Employee R v. B.H. Allen Building Centre Ltd. dba RONA and others, 2026 BCHRT 105
Date Issued: April 22, 2026
File: CS-003350
Indexed as: Employee R v. B.H. Allen Building Centre Ltd. dba RONA and others, 2026 BCHRT 105
IN THE MATTER OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS CODE,
RSBC 1996, c. 210 (as amended)
AND IN THE MATTER of a complaint before
the British Columbia Human Rights Tribunal
BETWEEN:
Employee R
COMPLAINANT
AND:
B.H. Allen Building Centre Ltd. dba RONA and Stephen Allen and Michael Allen
RESPONDENTS
REASONS FOR DECISION
Tribunal Member: Theressa Etmanski
On their own behalf: Employee R
Agent for the Respondents: Stephen Allen
Date of Hearing: October 21, 2025
Location of Hearing: Via Videoconference
I INTRODUCTION
[1] Employee R is a gay man who sought part-time employment at RONA to supplement his income during the COVID-19 pandemic. He was subjected to a homophobic slur at work by a colleague and filed a complaint with his employer in which he expressed concern about his safety. Subsequently, Employee R’s regular shift was cancelled and then he was terminated.
[2] Employee R filed a human rights complaint alleging discrimination based on his sexual orientation contrary to s. 13 of the Code. The Respondents deny discriminating. The resolution of this complaint turns on whether Employee R has established that his sexual orientation was a factor in his shift reduction and termination.
[3] I have reviewed and considered all the evidence admitted at the hearing, which includes witness testimony by Employee R, his boyfriend, and Stephen Allen, as well as documents entered via by both parties’ witnesses. After the hearing the parties provided closing submissions in writing. In this decision, I recount only the evidence and arguments required to explain my decision.
[4] For the following reasons, I find the complaint is justified and I award declaratory and financial remedies.
II Order limiting publication
[5] Following the hearing, Employee R applied for an order limiting publication of his name and identifying information. The Respondents do not oppose the application.
[6] I find that Employee R’s privacy interests outweigh the public interest in knowing his identity and I grant the order limiting publication: Rules of Practice and Procedure, Rule 5(6). Employee R immigrated to Canada from Iran, where his elderly parents still reside. Homosexuality is illegal in Iran, and punishment may be as sever as death. Employee R is concerned that publication of his personal information in association with the facts in this complaint could put him and his family at risk of significant danger. I accept that this threat of harm is not theoretical, as Employee R is required to travel to Iran from time to time to assist his family. I am satisfied that granting this order is necessary and appropriate in the circumstances of this complaint.
[7] On my own motion, I also determine that it is appropriate to protect the name of Employee R’s boyfriend [Boyfriend], who is also a gay man from Iran and acted as a witness in this complaint.
[8] I order as follows:
a. No person shall publish in any document, or broadcast or transmit in any way any information disclosed in or in relation to this complaint that could identity Employee R and/or his Boyfriend.
b. If the Tribunal releases parts of the complaint file to the public, it will redact any information that could identify Employee R and/or his Boyfriend.
III BACKGROUND
[9] The corporate respondent is a family-owned business which has operated since 1987 under the RONA banner. Stephen Allen is the office manager, and Michael Allen is the store manager.
[10] Employee R sought part-time employment at RONA after the business he was previously working at closed due to the COVID-19 pandemic. He was hired on or around November 29, 2020, at the same time as his Boyfriend.
[11] Following his orientation, Employee R says he was regularly scheduled to work two days per week, on Saturdays and Sundays. The rest of the week he was employed elsewhere in a professional occupation.
[12] The Respondents do not dispute that Employee R was regularly scheduled to work Saturdays and Sundays. Employee R provided T4s for 2020 and 2021 with earnings consistent with working two days a week.
[13] Employee R testified that he and his Boyfriend were open about their relationship and sexual orientation at work. He provided evidence of text messages between his Boyfriend and a store supervisor in which the Boyfriend frequently referred to Employee R as his “boyfriend”.
