Employee F v. The Company and others, 2025 BCHRT 291
Date Issued: November 26, 2025
File:CS-000601
Indexed as: Employee F v. The Company and others, 2025 BCHRT 291
IN THE MATTER OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS CODE,
RSBC 1996, c. 210 (as amended)
AND IN THE MATTER of a complaint before
the British Columbia Human Rights Tribunal
BETWEEN:
Employee F
COMPLAINANT
AND:
The Company and the Owner and the Director and the Manager
RESPONDENTS
REASONS FOR DECISION
APPLICATION TO DISMISS A COMPLAINT
Section 27(1)(d)(ii)
APPLICATION TO LIMIT PUBLICATION and APPLICATION FOR COSTS
Rule 5 and Section 37(4)
Tribunal Member: Edward Takayanagi
Counsel for the Complainant: Laura Track
Counsel for the Respondents: Andrew LaCroix
I INTRODUCTION
[1] Employee F filed a complaint alleging her former employer, the Company, its Owner, the Director and her Manager [collectively the “Respondents”] discriminated against her in employment on the basis of her sex, family status, and marital status contrary to s. 13 of the Human Rights Code. She says she was subjected to gender-based violence by her Manager, which the other Respondents did nothing to address. She says instead the Respondents terminated her employment.
[2] The Respondents say Employee F signed a release of all claims on August 16, 2019, in exchange for financial compensation. They apply to dismiss the complaint under s. 27(1)(d)(ii) of the Code on the basis that it does not further the purposes of the Code to proceed with the complaint in the face of the release.
[3] For the following reasons, I deny the application to dismiss. To make this decision, I have considered all the information filed by the parties. In these reasons, I only refer to what is necessary to explain my decision.
II Application to limit publication
[4] Employee F seeks an order anonymizing her name in the Tribunal’s decision. The Respondents take no position on the request. As is already apparent I have granted the application to anonymize for the following reasons.
[5] Complaints at Tribunal are presumptively public: Mother A obo Child B v. School District C, 2015 BCHRT 64 at para. 7. It may limit disclosure of personal information where a person’s privacy interests outweigh the public interest in full access to its proceedings: Tribunal Rules of Practice and Procedure [Rules], Rule 5(6); Stein v. British Columbia (Human Rights Tribunal), 2020 BCSC 70 at para. 64(a).
[6] In JY v. Various Waxing Salons, 2019 BCHRT 106, the Tribunal set out a number of factors to consider in respect of anonymization including: the stage of the proceeding, nature of allegations, private details, reputational harm, and other potential harm.
[7] This application arises in the early stages of the Tribunal’s process. The allegations are unproven at this stage, which affords greater scope for limiting public access. The complaint involves allegations of sexual harassment and sexual assault which is more likely to attract the public’s “prurient” attention: The Employee v. The University and another (No. 2), 2020 BCHRT 12 at para. 17. There is also a high risk of reputational damage based on unproven allegations of sexual harassment: Musa v. Costco, 2009 BCHRT 271 at para. 20. I am satisfied that the privacy interests of Employee F outweighs the public interest in her identity. Further, I am persuaded that in protecting the privacy of Employee F, it is necessary to also limit publication of the names of the Company, the Owner, the Director, and the Manager accused of sexual harassment, as there is a substantial risk of identifying all parties through association if the identity of any one party is revealed.
[8] In my view, restricting publication of the parties’ names minimally impairs the openness of this proceeding as the public will still be able to understand the complaint, and the Tribunal’s decision, without knowing the names of the parties.
[9] Under the circumstances, I find it appropriate to order that the Tribunal will not publish or make available to the public any information that could identify the parties in this complaint. This order is in effect until the Tribunal makes a final decision about the complaint, at which point Employee F may apply to extend it.
III BACKGROUND
[10] Employee F started working for the Company on April 14, 2019. Employee F and the Manager were in a pre-existing romantic relationship. During her employment Employee F reported to the Manager.
[11] Employee F alleges the Manager sexually abused and harassed her during her employment. Employee F says she reported the abuse and harassment to the Director who took no action.
[12] The parties provide differing accounts of how the employment ended.
