Doyle v. BC Office of the Premier and another (No.2), 2025 BCHRT 288
Date Issued: November 25, 2025
File: CS-006487
Indexed as: Doyle v. BC Office of the Premier and another (No.2), 2025 BCHRT 288
IN THE MATTER OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS CODE,
RSBC 1996, c. 210 (as amended)
AND IN THE MATTER of a complaint before
the British Columbia Human Rights Tribunal
BETWEEN:
Sheila Doyle
COMPLAINANT
AND:
His Majesty the King in Right of the Province of British Columbia
as represented by the Office of the Premier and Alex MacLennan
RESPONDENTS
REASONS FOR DECISION
APPLICATION TO DEFER A COMPLAINT
Section 25 and Rule 16
Tribunal Member: Beverly Froese
Counsel for the Complainant: Ib S. Petersen
Counsel for the Respondents: Joanne Kim
I INTRODUCTION
[1] In August 2021, Sheila Doyle made a complaint against His Majesty the King in Right of the Province of British Columbia as represented by the Office of the Premier [Province] and Alex MacLennan alleging they discriminated against her regarding her employment based on physical and mental disability contrary to s. 13 of the Human Rights Code [Code]. Specifically, Ms. Doyle alleges her employer failed to accommodate her disabilities and then terminated her employment.
[2] In May 2023, the Respondents applied to the Tribunal under s. 25 of the Code and Rule 16 of the Tribunal’s Rules of Practice and Procedure to defer the complaint pending the outcome of a civil claim Ms. Doyle filed in the British Columbia Supreme Court [Civil Action]. In Doyle v. BC Office of the Premier and another, 2023 BCHRT 175, I granted the application and deferred the complaint for one year or until the outcome of the Civil Action, whichever was sooner [Deferral Decision].
[3] After one year from the date of the Deferral Decision, the deferral was lifted. The Respondents now apply to defer the complaint again until the outcome of the Civil Action. The Respondents say the relevant factors and circumstances have not changed since the Deferral Decision.
[4] Ms. Doyle opposes the application. She says the circumstances relating to the Civil Action have changed since the Deferral Decision and that allowing the complaint to proceed is fair and in the public interest.
[5] For the reasons that follow, the Respondents’ application is denied. Based on the materials before me, I am no longer persuaded that the Civil Action is capable of appropriately dealing with the substance of the complaint.
II BACKGROUND
[6] The background to this complaint was set out in the Deferral Decision and I need not repeat it here. I make no findings of fact on the merits of the complaint.
III Analysis and DECISION
[7] The Respondents apply to defer the complaint pending resolution of the Civil Action. The Tribunal has discretion under s. 25(2) of the Code to defer further consideration of a complaint if it is satisfied that another proceeding is capable of dealing appropriately with its substance. Rule 16 says the Tribunal also may defer a complaint if it is fair and reasonable in the circumstances.
[8] The Tribunal’s authority to defer a complaint under s. 25(2) arises out of a legislative intent that its resources should not be expended if it would result in needless duplication of the other proceeding’s adjudicative resources: Young v. Coast Mountain Bus Company Ltd., 2003 BCHRT 28at para. 21.
[9] Deferral of a complaint is a temporary measure. After the outcome of the other proceeding, the Tribunal determines whether the substance of the complaint has, in fact, been appropriately dealt with. At that time the Tribunal decides whether the complaint should proceed or whether it should be dismissed, either in whole or in part: Young at para. 20.
[10] In deciding whether to exercise its discretion under s. 25(2), the Tribunal considers the nature and subject matter of the other proceeding, the adequacies of the remedies available in the other proceeding, the status of the other proceeding in relation to the status of the complaint, fairness to the parties, and the public interest: Young at para. 19.
[11] The burden of establishing that another proceeding is capable of appropriately dealing with the substance of the complaint is on the party seeking the deferral: Copeland v. B.C. (Min. of Public Safety and Solicitor General), 2006 BCHRT 383 at para. 17.
[12] I now turn to consider each of the Young factors.
A. Nature and subject matter of the Civil Action
[13] In the Deferral Decision, I found that the nature and subject matter of the Civil Action was sufficiently similar to the subject matter of the complaint to weigh in favour of deferral. Specifically, I found that both the Tribunal and the Court are being asked to make findings on the same evidence about what happened when Ms. Doyle attempted to return to work when her LTD benefits ended and why her employment was terminated. Nothing in the materials before me changes that finding.
B. Adequacies of the remedies available in the Civil Action
[14] In the Deferral Decision, I found that the remedies in the Civil Action are adequate. In particular, I found that the damages Ms. Doyle seeks in the Civil Action could be functionally equivalent to a damage award from the Tribunal for compensation for injury to dignity. Nothing in the materials before me changes that finding.
C. Status of the Civil Action
[15] In the Deferral Decision, I found that both the Civil Action and the complaint were at the early stages of their respective processes. As I could not say with any degree of certainty which proceeding would be the most timely and efficient, I found this factor weighed neither in favour of deferral nor against it.
