lighting the boxes was unreasonable. The RTB dismissed the application for an early eviction and noted that the One Month Notice to End Tenancy hearing was scheduled to be heard on April 26, 2019.

[52]           On April 26, 2019, the RTB decided the One Month Notice to End Tenancy and Ms. Lloyd’s dispute resolution application concerning the notice. The arbitrator found that the Respondents did not issue the notice for a valid reason and had not proven any element of their application.

[53]           The RTB ordered the Respondents to allow Ms. Lloyd to access laundry from 9 a.m. to 9 p.m. on Monday, Wednesdays, Thursdays and Fridays. Both the Respondents and Ms. Lloyd consented to the arrangement. The RTB found that Ms. Lloyd was not entitled to guaranteed parking in the driveway because it was not part of any written tenancy agreement. The Respondents agreed to allow Ms. Lloyd access to unload her groceries and heavy items in the driveway since she is disabled, provided she notified them when she required access. The Respondents also agreed to allow her access to the backyard, as she had a table and chair set up there. The Respondents confirmed there is a power outlet for Ms. Lloyd to recharge her scooter outside. Finally, the RTB found that Ms. Lloyd was not entitled to any guaranteed storage in the garage and laundry room because the Respondents did not consent to the arrangement, and it was not part of any written tenancy agreement between the parties.

[54]           The Respondents acknowledge that they did not initially comply with the RTB order. Immediately after the RTB order, the Respondents unlocked the laundry room door on the first two consecutive Mondays. It remained locked the remainder of the days. I understand the Respondents’ position to be that they did not, in fact, “agree” to grant Ms. Lloyd four days a week access and wished to maintain the status quo imposed on Ms. Lloyd in January 2019.

[55]           Ms. Lloyd says the day after the RTB decided she could park her scooter next to an outlet, Mr. Rosso told her the scooter had to go either at the front of the house in front of her window if it was in working condition, or at the back of the house if the scooter remained nonfunctional. Mr. Rosso introduced photos of the front of the house as evidence to support his claim that the area he designated was a reasonable accommodation because there was an outlet in that area. I understand from Mr. Rosso that the photos of the home were recent photos taken in preparation of the hearing Ms. Lloyd disputed that there was, in fact, an outlet at the front of the house. On balance, I accept Ms. Lloyd’s evidence that there was not an outlet at the front of the house. As I have stated, Mr. Rosso’s testimony was self serving and I assign less weight to it. The evidence he offered in support of his position is neither contemporaneous nor conclusive. Regardless of whether there was a charger at the front, the Respondents said Ms. Lloyd was not allowed to park the scooter at the front of the house until it was charged and in full working condition.

[56]           Effectively, the Respondents gave Ms. Lloyd one choice only: to move the scooter from the garage to the back of the house. To move the scooter from the garage, the scooter had to be lifted over a step to bring it to the back of the house. Whether Ms. Lloyd’s son assisted Mr. Rosso or he moved it himself is in dispute, but nothing turns on this. Ms. Lloyd says Mr. Rosso then rearranged the garbage and recycling bins, which used to be at the front of the house, along the back wall. The Respondents told her she was not allowed to move the bins. The effect of this was that Ms. Lloyd’s scooter plug was not long enough to access the outlet.

[57]           Ms. Lloyd’s legal advocate urged the Rossos to get legal advice for expressly refusing to comply with the RTB’s decision simply on the basis that they did not agree with it. Ms. Rosso replied in part:

Ok so I’m going to write this out very simple.

[…]we provide a parking place and a place to charge her broken scooter even though it does not run. We will not provide another spot because Catherine did not get to choose it herself.

[…] Catherine can use an extension cord if needed.

[…] We will not be giving Catherine anything else as this is what she rents. We are taking our house over at the end of this month and we will never deal with this again

[58]           There is no dispute that on October 4, 2019, Ms. Lloyd advised the Rossos by email: “I am filing a Human Rights Complaint with respect to my difficulties I have encountered obtaining disability accommodations I have requested in consideration of my considerable mobility and arthritis pain-related disabilities. Around this time, the Respondents installed cameras with external speakers in communal areas of the home. Ms. Lloyd filed the discrimination complaint on November 14, 2019. The Tribunal issued the notice of complaint proceeding to the Respondents on January 3, 2020. After that, the Respondents:

f.        Threatened and intimidated her and her guests;

g.       Eliminated her access to the laundry;

h.      Turned off the heat in her unit throughout the winter of 2019/2020;

i.        Attempted to evict her on multiple occasions; and,

j.        Listed the house for sale during the Covid-19 pandemic.

[59]           The parties dispute whether the Respondents refused to address a mold issue in her suite.

[60]           Ms. Lloyd’s tenancy ended when she moved out on November 30, 2020.

V       ANALYSIS AND DECISION

[61]           In this section I will first consider Ms. Lloyd’s complaint that she was adversely impacted in tenancy contrary to section 10 of the Code. I will then consider whether the Respondents’ conduct as of October 4, 2019 constitutes retaliation, contrary to s. 43 of the Code.

A.    Legal principles

[62]           Section 10 of the Code applies to tenancies. Section 10(1) says:

A person must not

(a) deny to a person or class of persons the right to occupy, as a tenant, space that is represented as being available for occupancy by a tenant, or

(b) discriminate against a person or class of persons regarding a term or condition of the tenancy of the space,

because of the…physical or mental disability…of that person or class of persons.

[63]           To prove discrimination, Ms. Lloyd must establish that: (1) she has a protected characteristic, in this case a physical disability; (2) she experienced an adverse impact regarding a term or condition of her tenancy; and (3) her physical disability was a factor in the adverse impact: Moore v. British Columbia (Ministry of Education), 2012 SCC 61 at para. 33.

[64]           If Ms. Lloyd proves the three elements of thetest set out in Moore, the burden shifts to the Respondents to justify the adverse impact as a bona fide reasonable justification. If the impact is justified, there is no discrimination.

[65]           Below, I explain my findings that Ms. Lloyd was negatively impacted in connection with her disabilities, by the Respondents’ actions.

B.     Disability

[66]           There is no dispute that Ms. Lloyd is a senior person with disabilities, and the Rossos knew of Ms. Lloyd’s disability.

[67]           Mr. Rosso testified that he knew the first day he moved in that Ms. Lloyd had a disability. He said she came to his door to introduce herself and ask for his and Ms. Rosso’s telephone numbers. He recalled her saying something about having sore knees and saw that she had a cane. He had also seen her mobility scooter in the corner of the garage.

[68]           Ms. Almeida and Ms. Rosso did not testify at the hearing. Mr. Rosso did not indicate in his testimony whether Ms. Rosso became aware of Ms. Lloyd’s disability on the first day of their tenancy or shortly thereafter. Mr. Rosso testified that Ms. Almeida had no knowledge of Ms. Lloyd’s disability. I find that evidence implausible. In her Complaint Response, Ms. Almeida said Ms. Lloyd disclosed she had a disability in mid-November 2018 in response to her asking Ms. Lloyd to remove her belongings stored on the property. In the RTB submissions, she advised the RTB that she visited the house frequently. If that is the case, Ms. Lloyd’s disability would have been apparent to her from observing Ms. Lloyd, the disability parking tag hanging in Ms. Lloyd’s car, or the mobility scooter parked in the garage. I am persuaded that Ms. Almeida knew about Ms. Lloyd’s disability earlier; she had advised Ms. Lloyd to work out her need to use communal property directly with the upstairs tenant. As a result, I accept Ms. Lloyd’s evidence that she discussed her disabilities with Ms. Almeida by phone and in person early in her tenancy. I find that Ms. Almeida knew that Ms. Lloyd had disabilities early in her tenancy and, in any event, at the time she asked Ms. Lloyd to remove her personal effects from storage to prepare for the Rosso’s tenancy.

[69]           I also acknowledge the Respondents’ submissions that Ms. Lloyd was not as disabled as she appeared. They made unsubstantiated claims that Ms. Lloyd was capable of carrying weights as heavy as fifty pounds and could do so without the support of a cane. There is no merit to this submission, and I rely instead on Ms. Lloyd’s medical records, notes, and testimony.  

[70]           I am satisfied that Ms. Lloyd has established the first element of Moore.

C.     Adverse impact in Tenancy and Connection to Ms. Lloyd’s Disability

[71]           I now consider the second and third prongs of the Moore test. Below I make findings about whether Ms. Lloyd has established each adverse impact in tenancy alleged and whether they were connected to her disability. If she does, I then consider the Respondents’ justification arguments.

[72]           I approach this section with the knowledge of the Respondents’ intentions that coloured their actions. As stated clearly and repeatedly by Mr. Rosso at the hearing, the Rossos wanted the house to themselves and intended to take possession of the property the first day of their tenancy. He said without any hint of remorse that the Respondents would have continued their conduct until Ms. Lloyd’s tenancy ended by eviction or from being rundown by their conduct. I conclude from this that the Respondents engaged in harassing behaviour over the entire period they were co-tenants with Ms. Lloyd as a means to force her to leave. This impacted her adversely in connection with her disability. In other words, the Respondents’ conduct would have adversely impacted any tenant if they had been treated the way Ms. Lloyd was treated, but for a person living with disabilities, the impact was exacerbated.

[73]           I now consider each of the alleged adverse impacts Ms. Lloyd says she experienced in her tenancy.

1.      Removing personal effects from storage

[74]           In the circumstances, I find the Respondents’ requirement that Ms. Lloyd remove her belongings from shared common spaces was an adverse impact related to her disability.

[75]           Prior to the Rosso’s moving in, Ms. Almeida asked Ms. Lloyd to remove all of her items from common storage areas. Ms. Lloyd did so. She moved her items from the crawlspace, laundry room, and garage into her home.

[76]           Ms. Lloyd’s spare room already had personal effects such as books, yarn, crafts, extra kitchen appliances and dishes, home décor items, a bureau, bookcases, and a desk. She had nowhere else to store these belongings and had to bring them inside of her home. Her home was soon crowded with boxes, including on the stairs and in the hall. The crowding coupled with her significant mobility limitations made it difficult for her to move around her apartment.

[77]           Mr. Rosso demanded more of Ms. Lloyd’s belongings to be moved. She also had a strawberry pot, which he lifted and brought to her front door and told her to take inside. He then placed every potted plant of hers on her doorstep and told her that the pots could not stay there and needed to be removed. She was also required to move the table and chair that she kept outside to rest in between walking from her front door to the car and while doing laundry. The pots and table were too heavy for Ms. Lloyd to carry.

[78]            I accept Ms. Lloyd’s evidence that her disability made moving her belongings from these areas slow, painful, and difficult work. Ms. Lloyd had to ask for her son’s assistance, who visited her 2-3 times per month. Her son began coming over more frequently to meet Mr. Rosso’s everchanging demands. She testified that the Rossos did not use the crawlspace after she emptied her belongings from it. Throughout the remainder of her tenancy, she observed that the crawlspace remained empty. I also understand the impact on her disability to be that before she was forced to move so many things inside, her unit was “very functional” and met her need to navigate safely around her home well.

