Wong v. Unifor Local 111 and others, 2026 BCHRT 100
Date Issued: April 14, 2026
File: CS-001313
Indexed as: Wong v. Unifor Local 111 and others, 2026 BCHRT 100
IN THE MATTER OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS CODE,
RSBC 1996, c. 210 (as amended)
AND IN THE MATTER of a complaint before
the British Columbia Human Rights Tribunal
BETWEEN:
Lena Wong
COMPLAINANT
AND:
Unifor Local 111 and Balbir Mann and Rajinder Purewal and Jessie Rana
RESPONDENTS
REASONS FOR DECISION
APPLICATION TO DISMISS A COMPLAINT
Section 27(1)(d)(ii)
Tribunal Member: Jessica Derynck
On her own behalf: Lena Wong
Counsel for the Respondent: Bennett M. Arsenault
I INTRODUCTION
[1] Lena Wong was an employee at Unifor Local 111 [Employer]. On May 25, 2020, she filed a complaint alleging that the Employer and three of its employees, Balbir Mann, Rajinder Purewal, and Jessie Rana [Respondents] discriminated against her in employment based on physical and mental disability.
[2] The Respondents deny discriminating. They also say that the parties have settled the complaint and proceeding with it would not further the purposes of the Human Rights Code.
[3] In response to the application, Ms. Wong says the settlement agreement she signed did not contain a clear and informed waiver of her rights under the Code. She also applies to add three additional respondents to the complaint.
[4] I deny Ms. Wong’s application to add additional respondents at this stage. She filed her application to do so far outside of the time limit for filing a complaint. In any case, my decision on the application to dismiss makes her application moot.
[5] To decide the Respondents’ application to dismiss, I must decide whether to honour the parties’ settlement agreement, or not to because the agreement or the conditions under which it was reached run counter to the purposes of the Code.
[6] For the following reasons, I honour the parties’ settlement agreement. I find that it does not further the purposes of the Code to allow the complaint to proceed, and I dismiss the complaint. To make this decision, I have considered all the information filed by the parties. In these reasons, I only refer to what is necessary to explain my decision. I make no findings of fact.
II BACKGROUND
[7] Ms. Wong worked for the Employer as a senior support staff. She was unionized in this position. A collective agreement between the Employer and the Pulp, Paper and Woodworkers of Canada, Local 5 [Union] covered the terms and conditions of her employment.
[8] The Employer submitted an affidavit from Mr. Purewal in support of its application. He was the Employer’s Financial Secretary at times relevant to the complaint. In his affidavit Mr. Purewal explains that on April 8, 2020, he advised Ms. Wong that the Employer was laying her off. He says that on June 15, 2020, Ms. Wong asked to exercise an option under her collective agreement to take a severance payment in lieu of being placed on a recall list. Mr. Purewal says Ms. Wong requested 52 weeks of severance, which was more than the 40-week maximum entitlement under the collective agreement.
[9] Mr. Purewal says he drafted a settlement agreement that required the Employer to pay Ms. Wong severance in the amount she requested on terms acceptable to the Employer. He met with Ms. Wong at her Union’s office with a representative from the Union on June 18, 2020, which was several weeks after she filed this complaint. Mr. Purewal says Ms. Wong had time to review the settlement agreement, and that he explained to her that the Employer was providing her with more compensation than she was entitled to under her collective agreement in exchange for a release that included her agreement to discontinue any human rights complaints against the Employer and its officers and employees.
[10] Mr. Purewal says Ms. Wong signed the settlement agreement in his presence. The Union representative signed it for the Union, and he signed it for the Employer. He attached a copy of the settlement agreement to his affidavit.
[11] Ms. Wong does not dispute any of Mr. Purewal’s evidence. Much of her response to the application to dismiss is about the merits of her complaint. Regarding the settlement agreement, she says “It did not contain a clear and informed waiver of Code rights. The enforceability and scope of that document require evidentiary determination and cannot dispose of this complaint at the dismissal stage.”
[12] The Respondents filed their application to dismiss on February 9, 2026. Ms. Wong filed her response to the application on March 12, 2026, and the Respondents filed a reply submission on March 16, 2026.
[13] Ms. Wong filed her application to add three new respondents [Proposed Respondents] to the complaint on March 16, 2026, and filed supporting submissions on March 17 and 23. On March 26, she filed a further “additional submission to application to dismiss”.
III DECISION
A. Ms. Wong’s application to add respondents to the complaint
[14] Rule 25(2) of the Tribunal’s Rules of Practice and Procedure sets out what a complainant must do to add a respondent to their complaint. An application to add a respondent must state: (1) why adding the proposed respondent will further the just and timely resolution of the complaint; (2) the facts that, if proven, could establish a contravention of the Code by the proposed respondent, and, (3) if the application is filed after the time limit for filing a complaint, why it is in the public interest to add the proposed respondent to the complaint and why no substantial prejudice will result to any person because of the delay.