[16] As the complaint did not proceed after the Deferral Decision, it is still in the early stage of the Tribunal’s process. Ms. Doyle filed her complaint in August 2021. Notice of the complaint proceeding was sent to the Respondents but they have not yet filed a response, and the parties have not exchanged their relevant documents.
[17] The Civil Action is also still in the early stages of its process. Ms. Doyle filed her Notice of Civil Claim in October 2021. In early April 2022, the Province filed its Response to Civil Claim. The other respondent in the Civil Action has not filed a Response to Civil Claim and has advised Ms. Doyle that it is not a proper party to the Civil Action. At the time I issued the Deferral Decision, the parties did not agree whether document disclosure in the Civil Action was complete, but they did not dispute that examinations for discovery and trial dates had not been scheduled.
[18] The Civil Action has not moved forward since the Deferral Decision. The Respondents submit that because those circumstances have not changed, this factor is either neutral or weighs in favour of deferral. They also say that Ms. Doyle has not met her obligation and responsibility to diligently pursue the Civil Action and that delays in the Court process are attributable to her. The Respondents say Ms. Doyle has a measure of control over the Civil Action and is ably represented in the Civil Action by the same lawyer who is representing her with respect to her complaint. Last, the Respondents say that given the Tribunal’s backlog and limited resources, “the Tribunal would not necessarily be the timelier path to resolve the dispute”.
[19] Ms. Doyle says this factor weighs against deferral. She does not dispute that the Civil Action is dormant and says her medical conditions have significantly affected her ability to advance both the Civil Action and her complaint. Ms. Doyle says that unless she gives the Court notice that she intends to proceed with the Civil Action or the Province files an application to strike the claim, the Civil Action “is becoming increasingly less likely to proceed to any trial or determination”.
[20] If a deferral is granted, the Tribunal’s process will again be put on hold for what could be another lengthy period of time. Based on the parties submissions, deferring the complaint will likely result in both processes remaining inactive and the parties moving no closer to resolving their dispute.
[21] If the complaint is allowed to proceed, the Tribunal will set a relatively short timeframe for the Respondents to file their response and for the parties to complete their document disclosure. After disclosure is complete, the Tribunal will make a decision under its Case Path Pilot as to whether the complaint will proceed to a hearing or the Respondents will be allowed to make an application to dismiss the complaint. If the Tribunal determines that the complaint will proceed to a hearing, the Tribunal will contact the parties to schedule the complaint for a hearing.
[22] Although there are still delays in the Tribunal’s process due to its significant backlog, given that the Civil Action has not progressed and will likely remain inactive, I am not persuaded the Civil Action is the most timely and efficient manner for the parties to resolve their dispute.
D. Fairness and public interest
[23] The Tribunal has said that what is fair to the parties, and in the public interest, is avoiding whenever possible the unnecessary duplication of proceedings and expenditures of public and private resources: Rutledge v. Canex Building Supplies and another, 2018 BCHRT 41at paras. 19-20; Complainant X v. B.C. (Ministry of Children and Family Development) and another (No. 2), 2012 BCHRT 98 at para. 28.
[24] In the Deferral Decision, I accepted that Ms. Doyle wanted the Tribunal’s process to continue because she has fewer resources than the Province and the Tribunal’s process is less formal and costly than a Court proceeding. However, I found that proceeding with the complaint at that time could result in unnecessary duplication and expenditures of resources, and there was a risk of inconsistent findings of fact.
[25] The Respondents say this factor continues to weigh in favour of deferral to avoid unnecessary duplication and expenditure of public and private resources. They say deferring the complaint would not cause Ms. Doyle any undue prejudice because she would still be able to pursue her complaint after the Civil Action is resolved. The Respondents say that proceeding with the complaint would cause prejudice to them because they would have to defend against the same allegations in two proceedings.
[26] I understand the Respondents’ concerns about Ms. Doyle not having taken any steps to pursue the Civil Action after the complaint was deferred. However, in the present circumstances, I am not satisfied that deferring the complaint again is fair and in the public interest.
[27] I agree with Ms. Doyle that because the Civil Action has been dormant since the deferral was granted, there is little risk of unnecessary duplication, inconsistent findings of fact, and needless expenditure of resources. I also accept that Ms. Doyle wants to proceed with the complaint because the Tribunal’s process is less formal and more affordable for her than the Court process and the Tribunal offers mediation. Further, in my view allowing the complaint to proceed at this time is consistent with the purposes of the Code, which are to prevent discrimination and provide a means of redress to people who are discriminated against. It is also consistent with the Tribunal’s reasoning in cases such as Harvey v. Gibraltar Mine, 2018 BCHRT 248 that open-ended deferrals are inconsistent with a timely and full resolution of a complaint, and with fundamental fairness: at para. 28.
[28] After weighing the Young factors, I am not convinced the Civil Action is capable of dealing appropriately with the substance of the complaint.
IV Conclusion
[29] The Respondents’ application under s. 25 of the Code to defer the complaint is denied.
[30] The Tribunal will proceed to set deadlines for the Respondents to file their response and for the parties to complete their document disclosure.
Beverly Froese
Tribunal Member