[14] On or around February 6, 2021, Employee R testified that he was working in the afternoon when another employee approached him. This employee was reportedly sixteen years old [Teenage Employee]. Employee R alleges that in the interaction which followed, the Teenage Employee said to him: “Go fuck yourself faggot”.
[15] Employee R states that he had a particularly strong reaction to this incident because of his previous experiences with homophobia in Iran. He was also unsure how to navigate the situation because of the younger age of the Teenage Employee.
[16] Employee R and his Boyfriend both sought to report this incident, but they were unsure of how to make a formal report or directly reach human resources. In these efforts, the Boyfriend posted messages on an employee group chat, which resulted in Michael Allen closing down the chat for “inappropriate content.” Eventually, a store supervisor informed the Boyfriend that Stephen Allen was responsible for human resources. On or around February 9, 2021, Employee R sent an email to Stephen Allen’s assistant describing the incident, and she confirmed that his email was provided to Stephen Allen. The email explained that the Teenage Employee’s remarks were made “with rage and anger” and included a sentence that Employee R does “not feel safe” around the Teenage Employee.
[17] The Respondents say in their closing submissions that there is an internal process for addressing complaints that Employee R was made aware of during his onboarding orientation, but he did not utilize that process. However, the Respondents did not provide evidence regarding any alternative complaint process, and do not dispute that they received Employee R’s complaint by email a few days after the incident occurred. There is also no evidence that after receiving his complaint email, any member of management directed Employee R to follow an alternative complaint process. Rather, the Respondents say that they immediately initiated an internal investigation after receiving his complaint. Given the lack of evidence regarding an alternative process, and because the Respondents have not made submissions to explain the significance of an alternative process to this complaint, nothing in my analysis turns on whether another complaint process was available or if Employee R was, in fact, told about it in his orientation.
[18] On or around February 9, 2021, Employee R received notification that his next two scheduled Saturday shifts had been cancelled. He noted that the Teenage Employee was still scheduled to work on those days. Employee R sent an email to Stephen Allen’s assistant on or around February 14, 2021, inquiring why he had lost these shifts.
[19] I accept that the Respondents subsequently conducted an investigation into Employee R’s complaint; however, they have provided inconsistent evidence regarding what this entailed. A letter summarizing the Respondents’ response to the incident dated March 8, 2021, and signed by Stephen Allen states that the investigation involved a supervisor speaking to the Teenage Employee who denied the allegation, and Stephen Allen speaking to a potential witness who was unable to corroborate anything. Conversely, during his testimony, Stephen Allen stated that they interviewed multiple employees who were on shift that day and had documents and incident reports filed by each employee. However, the Respondents did not seek to have any of these documents admitted as evidence during the hearing. Employee R indicated that there should have been security camera footage available of the incident, but the Respondents have not provided evidence that any cameras were reviewed.
[20] Michael Allen provided a letter to Employee R on or around February 14, 2021, stating that his allegation about the Teenage Employee could not be substantiated as “it was a single incident with no witnesses.” The Respondents say they took no disciplinary measures against the Teenage Employee, though the documentary evidence they provided states that he was given a “verbal warning” that this type of behaviour was unacceptable in the workplace.
[21] Michael Allen’s letter also addressed Employee R’s concern about his cancelled shifts. It stated: “Our staff schedules are done weekly and are always done in the best interest of the stores needs, this incident in no way would have caused you to lose a shift.” Stephen Allen testified that “best interest of the store” includes the safety of staff, including the complainant.
[22] On or around February 15, 2021, the Boyfriend emailed Stephen Allen’s assistant resigning from his position. His email stated that the reason for his resignation was that he felt “very unsafe and fearful” following the Teenage Employee’s conduct towards Employee R, and the employer’s lack of action to address it. He stated that he was particularly shocked by this incident as a gay man from Iran where violent homophobia is common.