[79]           I also accept Ms. Lloyd’s testimony that, over time, the Rossos dictated where she could place her table and chair. Initially, they refused to allow her to keep them on the patio and required her to store them beside her door. Later, they moved the table and chairs to area section of the backyard that was inaccessible because the ground was uneven and upheaved by tree roots, making it unsafe for her to navigate. When she asked the Rossos to return the items to her door, they refused, and she had to ask her son to retrieve them so she could use them. I understand this caused Ms. Lloyd disability-related pain, as she could no longer sit and rest outside the laundry room and had nowhere to pause between walking to and from her car. By relocating the table and chair to an area she could not safely access—and denying her the ability to return them to a location that accommodated her needs—the Rossos deprived her of agency over her own accommodations and undermined her independence.

[80]           On its face, asking a tenant to remove personal belongings from common areas may not be an adverse impact in tenancy. Neither would a tenant choosing to put their belongings in their home instead of in storage such that it limited their mobility. However, in this instance, it is the way in which the Respondents required Ms. Lloyd to do so. The Respondents were aware she had a disability that affected her mobility and strength, yet they demanded arbitrary and excessive physical labour of her, such as requiring her to remove her strawberry pots. Finally, the Respondents’ demand did not consider Ms. Lloyd’s disability or disability related need to keep a table and chair outside. 

2.      Home Inspections and first eviction attempt

[81]           I find the Rossos’ home inspection and first eviction attempt to be connected to the adverse impact she experienced because of her disability. I find that it uniquely impacted her in her disabilities.

[82]           On January 16, 2019, soon after Ms. Lloyd was required to bring all her belongings from common storage areas into her home, the Rossos conducted their first inspection of her home. They cited her for having too many possessions that, in their view, posed fired and health hazards. The Rossos imposed a 40-day deadline to clear out her unit.

[83]           The Rossos inspected her home again and cited the clutter as being the basis for the first eviction attempt. Mr. Rosso testified that he was “blown away” by the “garbage”, “rotten food”, and a “horrendous” smell in Ms. Lloyd’s unit. He also alleged that she caused mold and damage to the unit; these allegations were rejected by the RTB. He submitted photographs of Ms. Lloyd’s unit at the time as evidence of Ms. Lloyd’s allegedly questionable hygiene. The photos, in my view, accords with Ms. Lloyd being required to move all her belongings into her unit in a short period of time and sorting through her belongings, to the best of her ability, while navigating mobility issues and pain. Mr. Rosso also entered into evidence a surreptitious recording he took of a phone call between himself and Ms. Lloyd. He points to the fact that Ms. Lloyd thanked him during the call for being “respectful.”

[84]           I am not persuaded that the tone of the one surreptitious recording negates the adverse impact on Ms. Lloyd. I find that the clutter existed only because the Respondents themselves manufactured the environment. The Respondents then took photos and used those photos to justify their claims before the RTB and this Tribunal that she was a hoarder, unhygienic, and posed a hazard to both their health and the property. Their demand that she purged her belongings and declutter to their standards in an arbitrary amount of time reflects what little regard they had to accommodate her disabilities.

[85]           I further find that the Respondents used the cluttered environment they artificially manufactured as the premise of their first eviction attempt, which was shortly after their second inspection. Despite the Respondents’ evidence, including the photos of the cluttered apartment, the RTB found, repeatedly, that Ms. Lloyd did not pose a risk to the health of the tenants or any hazard to the property.

[86]           They Respondents say they conducted another inspection in September 2019 because Ms. Lloyd’s “clutter” caused a silverfish infestation. They say inspections were done with proper notice and to protect the property and residents.

[87]           I accept Ms. Lloyd’s testimony that the Rossos required Ms. Lloyd to clear items from her home on very short notice for a pest control visit. The Respondents instructions demanded that belongings be removed from the floor—tasks she could not complete without assistance due to her disabilities. Despite her request for additional time, the Rossos refused and scheduled another inspection for the following day.

[88]           I accept Ms. Lloyd’s testimony that she called the pest control company to confirm that rescheduling would not cause delay or extra cost. However, the Rossos remained unwilling to accommodate her and expressed their anger that she had contacted the company. As a result of the pressure to clear her floor on short notice, and the loss of storage areas previously available in the garage, crawlspace, and laundry room, she was forced to rent a storage unit.

[89]           I accept that the inspections were an adverse impact on Ms. Lloyd’s tenancy in connection to her disability.

3.      Harassing Ms. Lloyd and her guests

[90]           I accept that harassing Ms. Lloyd, her guests, and service providers is an adverse impact in her tenancy connected to her disability.

[91]           Ms. Lloyd testified that one day she used a camping chair so she could sit outside her front door while waiting for her laundry. Mr. Rosso spoke to her through the monitoring system, telling her she had 10 minutes to remove the chair she was sitting on, or he would remove her and the chair to the street. She also gave uncontested evidence that Mr. Rosso harassed her friends. She recalled one occasion where a friend visited with a dog in his arms. Mr. Rosso told her friend that the dog was not allowed inside her unit because Ms. Lloyd had not paid a pet deposit. Her friend put the dog in the car and told Mr. Rosso he hoped he got what he deserved, referring to karma. Mr. Rosso threatened to call the police on Ms. Lloyd’s friend. He also told her friend that he parked in the wrong direction and that he would call the police. He then, in fact, called the police. Her friend moved his car to a neighbour’s property. Mr. Rosso told Ms. Lloyd’s friend that he called the police back and told them not to come. 

[92]           Caleb Tiessen, Ms. Lloyd’s support worker from Progressive Housing, gave evidence that the Respondents harassed him. I accept all of Mr. Tiessen’s evidence. It is consistent with his case management notes from Progressive Housing, and he was unshakable in cross.

[93]           Mr. Tiessen testified that the first time he went to help Ms. Lloyd move boxes sometime in March 2019, Mr. Rosso presented him with an extensive waiver or contract with various conditions that required his signature in 15 places. Mr. Tiessen said he should have pushed back and not signed the document, but he wanted to help Ms. Lloyd and work with the Respondents. He said he felt intimidated by Mr. Rosso and believed he would not be permitted on the property or that Mr. Rosso would take steps to prevent him from helping Ms. Lloyd if he didn’t sign the form.

[94]           Mr. Tiessen testified, and I accept, that the Rossos communicated with his employer to complain about him and demand that Progressive Housing discipline or terminate him.

[95]           Mr. Tiessen said the Respondents’ hostility made him reticent to go to the property. At some point, he minimized his visits to Ms. Lloyd, then stopped going to the property altogether. He had to take stress leave related to his interactions with Mr. Rosso and Mr. Rosso’s threats to his employment. He said engaging with the Rossos while trying to support Ms. Lloyd was a high point of stress in his career, and he eventually transitioned out of the role. His experience with the Rossos is part of the reason he does not do support work anymore.

[96]           Ms. Lloyd’s legal advocate, Ms. Beda gave uncontested evidence that Mr. Rosso insisted that their organization serve the Respondents personally in legal proceedings. When Ms. Beda’s representative came to the home, he refused service. Speaking through the Ring doorbell, Mr. Rosso told the representative that he would report them to the police for trespassing. He also called and threatened to file lawsuits against various organizations that advocated and supported Ms. Lloyd.

[97]           Ms. Lloyd testified that it was awful dealing with Mr. Rosso’s rage and swearing. It frightened her. She said the Rossos taunted her when she came out of her home. Every single time she stepped out once they got the cameras that she would not hear from them. She said the Rossos made extensive false claims about her, her tenancy, her friends and her support workers, that she couldn’t believe anything Mr. Rosso said. She described his conduct as hurtful, demeaning, and awful. She did not want to subject her friends to the rude behaviour and threats of lawsuits or police reports.

[98]           Considering Ms. Lloyd was disabled, and it was difficult for her to leave her home because of her disability, it was necessary for her friends and service providers to come to her home. By preventing her from hosting visitors without fear of harassment, the Rossos hindered Ms. Lloyd’s access to support services and social connections. Ms. Lloyd became emotional when giving her testimony, describing the Rossos’ treatment of her and her guests as very isolating and upsetting. I find the Respondents’ harassment of Ms. Lloyd, her guests, and her support workers was an adverse impact in her tenancy connected to her disability.

4.      Laundry

[99]           I find that the limitation in laundry use was an adverse impact in tenancy that was connected to Ms. Lloyd’s disability. She says, and I accept, that her pain and mobility necessitated less restrictive use of laundry because the inconsistent nature of her pain events and flareups did not allow her to do laundry daily. She could not know what day she would need to do laundry, as such task was dependent on her strength or pain levels. I accept her evidence that she and her advocates told the Respondents that she needed more flexible and regular access to the laundry room. I also accept that limiting her laundry use resulted in having to go long periods of time without having done laundry or resorting to washing laundry by hand inside her home, which was difficult and painful work because of her disabilities.

5.      Scooter storage

[100]       I find the Respondents denying Ms. Lloyd safe storage of her scooter is an adverse impact in Ms. Lloyd’s tenancy related to her disability. Ms. Lloyd used her scooter to accommodate her disability. It was not in full working order when the Rossos moved in because the battery needed to be replaced. The replacement was expensive, and Ms. Lloyd’s fixed income meant it took her some time to afford the new battery. The Respondents demanded that she store it outdoors. The scooter remained parked outside, with a clear plastic cover on it. I accept Ms. Lloyd’s evidence that by the time she was able to replace the battery the scooter was damaged by environmental elements from being parked outdoors without adequate shelter.

6.      Use of the driveway

[101]       The Respondents adversely impacted Ms. Lloyd in her tenancy when they restricted her and her service providers use of the driveway.

[102]       The Rossos implemented their blanket rule that Ms. Lloyd was no longer permitted to park in the driveway early in January 2019. Mr. Rosso testified that she was welcome to drive up the driveway and drop things off and then immediately park somewhere else. I do not accept Mr. Rosso’s evidence that Ms. Lloyd was welcome to use the driveway, as he did not dispute the evidence that the Respondents parked at the bottom of the driveway or placed garbage bins in the middle of the driveway, in the midway point between the street and the garage. The practical effect of his rule was that Ms. Lloyd could not access the driveway.

[103]       Ms. Lloyd testified that when Mr. Rosso told her she was no longer allowed to use the driveway, she asked him how he could make that rule when he could plainly see that she had problems walking. She said he replied, “yeah it sucks. I know.” He said as owners, they would not park on the streets, and the driveway did not have room for the cars to be parked side by side. Ms. Lloyd told him that they did not need to park side by side and that for the previous 4 years, she parked closest to the house and the upstairs tenant parked behind her because she went out more often. Ms. Lloyd testified that prior to the Rossos taking over the upstairs tenancy, on the occasion Ms. Lloyd needed to go out, the upstairs tenant would move her car. Ms. Lloyd said the arrangement worked well, though on occasion the upstairs tenant said it was an annoyance.

[104]       Ms. Lloyd testified that the Rossos frequently parked at the bottom of the driveway, which fully prevented her access the driveway. She testified she would have to do the crabwalk 2 or 3 times a week and described it as “awful. It was very painful. And I would have to sit in my car and rally myself to face the pain of it.” As a result, she began limiting the number of times a week she would go out. I have already accepted Ms. Lloyd’s evidence that walking the distance between her home and the end of the driveway was difficult work on account her disability. The Respondents prohibition on Ms. Lloyd’s ability to park on or use the driveway is an adverse impact in tenancy related to Ms. Lloyd’s disability: NT by HST v. Daljit Sekhon and others, 2019 BCHRT 201, at para. 20.

