Wright (by Prisk) v. Royal Trust Corporation of Canada, 2025 BCHRT 75
Date Issued: April 1, 2025
File(s): CS-004157
Indexed as: Wright (by Prisk) v. Royal Trust Corporation of Canada, 2025 BCHRT 75
IN THE MATTER OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS CODE,
RSBC 1996, c. 210 (as amended)
AND IN THE MATTER of a complaint before
the British Columbia Human Rights Tribunal
BETWEEN:
Robert Wright (by Heather Prisk)
COMPLAINANT
AND:
Royal Trust Corporation of Canada
RESPONDENT
REASONS FOR DECISION
APPLICATION TO DISMISS A COMPLAINT
Section 27(1)(g)
Tribunal Member: Ijeamaka Anika
On behalf of the Complainant: Heather Prisk
Counsel for the Respondent: Nicole Mangan
I INTRODUCTION
[1] Robert Wright (by his representative, Heather Prisk) alleges that Royal Trust Corporation of Canada [ Royal Trust ] discriminated against him when it was Trustee of the Robert Wright Trust [the Trust ]. He alleges that Royal Trust discriminated against him in services on the basis of mental disability, race, family, Indigenous Identity, and marital status contrary to s. 8 of the Human Rights Code. Mr. Wright alleges that Royal Trust denied him in-home medical and community care services and instead spent the Trust funds on administrative and legal fees . Mr. Wright says that Royal Trust acted contrary to his best interest by denying him these care services. Ms. Prisk had to provide his care, and Royal Trust did not compensate her for her time.
[2] I pause here to note that regarding the ground of Indigenous identity, on November 25, 2021, the BC government added Indigenous Identity to the Human Rights Code as a protected ground. Given the nature of the allegations, Indigenous Identity was added as a ground of discrimination to this complaint. Its addition was explained in the Notice of Complaint Proceeding given to the parties on June 27, 2022. Neither party disputed the addition of this ground.
[3] Royal Trust resigned as Trustee on May 31, 2019, and Mr. Wright filed his complaint on April 6, 2021.
[4] Royal Trust denies discriminating. It applies to dismiss the complaint under s. 27(1)(g) of the Code on the basis that the complaint was filed outside the Code’s one-year limitation period. It says Mr. Wright has not established that it is in the public interest to accept the complaint.
[5] This decision is about whether the complaint is late-filed and should be dismissed without a hearing.
[6] For the following reasons, I grant the application. The public interest does not weigh in favour of accepting the late filed complaint. To make this decision, I have considered all the information filed by the parties. In these reasons, I only refer to what is necessary to explain my decision.
II BACKGROUND
[7] Mr. Wright was injured in 2012 while in police custody. He suffered a brain injury and reached a settlement with the RCMP. As a result of the injury, Mr. Wright requires round the clock care. The Trust was created in February 2016 to hold the settlement funds in trust for Mr. Wright and care for him. Ms. Prisk, who is also Mr. Wright’s spouse, and a wealth management service were the initial Trustees until the end of 2017.
[8] Mr. Wright says that following his injury, he received round the clock care including from Ms. Prisk who provided overnight supervision from 11pm to 7am. Ms. Prisk received an income for caring for Mr. Wright.
[9] On January 12, 2018, Royal Trust became Trustee of the Trust. In March 2018, Royal Trust told Ms. Prisk that it needed to gather information to reassess Mr. Wright’s care and consider alternative care options for him. It told her the reassessment process would take approximately three months. It said that during that time, Royal Trust would pay Mr. Wright’s bills directly to any service providers. It would pay for Ms. Prisk to hire a care worker for up to 20 hours a week to provide respite for Ms. Prisk to explore her own career options. Finally, Royal Trust told Ms. Prisk that it would provide Mr. Wright with a monthly allowance of $1,000.
A. Civil Proceedings
[10] In November 2018, Royal Trust filed a petition in the BC Supreme Court to pass its accounts as Trustee for the period between January 12, 2018, and August 31, 2018, approval of its remuneration, and directions in relation to the administration of the Trust [ Interim Accounts ].