[23] On or around February 17, 2021, Employee R emailed Michael Allen, providing information and again questioning the stated reason for his cancelled shifts. Stephen Allen responded the same day, stating that the shifts were cancelled at his request as Employee R’s email indicated that he did not feel safe working with the Teenage Employee. It stated that the investigation into the incident was complete and the matter was considered closed. Finally, it reiterated that scheduling is done “in the best interest of the store” and that part time hours are not guaranteed.
[24] Employee R responded to Stephen Allen that day and clarified that he had not requested to not work with the Teenage Employee, and as the investigation into the incident was closed, he expected to get his Saturday shifts back going forward.
[25] The following day, February 18, 2021, Stephen Allen terminated Employee R’s employment during his probationary period, stating: “It has been determined that we are unable to meet your personal shift expectations.” Employee R was told to collect his personal items from the store premises immediately.
IV DECISION
[26] To prove his case, Employee R must establish, on a balance of probabilities, that he has a protected characteristic, that he experienced an adverse impact in his employment, and that his protected characteristic was a factor in that adverse impact: Moore v. BC (Education),2012 SCC 61 at para. 33. If Employee R does not prove the three elements of his case, there is no breach of the Code.
[27] The Respondents do not dispute that Employee R is gay and that his sexual orientation is a protected characteristic under the Code. However, they deny that Employee R experienced an adverse impact, or that his sexual orientation was a factor in any adverse impact.
1. Did Employee R experience an adverse impact in his employment?
[28] I have no trouble finding that Employee R experienced an adverse impact first when his regular Saturday shifts were cancelled, and then when his employment was terminated. These facts are substantiated by Employee R’s testimony, and the correspondence from Stephen Allen dated February 17, 2021, and February 18, 2021, discussed above.
[29] The Respondents’ position that Employee R did not experience an adverse impact, despite the undisputed facts of the Saturday shift loss and termination, is untenable. The loss of a regularly scheduled shift is a reduction in hours and amounts to a loss of anticipated income, which negatively impacts an employee who relies on that income: Basic v. Esquimalt Denture Clinic and another, 2020 BCHRT 138 at para. 91. The termination of one’s job is the “ultimate employment-related consequence”, which is severe in any circumstance: Nelson v. Goodberry Restaurant Group Ltd. dba Buono Osteria and others, 2021 BCHRT 137 at para. 129. I find that the Respondents’ cancelling Employee R’s Saturday shifts and terminating his employment are adverse impacts under the Code.
2. Was Employee R’s sexual orientation a factor in the adverse impact?
[30] The onus is on Employee R to show that his sexual orientation was a factor in the adverse impacts: Quebec (Commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse) v. Bombardier Inc. (Bombardier Aerospace Training Center), 2015 SCC 39 at para. 49. It is not necessary for him to prove that his sexual orientation was a significant factor or a material factor, only that it was a factor: Stewart v. Elk Valley Coal Corp., 2017 SCC 30 at para. 46.
[31] For the following reasons, I find that the evidence establishes that Employee R’s sexual orientation was a factor in his shift loss and termination. I address each of the Respondents’ arguments below.
[32] The Respondents say that Employee R has not met his burden of establishing a nexus between the adverse treatment and his sexual orientation beyond speculation. They say Employee R’s evidence is inconsistent and unreliable and should be treated with caution. However, the only specific inconsistency the Respondents note with respect to Employee R’s statements appear to be related to his understanding of RONA’s corporate structure. They say that while Employee R stated that he believed he was working for a large corporate RONA store, he was clearly made aware that it was instead a family-run company during his onboarding orientation. They say it is this apparent misunderstanding that informs his allegations. However, I am not persuaded that any confusion Employee R had with respect to this matter has any bearing on the reliability of his testimony regarding the key events in this complaint. Rather, I found his testimony regarding the events in question to be consistent, reliable, and supported by the documentary evidence provided. In any event, I note that the Respondents’ corporate structure is irrelevant to the issues in this complaint; as an employer, the Respondents are bound by the Code whether they are a family-run business or a large corporate entity.