[105]       The Respondents also prevented Ms. Lloyd or her guests from using the driveway at all, without any justification. Mr. Tiessen of Progressive Housing testified that over the phone and in person, Mr. Rosso told him they did not want Progressive Housing to use the driveway to drop off Ms. Lloyd. At first, he was told that he must call ahead of time to get permission. When he called the first time, the Respondents told Mr. Tiessen he was not allowed to use the driveway under any circumstances, and if he did, they would block the driveway. Mr. Tiessen explained to Mr. Rosso that dropping Ms. Lloyd off on the driveway was a way of alleviating some disability related pain from walking. Mr. Rosso told him, “I don’t care, I’ll blockade the driveway.”

[106]       Mr. Tiessen testified that Mr. Rosso demanded that the Progressive Housing van not be seen on the property so as not to sully the image of their home by association with the variety of Progressive Housing’s community outreach work. Mr. Rosso confirmed this testimony. He said he did not want Progressive Housing to make a big production in supporting Ms. Lloyd with clearing her belongings from her unit, like the “tv show Hoarders” that he said often showed bins on the lawn.

[107]       Mr. Rosso explained that he required Mr. Tiessen to call before using the driveway due to an instance where Mr. Tiessen had blocked Ms. Rosso’s car for 45 minutes and she was late for work. I do not accept Mr. Rosso’s reasoning because Mr. Rosso did not present this assertion to Mr. Tiessen, and Ms. Rosso did not testify. I accept that the reason Mr. Rosso did not want the van in the driveway was because of the stigma he attached to the services Progressive Housing provides.

[108]       Ms. Lloyd testified that Mr. Rosso moved his car from the top of the driveway to the bottom around the time he would have known Mr. Tiessen was arriving to pick up Ms. Lloyd for an RTB hearing that he was a participant in. Mr. Rosso testified that he is “not a wizard” and would not have known Mr. Tiessen was coming. Mr. Tiessen and Ms. Lloyd both testified about an occasion when Mr. Tiessen drove Ms. Lloyd home after the June 18 RTB hearing. They found the garbage bin, which was usually in front of the garage door, in the middle of the driveway. Mr. Tiessen testified that he rolled the bin back to its usual spot and drove Ms. Lloyd to the top of the driveway to drop her off. Ms. Rosso came out of the house with Mr. Rosso on speakerphone. She came to her window and Mr. Rosso yelled threats to report Mr. Tiessen to the police for destruction of property and trespassing. Mr. Rosso testified that there was a yard waste bin was placed in the middle of the driveway because his wife was weeding the yard at the time. He also said he and Ms. Rosso placed bins in the middle of the driveway “all the time” and suggested it would not be unusual to find a garbage bin sitting in the middle of their driveway. When it was put to him why the garbage bin was in use instead of the compost bin, he said it was because it was full. I find on the balance of probabilities Ms. Rosso placed the bins in the driveway to prevent Ms. Lloyd from being picked up close to her home.

[109]       On this issue I prefer Mr. Tiessen’s evidence over Mr. Rosso’s because Mr. Rosso admitted that he was not there at the time, and Ms. Rosso did not testify. Mr. Rosso also called Mr. Tiessen’s manager, who told Mr. Tiessen that Mr. Rosso contacted Progressive Housing and requested Mr. Tiessen’s termination or some type of discipline for Mr. Tiessen driving on the driveway. Mr. Tiessen said the Respondents verbally banned him from the property during or around the time Mr. Rosso threatened to call the police.

[110]       The Respondents prohibition on Ms. Lloyd’s support workers using or parking on the driveway is an adverse impact in tenancy related to Ms. Lloyd’s disability.

7.      Backyard access

[111]       I find that Ms. Lloyd’s need to put her table and chair where she could sit and rest on her walk to and from her car is a disability related need. The Respondents’ restrictions on where she placed her table and chair is an adverse impact in her tenancy related to her disability.

8.      Eviction attempts

[112]       I find that underpinning every eviction attempt was the discriminatory conduct, in particular:

1.      requiring Ms. Lloyd to move all her belongings from storage into her home, then using the manufactured clutter as the foundation for inspections and false allegations that Ms. Lloyd’s living conditions caused health and safety concerns;

2.      limiting and terminating use of common space and amenities including the driveway, storage, backyard, and laundry facility. 

[113]       Mr. Rosso gave testimony that they felt “forced to be a landlord” and were “held hostage” by Ms. Lloyd’s tenancy. I find that the Respondents’ eviction attempts to evict Ms. Lloyd were, at their core, attempts to evade their obligations to accommodate Ms. Lloyd’s disabilities.

9.      Disruption of Quiet Enjoyment

[114]       Ms. Lloyd submits, and I agree, that the Respondents’ multiple eviction attempts, the threatened and effected lockout, the bullying over her belongings and alleged smell, the persistent harassment and threats to her visitors and guests were all connected to her disabilities.

[115]       Section 10(b) of the Code protects tenants from discrimination “regarding a term or condition of the tenancy of the space.” The RTA sets out the terms and conditions applicable to residential tenancies, including the term of “quiet enjoyment” set out in s.28 of the RTA:

A tenant is entitled to quiet enjoyment including, but not limited to, rights to the following:

(a)    reasonable privacy;

(b)   freedom from unreasonable disturbance;

(c)    exclusive possession of the rental unit subject only to the landlord’s right to enter the rental unit in accordance with section 29 [landlord’s right to enter rental unit restricted];

(d)   use of common areas for reasonable for lawful purposes, free from significant interference.

Quiet enjoyment on a home is a condition of tenancy protected under s. 10(b) the Code when the complainant’s protected characteristics are a factor in the respondent’s conduct: Friedmann v. MacGarvie, 2012 BCCA 445 at paras. 27-28 [MacGarvie]; NT by HST v. Daljit Sekhon and others, 2019 BCHRT 201.

[116]       I accept that the Respondents’ harassing conduct was designed to make Ms. Lloyd’s life intolerable and cause her to leave the tenancy so the Respondents could avoid their obligations to accommodate her, and her disabilities were a factor in this conduct.

[117]       In summary, I find that Ms. Lloyd was adversely impacted in her tenancy in connection to her disability when the Respondents:

1.      Required her to move her belongings into her home, including disability related items that removed barriers related to her disability;

2.      Limited and terminated her use of common space and amenities including the driveway, storage, backyard, and laundry facility;

3.      Attempted to evict her;

4.      Harassed her, her guests, and service providers; and

5.      Disrupted her quiet enjoyment of the property.

[118]       Next, I consider whether the Respondents have established that was reasonably justified.

D.    Justification

[119]       The Respondents say that the tenancy standards they set for Ms. Lloyd were justified. To establish this defence, the onus is on the Respondents to prove on a balance of probabilities that the discriminatory standard has a bona fide and reasonable justification. To establish this justification, the Respondent must prove that:

1.      They adopted a standard for a purpose rationally connected to the function being performed;

2.      They adopted the particular standard in an honest and good faith belief that it was necessary for the fulfillment of the purpose or goal;

3.      The standard adopted is reasonably necessary to accomplish the purpose. To show that the standard is reasonably necessary, it must be demonstrated that it is impossible to accommodate individuals sharing the characteristics of the claimant without incurring undue hardship.

British Columbia (Superintendent of Motor Vehicles) v. British Columbia (Council of Human Rights), 1999 CanLII 646 (SCC), [1999] 3 S.C.R. 868 [Grismer] at para. 20.

[120]       Landlords have a duty to accommodate their tenants by taking all reasonable and practical steps to avoid a negative effect based on a tenant’s protected characteristic under the Code: Biggings obo Walsh v. Pink and others, 2018 BCHRT 174 at para. 79.  The duty to accommodate a person with a disability is “a core and transcendent human rights principle”: Québec (Commission des norms, de l’équité, de la santé et de la sécurité du travail) v. Caron, 2018 SCC 3 [Caron] at para. 20. The Supreme Court of Canada has instructed tribunals to “be wary of putting too low a value on accommodating the disabled”: British Columbia (Superintendent of Motor Vehicles) v. British Columbia (Council of Human Rights), 1999 CanLII 646 (SCC), [1999] 3 SCR 868 [Grismer] at para. 41.

[121]       I understand Mr. Rosso’s stated purpose or goal for the standards they set on Ms. Lloyd’s tenancy as needing the home for themselves to start a family and “protecting” his family. I find that the Respondents fail both the second and third prongs set out in the Grismer justification test. Mr. Rosso stated unequivocally that he had an ulterior motive for his conduct, which was to make Ms. Lloyd’s tenancy intolerable until she moved out. Such an ulterior motive undermines a finding that the standards the Respondents set were adopted in an honest and goof faith belief that the standards were necessary to fulfill their stated purpose or goals: Grismer at para. 29.

[122]       I also consider the third prong of Grismer and whether the Respondents have satisfied their obligation to accommodate Ms. Lloyd’s disabilities to the point of undue hardship. The evidence is clear that they did not.

[123]       The Respondents assert a blanket justification for their conduct namely, that it is their home; they can do as they wish; Ms. Lloyd’s needs around the property did not align with how they wanted to use the property; and, they did not need to consider accommodating Ms. Lloyd’s use of the property outside of the boundaries of her unit. The Rossos’ blanket justification stemming from an incorrect belief that they were the property owners, and not tenants, is not a defence. Further, such a blanket defence is not justified, as the means by which they seek to achieve their goals must be tailored to the ends: Grismer at para. 21.

[124]       At the hearing, Mr. Rosso expressed no reservations when he stated that the Respondents would have continued their conduct until Ms. Lloyd’s tenancy ended by eviction or from being run-down by their conduct. Despite his grand statements that he and his wife are particularly well suited to identify and understand disabilities, he showed no remorse for his conduct because his singular focus was “protecting” his family and taking over the property. As Mr. Rosso submits in closing on behalf of the Respondents, “I mean no disrespect, but this tribunal cannot tell me how to live my life. I live it the best way I can, and I cannot change my whole life to accommodate this.”

[125]       Notwithstanding the RTB’s orders that she was not entitled to storage in the laundry room or garage, the Code requires more of the landlord when a tenant has a disability that requires accommodation. In my view, the Respondents may not have run afoul of the Code if their ask had ended with a request that she relocate her possessions stored around the property into her home. They gave her 40 days, and there is no indication that she asked for more time. However, it is the extent to which they required her to move her belongings that crosses the line and leads me to conclude that it was not reasonably necessary to have her move strawberry pots, tables and chairs to accomplish the purpose of clearing areas of the property. The Respondents have not provided any justification other than it being their home to do with as they wish. Ms. Lloyd needed the table and chair to rest because walking the distance between her front door to her car was arduous because of her disability. They knew this but disregarded her disability. In doing so, they created disability related barriers in her tenancy. As such, I cannot find that the Respondents conduct was justified.

[126]       With respect to the eviction attempts, the RTB did not find the matter urgent or find there were sufficient grounds to evict Ms. Lloyd. The Respondents have not indicated that they even considered giving Ms. Lloyd extra time to remove her belongings from the floor, which were there because of the Rosso’s arbitrary demands. The Respondents have not established any hardship, let alone undue hardship, had they allowed Ms. Lloyd more time to clear her home on account of her disability to prepare for the pest control treatment.

[127]       Other than their blanket justification argument, the Respondents made some pointed arguments for why they could not accommodate Ms. Lloyd with respect to access to the laundry room, scooter storage, or use of the driveway. I deal with each in turn and explain why the Respondents’ have not met their burden of establishing that such conduct was justified.