[13] The Respondents say that the Owner met with Employee F on August 14, 2019, to inform her that she was being terminated. They say the Owner offered her a severance payment of $1,500 and presented her with a release stating she would release the Company from any actions arising from the employment. The Respondents say they allowed Employee F to take the release and think about it before signing. They say Employee F returned with the signed release on August 16, 2019.
[14] Employee F says that the termination occurred by telephone on August 16, 2019. She says the Owner called her on the morning of August 16, 2019 and told her she was being terminated. She says that at some point after the phone call the Owner contacted her to arrange to meet at a nearby gas station. She says she was presented with the release at the gas station by the Owner and the Director who told her she needed to sign the form if she wanted any severance. She says she signed the release at the gas station.
[15] On September 6, 2019, Employee F filed this human rights complaint.
IV DECISION
A. Application to Dismiss
[16] There is no dispute that the Respondents offered Employee F $1,500 in exchange for the execution of a release. The release states:
KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS that [Employee F], for and in consideration of the sum of One Thousand Five Hundred ($1,500.00) DOLLARS receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, from [the Company] do for themselves, their heirs, executors and administrators RELEASE, REMISE AND FOREVER DISCHARGE [the Company], its servants, agents, administrators, successors and assigns from any and all manner of actions, causes of actions, suits, contracts, claims, debts, personal guaranties, demands and damages of every nature and kind whatsoever as against [the Company] which I now have or anytime hereafter can, shall or may have by reason of or arising out of any cause, matter or thing whatsoever occurring or existing up to and including the date of execution of these presents, and in particular, but without limiting the generality of the foregoing, for or by reason of or arising out of my Employment Contract dated the 14 day of April, 2019, between [the Company] and me.
IT IS FURTHER UNDERSTOOD AND AGREED that this release contains the entire agreement between the parties hereto and the terms of this Release are contractual and not a mere recital.
AND [Employee F] HEREBY DECLARE AND ACKNOWLEDGE that the terms of this settlement are fully understood, that the amount stated herein is the sole consideration of this Release, and that the said sum is accepted voluntarily for the purpose of making a full and final compromise, adjustment and settlement of all claims as against [the Company]
[17] There is no dispute that Employee F signed the release. The Respondents argue that Employee F’s complaint should be dismissed because it does not further the Code’s purpose to proceed in circumstances where Employee F has released them from all further actions.
[18] Section 27(1)(d)(ii) allows the Tribunal to dismiss a complaint where proceeding with it would not further the purposes of the Code. The Tribunal may dismiss a complaint under s. 27(1)(d)(ii) where the parties have settled the complaint. While a settlement agreement does not deprive the Tribunal of jurisdiction over a complaint, there is a strong public interest in honouring settlement agreements: Thompson v. Providence Health Care, 2003 BCHRT 58 at para. 38. There are also situations, however, where the terms of the settlement or the conditions under which it was reached run counter to the purposes of the Code: Edwards v. Cowichan Valley Regional District, 2018 BCHRT 172 at para. 35; Thompson at paras. 39-46; The Employee v. The Company and the Owner, 2017 BCHRT 266 at para. 35.
[19] The burden is on the person seeking to pursue their complaint in the face of an agreement to persuade the Tribunal that the purposes of the Code are best served by allowing the complaint to proceed: Thompson at para. 46. In this case, that means Employee F bears the burden of persuading me that her complaint should be allowed to proceed in the face of the release.
[20] In considering this issue, the Tribunal has recognized a number of relevant factors, including: the language of the release; unconscionability; undue influence; whether the party received independent legal advice; conditions of duress, which may be related to the timing of the agreement, financial need, or other circumstances; and whether the party received little or no consideration for the release: Thompson at paras. 42-44, citing Chow (Re) (1999), 1999 ABQB 1026 (CanLII), and Pritchard v. Ontario (Human Rights Commission) (No. 1) (1999), 1999 CanLII 15058 (ON SCDC), at para. 17. The Tribunal may also consider “the seriousness of the allegations in a complaint and what is at stake for the complainant”: Gerard v. Olive’s Market Whistler and others, 2015 BCHRT 102 at para. 17.
[21] I am persuaded, in the circumstances of this case, that the purposes of the Code are best served by allowing Employee F’s complaint to proceed.