[33] The Respondents further deny that the Teenage Employee, or any member of management or staff, treated Employee R poorly because of his sexual orientation. They say that they immediately investigated Employee R’s complaint, but his allegations could not be substantiated as the Teenage Employee denied making the alleged statement and there were no other witnesses. They say Employee R was “unable to identify any language, conduct, or behaviour that reasonably connected the interaction to sexual orientation or any other protected characteristic.”
[34] I understand the Respondents to be arguing that the incident with the Teenage Employee either did not happen, or even if it did, the language used was not homophobic. I am not persuaded by either argument. Employee R’s written complaint to human resources alleged that the Teenage Employee used a well-known homophobic slur towards him. The Respondents’ own evidence supports that they understood this was a homophobic slur. While the Respondents’ may have concluded that they could not substantiate Employee R’s allegation without an independent witness, Michael Allen’s correspondence to Employee R regarding the investigation acknowledged that “this is not to say it didn’t occur”. At the hearing, the Respondents did not call the Teenage Employee as a witness to dispute Employee R’s version of events, though they did provide an undated letter from an employee that Employee R had identified as someone who was nearby when the incident occurred, which simply states that he is unable to corroborate the allegation. This witness was unavailable to participate in the hearing due to medical reasons, and Employee R was not able to cross-examine him. On its face, this letter does not establish any fact beyond that the Respondents spoke to this individual regarding the incident at some point in time. It does not establish that the incident did not occur.
[35] On the other hand, I have found that Employee R’s testimony regarding this incident was credible, reliable, and consistent. I am satisfied that the Teenage Employee did direct a homophobic slur at Employee R. This is self-evidently connected to Employee R’s sexual orientation. Moreover, Employee R’s complaint to Stephen Allen clearly identified that his concerns about this interaction were connected the Teenage Employee’s use of homophobic language.
[36] I pause to note that one incident of harassing behaviour of this nature by a co-worker, if properly investigated and addressed by the Respondents, may not have been sufficient to substantiate a violation of the Code: Pardo v. School District No. 43, 2003 BCHRT 71 at para. 12. However, the Code requires a reasonable and appropriate response to complaints of discrimination. A failure to respond adequately may independently give rise to a breach of the Code: Jamal v. TransLink Security Management and another (No. 2), 2020 BCHRT 146 at para. 106. My findings of discrimination relate to the Respondents’ conduct following Employee R reporting the incident, most specifically terminating him.
[37] The Respondents deny that the change to Saturday scheduling and termination was connected to Employee R’s allegations against the Teenage Employee. They say that the change in Employee R’s work schedule was the direct result of his own request not to be scheduled at the same time as the Teenage Employee, and not for any discriminatory reason. Stephen Allen testified that the Teenage Employee was only scheduled to work on Saturdays, so they kept him on shift for those days and retained Employee R on the schedule for his Sunday shifts.
[38] The problem with this argument is that the evidence does not support that Employee R requested a shift change. Rather, it is undisputed that he stated that he did not feel safe working with the Teenage Employee after his homophobic conduct. Bringing this information to his employer’s attention is not the same as requesting a shift change. At most Employee R’s statement was a basis for the Respondents to misinterpret what Employee R was saying he wanted or needed. However, even after Employee R clarified that he had not requested to not work with the Teenage Employee, the Respondents declined to schedule him on Saturdays. Instead, they terminated Employee R’s employment. I find Employee R did not request a shift change. Employee R reported an incident of possible workplace discrimination and the impact it had on him. It was the Respondents who chose to deal with that report by decreasing his shifts and ultimately terminating him.
[39] There is no evidence before me that the Respondents considered any alternatives to cancelling Employee R’s shifts after he brought forward his concerns. For example, there is no evidence that they considered directly discussing Employee R’s concerns with him following the investigation, offering Employee R and the Teenage Employee mediation, rescheduling the Teenage Employee’s shifts, or any other alternative options to avoid the adverse impact.