[128]       The Respondents say limiting Ms. Lloyd’s access to laundry was justified because Ms. Rosso is a nurse and needed to wash her clothes frequently because her work necessitated a high likelihood of contact with COVID-19 patients. However, the pandemic was not declared until March 2020. This does not justify limiting Ms. Lloyd’s use between January 2019 and March 2020. When this timing was put to Mr. Rosso, he then denied withdrawing laundry access in January 2019 and said he did so in 2020. He also claimed that before the COVID pandemic was declared, his wife was caring for COVID-19 patients in the hospital. These claims are proved demonstrably false by the documentary evidence showing the Respondents limited laundry access in January 2019, and by the well-known fact that the province of British Columbia declared a provincial state of emergency to support the province’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic March 2020. Mr. Rosso also claimed that his wife, Ms. Rosso, “has a problem” and does laundry every single day, all day, 7 days a week because they are “very clean people.” In any event, Mr. Rosso’s argument does not explain why other arrangements could not have been made to limit contact between Ms. Lloyd and the Rossos during the pandemic, especially considering that the laundry was a space separate from both units of the home and had two separate entrances.

[129]       At the hearing, Mr. Rosso also claimed he stored valuable jewelry in the laundry room and did not want Ms. Lloyd to “rob” him. First, it is not credible that the Respondents kept valuable jewelry in the laundry room. This was a shed-like space with no direct access into their home, and it is simply not believable that a person would store valuables, including jewelry, in that type of structure. Additionally, Ms. Lloyd did not give the Respondents any reason to believe that she would steal their belongings. If the Respondents sincerely believed that, it would not make sense to store valuables in a minimally secure space she could have accessed.

[130]       Mr. Rosso said he changed the locks after he moved in so that the garage and laundry room used the same key as his front door. It was put to Mr. Rosso why he could not put a lock on the laundry door that was different from the lock that led to the garage. He said he could not afford to do so. Mr. Rosso’s claim that he possessed valuables undermines his claim that he could not afford a separate lock on the laundry room door and share a copy of the key with Ms. Lloyd.

[131]       Finally, Mr. Rosso said Ms. Lloyd could have taken her laundry to a laundry mat, which he says is located in the neighbourhood. Such a suggestion does not consider Ms. Lloyd’s disability-related barriers to walking to her car or carrying the laundry’s weight.

[132]       The Respondents’ justifications for limiting Ms. Lloyd’s access to laundry underscored Mr. Rosso’s inclination to lie and manipulate his evidence in response to the question asked. His inconsistencies not only undermined his evidence but undermined his justification arguments. Despite their various reasons or suggested proposals, the Respondents have not established that it was impossible to accommodate Ms. Lloyd without incurring undue hardship.

a.    Safe storage of the scooter

[133]       Mr. Rosso reasserted his blanket justification that this was his home, and no one could tell him what to do with his home. He said, “I needed it all to myself, it’s my garage”. Mr. Rosso said he had no covered storage to offer Ms. Lloyd and, besides, it was “not his job” to store her scooter. He also said that the Respondents were “renovating nonstop” after moving in, including in the garage. Mr. Rosso did not provide details about the timeframe or duration of the renovations. Mr. Rosso also agreed that the Respondents kept one car at the property and did park in the garage.

[134]       Mr. Rosso explained that he could not allow Ms. Lloyd to store her scooter in the garage because he had “a lot of money in the garage”, including two ATVs. He emphasized that the ATVs were expensive. He described ATVing as the “biggest hobby” in his life. He also said because of the ATVs, he did not have room in the garage because he stored two ATVs in the garage.

[135]       Mr. Rosso put into evidence photos of his garage with the ATVs, and photos of measuring tape between the ATV and the surrounding area of the garage as evidence of the little amount of room available to store the scooter in the garage. Mr. Rosso testified that the ATVs remained in storage at a friend’s home until January 14, 2020. On cross examination, he admitted the photos he submitted as evidence presents how he used his garage at the time of the hearing and agreed that moving the scooter had nothing to do with the ATVs.

[136]       Mr. Rosso testified in direct examination as part of his employment as a specialized support worker, he gets special permission from the Ministry to take children with mental and physical disabilities on ATV excursions. I asked Mr. Rosso to tell me more about the program, curious that it might lead to a justification defence. Unfortunately, he became angry and evasive, and I did not learn more about this alleged Ministry sanctioned program.

[137]       Again, in an effort to see if the Respondents explored every reasonable possible solution to allow Ms. Lloyd to keep her scooter parked in the garage, I asked him if he ever considered moving things around in his garage to keep the scooter stored there. He said this was an impossibility without expanding on his testimony. Because Mr. Rosso maintained, repeatedly, that the Respondents did not have to share any common property with Ms. Lloyd because they were the owners and entitled to use the property however, they wished, I am satisfied that he did not turn his mind to the possibility of keeping the scooter in the garage or in covered storage.

[138]       I find the Respondents have not provided a justification for not allowing Ms. Lloyd to keep her scooter parked in the garage. They did not use the garage to park their car, and the ATVs did not arrive until January 14, 2020. The Respondents have not adequately explained whether they considered options to keep the scooter stored safely.

a.    Parking on driveway

[139]       The Respondents have not met their burden of proving a reasonable justification for denying Ms. Lloyd or her support workers the ability to park on the driveway.

[140]       Mr. Rosso says the blanket rule is justified. Mr. Rosso testified that as the homeowner, it was only right that the Rossos park there and tenants park on the street. He suggested that it would be degrading as a homeowner to have any other arrangement, and no one can tell a homeowner what they can and cannot do with their property. I reiterate that the Rossos were not the homeowners and even if they were, their position that a homeowner may do as they please and disregard a tenant’s need for a disability related accommodation is contrary to the law.

[141]       Ms. Lloyd testified that Mr. Rosso allowed other people to park on the driveway for extended periods. There is no dispute that Mr. Rosso carpooled with a colleague in 2019 and directed his colleague to park in the driveway.

[142]       I understand Mr. Rosso’s position to be that Ms. Lloyd did not actually need to use the driveway to accommodate her disability. He points to the fact that she parked parallel to the house, at the spot farthest from the driveway. From the evidence, I understand this to be about two car lengths from the driveway. I accept Ms. Lloyd’s explanations for why she chose to park in this spot. It has a direct sightline from her kitchen window, and she was able to use her key fob from her home to unlock the car for her son when he came over to unload things from the car for her. In the spots closer to the driveway, there are trees and large bushes, so Ms. Lloyd could not see her car from her home. I also accept her testimony that the home directly across from the driveway had many vehicles, and she wanted to reduce the chances of the neighbour’s vehicles reversing into her car. She gave evidence that while reducing her walk was important, the second-best option was to park her car within her sightline and away from neighbouring traffic. I accept Ms. Lloyd’s explanation and find that it does not negate the adverse impact she experienced connected to her disability from not being able to park on the driveway.

[143]       Further, Mr. Rosso asserted that, from his perspective, Ms. Lloyd only left the home a couple of times a month, so parking on the road was not an inconvenience for her. I view this evidence differently. If Ms. Lloyd only left the property a couple of times a month, then it is difficult to see what undue hardship would arise for the Respondents to allow Ms. Lloyd to park on the driveway close to the garage and move their car on the infrequently occasion when she needed to use her car to leave the property.

[144]       I also understand the Respondents to argue that they could not have accommodated Ms. Lloyd by allowing her to park on the driveway because Mr. Rosso frequently needed to take his ATVs in and out of the garage. However, his testimony shows that the ATVs were not actually at the property until January 2020 and when they were, they were not his primary vehicle or used daily. It was also Mr. Rosso’s evidence that the Respondents did not park in the garage before the ATVs arrived. Mr. Rosso has not provided any other explanation for why Ms. Lloyd parking on the driveway would have prevented him from entering or exiting the garage, or why, when the ATVs finally arrived, he could not ask Ms. Lloyd to move her car for a period when he needed to drive them off the property.

[145]       Finally, Ms. Lloyd’s support workers used the driveway as a place to pick up and drop of Ms. Lloyd to alleviate her disability related pain from walking.

[146]       The Respondents have not provided a reasonable explanation for why Ms. Lloyd could not have parked at the top of the driveway, close to the home. The Rossos acknowledged that they regularly parked at the bottom of their driveway, invited others to park on the driveway during the day, and observed Ms. Lloyd to leave the property infrequently. The Respondents have not established that they sufficiently considered accommodating Ms. Lloyd’s disabilities to the point of undue hardship.

[147]       The Respondents have not shown that they “could not have done anything else reasonable or practical to avoid the negative impact” on Ms. Lloyd: British Columbia (Public Service Employee Relations Commission) v. BCGSEU, 1999 CanLII 652 (SCC), [1999] 3 SCR 3 [Meiorin] at para. 38; Caron at para. 29. Not permitting Ms. Lloyd or her support worker to use the driveway momentarily without advance permission or attempting to blockade the driveway to limit Ms. Lloyd’s access to a reasonable accommodation for her disability is unjustifiable and a violation of s. 10 of the Code.

[148]       In summary, the Respondents have not proved a bona fide reasonable justification for their discriminatory conduct. I accept Ms. Lloyd’s submission that the Respondents’ conduct was designed to make Ms. Lloyd’s life miserable and cause her to leave the tenancy so the Respondents could avoid their obligations to accommodate her, and her disabilities were a factor in this conduct. The Respondents have failed to demonstrate that their conduct was sufficiently accommodating. The Respondents have not established any hardship, let alone undue hardship, for their adverse treatment of Ms. Lloyd. Much of the standards set around Ms. Lloyd’s use of the property were arbitrary and failed to consider Ms. Lloyd’s particular needs.

[149]       I now turn to whether the Respondents’ conduct after they were made aware that she might be making a human rights complaint meets the test for retaliation under the Code.

E.     Retaliation

1.      Legal Principles

[150]       Section 43 of the Code states, in part, that:

43 A person must not…evict … intimidate, … deny a right or benefit to or otherwise discriminate against a person because that person complains … [or] might complain [to the Tribunal]

[151]       To succeed in her retaliation complaint, the burden is on Ms. Lloyd to prove that:

a.    The Respondents were aware that she made or might make a complaint under the Code;

b.    The Respondents engaged in or threatened to engage in conduct described in s. 43 of the Code (e.g., evicted, intimidated, etc.); and,

c.     There is a sufficient connection between her intended or actual filing of the complaint and the Respondents’ conduct. This connection may be established in one of two ways. First, by proving that the Respondents intended to retaliate. It may also be proved by inference where, from the point of view of a reasonable complainant, apprised of the facts at the time of their conduct, it can be reasonably perceived the Respondents engaged in their conduct in retaliation.

Gichuru v. Pallai, 2018 BCCA 78 at para. 58.

2.      When did the Respondents become aware of Ms. Lloyd’s intention to file, or actual filing of, the complaint?

[152]       I am satisfied that as of October 4, 2019, the Respondents were aware that Ms. Lloyd might make a complaint under the Code. There is no dispute that on October 4, 2019, Ms. Lloyd advised the Rossos by email: “I am filing a Human Rights Complaint with respect to my difficulties I have encountered obtaining disability accommodations I have requested in consideration of my considerable mobility and arthritis pain-related disabilities.” Shortly after making the statement in her email, Ms. Lloyd filed the discrimination complaint on November 14, 2019, and the Tribunal issued the notice of the complaint proceeding to the Respondents on January 3, 2020.