[15] Ms. Wong’s allegations about the Proposed Respondents are all related to her time working for the Employer, which ended on April 8, 2020. She alleges that the Proposed Respondents reported her for minor mistakes and made sexist remarks. The latest possible time limit for filing a complaint about these allegations is April 8, 2021, so Ms. Wong made her application to add the Proposed Respondents almost five years late.
[16] Ms. Wong did not explain why adding the Proposed Respondents would further the just and timely resolution of the complaint, and I find that it would not. She has not explained why she did not include her allegations about these individuals or include them as respondents to her complaint in the first place or amend her complaint to add them before this stage in the process.
[17] In any case, the Proposed Respondents all appear to be employees of the Employer. In light of my conclusion on the application to dismiss, the complaint would be dismissed against the Proposed Respondents even if I had allowed her application. The application is denied.
B. Respondents’ application to dismiss on the basis of a settlement agreement
[18] The Tribunal may dismiss a complaint under s. 27(1)(d)(ii) where the parties have settled the complaint. While a settlement agreement does not deprive the Tribunal of jurisdiction over a complaint, there is a strong public interest in honouring settlement agreements: Thompson v. Providence Health Care, 2003 BCHRT 58 at para. 38. There are also situations, however, where the terms of the settlement or the conditions under which it was reached run counter to the purposes of the Code: Edwards v. Cowichan Valley Regional District, 2018 BCHRT 172 at para. 35; Thompson at paras. 39-46; The Employee v. The Company and the Owner, 2017 BCHRT 266 at para. 35.
[19] Ms. Wong does not dispute that she signed the settlement agreement. I understand her submission in response to the application to be that it was not clear to her that she was waiving her rights under the Code.
[20] Ms. Wong also made submissions related to the settlement agreement in one of her submissions on her application to add respondents, after the Respondents filed their final reply. Although Ms. Wong made these submissions outside of the submissions process on the application to dismiss, I decided to consider them and address them in this decision. I refer to these as the “additional submissions”. I did this because Ms. Wong is self-represented and it is clear that her complaint and the issues in the complaint are important to her. If I had found that her additional submissions may change my decision, I would have given the Respondents an opportunity to reply to them. This was not necessary since my decision is to dismiss the complaint.
[21] I have not, however, considered the further additional submissions filed by Ms. Wong on March 26. These submissions do not address a new issue raised in the Respondent’s reply, or new evidence not available at the time that Ms. Wong made her original arguments: Rule 28(5). Rather, they repeat or expand upon her allegations of discrimination, and set out a remedial request for $3.4 million. Fairness does not require me to consider this information. In my view, doing so would undermine the principle of finality and condone an “endless submission process”: Murphy v. VIHA and others (No. 2), 2014 BCHRT 102 at para. 9.
[22] In her additional submissions, Ms. Wong says the Respondents’ application relies on “procedural finality” while failing to address substantive human rights violations. She notes that releases cannot bar complaints where doing so would undermine the purposes of the Code, so the Tribunal must assess whether the settlement agreement “reflects a true and informed waiver of rights.” She asks the Tribunal to consider her circumstances at the time she signed the agreement and says she was “experiencing significant psychological distress, including severe anxiety and cognitive impairment.”
[23] In her additional submissions Ms. Wong also says the Tribunal must consider inequality and vulnerability, and that the presence of union representation does not cure deficiencies where a union fails to protect a complainant. She says that the settlement agreement must be scrutinized for unconscionability and lack of informed consent. She also says the Tribunal should consider the seriousness of the issues she raises in her complaint.
[24] I now turn to whether Ms. Wong has identified factors that would weigh against dismissing the complaint. Relevant factors may include:
a. the language of the release;
b. whether the complainant understood the significance of the release;
c. whether the complainant understood their rights under the Code, including whether they had independent legal advice;
d. whether the complainant felt they had no choice but to agree because of issues like timing and financial need;
e. whether the respondent improperly coerced the complainant to consent;
f. whether there was an inequality of bargaining power;
g. whether the settlement was substantially unfair, including, for example, whether the complainant received little or no consideration for the release beyond statutory entitlements under employment standards legislation; and
h. the seriousness of the complaint and what is at stake for the complainant.
Thompson at paras. 41-44, citing Chow (Re), 1999 ABQB 1026 and Pritchard v. Ontario (Human Rights Commission) (No. 1), 1999 CanLII 15058 (ON SCDC); Gerard v. Olive’s Market Whistler and others, 2015 BCHRT 102 at para. 17
[25] Ms. Wong’s response to the application and her additional submissions are somewhat difficult to follow. They include a lot of information and submissions about what she says happened in her workplace. These speak to the merits of her complaint as opposed to the issue on the application, which is whether the settlement agreement is contrary to the purpose of the Code. I address the relevant parts of her submissions as I understand them with reference to the relevant factors listed above.