[40] To simply cancel Employee R’s shifts based on his stated safety concern rather than exploring less adverse options was not reasonable and amounts to adverse treatment based on his sexual orientation. Employee R’s expression of safety concerns about the Teenage Employee was explicitly linked to the fact that he had called him a homophobic slur.
[41] As noted above, when Employee R clarified by email that he had not specifically asked not to be scheduled with the Teenage Employee and asked to be put back on the Saturday schedule, the Respondents’ response was to terminate his employment. The stated reason in the termination letter was that the Respondents could not “meet [his] personal shift expectations.” Stephen Allen testified that they had determined at that time that they could not offer him Saturday and Sunday shifts, which was Employee R’s expectation, and so they felt they needed to move on from the employment relationship. The Respondents have not raised any other basis for his termination.
[42] I find that Employee R’s “personal shift expectations” is linked to the Respondents’ perception of whether he requested not to be scheduled to work with the Teenage Employee. Again, I find there is a nexus between this issue and Employee R’s sexual orientation given the question of scheduling arose in response to Employee R’s safety concern due to the use of homophobic language by the Teenage Employee. While the Respondents stated that scheduling is done in the best interests of the store, they have not provided evidence of any other reason why Employee R could not be scheduled to work on Saturdays.
[43] My conclusion that there is a nexus between the termination of Employee R’s employment and his sexual orientation is supported by the circumstantial information available: Radek v. Henderson Development (Canada) Ltd. (No.3) (2005), 52 C.H.R.R. D/430, 2005 BCHRT 302 at para. 482; Mann v. JACE Holdings, 2012 BCHRT 234 at para. 105. An inference of discrimination may be drawn where the evidence, including circumstantial evidence, renders the inference more probable than other possible inferences or explanations: Brar and others v. B.C. Veterinary Medical Association and Osborne, 2015 BCHRT 151 at para. 703. Here, I draw an inference from the timing and context of the termination, given its close proximity to Employee R’s complaint, the correspondence between Stephen Allen and Employee R regarding his stated safety concerns and the Respondents’ statement that it “could not meet his stated shift concerns” (which I have found was based on a misapprehension of what Employee R did or did not ask for). The Respondents have not provided any evidence to rebut this inference.
[44] In reaching this conclusion, I have considered Stephen Allen’s evidence that he was not aware of Employee R’s sexual orientation during the events in this complaint. This statement is difficult to accept given Employee R’s response to being called a homophobic slur, the Boyfriend’s statements in his resignation letter, and the evidence that Employee R and the Boyfriend were hired at the same time and were open about their relationship in the workplace. However, even accepting his evidence as true, Stephen Allen was aware that Employee R’s safety concerns were related to the Teenage Employee’s use of homophobic language towards him. This would alert him, at the very least, to a connection between the alleged conduct and Employee R’s perceived sexual orientation by the Teenage Employee. In that sense, his actual knowledge of Employee R’s specific sexual orientation was not necessary for him to be on notice that there were human rights implications to the alleged conduct in the complaint. It should also be recalled that the Code does not require an intention to discriminate but rather focuses on the impact of the conduct on the individual: Code, s. 2; Fenech v. PNI Media Inc. and another, 2023 BCHRT 120 at para. 61.
[45] Finally, the fact that Employee R was still in his probationary period when he was terminated does not relieve the Respondents of their human rights obligations under the Code: Schmidt v. Holekamp & Company and Holekamp, 2009 BCHRT 74 at para. 17.
3. Have the Respondents established a bona fide reasonable justification?
[46] In many cases, employers argue a justification defence against a complaint of discrimination: British Columbia (Public Service Employee Relations Commission) v. British Columbia Government and Service Employees’ Union (Meiorin Grievance), 1999 CanLII 652 (SCC), [1999] 3 SCR 3 at para. 54. In such cases, after a complainant has made out its case the burden shifts to the employer to establish that they were applying a standard adopted in good faith, for a purpose rationally connected to its function, and they took all reasonable and practical steps to accommodate the complainant.