[153]       Ms. Lloyd submits that the Respondents knew of her intention to file a human rights complaint as early as the spring of 2019, when Ms. Beda emailed them requesting accommodations, and notifying them that they may be in breach of the RTA and the Code. In the circumstances of this complaint, I do not accept that the Respondents were aware prior to October 4, 2019. Neither Ms. Lloyd nor her witnesses led evidence that the Respondents were told directly about her intention to file a complaint before October 4, 2019.

3.      Did the Respondents retaliate against Ms. Lloyd?

[154]       I now turn to the Respondents’ conduct as of October 4, 2019. Ms. Lloyd’s retaliation complaint alleges that the Respondents breached s. 43 of the Code by “making her life in the basement suite untenable” after she told them she was going to file a human rights complaint against them. All of the alleged conduct is an escalation of, or different from, the Respondents’ conduct in Ms. Lloyd’s original complaint. Specifically, Ms. Lloyd alleges the Respondents threatened, surveilled, harassed, and intimidated her and her guests, terminated her laundry access, turned off the heat in her suite, refused to address mold in her suite, attempted to evict her on multiple occasions, and attempted to sell their home during the COVID-19 pandemic as retaliation for filing her human rights complaint.

[155]       The Respondents do not dispute that they cut off Ms. Lloyd’s laundry access or gas heat, or that they installed security cameras, sought to evict her, or listed the house for sale. However, the Respondents say that none of their actions were retaliatory. In their view, they acted reasonably in circumstances where Ms. Lloyd caused damage to the suite and compromised the safety of the home and refused to leave despite their many attempts to end the tenancy. They say there is no connection between their conduct and the Complaint. In addition, the Respondents say many of the allegations are unfounded or the RTB dealt with them in their favour. For example, they say:

• Laundry access was terminated on January 1, 2020, for privacy and security reasons, and in compliance with the RTB, including notice and a reduction in rent.

• Gas heat was turned off and electrical heat provided because of the “horrendous odour” in the basement suite caused by unsanitary conditions, hoarding, and mold.

• Evictions were sought in good faith and based on the Rossos need for the space.

• Ms. Lloyd obstructed their ability to do mold remediation.

• Cameras were installed for security and had nothing to do with Ms. Lloyd.

• Ms. Lloyd created conflict by parking on the lawn and causing damage.

• It was within their rights to list the house for sale and they did so before the pandemic started.

• Inspections were done with proper notice and to protect the property and residents.

[156]       Ms. Lloyd alleges that the Respondents’ negative conduct toward her after October 4, 2019 indicate that they were motivated by retaliation. I now turn to each of the alleged retaliatory acts and consider whether they establish the second and third preconditions for retaliation.

1.      Threats and intimidation

[157]       Ms. Lloyd says, as retaliation, the Respondents threatened and intimidated her and her guests.

[158]       Since filing her human rights complaint, the Respondents have threatened to sue Ms. Lloyd in court if she did not withdraw her complaint. One such example is in a letter from Mr. Rosso dated April 26, 2020. In it, the Respondents accused her and her advocates of slander and bad faith and threatened litigation against her and people who have helped her. In the Form 2 Response to the Retaliation complaint, the Respondents threatened Ms. Lloyd and her counsel with lawsuits and Law Society complaints unless she withdrew her human rights complaint within 45 days. She says, and I accept, that the Respondents’ threats made her feel intimated, punished for filing a complaint, and as though they were attempting to coerce her into abandoning her human rights complaint. These facts establish the second and third criteria of retaliation. The Respondents intimidated and sought to coerce her into abandoning her human rights complaint and did so directly in response to her retaliation complaint.

[159]       Further, Ms. Lloyd says the Respondents retaliated by intimidating her, her guests, and support workers by monitoring them and threatening to report them to the police or ICBC.

[160]       There is no dispute that the Respondents installed cameras with external speakers in communal areas of the home. Through the monitoring system, the Respondents were able to remotely surveil the property and speak through the speakers. I understand from the evidence they were installed after Ms. Lloyd filed her human rights complaint. If I am incorrect in my understanding, I accept Ms. Lloyd’s evidence that the monitoring system was first wielded against her after the Respondents knew of the human rights complaint.

[161]       As previously stated, I accept Ms. Lloyd’s evidence. She described three instances where the monitoring device was used to harass and intimidate her and her son.

[162]       On October 23, 2019, Ms. Lloyd sat on a folding chair outside of her door so she could rest while waiting for a load of laundry to finish. She was using the folding chair because she was no longer permitted to have patio furniture outside of her door. Mr. Rosso spoke to her over the speaker while he was at work, stating that she had ten minutes to remove the chair she was sitting on or else he would remove her and the chair out to the street.

[163]       On May 11, 2020, Ms. Lloyd sat on a cement retaining wall in front of the house while she waited for her son to visit. The Rossos used the speaker to tell her to get off the wall. They then emailed her and told her not to sit there again and that they would have to sanitize the cement areas where she touched and sat. This was during the COVID-19 pandemic.

[164]       Over the speaker, Mr. Rosso told Ms. Lloyd’s son that he had to leave, and to get away from a common area near the yard’s entry gate.

[165]       Mr. Mackenzie gave uncontested evidence about his interactions with the Rossos on October 28, 2019. His testimony reflects his comments in the environmental report, which states:

During the assessment the back door of the basement suite was knocked on very loudly twice. The tenant Ms. Lloyd decided not to answer the door and stated it was the landlord. Upon myself leaving the suite a loud speaker came on in the back yard stating it was the landlord. A lady also came out the front door and asked for my business name. I left the property immediately and did not respond. On October 30, 2019, I received a call from Mr. Wayne Rosso and he stated he was the owner of the…property. He stated we were trespassing on the property and he has notified the police. He also stated he has filed a lawsuit in the BC Supreme Court against ABM Environmental and notified the media about this. He also stated he was filing a complaint with the Better Business Bureau. Finally, he stated we were not allowed to come on the property again. During the conversation we informed Mr. Rosso we had the tenants permission to enter the property basement suite. He claimed we were still not allowed on the property. It seemed he was trying to intimidate ABM Environmental from servicing the Client.

[166]       The Respondents’ defence is that the cameras were installed for security and had nothing to do with Ms. Lloyd. I do not accept that defence because it is clear from the evidence that the surveillance was wielded against Ms. Lloyd and her guests after the Respondents knew of her intention to make a human rights complaint. The monitoring system was wielded against Ms. Lloyd to intimidate her and her guests. I infer from the timing of the Respondents’ use of the monitoring system to intimidate Ms. Lloyd and her guests that there is a sufficient connection to her human rights complaint. 

[167]       It is also not disputed that the Respondents did not allow Ms. Lloyd to park on the driveway. Instead, they required her to park on a gravel area between the road and their front yard. Ms. Lloyd had no choice but to comply. Even after she started parking on the gravel pad, they found fault with her parking.

[168]       In December 2019, Mr. Rosso set up light plastic poles and tape along the gravel area where they told her to park her car. Ms. Lloyd testified that on December 19, 2019, she accidentally made contact with the poles, and the contact with the poles did not damage her car. The Respondents reported the bump to ICBC and the RCMP as a “mischief call” at 7:13 AM on Sunday, December 22, 2019. Nothing came of their reports, but Ms. Lloyd affirmed speaking to the police officer was stressful and upsetting.

[169]       The Respondents’ defence is that Ms. Lloyd created conflict by parking on the lawn and causing damage. Mr. Rosso provided photo evidence to support this claim; however, I find, consistent with the RTB’s conclusion of this claim, that the photos do not add weight to his assertion that Ms. Lloyd caused any damage. This defence is conjectural and without corroboration, and indicative of the Respondents’ ongoing efforts to discredit Ms. Lloyd by characterizing her as a disruptive tenant. I accept Ms. Lloyd’s testimony that she did not damage the Respondents’ garden or yard. Further, the defence does not shield the Respondents from a finding of retaliation. The Respondents’ conduct sought to both intimidate and impose a penalty on Ms. Lloyd. I am satisfied from the point of view of a reasonable complainant that the Respondents’ escalating concern with trivial matters after Ms. Lloyd filed her human rights complaint establishes a sufficient connection to her complaint.

2.      Change in Laundry Access

[170]       I find that the suspension in laundry services was retaliatory.

[171]       On November 27, 2019, the Respondents filed a notice to terminate Ms. Lloyd’s laundry with the RTB. On December 12, 2019, Ms. Rosso wrote to Ms. Lloyd to give her “formal notice” that they were unilaterally changing her laundry access such that it would be eliminated on January 1, 2020 due to “increased behaviours we have talked to you about caught on camera in the laundry room, lies about our home, the hostility and damage being purposely done to our front lawn and posts.” Because the language in the December 12, 2019 email mirrors the Respondents’ language in the Form 2- Response, I understand the “lies about our home” to be in direct reference to the allegations in Ms. Lloyd’s human rights complaint. This satisfies the sufficient connection requirement between the Respondents’ knowledge of the complaint and a reasonable inference of an intention to retaliate.

[172]       The behaviour “caught on camera in the laundry room” refers to Ms. Lloyd touching the waterline connected to the washing machine in the laundry room. The Respondents entered a still frame image of the video recording into evidence and asserted that the image shows Ms. Lloyd “grabbing” the water lines to break them.

[173]       Ms. Lloyd explained the photo of her touching the water lines. She said that laundry machine was not starting, so she wanted to feel the waterline and check if the water was coming through. I accept Ms. Lloyd’s evidence as a reasonable, plausible explanation for her actions in the photo. The Respondents were in possession of the video, which would have provided context to Ms. Lloyd touching the water lines. Instead of submitting the videos into evidence, the Respondents selectively took still frames of the videos to support their narrative that they were concerned by Ms. Lloyd’s attempts to damage their property.  

[174]       The Respondents also say they followed the RTB decision regarding laundry until they ended the service. They say the service was ended in accordance with the law, which states shared non-essential services can end with 30 days’ notice accompanied by a reduction in rent. They say they needed the laundry room for storage; the stacked bins they placed inside were filled with priceless, valuable possessions, and made it unsafe for Ms. Lloyd use the laundry room.

[175]       The Respondents do not say whether the stacked bins posed a risk to Ms. Lloyd’s safety, or whether Ms. Lloyd’s access to the room posed a risk to the security of their possessions. Either way, for reasons previously stated, I do not accept that priceless, valuable possessions, such as jewelry, were stored in the laundry room. I also do not accept that it would have been impossible to stack the bins securely.

3.      Turning off the heat in her unit throughout the winter of 2019/2020.

[176]       I find that turning of Ms. Lloyd’s heat was retaliatory.

[177]       There is no dispute that the Respondents turned Ms. Lloyd’s heat off during the winter of 2019-2020. They say they are not obligated to provide a tenant with a heating source of their choice. The Respondents say they turned off her heat and provided her with electrical heat because of the “horrendous odour” in the basement suite caused by unsanitary conditions, hoarding, and mold.

[178]       The Respondents’ explanation is without merit. I have already found that there is no evidence to support the assertion that Ms. Lloyd was a hoarder or lived in unsanitary conditions. I also accept Mr. Tiessen’s testimony that he did not smell any odours on any of his frequent visits to Ms. Lloyd’s apartment. Moreover, I accept the RTB’s finding that the source of the smell is not clear and may be coming from the vents themselves, which the Respondents acknowledged had not been cleaned in some time. None of the evidence supports a conclusion that there was any odour originating from Ms. Lloyd’s suite.