[11] In March 2019, the Court adjourned the hearing of the petition to allow Mr. Wright’s counsel to examine the particulars of the legal invoices and management fees which Royal Trust deducted from the Trust funds during the period of the Interim Accounts.
[12] In April 2019, Royal Trust resigned as trustee effective May 31, 2019, and a new Trustee was appointed.
[13] In October 2019, Royal Trust sent its accounts for the period from September 1, 2018, to May 31, 2019 [ Final Accounts ].
[14] Between October 2019 and February 2020, the parties sought to settle the Interim and Final Accounts. In February 2020, Ms. Prisk sent Royal Trust signed Releases and Consents, settling the Interim and Final Accounts with an annotation stating that Ms. Prisk was barred from bringing a claim against Royal Trust unless such actions “are for human rights violations or banking practices complaints” [as annotated]. When the parties could not agree on the terms, Ms. Prisk and Mr. Wright withdrew their consent to the settlement.
[15] In September 2020, Royal Trust filed an application to enforce the settlement. The application was adjourned and re-scheduled for April 9, 2021.
B. Human Rights Complaint
[16] On April 6, 2021, Mr. Wright filed his complaint with the Tribunal. Royal Trust says Mr. Wright’s complaint to the Tribunal largely duplicates those made by Mr. Wright in the civil proceedings.
[17] In his human rights complaint, Mr. Wright alleged as follows:
a. He was denied essential needs-based home and community care and that Royal Trust denied financial resources for his 24/7 medically and legally required in-home care services.
b. Ms. Prisk was forced to provide professional level in-home care for Mr. Wright without a formal agreement for care and at the expense of her career.
c. Royal Trust would not reimburse Ms. Prisk for legal expenses she incurred in order to be compensated for her time as Trustee.
d. Royal Trust incurred considerable expenses against his wishes which have been filed at the BC Supreme Court.
e. As a First Nations, Status Indian, he requested that his Trust funds not be invested in oil and gas, and his request was not respected.
f. Royal Trust gave him a monthly allowance of $1000 a month which was insufficient to meet his needs. He says that under a new Trustee, he now receives $1,750.
g. He is incurring unnecessary legal costs to communicate and deal with Royal Trust.
C. Settlement in the Civil Proceedings
[18] On April 9, 2021, the Court determined that the releases signed by Ms. Prisk in February 2020 did not form a binding settlement and directed Royal Trust to pass their accounts as former Trustee of the Trust before a Registrar of the Court. The Registrar hearing was scheduled for October 26-28, 2022.
[19] On October 25, 2022, Royal Trust, Mr. Wright, and Ms. Prisk settled the civil proceedings. The settlement expressly stated that it did not impact Mr. Wright’s human rights complaint. In November 2022, pursuant to the settlement, Ms. Prisk signed releases on behalf of Mr. Wright and in her personal capacity.
III DECISION
A. Are the allegations of discrimination during Royal Trust’s administration of the Trust out of time?
[20] Royal Trust argues that the allegations in this complaint are late filed and should be dismissed under s. 27(1)(g) of the Code .
[21] Mr. Wright argues that his allegations, considered together, form part of a continuing contravention. In the alternative, Mr. Wright argues that the Tribunal should exercise its discretion to accept the late-filed allegations because it is in the public interest to do so, and no one will suffer substantial prejudice as a result: s. 22(3).
1. Time limit for filing a complaint
[22] There is a one-year time limit for filing a human rights complaint: Code , s. 22. Section 22 is meant to ensure that complainants pursue their human rights remedies promptly so that respondents can go ahead with their activities without the possibility of a dated complaint: Chartier v. School District No. 62 , 2003 BCHRT 39 at para. 12.
[23] The first step in the analysis is to identify an allegation of discrimination within the one-year limitation period: School District v. Parent obo the Child , 2018 BCCA 136 [ School District ] at para. 51.