[47] The Respondents have not made arguments with respect to a bona fide reasonable justification for the decision to remove Employee R from the Saturday schedule or terminate his employment. Since the Respondents have not made any justification arguments, there is no dispute at this stage of the analysis and nothing for me to decide. I consider remedies next.
V Remedy
[48] Having found that Employee R has made out his complaint, I must now determine the appropriate remedy to award in this case.
A. Cease and Refrain Order
[49] I begin by ordering the Respondents to cease the contravention of the Code and to refrain from committing the same or a similar contravention: Code, s. 37(2)(a).
B. Declaratory Order
[50] Under s. 37(2)(b) of the Code, the Tribunal may make a declaratory order that the conduct complained of, or similar conduct, is contrary to the Code. In the circumstances of this case, I consider it appropriate to make such an order. I declare that the Respondents discriminated against Employee R based on his sexual orientation, in violation of s. 13 of the Code.
C. Lost Wages
[51] Employee R seeks $10,140 in compensation for lost wages between February 15, 2021, and February 15, 2022, because, he says, he was unable to find alternative employment during this period.
[52] The Respondents deny that Employee R is entitled to any remedy but have not made specific submissions with respect to Employee R’s entitlement to lost wages.
[53] The Tribunal can order an employer to pay compensation for lost wages caused by the discrimination. The purpose of compensation is to restore a person, to the extent possible, to the position they would have been in had the discrimination not occurred: Gichuru v. The Law Society of British Columbia (No. 9), 2011 BCHRT 185 at para. 300; upheld in Gichuru v. The Law Society of British Columbia, 2014 BCCA 396. Employee R must establish he is entitled to compensation. He must show a causal connection between the discrimination and the loss claimed: Gichuru at paras. 301-302. Once a causal connection is established, the amount of compensation is a matter of discretion in light of the remedial purposes of the Code and the purpose of a wage loss award: Gichuru at para. 303; Benton v. Richmond Plastics, 2020 BCHRT 82 at para. 91.
[54] This discretion must be exercised on a principled basis: Gichuru at para. 300; Chopra v. Canada (Attorney General) (F.C.A.), 2007 FCA 268at para. 40. In calculating the appropriate amount of compensation, I may take into account other factors that affected Employee R’s wage loss during the relevant period, such as any failure to mitigate his damages: Benton v. Richmond Plastics, 2020 BCHRT 82 at para. 91. The Respondents bear the onus of proving a failure to mitigate: Vanton v. British Columbia Council of Human Rights, [1994] B.C.J. No. 497 (S.C.)(QL) at paras. 78-83.
[55] I am satisfied that there is a causal connection between the discrimination and the loss of income in this case. Employee R was terminated and therefore lost access to the income expected from working regular Saturday and Sunday shifts. He has provided evidence that during his employment for the Respondents, he regularly worked between 13 and 15 hours per week for the Respondents.
[56] Employee R says he was unable to find alternative weekend employment for a one-year period following his termination. He has provided evidence of his efforts to seek alternative employment, which can be sorted into two categories:
a. Efforts to seek alternative part-time employment from February 23, 2021, to March 15, 2021; and
b. Efforts to seek higher paying full-time professional employment from September 25, 2021, to February 17, 2022.
[57] Employee R explained that due to the negative experience he had at RONA, he developed anxiety about seeking general part-time positions, as he was afraid that something similar would happen again. He decided that rather than seeking part-time employment to supplement his professional income, he shifted his efforts to seeking higher paid full-time professional employment. He secured a new position of this nature on February 17, 2022.