[179]       The Respondents say they offered Ms. Lloyd space heaters when they turned off the gas heat. Ms. Lloyd explained that she had several space heaters running and that her unit remained extremely cold. She was concerned that more space heaters would exceed the unit’s circuit breaker’s capacity. I accept Ms. Lloyd’s evidence that the cold exacerbated her arthritis and pain in her knees, back and hands. I accept that the space heaters alone were not sufficient, and any additional heaters would have been cause for concern for the electrical capacity in her unit.

[180]       I am satisfied that there is a sufficient connection between turning off Ms. Lloyd’s heat and Ms. Lloyd’s complaint. The Respondents’ conduct is consistent with in their ongoing escalation of punitive behaviour against Ms. Lloyd for filing a human rights complaint, and the Respondents have offered no plausible alternative.

4.      Refusing to address a mold issue in her suite.

[181]       The Respondents retaliated against Ms. Lloyd when they denied her a safe living environment by failing to perform minimal mold remediation in her unit.

[182]       In their defence, Respondents say Ms. Lloyd obstructed their ability to do mold remediation. The evidence does not bear out this assertion.

[183]       There is no basis for the Respondents’ defence. At the suggestion of an RTB arbitrator, Ms. Lloyd retained a certified, licensed professional to attend her home. The RTB rejected the premise that Ms. Lloyd created a mold issue in her apartment. Mr. MacKenzie’s inspection on October 28, 2019 concluded that there were slightly elevated mold levels in Ms. Lloyd’s unit likely caused by a leak in the eavestrough that caused moisture ingress into Ms. Lloyd’s ceiling. Mr. MacKenzie recommended a small area above Ms. Lloyd’s front door to be investigated and remediated, if necessary. Ms. Lloyd obtained an order from the RTB requiring the Respondents to heed Mr. MacKenzie’s recommendation. The Respondents did not comply with the order. Instead, they used it as a pretext to evict Ms. Lloyd for causing a major mold issue.

[184]       I find the timing of the Respondents’ refusal to remediate mold to be sufficiently connected to the Respondents’ knowledge on October 4, 2019 that Ms. Lloyd would be filing a human rights complaint. I am satisfied that a reasonable person would have no trouble concluding that the Respondents took the measures outlined above in retaliation for Ms. Lloyd asserting her human rights and filing a human rights complaint. Their conduct occurred just weeks after being notified of the complaint. It is certainly true that the Respondents treated Ms. Lloyd adversely both before and after she filed her complaint, but their conduct escalated considerably after she advised them that she was filing the complaint. Further, the Respondents have provided little to no explanation for the conduct that might explain it as anything other than retaliatory.

5.      Attempting to evict her on multiple occasions.

[185]       I find each eviction attempt after the Respondents were notified that Ms. Lloyd would file a human rights complaint to be separate acts of retaliation.

[186]       During COVID, the Respondents notified Ms. Lloyd that they were prepared to serve her 3 eviction notices once the COVID-related ban on evictions was lifted. They did eventually serve her with 3 eviction notices, claiming that Ms. Lloyd was causing various health and safety issues. The eviction notices were ultimately unsuccessful because the evidence did not support the Respondents’ claim. When confronted with this fact at the hearing, Mr. Rosso declared that he is not required to present evidence in order to take over his home.

[187]       The Respondents say the evictions were sought in good faith and based on the Rossos need for the space. I have already rejected this argument, and my reasons are reinforced by Mr. Rosso’s testimony at the hearing. On cross examination, Mr. Rosso testified that “100%” of the reason the Respondents filed the eviction notices was because Ms. Lloyd had filed a human rights complaint. He testified that if she remained as a tenant to the present day, he would have fought her until she left.

[188]       In this instance, the stated intent to retaliate against Ms. Lloyd is clear.

6.      Selling House

[189]       I am not convinced that the Respondents put their home on the market during the COVID pandemic as retaliation against Ms. Lloyd for filing her human rights complaint.

[190]       Ms. Rosso sent Ms. Lloyd an email on February 22, 2020 stating that they made the decision to sell the house. In March 2020, they listed the house for sale. People came to view the house. Ms. Lloyd said because it was done during the pandemic, people were coming in and out of the house. She was scared, because her health made her especially vulnerable if she contracted COVID-19.

[191]       Mr. Rosso said in a subsequent letter, dated April 26, 2020:

[W]e have never really wanted to sell our home to begin with and were only selling as we felt we had no other options to end this ongoing tenancy dispute and your refusal to accept we are using the whole house for our needs. This has given us the time to think. We have decided we are not selling our home to get away from you any longer.

[192]       Mr. Rosso testified that “100%” of the reason the Respondents put the home up for sale was to end Ms. Lloyd’s tenancy and “get away from her”. The question was put to him twice in a row and he did not equivocate. However, it is undisputed that the Respondents removed the home from the market shortly after listing it, and this was not the reason Ms. Lloyd ended her tenancy on November 30, 2020.

[193]       Mr. Rosso was candid about the reason for listing the home for sale. Selling real estate is a significant and irreversible decision, fundamentally different from any alleged mistreatment of Ms. Lloyd; had the property sold, the Respondents themselves would have faced substantial consequences. This fact strongly supports that the decision was not retaliatory. The evidence demonstrates that the Respondents’ intent was to conclude their relationship with Ms. Lloyd and make a fresh start—not to respond to the filing of the complaint.

7.      Conclusion

[194]       Overall, I am satisfied that Ms. Lloyd has established the elements for retaliation. The Respondents’ escalation of limiting her access to basic amenities that would accommodate her disability, lack of remorse or accountability for any of their behaviour all weigh heavily toward an inference that the Respondents can reasonably have been perceived to have engaged in the above-described conduct in retaliation. Their behaviour targeted Ms. Lloyd for pursuing her right to be accommodated in her tenancy. I find that from the point of view of a reasonable complainant, apprised of the facts, at the time of the impugned conduct that the Respondents’ conduct was retaliatory.

VI    Remedy

[195]       Although the Respondents had an awareness of Ms. Lloyd’s disabilities, the Respondents’ actions caused her numerous adverse impacts in her tenancy in connection with those disabilities. None of the adverse impacts were justified. The Respondents failed in their duty to accommodate Ms. Lloyd and thus breached s. 10 of the Code. I am also satisfied Ms. Lloyd has established that, after the Respondents were aware that Ms. Lloyd might make a complaint under the Code, the Respondents engaged in or threatened to evict and intimidate Ms. Lloyd in connection with this complaint, in violation of s. 43 of the Code. I order the Respondents to cease the contravention of the Code and refrain from committing a similar contravention: s. 37(2)(a) of the Code.

[196]       Ms. Lloyd seeks compensation for the injury to her dignity, feelings, and self-respect caused by the Respondents’ discriminatory and retaliation conduct. She also seeks compensation for the expenses she incurred due to the discrimination. I find that Ms. Lloyd is entitled to the remedies she seeks.

A.    Expenses incurred

[197]       Ms. Lloyd is entitled to an order compensating her for expenses incurred due to the discrimination she faced in tenancy, in the amount of $30,596.17. The purpose of this order is to place Ms. Lloyd in the position she would have been but for the discrimination: Valdez v. Bahcheli and another, 2020 BCHRT 41 at para. 52.

[198]       I am satisfied that Ms. Lloyd’s scooter was damaged because of the Respondents’ discriminatory conduct in refusing to allow her to store the scooter in a covered area. In response, the Respondents say that scooters are intended to be stored outdoors, and they are not responsible for the broken scooter. I accept the scooter repair invoice and assessment report, which concludes the damage resulted from outdoor storage and exposure to the elements. I order compensation for the costs associated with the damage assessment and replacement of her scooter, which she would not have otherwise incurred but for the Respondents’ discrimination.

[199]       I also accept that Ms. Lloyd incurred the expense of a storage unit because of the Rossos’ insistence that she clear items from her home for a pest control visit. The request was made on a short timeline, after they had demanded she put those items into her home from storage around the property in the first place, and with no regard to her disabilities or accommodating her disabilities by giving her more time to organize those belongings.

[200]       I further accept Ms. Lloyd’s evidence that she would not have moved had the Respondents not discriminated and retaliated against her. As noted earlier in this decision, there is a housing shortage in this province, and I accept Ms. Lloyd’s submission that she had no choice but to move into a unit with a higher rent. Ms. Lloyd’s rent was $905 when she moved from the Respondents’ property. Her new rent was $1,250 and increased annually to the maximum amount allowable by her new landlord. I also accept Ms. Lloyd’s evidence that she required the services of move-in assistance to her new renal unit because of her disabilities. The move-in assistance service assisted Ms. Lloyd with moving, unpacking boxes in her new home, and putting her belongings away. I therefore order compensation for the itemized expenses she incurred as a result of having to end her tenancy due to discrimination. These expenses include moving costs and the rent differential up to the date of the hearing: Friedmann v. MacGarvie (No.4), 2009 BCHRT 47, upheld in 2012 BCCA 445; Valdez at para. 57.

[201]       The Respondents did not challenge the expenses incurred or their reasonableness. They also raised no arguments about whether Ms. Lloyd could have mitigated her losses. Accordingly, I find no basis to reduce the amount Ms. Lloyd seeks as compensation.  

[202]       The Respondents are ordered to compensate Ms. Lloyd for the following expenses:

a.    Scooter, mechanic’s assessment: $95.00

b.    Scooter replacement based on mechanic’s assessment: $1,800.00

c.     U-Haul rental: $152.25

d.    Movers: $523.78

e.    Boxes, bags, and various moving-related items: $220.66

f.      Move-in assistance: $6,342.84

g.    Storage unit: $2,563.20

h.    Rental differential totalling $18,898.44, calculated as follows:

                                                     i.          December 2020: $1,250 – $905= $345.00

                                                   ii.          January 2021 – March 31, 2022: ($1,250 – $905) x 15 months = $5,175.00

                                                  iii.          April 1, 2022 – March 31, 2023: ($1,268.75 – $905) x 12 months = $4,365.00

                                                  iv.          April 1, 2023 – March 31, 2024: ($1,294.12 – $905) x 12 months = $4,669.44

                                                   v.          April 1, 2024 – January 31, 2025: ($1,339.40 – $905) x 10 months = $4,344

B.     Injury to dignity

[203]       Ms. Lloyd says the Tribunal should award $60,000.00, a precedent-setting amount of compensation, for injury to dignity.

[204]       I understand the Respondents to say such compensation will deter landlords from renting their homes to elderly, disabled, and low-income families. I also understand the Respondents to say, without supporting evidence, that adjudicating Ms. Lloyd’s tenancy and complaints before the RTB and this Tribunal has put them out financially to the amount of approximately $45,000 in the form of “a line of credit for damages, lawyers, inspections, time off work, but most importantly health damages and horrendous things we won’t get into in this tribunal”.

[205]       A Respondents’ ability to pay is not a consideration in assessing an award for injury to dignity. In assessing compensation for injury to dignity, feelings and self-respect under s. 37(2)(d)(iii) of the Code, the Tribunal considers the nature of the discrimination, the complainant’s social context or vulnerability, and the specific effect the discrimination had on the complainant: Gichuru v. The Law Society of British Columbia (No. 9), 2011 BCHRT 185, at para 260, upheld in 2014 BCCA 396. The Tribunal’s exercise of finding an appropriate quantum is to try to compensate a complainant, as much as possible, for the actual injury to their dignity: Francis v. BC Ministry of Justice (No. 5), 2021 BCHRT 16 at para. 176.