[24] Mr. Wright filed his complaint with the Tribunal on April 06, 2021. That means to be timely, there must be at least one allegation of discrimination that occurred on or after April 06, 2020.
2. Allegations of discrimination
[25] Mr. Wright states in his complaint that the most recent discriminatory incident occurred on April 05, 2021. An allegation that discriminatory conduct occurred on this date would make, at least one allegation, within the one-year time limit. However, Mr. Wright’s argument that the most recent conduct occurred on April 05, 2021, is unsupported by the materials before me. There is nothing in the materials before me to suggest that Royal Trust continued to provide Trustee services to Mr. Wright following its resignation. In fact, Mr. Wright submits that another Trustee was appointed following Royal Trust’s resignation. Mr. Wright did not state what the alleged discriminatory conduct was that occurred on that date and there is nothing in the materials regarding conduct occurring after Royal Trust’s resignation as Trustee on May 31, 2019. Royal Trust argues, and I accept, that even if the Tribunal were to accept that alleged discriminatory acts occurred until it resigned as Trustee, the last discriminatory conduct would have occurred on or around May 31, 2019. It argues that it did not provide further Trustee services to Mr. Wright after that date. Mr. Wright does not dispute this in his response to this application.
[26] On this basis, I find that the allegations concerning Royal Trust’s administration of the Trust are late filed and do not form a continuing contravention.
[27] I turn to Mr. Wright’s argument that Royal Trust’s involvement in the civil proceedings is a timely allegation. I disagree and my reasons are next.
[28] Mr. Wright argues that the passing of the accounts remained before the courts in the civil proceedings when he filed his complaint. I understand Mr. Wright’s argument to be that an alleged discrimination continued because the passing of the accounts was ongoing at the time he filed his complaint.
[29] I cannot accept this argument because Mr. Wright has not set out what conduct during the civil proceeding that could constitute an arguable contravention of the Code. The Tribunal will only accept a complaint for filing if the complaint alleges facts which could, if proven, amount to a contravention of the Code : Chen v. City of Surrey , 2015 BCCA 57 at para. 23.
[30] In this case, Mr. Wright must set out facts that, if proved, could establish that he has a characteristic protected by the Code , he was adversely impacted in services, and one or more of his protected characteristics was a factor in the adverse impact: Moore v. British Columbia (Education) , 2012 SCC 61 at para. 33.
[31] Having reviewed this complaint, Mr. Wright has not particularized any fact or allegation that Royal Trust discriminated against him during the civil proceedings. The Tribunal has distinguished between “a succession or repetition of separate acts of discrimination of the same character” that could be considered separate contraventions of the Code, and “not merely one act of discrimination which may have continuing effects or consequences ”: Chen v. Surrey (City) , 2015 BCCA 57 at para. 23; School District v. Child (Litigation Guardian of) , 2018 BCCA 136 at para. 50; see generally, Dove v. GVRD and others (No. 3) , 2006 BCHRT 374 at paras. 13-19.
[32] The alleged discriminatory incidents of which Mr. Wright complains occurred during Royal Trust’s trusteeship: incurring unnecessary legal fees, failing to pay Ms. Prisk’s invoices, denial of appropriate finances for Mr. Wright’s care. There is no allegation that after Royal Trust terminated its relationship with Mr. Wright and Ms. Prisk, there were new allegations of these discriminatory incidents. Mr. Wright states that with the new Trustees, he was provided with the care he required and Ms. Prisk’s invoices were paid. Mr. Wright does not allege that the conduct of the civil proceedings were discriminatory. Seeking to resolve the dispute using another forum does not, without more, amount to discrimination for the purposes of the Code . Therefore, the civil proceedings were intended to deal with the Trust administration while Royal Trust was the Trustee. On this basis, I find that the civil proceedings do not rise to an arguable contravention of the Code .
[33] Given my finding that the last alleged discriminatory act occurred during Royal Trust’s trusteeship which ended on May 31, 2019, all of Mr. Wright’s allegations are out of time – at least, by 13 months.
[34] Next, I consider whether to exercise my discretion to accept Mr. Wright’s late-filed complaint.