[26] I first address the language of the settlement agreement. The agreement sets out an amount the Employer will pay to Ms. Wong representing 40 weeks of pay, that the Employer will pay her outstanding vacation pay, and that the Employer will pay her an additional amount representing 12 weeks of pay as a retiring allowance. Then the agreement says:
In consideration of the retiring allowance payment, Ms. Wong agrees to discontinue all grievances, human rights complaints, or other legal action known to the Employer filed by Ms. Wong against the Employer, officers of the Employer, or employees of the Employer.
[27] The next clause of the agreement says Ms. Wong releases the Employer and Union from any actions, complaints, claims, and grievances.
[28] The language of the settlement agreement is clear. It specifically says that Ms. Wong will discontinue all human rights complaints in consideration of the retiring allowance payment. This factor weighs in favour of honouring the agreement and dismissing the complaint.
[29] I next consider the issue of whether Ms. Wong understood the significance of the agreement and release.
[30] Ms. Wong does not claim that she did not understand the significance of the agreement and release at the time. All she says in relation to this factor, including in her additional submissions, is that she was experiencing psychological distress, including anxiety and “cognitive impairment”. She does not dispute Mr. Purewal’s explanation of how she came to sign the agreement, including that she had time to review it before signing it and that he explained the significance of it to her at the time. She has not submitted any evidence about cognitive impairments she might have had at the time or explained how any issues she had may have impacted her ability to understand the significance of the agreement.
[31] I do not find that this factor weighs against dismissal of the complaint based on Ms. Wong’s submissions. She does not say that she failed to understand that she was giving up this complaint in exchange for the retiring allowance, regardless of her anxiety and “cognitive impairment” at the time.
[32] There is also no question of whether Ms. Wong understood her rights under the Code. She had already filed this complaint by the time she entered into the settlement agreement.
[33] While Ms. Wong writes about the financial impact on her of the alleged discrimination in her submissions, she does not say she felt she had no choice but to accept the settlement agreement for financial reasons. The undisputed facts suggest that she was not under financial pressure: she decided to take a severance package rather than remain on a recall list, she proposed the settlement amount, and the “retirement allowance” amount is separate from the severance amount in her collective agreement.
[34] Regarding Ms. Wong’s submission that the Tribunal must consider issues of vulnerability and inequal bargaining power, I find there is no suggestion that the Employer or her Union coerced her into signing the settlement agreement. I also find there is no suggestion of an inequality of bargaining power that would weigh against honouring the agreement. The fact that Ms. Wong suggested the severance amount that the Employer ended up paying her strongly weighs in favour of honouring the agreement.
[35] Finally, I considered whether the settlement agreement is substantially unfair along with the seriousness of the complaint. I find that these factors weigh in favour of honouring the settlement agreement.
[36] Ms. Wong received an amount equivalent to 12 weeks of pay as a retiring allowance in exchange for discontinuing this complaint and releasing the Respondents from any other claims. Again, she received the total amount of severance that she requested. Nothing in her submissions persuades me that this was unfair.
[37] Ms. Wong alleges in her complaint that her layoff was discriminatory based on disability because they laid her off instead of a junior support staff because of a permanent accommodation she had in place. Ms. Wong also says she experienced a poisoned work environment before she was laid off. She says she was subjected to disproportionate scrutiny, one of the individual respondents sometimes checked on whether she was working, and another ignored her one day when she boarded a bus.
[38] I am not persuaded that the issues in the complaint weigh against its dismissal. Without diminishing the impacts Ms. Wong says the alleged discrimination had on her, the most significant allegation in her complaint is that the layoff is discriminatory, and I have explained that she received the additional severance pay beyond the maximum entitlement in her collective agreement.
[39] In summary, I find that it would not further the purposes of the Code to proceed with the complaint in light of the settlement agreement. Neither the terms of the settlement nor the conditions under which it was reached run counter to the purposes of the Code. To the contrary, allowing the complaint to continue in the face of the parties’ agreement to resolve it would undermine the Code’s purposes of encouraging parties to resolve their human rights disputes directly: Nguyen v. Prince Rupert School District No. 52, 2004 BCHRT 20 at para. 15.
IV CONCLUSION
[40] Ms. Wong’s application to add the Proposed Respondents is denied.
[41] The complaint is dismissed under s. 27(1)(d)(ii) of the Code.
Jessica Derynck
Tribunal Member
Human Rights Tribunal