[206]       I find that the nature of discrimination and retaliation in this case was severe, prolonged, continuous, and escalating. The Respondents failed to accommodate Ms. Lloyd’s disability-related needs for almost two years. Instead of implementing simple, cost-free or low-cost accommodations, the Respondents initiated a relentless, escalating campaign targeting Ms. Lloyd for adverse treatment because of her disabilities, and retaliated against her for asserting her rights.

[207]       I have no issue finding Ms. Lloyd was particularly vulnerable to the Respondents’ discrimination due to her disability and low income. The Tribunal has said,

Discrimination in respect of a person’s home can be particularly egregious and is often marked by a power imbalance between landlord and tenant. Safe and secure housing is critical to a person’s overall well-being. For people with disabilities, this necessarily requires that housing be accessible to them, taking into account their individual needs and circumstances.

Biggings obo Walsh v. Pink and others, 2018 BCHRT 174 at para. 156.

[208]       With respect to Ms. Lloyd’s social context, I first note the extreme power imbalance between Ms. Lloyd and the Respondents. She lived with the individuals who discriminated against her and exploited their familial connection to the landlord to assert unwarranted authority and exercise excessive control over her tenancy. She could not appeal to her landlord to assist her because her landlord, Ms. Almeida, had deferred all responsibility of the tenancy other than receipt of the rental cheques, to the Rossos.

[209]       As previously noted, there is a housing crisis in this province. What the Tribunal has said in 2017 applies today: the province’s tight rental housing market makes it very difficult for many Code-protected groups to access safe and secure rental housing: Abernathy v. Stevenson, 2017 BCHRT 239 at para. 15. Ms. Lloyd’s limited options to easily remove herself from her situation due to the housing crisis and the compounded issues of her disability and low wage made her a “captive audience” of the Rossos as they harassed, discriminated, and retaliated against her: McCulloch at para. 128, citing Schrenk at para. 67. Even though they treated Ms. Lloyd poorly, she was reliant upon them to remain housed.

[210]       I now turn to the effect the Respondents’ discrimination had on Ms. Lloyd. I have previously found that the impact of discrimination and retaliation was acute. The Respondents’ behaviour towards her was extreme: they manufactured conditions to justify their multiple eviction attempts; they illegally entered and changed the locks of her home; and they monitored and harassed her and her guests with outdoor recording devices and speakers.

[211]       Ms. Lloyd’s disability-related pain was exacerbated from not being allowed to park in the driveway or access the property’s laundry facilities. Her pain was exacerbated from having to move her belongings not only from storage on the property, but within her home on the Rossos’ whim. She did so in good faith to meet the Respondents demands to make space for pest control management. People who came to the home to support her in these efforts were harassed and threatened. The Respondents labelled a lifetime of Ms. Lloyd’s personal belongings as “garbage”, and she was forced to part with much of it to satisfy the Respondents who were, frankly, unappeasable. She suffered the indignity of defending against the Respondents’ unfounded accusations that she was unhygienic, the source of horrific odours, and a threat to the integrity of the property and the health of its occupants.

[212]       Ms. Lloyd gave tearful, emotional testimony about the cumulative impact the effect of discrimination had on her. She testified that it was very distressing to remember and talk about this time in her life. She described Mr. Rosso’s rage as “very frightening” and described the Respondents’ treatment of her as “hurtful”, “demeaning”, and “awful.” I observed similar behaviour from Mr. Rosso at the hearing. I accept that her interactions with the Rossos in person or through the loudspeakers was upsetting and impacted her such that she avoided leaving the home or having people over because she was afraid of the way Mr. Rosso treated them. The Respondents unashamedly admitted at the hearing that they would have maintained their targeted campaign of discrimination had Ms. Lloyd remained in her tenancy. The Respondents’ actions cruelly isolated a vulnerable, disabled senior. The hearing evidence uncovers a disturbing picture of the Respondents vacillating between contempt or complete indifference toward Ms. Lloyd during her tenancy and lack of remorse for their conduct. The only flicker of acknowledgment by the Respondents came not from conscience, but from fear—when police arrived during an illegal lockout and informed them they were breaking the law.

[213]       In summary, I find the nature of the discrimination, Ms. Lloyd’s social context and vulnerability, and the specific effect the discrimination had on her to be egregious. The highwater mark in injury to dignity awards in tenancy cases has been Biggings, which awarded $35,000 in injury to dignity, feelings, and self-respect. In Biggings, the complainant requested a wheelchair ramp in June 2016 due to her progressive disability. The landlords’ response came a month later, and included offers to accommodate the complainant, such as helping her move or purchasing a stair-climbing wheelchair. The landlords argued that building a ramp was not feasible due to zoning and building bylaw issues, and that the complainant may not live there long enough to justify the effort. The Tribunal found the alternative accommodations, which were rejected due to safety and impracticality, did not constitute reasonable accommodation under the Code, despite the landlords’ “best intentions”. Ultimately, the landlords’ refusal to install a wheelchair ramp effectively denied the complainant accessible housing. Biggings is significant for affirming that accommodation must be meaningful and practical, and that landlords cannot avoid accessibility obligations by offering inadequate or unsafe alternatives.

[214]       In contrast, the Respondents in this case discriminated against Ms. Lloyd on multiple fronts. The Respondents made no effort to explore Ms. Lloyd’s accommodation requests. They dictated Ms. Lloyd’s use of shared space with no regard to alleviating her disability-related barriers in tenancy. The Respondents did not meaningfully engage Ms. Lloyd in dialogue on what accommodations could be implemented, which I previously noted, would have mostly been simple and either free or low-cost. Instead, whenever Ms. Lloyd asked for a disability-related accommodation, the Respondents increased their oppressive tactics. The Respondents showed no empathy or remorse for their treatment of Ms. Lloyd, openly admitting they would have continued their discriminatory conduct and retaliation until her tenancy ended.

[215]       The Tribunal noted in Biggings that the “trend in damages for injury to dignity is upwards”: para. 163. In the 7 years since Biggings was decided, the Tribunal has made awards of up to $176,000 (Francis; $100,000 (Ms. L v. Clear Pacific Holdings Ltd. and others, 2024 BCHRT 14); $50,000 (Mema v. City of Nanaimo (No. 2), 2023 BCHRT 91; Hale v. University of British Columbia Okanagan (No. 5), 2023 BCHRT 121); $45,000 (Ms. K v. Deep Creek Store and another, 2021 BCHRT 158); $40,000 (Jickling v. Sweet Meadows Market (No. 2), 2024 BCHRT 325 [Jickling]; Brooks v. Skyacres Turkey Ranch Ltd. and others (No. 2), 2022 BCHRT 73; MP v. JS, 2020 BCHRT 131; Araniva v. RSY Contracting and another (No. 3), 2019 BCHRT 97).The Tribunal in Biggings explained:

While most of the Tribunal’s high awards have arisen in connection with employment discrimination, in my view there is no principled reason to suggest that the awards should be higher or lower depending on the area of discrimination. Just as work is fundamental to a person’s dignity, so is their housing.

[216]       I take judicial notice of the fact that the inflation rate for the Canadian dollar over the past seven years has averaged 3.04% per year. Taking into account the average annual inflation rate, the $35,000 awarded in Biggings in 2018 is equivalent to about $43,167.54 in 2025. Considering all of the circumstances, including the Respondents’ retaliatory actions that increased disability-related barriers in Ms. Lloyd’s tenancy, I award Ms. Lloyd $60,000 for injury to her dignity, feelings, and self-respect. I also order post-judgment interest on this amount. In my view, this is a meaningful amount grounded in the Tribunal’s jurisprudence that will compensate Ms. Lloyd for the effect of discrimination and retaliation and account for the upward shift in Tribunal awards.

VII  Costs

[217]       Ms. Lloyd applied for costs on September 6, 2023, pursuant to s. 37(4) of the Code, on the basis that the Respondents had acted improperly during the complaint process [Costs Application]. She filed an application to make further costs submissions and attached further submissions on April 23, 2024 [Further Costs Submissions]. In her closing submissions, she raises further improper conduct in the lead-up to the hearing and during the hearing.

[218]       Section 37(4) of the Code allows the Tribunal to award costs against a party who has engaged in improper conduct during the course of a complaint. The purpose of a costs award is punitive: Terpsma v. Rimex Supply Ltd. (No. 3), 2013 BCHRT 3 [CHRR Doc. 13-0003] at para. 102. It aims to deter conduct that has a significant and detrimental impact on the integrity of the Tribunal’s process.

[219]       The Tribunal has previously held that improper conduct for the purposes of the costs provision includes a broad range of circumstances including, among other things, repeatedly failing to abide by the Tribunal’s orders or direction (Ghinis v. Crown Packaging Ltd. (No. 2), 2002 BCHRT 38, Matthews v. Huckleberry Mines and others (No. 2), 2006 BCHRT 93); failing to provide document disclosure in a timely manner or failing to otherwise abide by the Tribunal’s timelines (Smith v. Jewish Community Centre of Greater Vancouver and others, 2006 BCHRT 171); submitting inappropriate pleadings and submissions (Stopps v. Just Ladies Fitness (Metrotown) and D. (No. 2), 2005 BCHRT 359 at paras. 22-3) subjecting other participants or counsel to irrelevant and disrespectful personal attacks unrelated to allegations set out in the complaint or otherwise engaging in appropriate communications (Stopps v. Just Ladies Fitness (Metrotown) and D. (No. 4), 2007 BCHRT 125 [Stopps No. 4]; Stone v. B.C. (Min. of Health Services) and others, 2004 BCHRT 221 [Stone]); engaging in threatening or intimidating conduct (Stopps (No. 4)); and showing disrespect for the Tribunal, its members and/or staff, or its proceedings (Stone v. B.C. (Ministry of Health) (No. 8), 2008 BCHRT 96 [Stone (No. 8)]). Several of these circumstances are applicable in this case.

[220]       Ms. Lloyd submits that the egregiousness of Mr. Rosso’s conduct throughout the many years of this proceeding, and his outrageous conduct during the hearing, justifies an award of costs of $10,000.

a.    In the Costs Application and Further Costs Submissions, Ms. Lloyd outlined the Respondents’ improper conduct to that point, which included: Making baseless, inflammatory and offensive allegations and threats against Ms. Lloyd and her counsel;

b.    Threatening Ms. Lloyd and her counsel with lawsuits and Law Society complaints, and threatening to report Ms. Lloyd’s counsel to the police;

c.     Improperly communicating directly with Ms. Lloyd and refusing to stop when repeatedly asked;

d.    Refusing to copy Ms. Lloyd’s counsel on communications with the Tribunal, then purporting to block communications from Ms. Lloyd’s counsel and the Tribunal, requiring Ms. Lloyd and Tribunal to expend unnecessary resources;

e.    Disclosing confidential settlement discussions;

f.      Making, then withdrawing, an “appeal” and an application for a publication ban after his application to dismiss the complaint was denied, wasting the Tribunal’s and Ms. Lloyd’s resources;

g.    Failing to comply with deadlines set by the Tribunal; and

h.    Sending numerous rude, derogatory, and hostile communications to Ms. Lloyd’s counsel and the Tribunal.