B. Is it in the public interest to exercise my discretion to accept the complaint under s. 22(3) of the Code ?
[35] I must consider two things: whether it is in the public interest to do so and whether there is no substantial prejudice to any person because of the delay: Code , s. 22(2), School District at para. 68.
[36] The burden is on Mr. Wright to persuade the Tribunal to accept his late filed complaint.
[37] The Tribunal may accept the late filed complaint if it is satisfied that it is in the public interest to accept the complaint, and no substantial prejudice will result to any person because of the delay: s. 22(3). In considering the public interest, the Tribunal considers a non-exhaustive list of factors, including the length of the delay, the reasons for the delay, the complainant’s interest in accessing the Tribunal, the respondent’s interest in being able to continue its activities without worrying about stale complaints, whether the complainant got legal advice, and the public interest in the complaint itself: British Columbia (Ministry of Public Safety and Solicitor General) v. Mzite , 2014 BCCA 220 [ Mzite ] at para. 53 and 63; Hoang v. Warnaco and Johns , 2007 BCHRT 24; Complainant v. The Board of Education of School District No. 61 (Greater Victoria) , 2022 BCHRT 44 at para. 18 [ Complainant ]. These are important factors, but they are not necessarily determinative and not every factor will be relevant in every case: Goddard v. Dixon , 2012 BCSC 161 at para. 152; Mzite at para. 55.
[38] I turn to Mr. Wright’s arguments. Although Mr. Wright did not make submissions on public interest in his response to the dismissal application, he provided his position with respect to the public interest of accepting his complaint in the complaint form. I have considered this information for the purpose of this analysis.
[39] Mr. Wright argues his complaint was late filed because he was providing Royal Trust with an opportunity to avoid more legal fees. He does not expand on this argument. As it is, I am not persuaded by this argument, and it does not weigh in favour of allowing the late complaint.
[40] To the extent that Mr. Wright’s argument goes to his pursuit of other actions and waiting for the outcome of the civil proceedings before exploring other viable options, I am unable to accept this argument. Mr. Wright filed this complaint three days before the Court hearing in the civil proceedings, and he does not explain why he filed the complaint before the conclusion of the civil proceeding if he was waiting for an outcome there. In any event, Mr. Wright’s complaint was already out of time by the time he filed the complaint. The Tribunal has repeatedly said that pursuing another process does not suspend the time limit under the Code , on its own, to relieve against the time limit: Sones v. District of Squamish , 2016 BCHRT 99 at para. 44; Devitt and Hargrove obo others v. School District No. 43 and another, 2011 BCHRT 218 at paras. 20-21. The Tribunal has also held that pursuing other avenues does not provide an excuse for filing a complaint outside the time limit and parties should be discouraged from waiting to file their human rights complaint in the hopes of achieving a resolution elsewhere: Johar and others v. College of Veterinarians of British Columbia (No. 3) , 2024 BCHRT 342 at para 185. Rather, the proper course is to file the human rights complaint on time and request the complaint be deferred pending the resolution of the issues elsewhere: George v. Montrose (Village) , 2012 BCHRT 279 at para. 19; Kang v. UBC and another , 2015 BCHRT 10 at para. 43-45. In this case, Ms. Prisk as Mr. Wright’s representative has demonstrated that she is capable of finding different avenues of redress. This weighs dispositively against accepting the late filed complaint.
[41] Mr. Wright also argues that his representative, Ms. Prisk, is currently dealing with a post-traumatic stress disorder that restricts her ability to navigate legal issues in a timely manner. Mr. Wright has put before me, a letter from the University of Northern British Columbia Counselling Career Centre Counsellor and Psychiatrist dated April 12, 2005, to the UNBC Harassment and Discrimination Tribunal with details of Ms. Prisk’s condition.