[22] I begin by considering the language of the release. In my view the wording of the release is broad, replete with legalese, and unclear. It is not explicit or specific with respect to its scope and there is no mention of a potential claim under the Code. There is nothing in the language of the release that would draw Employee F’s attention that she was releasing the Respondents from liability for a human rights complaint.
[23] In considering the circumstances in which the release was executed, the parties have provided different versions of how the release was signed. Employee F says she was pressured to sign the release when it was presented to her. The Respondents say they allowed her to take the release and think about it for a few days. On an application to dismiss, I cannot make a finding of fact by determining which version of events is more plausible. Because I cannot reconcile the different versions of events, the circumstances of how the release was executed is not a factor in my analysis.
[24] The circumstances that are undisputed weighs in favour of allowing the complaint to proceed. In both versions the parties agree Employee F was presented with the release and told that she must sign it in order to receive her severance. No other payment was provided at the time of her termination and she signed it relatively shortly after the sudden termination of her employment. In my view, these undisputed facts go beyond the ordinary stress and pressure faced by all employees facing termination and weighs in favour of a finding of duress.
[25] Finally, in my view the nature of the complaint weighs in favour of allowing the complaint to proceed. The allegations of sexual harassment are serious. They involve allegations of assault and being involuntarily drugged by the Manager and inaction by the other Respondents when Employee F reported the conduct. None of these allegations are proven, and I make no comment on whether Employee F is likely to prove them at a hearing. However, the information provided supports the seriousness of the nature of the allegations, which reflect the core of what the Code’s protections are intended to guard against. This is a factor that weighs in favour of allowing the complaint to proceed.
[26] In considering these factors and the circumstances of this case, I find it would be in the public interest and would further the purposes of the Code to allow Employee F’s human rights complaint to proceed. Accordingly, I deny the application to dismiss.
B. Application for Costs
[27] Employee F applies for an order of costs against the Respondents for improper conduct in the course of a complaint: Code, s. 37(4). She argues that the Respondents failed to abide by the Tribunal’s case path decision and made arguments to dismiss the complaint under portions of s. 27 they were not granted permission to argue. She says the Respondents’ evidence in support of the dismissal application is irrelevant to the issue the Tribunal must decide.
[28] The Tribunal may award costs “against a party to a complaint who has engaged in improper conduct during the course of the complaint”: Code, s. 37(4). The purpose of a costs award is punitive: Terpsma v. Rimex Supply (No. 3), 2013 BCHRT 3 at para. 102. It aims to deter conduct that has a significant and detrimental impact on the integrity of the Tribunal’s process: Oger v. Whatcott (No. 7), 2019 BCHRT 58 at para. 246.
[29] Improper conduct is “not necessarily limited to intentional wrongdoing”: McLean v. B.C. (Min. of Public Safety and Sol. Gen.) (No. 3), 2006 BCHRT 103 at para. 8. Rather, “[a]ny conduct which has a significant impact on the integrity of the Tribunal’s processes, including conduct which has a significant prejudicial impact on another party, may constitute improper conduct”: McLean at para. 8.
[30] I am not persuaded that the conduct of the Respondents in this proceeding warrants a cost award. I agree that the Respondents made arguments and submissions beyond what the Tribunal allowed in the case path decision. Generally, it is not appropriate for a respondent to add grounds to an application to dismiss when those grounds have not been allowed through the case path process: Ibrahim v. The Owners, Strata Plan LMS 1222 and another, 2024 BCHRT 183 at para. 5.
[31] However, I am not persuaded that the excess arguments and evidentiary materials significantly impacted the integrity of the Tribunal’s process or had a prejudicial impact on Employee F. I have not considered dismissal on grounds other than those permitted. To be clear, there may be circumstances where submitting a large amount of arguments on grounds that are not permitted and evidence that is irrelevant to the issues the Tribunal must decide may warrant a cost award because of the nature of the submissions, and the seriousness of the effects on the Tribunal’s process. In my view, this is not such a case. I am not persuaded that a costs award is warranted, and I deny the application.
V CONCLUSION
[32] I deny the application to dismiss.
Edward Takayanagi
Tribunal Member