[58] I am satisfied that Employee R is entitled to compensation for wage loss for his cancelled shift on February 13, 2021, and from February 18, 2021, to March 15, 2021, during which time he has demonstrated reasonable efforts to seek alternative part-time employment. I calculate this entitlement to be $877.50, as follows:
| Date | Hours | Rate | Total |
| February 13 | 6.5 | $15/hour | $97.50 |
| February 20/21 | 13 | $195.00 | |
| February 27/28 | 13 | $195.00 | |
| March 6/7 | 13 | $195.00 | |
| March 13/14 | 13 | $195.00 | |
| Total | 58.5 | $877.50 |
[59] However, on the information before me, I am unable to find a causal connection between the discrimination and the wage loss following this date. I acknowledge that Employee R testified that many of his job applications were done in person, so he was unable to produce documentary evidence to support these efforts. However, he did not provide details on where he applied, or during what time period. He also did not provide financial information regarding his full-time position, so I am unable to determine if there were any changes with respect to his salary or hours worked in that capacity. It may be that it was around this time that Employee R decided to focus his efforts on seeking higher paid professional employment instead on secondary part-time work, however he was vague about when that transition occurred and the evidence provided does not demonstrate these efforts until September 2021. To the extent that Employee R says his discriminatory experience at RONA caused him anxiety related to seeking out and securing another part-time position, I take this into consideration in the injury to dignity award below. In sum, I find the information before me is insufficient to determine what other factors may have influenced his wage loss after March 15, 2021, and I find the evidence of a causal connection to the Respondents’ discrimination is interrupted.
D. Injury to Dignity
[60] The Tribunal has the discretion to order compensation for injury to dignity, feelings and self respect under s. 37(2)(d)(iii) of the Code. The purpose of these awards is compensatory, and not punitive. In exercising its discretion, the Tribunal generally considers three broad factors: the nature of the discrimination, the complainant’s social context or vulnerability, and the effect on the complainant: Gichuru at para. 260. The quantum is “highly contextual and fact-specific”, and the Tribunal has considerable discretion to award an amount it deems necessary to compensate a person who has been discriminated against: Gichuru at para. 256; University of British Columbia v. Kelly, 2016 BCCA 271 at paras. 59-64.
[61] I turn first to the nature of the discrimination, which is serious. As articulated in Reference Re Public Service Employee Relations Act (Alta.), 1987 CanLII 88 (SCC), [1987] 1 SCR 313 at p. 368 (per Dickson CJ):
Work is one of the most fundamental aspects in a person’s life, providing the individual with a means of financial support and, as importantly, a contributory role in society. A person’s employment is an essential component of [their] sense of identity, self-worth and emotional well-being.
[62] Cases involving the loss of employment often attract the top end of the Tribunal’s awards given the central significance of a person’s employment to their financial and emotional wellbeing: Nelson at para. 129.
[63] Next, I consider the social context of the complaint. Here, Employee R was vulnerable given the employer-employee relationship between him and the Respondents: Senyk v. WFG Agency Network (No. 2), 2008 BCHRT 376 at paras. 463-464. This vulnerability was compounded by the fact that Employee R was in his probation period. Further, this complaint arose in the context of the pandemic, and the difficulties associated with gaining and maintaining employment at the time.
[64] At the same time, I observe that Employee R’s employment for the Respondents was not his primary source of income, and his professional identity was more closely aligned with his other career.
[65] Finally, regarding the effect on Employee R, he testified that he was particularly impacted by these events given his traumatic history with homophobia in Iran. He stated that as an immigrant to Canada, he never expected to experience something like this here, and it left him in shock. He stated that he developed anxiety and was afraid that something like this would happen again if he secured other part-time employment. He further explained that he had been working seven days a week to save money for his family’s surrogacy journey, and the loss of income created delays in reaching this goal.
[66] Employee R seeks $10,000 in compensation for injury to dignity. He relies on Araniva v. RSY Contracting and another (No. 3), 2019 BCHRT 97 in support of his entitlement to this amount.