[42] I have considered whether Ms. Prisk’s disability precluded her from filing such that the public interest is attracted in allowing the Complaint to proceed late. Where the delay is due to a disabling condition, the Tribunal has observed that it may be in the public interest to accept a late-filed complaint: MacAlpine v. Office of the Representative for Children and Youth , 2011 BCHRT 29 at para. 42. Disabling conditions can include physical and mental ailments resulting in great difficulty coping with even the basic daily tasks of life: Naziel-Wilson v. Providence Health Care and another , 2014 BCHRT 170, at para. 21. While the letter states that Ms. Prisk suffers from PTSD, it does not comment on Ms. Prisk’s ability to navigate legal issues. Further, the letter is dated April 2005 and there is no updated medical evidence about how Ms. Prisk’s disability currently impacts her ability to navigate legal issues in a timely manner. Without doubting the existence of Ms. Prisk’s disabilities during the timeframe for filing and beyond, there is a lack of current information indicating how her disabilities precluded her from filing sufficiently to attract the public interest. Ms. Prisk, as with the complainant in Complainant , has demonstrated her ability to file this complaint while participating in the BC Supreme Court process which leaves me with little doubt that she had the capacity to research the Tribunal’s process. There is no apparent reason she could not have also filed the human rights complaint within the timeline for doing so. This factor weighs against accepting the complaint for filing: see e.g. Liew v. Vancouver (City), 2005 BCHRT 267 at para. 38; Chunik Chrunik v. BCIT , 2004 BCHRT 39 at para. 25.
[43] Next, Mr. Wright argues that there is a public interest in hearing his complaint. He says that his case deals with a person who is denied medical care by federal and provincial health authorities due to a third-party settlement. He says that such a person should have their needs met from their Trust. He also argues that other trustees of medical beneficiaries would be emboldened to do the same as Royal Trust has done and deny medical support that is required for independent living in the community.
[44] Royal Trust disputes this and argues this case is not sufficiently unique or novel to attract the public interest. In its view, the Tribunal frequently addresses allegations of discrimination involving the provision of services, including in the context of race, disability, and marital status.
[45] In determining whether acceptance of a late-filed complaint is in the public interest, the Tribunal considers whether there is anything particularly unique, novel, or unusual about the complaint that has not been addressed in other complaints: Hau v. SFU Student Services and others , 2014 BCHRT 10 at para. 22; Bains v. Advanced Air Supply and others , 2012 BCHRT 74 at para. 22; Mathieu v. Victoria Shipyards and others , 2010 BCHRT 244 at para. 60. Where a complaint raises a novel issue on behalf of a vulnerable group, which advances the purposes of the Code , this factor may weigh in favour of finding a public interest in accepting the complaint: Mzite at paras. 65-66. The Tribunal has considered gaps in its jurisprudence, on the one hand, and the existence of good precedents, on the other hand, in determining whether to permit a complaint to proceed: Mzite at para. 67.
[46] I disagree with Royal Trust’s characterisation of the novelty of this complaint. While the complaint involves allegations of discrimination in services which are commonly heard by the Tribunal, Mr. Wright’s allegations go beyond simply alleging discrimination in services. Mr. Wright alleges discriminatory Trustee services on the basis of race, Indigenous Identity, disability, marital and family status. In the case of multiple grounds of discrimination, the Tribunal takes an intersectional approach to account for a person’s distinct experiences, including any distinct forms of discrimination: Young Worker v. Heirloom and another , 2023 BCHRT 137, para. 49; Radek v. Henderson Development (Canada) and Securiguard Services (No. 3) , 2005 BCHRT 302, paras. 463-467.