[221]       I agree with Ms. Lloyd that the Respondents engaged in numerous instances of inappropriate communications amounting to improper conduct throughout these proceedings, including:

a.    Failing to copy Ms. Lloyd’s counsel on his “appeal” of the ATD Decision, sent to the Tribunal on August 1, 2023;

b.    Ignoring the Case Manager’s August 2, 2023 direction to copy Ms. Lloyd’s counsel on the “appeal”;

c.     Telling the Case Manager to “stop playing games” on August 2, 2023, when the Case Manager asked him whether the “appeal” was an application for reconsideration;

d.    Improperly bringing an application for a retroactive publication ban when the Tribunal’s ATD Decision did not go his way;

e.    Disclosing confidential settlement discussions to the Tribunal by email on June 21, 2023, and again failing to copy Ms. Lloyd’s counsel on his correspondence;

f.      Making spurious, inflammatory, and offensive allegations and threats against Ms. Lloyd and her counsel in an email that was copied to the Tribunal on June 20, 2023, and which included unsupported and baseless allegations of “slander,” “lying under oath,” and “ethical breaches,” as well as threats of lawsuits and Law Society complaints;

g.    Improperly cc’ing his June 20 email to Ms. Lloyd, despite multiple and repeated requests from Ms. Lloyd’s counsel not to communicate directly with Ms. Lloyd, and to correspond with counsel only;

h.    Making further threats to Ms. Lloyd’s counsel by email on June 20, 2023, including by stating: “You and I will have our time in court and the law society”; refusing to stop copying Ms. Lloyd on correspondence despite repeated requests; and arguing that counsel’s use of the email address he had provided for service on his Form 2 was improper;

i.      Blocking Ms. Lloyd’s counsel’s emails and threatening to call the RCMP if Ms. Lloyd’s counsel continued to correspond with him, which is required under the Tribunal’s rules;

j.      On September 22, 2021, directing Ms. Lloyd’s counsel not to contact him at the email address he provided for service, stating that further communications would be “considered as harassment and forwarded to the appropriate people,” while failing to provide alternate contact information;

k.    On June 30, 2020, again stating that he would continue sending correspondence directly to Ms. Lloyd, stating that it was his “right”; directing Ms. Lloyd’s counsel to “know your place”; and stating: “We look forward to embarrassing you in the hearing and the press”;

l.      On June 18, 2020, again communicating directly with Ms. Lloyd and failing to copy Ms. Lloyd’s legal advocate, and repeatedly rejecting Ms. Lloyd’s advocate’s and counsel’s request to send correspondence to Ms. Lloyd’s legal representatives only; and

m.  On April 21, 2020, rejecting the Ms. Lloyd’s legal advocate’s request to correspond with him, stating that he would “email whomever and choose to speak to anything I choose to without your permission.”

[222]       The Tribunal has said an award of costs is warranted when a party continues to engage in improper conduct and expresses an unwillingness to change their behaviour, punitive measures are necessary: Dr. A. v. Health Authority and another (No. 3), 2023 BCHRT 10 at para. 65. Mr. Rosso’s conduct in this regard is improper and warrants an order for costs.

[223]       Ms. Lloyd also requests costs for the Respondents’ failure to meet deadlines and comply with Tribunal rules and directions. Ms. Lloyd also submits that Mr. Rosso’s improper conduct continued in the lead-up to the hearing by:

a.    Failing to meet the Tribunal’s deadline for filing his outstanding Form 9.3 – Witness List and Book of Documents.

b.    Failing to file a Form 9.6 or Form 9.7

c.     Failing to follow Tribunal’s directions regarding the format of the Book of Documents. Instead, he submitted a list of documents and approximately 180 electronic files in the form of various electronic photos, PDFs, and Word documents. Many folders contained multiple jpeg files, some of which were only titled “Image” or “unnamed”.

[224]       Ms. Lloyd submits that the documents were disorganized, not in chronological order, and difficult to navigate. Some documents were duplicates and others could not be opened. The Tribunal gave the Respondents an opportunity to comply with the original direction regarding their documents, but they did not do so. Ms. Lloyd submits that the chaotic state of the Respondents’ documents undermined the efficiency of the hearing and the just and timely resolution of the dispute.

[225]       I agree with Ms. Lloyd in regard to this allegation in part. Ms. Lloyd acknowledges that Mr. Rosso was self-represented, and acknowledges the responsibility of this Tribunal “provide a fair and impartial process and prevent an unfair disadvantage to self-represented persons”: Canadian Judicial Council Statement of Principles on Self-represented Litigants and Accused Persons, endorsed by the Supreme Court of Canada in Pintea v. Johns, 2017 SCC 23 [Pintea Principles]. Ms. Lloyd says the Pintea Principles requires self-represented persons to be accountable for their participation and are expected to meet their obligations and prepare their case.

[226]       Ms. Lloyd submits that the Tribunal went above and beyond to ensure that Mr. Rosso had every opportunity to present his case. She says Mr. Rosso was given multiple, clear instructions of his obligations in the proceeding, but simply chose not to comply. She says the Tribunal should consider the costs awarded in Asad v. Kinexus Bioinformatics, 2008 BCHRT 293. The Tribunal ordered $5,000 for conduct that disrupted a just and orderly legal process and complicated and frustrated the process of determining the truth: paras. 1005-9.

[227]       Though he did not have a persuasive reason for failing to file his evidence in the form requested by the Tribunal, I cannot find that Mr. Rosso’s filing of his evidence unduly lengthened the hearing.

[228]       I find the remainder of his conduct merits an order for costs. At the start of the hearing, Mr. Rosso disclosed that he would be working during the hearing and taking work calls throughout the course of the day. He disrupted proceedings by saying he had to end the day early to get ready for work. He was dismissive and disrespectful of the Tribunal and other participants’ time. Ms. Lloyd points to the fact that when the Tribunal advised the parties in January 2024 that hearing dates were available later that year, Mr. Rosso refused to attend a case conference call to set hearing dates and requested hearing dates in the latter half of 2025. He justified the delay by citing his work schedule and the fact that he could not book time off work until 2025. I conclude that Mr. Rosso’s request for a delay was not made in good faith, and Ms. Lloyd’s cost application is justified in this regard.

[229]       During the hearing, Mr. Rosso accused Ms. Lloyd’s counsel and service providers of “abusing her”, perpetrating a “legal scam”, and “lying to her to make money off of her” instead of helping her. Mr. Rosso also accused Ms. Lloyd’s counsel of “lying under oath” and “making up stories”. On one occasion he asked her, “can you do your job without lying?” In my view, this type of conduct and slanderous remarks based on no evidence cannot be condoned by the Tribunal and constitutes improper conduct. In response, Mr. Rosso says the Respondents have never lied and they have evidence to support their claim; they again accuse Mr. Lloyd’s counsel of “slandering” the Respondents and “filing lies in court under oath”. No such evidence has been submitted to the Tribunal to support Mr. Rosso’s assertions.

[230]       During the hearing, Mr. Rosso made false and highly inflammatory and prejudicial accusations about Ms. Lloyd’s conduct but did not put these accusations to her in cross-examination. He had to be persuaded to answer questions in cross-examination, initially stating that he would refuse. This caused delays in the hearing. In cross-examination, he repeatedly refused to answer relevant questions, retorting “none of your business” on several occasions and stating that he was “pretty done with this and we need to hurry up”. He directed outbursts at Ms. Lloyd’s counsel and demonstrated repeated disrespect for the Tribunal several times. This conduct is in violation of expected norms of a hearing and constitutes improper conduct.

[231]       Mr. Rosso continued to repeatedly disclose settlement discussions. On the first day of the hearing, the Tribunal, through its member, cautioned him not to disclose settlement discussions, citing the protection afforded by settlement privilege. Such disclosure was ruled inadmissible. Mr. Rosso was reminded that there was an outstanding application for an order for costs because of this same behaviour. Mr. Rosso expressed his understanding and agreement with the ruling. Despite this, Mr. Rosso continued to disclose settlement discussions throughout the hearing. In response to various warnings, he replied, “I don’t care, I don’t care”.  While a self-represented party may be reasonably expected to be less familiar with the Tribunal’s Rules and procedures than a lawyer, Mr. Lloyd’s repeated and continued failure to comply with the Rules and directions after being repeatedly advised of them demonstrates a lack of respect for the Tribunal, the human rights process and Ms. Lloyd, and justifies an award of costs: Mahal v. Hartley (No. 2), 2004 BCHRT 63 at para. 28.

[232]       Mr. Rosso also lied under oath. Examples highlighted in the decision were Mr. Rosso lying about ending Ms. Lloyd’s access to laundry because of the COVID pandemic and being the owners of the home during Ms. Lloyd’s tenancy when all the evidence supports a finding that the Rossos were tenants and Ms. Almeida was the owner of the home.

[233]       With respect to Mr. Rosso’s inflammatory, derogatory, disrespectful and inappropriate comments, Ms. Lloyd points to numerous cases that found such conduct justified an award between $2,500 and $10,000. I am satisfied that the conduct in this complaint is most analogous to MacGarvie v. Friedmann (No. 4), 2009 BCHRT 47, at paras. 190-206 [MacGarvie No. 4] and Gichuru v. Purewal and another, 2017 BCHRT 19.

[234]       In MacGarvie No. 4, the Tribunal awarded $7,500 in costs for improper comments made during a hearing, threats, unfounded accusations and smears in correspondence to and about the complainant and the Tribunal, and failure to abide by the Tribunal’s orders and directions without reasonable excuse.

[235]       In Gichuru v. Purewal and another, 2017 BCHRT 19, the Tribunal awarded $10,000 in costs against a respondent who perjured himself on a single point of evidence. The Tribunal noted that giving false evidence has a very significant impact on the integrity of the Tribunal’s processes: “I can think of little behaviour which is more disrespectful of the Tribunal and its processes than giving false evidence with the intention to mislead with respect to underlying facts of the complaint” (at para. 327). The Tribunal noted that costs awards were typically between $1,000 and $5,000 in situations where the only improper conduct alleged was untruthfulness (at para. 330).

[236]       I note that I observed other conduct by Mr. Rosso that would warrant censure but was not raised by Ms. Lloyd. Nevertheless, on Ms. Lloyd’s submissions, I am satisfied that she has established that Mr. Rosso’s conduct warrants a $10,000 order for costs. I consider that he misled the Tribunal regarding the reasons for delaying the scheduling for the hearing, repeatedly disregarded the Tribunal’s ruling regarding disclosure of settlement discussions during the hearing, repeatedly made unfounded accusations, smears, and invectives against Ms. Lloyd and her counsel, made impertinent remarks directed to the Tribunal during the hearing, and gave false testimony.

VIII           CONCLUSION

[148]      I find Ms. Lloyd’s complaint of discrimination justified. I make the following orders:

a.   I declare that the Respondents’ conduct was discrimination contrary to the Code: s. 37(2)(b).

b.   I order the Respondents to stop the contravention and to refrain from committing the same or a similar contravention: s. 37(2)(a).

c. I order the Respondents to pay Ms. Lloyd $30,596.17 as compensation for expenses incurred as a result of the contravention: s. 37(d)(ii).

e. I order the Respondents to pay Ms. Lloyd $60,000 as compensation for injury to her dignity, feelings, and self-respect, within three months of this decision: s. 37(d)(iii).

f.   I order the Respondents to pay post-judgment interest on the amounts awarded until paid in full, based on the rates set out in the Court Order Interest Act [R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 79].

e. I order the Respondents to pay costs in the amount of $10,000: s. 37(4).

[237]       The Respondents are jointly and severally liable for the orders herein.

Laila Said Alam,

Tribunal Member