[67] Araniva is an employment case involving sexual harassment by an employer, and the reduction of hours after the employee voiced her opposition to that conduct. In awarding $40,000 for injury to dignity, the Tribunal noted the complainant’s particular vulnerability relating to her history of similar trauma, and the significant mental health impacts she experienced because of the discrimination. While the facts in this case are different than the current complaint, I acknowledge that some of the adverse impact, namely the reduction of hours for discriminatory reasons, is similar. And, notably, the adverse impact here included termination, which as I have explained generally attracts an award at the high end of the spectrum. I also note that Employee R is seeking a considerably lower award than that ordered in Araniva.
[68] The Respondents have not brought any cases to my attention that they say would assist me in determining an appropriate award for injury to dignity. Employee R’s request is at the lower end of the of the spectrum for termination of employment cases. See for example, Zheng v. Kimberlite (Canada) International Business Inc and another, 2025 BCHRT 260 ($20,000), Jickling v. Sweet Meadows Market (No. 2), 2024 BCHRT 325 ($40,000), Gibbons v. CML Contracting and another, 2024 BCHRT 220 ($22,500), Kerr v. Boehringer Ingelheim (Canada) (No. 4), 2009 BCHRT 196 ($30,000), Flynn v. DF Architecture Inc. (No. 2), 2025 BCHRT 81 ($25,000), and Gbedze v. Hilton Vancouver Metrotown (No. 2), 2025 BCHRT 225 ($32,000).
[69] I am satisfied that $10,000 is appropriate in these circumstances.
E. Expenses
[70] Employee R initially indicated that he was seeking compensation for expenses; however, he did not present any evidence or make further submissions to support this request. Accordingly, I decline to order compensation of this nature.
F. Interest
[71] The Tribunal has the discretion to award interest on awards and regularly does so. An award of interest is part of the compensatory nature of the Tribunal’s awards, recognizing that but for the discrimination a complainant would have had the use of the money now awarded. The interest places the complainant in the economic position they would have been in but for the discrimination: Vasil v. Mongovius and another (No. 3), 2009 BCHRT 117.
[72] I order the Respondents to pay Employee R pre- and post-judgement interest on the order for lost wages, and post-judgement interest on the order for compensation for injury to dignity, feelings and self-respect in accordance with the provisions of the Court Order Interest Act.
G. Other Remedies
[73] The Tribunal may require a respondent to take specific steps to address the effects of a discriminatory practice and may require a respondent to adopt and implement an employment equity program or other special program: Code, ss. 37(2)(c)(i) and 37(2)(c)(ii).
[74] Employee R requests that that I order the Respondents to offer an apology or an acknowledgment of the discrimination, and that I order them to implement changes in policies or practices and/or training to prevent further discrimination.
[75] The Tribunal has frequently declined to order respondents to apologize for discrimination, often questioning whether it has the jurisdiction to do so: Cha and Cha v. Hollyburn Estates (No. 2), 2005 BCHRT 409 at para. 12; Williams (by Williams) v. Hertzberg, 2024 BCHRT 310 at para. 199. I also decline to order the Respondents to apologize, noting that it would not be possible for Employee R to know whether an apology made in compliance with such an order is sincere.
[76] Employee R did not expand on his request with respect to policy changes or training during the hearing or in his closing submissions, and no evidence was presented by either party with respect to this matter. I find there is insufficient information before me to make any specific order in this regard, and I decline to do so.
VI Orders
[77] I have found that the Respondents discriminated against Employee R in his employment based on his sexual orientation, in violation of s. 13 of the Code. Accordingly, I make the following orders:
a. I declare that the Respondents’ conduct contravened s. 13 of the Code: s. 37(2)(b).
b. I order the Respondents to cease the contravention and refrain from committing the same or similar contraventions: Code, s. 37(2)(a).
c. I order the Respondents to jointly pay Employee R the following:
i. $877.50 as compensation for wages lost because of the discrimination: Code, s. 37(2)(d)(ii).
ii. $10,000 as compensation for injury to his dignity, feelings, and self-respect: Code, s. 37(2)(d)(iii).
d. Pre and post judgement interest based on the rates set out in the Court Order Interest Act.
Theressa Etmanski
Tribunal Member