[47] Mr. Wright’s complaint raises the issue of an Indigenous person who is disabled, requires consistent care, and is reliant on the Trustee of his Trust estate for the resources required for his care. Royal Trust does not dispute this. The Tribunal has dealt with allegations regarding the provision of services to Indigenous individuals in the context of police services in Campbell v. Vancouver Police Board (No. 4 ), 2019 BCHRT 275 and child protection services in RR v. Vancouver Aboriginal Child and Family Services Society (No. 6), 2022 BCHRT 116. However, this Tribunal does not have much case law about allegations of discrimination in the provision of trust administration services. The complaint would offer the Tribunal the opportunity to address a novel and serious allegation. Mr. Wright argues that his complaint is in the public interest because persons who are reliant on a Trust for resources for their medical needs should have those needs met by the Trust administrator. This supports an argument that this complaint is novel with a possible inference about the administrator of a Trust allegedly applying stereotypes about Indigenous people being less worthy of appropriate services. Here, I must repeat that the inclusion of Indigenous Identity as an alleged ground of discrimination in this complaint was set out in the notice of this complaint proceeding which the parties were provided with. Neither party took issue with the inclusion of that ground of discrimination. I find that Mr. Wright’s complaint is unique for the purposes of attracting the public interest in allowing the case to proceed late. This factor weighs in favour of allowing the late filed complaint to proceed.
[48] Next, in the response submissions, Ms. Prisk says she has been unable to get any legal help for Mr. Wright in the human rights complaint due to the legal fees involved. While I am able to accept that legal fees are a barrier to obtaining legal help, the materials Ms. Prisk provides in support of her response to the dismissal application do not support this argument. Ms. Prisk does not state when she started seeking legal help for this complaint and does not mention it as a reason for delay in filing in the complaint. Based on the filings in this complaint, Ms. Prisk has demonstrated that she is capable of meeting the requirements of filing a human rights complaint and responding to the dismissal application even without the benefit of legal counsel. This factor weighs against accepting the late filed complaint.
[49] I turn to the length of the delay. Royal Trust argues that Mr. Wright’s response in the dismissal application does not set out any reason he was unable to file this complaint within one year of the alleged contravention by May 31, 2020. A delay of one year or more is considered by the Tribunal to be excessive and militates strongly against the public interest: Naziel-Wilson, at para. 13. The delay of 13 months in this case is significant: Asna-Ashari v. B.C. (Attorney General) and others , 2010 BCHRT 315 at para. 40 ; Benedict v. Rutland Dental Centre and others , 2008 BCHRT 39 at para. 19; Schulz v. Camosun College , 2023 BCHRT 142 at para 23; Bradley v. Onni Group of Companies , 2018 BCHRT 250 at para. 11. However, this is not insurmountable if there are compelling public interest reasons to accept the late-filed complaint. Beyond Mr. Wright’s statement in his complaint form that he wanted to give Royal Trust an opportunity to avoid incurring more legal fees, he does not provide further information regarding the reason for the delay. This factor weighs against accepting the late filed complaint.
[50] Royal Trust also argues that Mr. Wright’s complaint is substantially the same as the issues in the civil proceeding and allowing the complaint to proceeding to hearing would amount to a re-litigation of the issues. Royal Trust says the substance of Mr. Wright’s complaint is materially the same subject as the civil proceeding regarding which the parties agreed to a settlement in November 2022.
[51] Pursuant to the Case Path Pilot, the Tribunal permitted Royal Trust to bring this dismissal application under s. 27(1)(g) of the Code. The Tribunal will generally not consider dismissal on grounds other than those it permitted under the Case Path Pilot. Given that I go on to dismiss this complaint, under s. 27(1)(g) I see no reason to consider Royal Trust’s argument that the complaint amounts to a re-litigation of a settled matter. In any event, the settlement expressly states that Mr. Wright’s rights in the human rights complaint were not impacted by the settlement agreement. However, I do see the settlement as generally relevant to this public interest analysis in the sense that it may not be in the public interest to expend public resources to resolve a complaint when the parties have resolved the underlying issues between them.
[52] Considering all of the information provided, I find that, overall, it is not in the public interest to allow the complaint to proceed to a hearing. Having considered the public interest factors above, the novelty of the issues in this complaint is not enough to overcome the public interest factors that weigh against accepting the late complaint.
[53] Having not found that it is in the public interest to accept the late-filed complaint, I need not address the issue of whether substantial prejudice would result.
IV CONCLUSION
[54] I grant Royal Trust’s application and dismiss the complaint.
Ijeamaka Anika
Tribunal Member