Berg-Iverson v. City of Maple Ridge, 2025 BCHRT 284
Date Issued: November 13, 2025
File(s): CS-005859
Indexed as: Berg-Iverson v. City of Maple Ridge, 2025 BCHRT 284
IN THE MATTER OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS CODE,
RSBC 1996, c. 210 (as amended)
AND IN THE MATTER of a complaint before
the British Columbia Human Rights Tribunal
BETWEEN:
Jenna Berg-Iverson
COMPLAINANT
AND:
City of Maple Ridge
RESPONDENT
REASONS FOR DECISION
APPLICATION TO DISMISS A COMPLAINT
Section 27(1)(c)
Tribunal Member: Robin Dean
For the Complainant: No submissions
Counsel for the Respondent: David Penner
I INTRODUCTION
[1] On January 4, 2022, Jenna Berg-Iverson filed a complaint against the City of Maple Ridge, alleging employment discrimination based on sexual orientation. Ms. Berg-Iverson, who worked as a Community Safety Officer [CSO], identifies as bisexual and says she is in a same-sex relationship. According to Ms. Berg-Iverson, the City failed to do anything after a colleague named AH told Ms. Berg-Iverson on September 2, 2021 that she did not want to pin the Pride flag on her uniform because she found it “triggering” [Comment]. Ms. Berg-Iverson says approximately three weeks after she reported the Comment to management, the City investigated her for misconduct, ultimately terminating her employment. She says that prior to the investigation, she had received commendations for her work from City council members as well as members of the public.
[2] The City denies discriminating and files an application to dismiss Ms. Berg-Iverson’s complaint under ss. 27(1)(c), 27(1)(d(ii), and 27(1)(f) of the Human Rights Code. It says AH apologized to Ms. Berg-Iverson, and it determined no further steps were warranted. In terms of Ms. Berg-Iverson’s termination, it says the reason for ending Ms. Berg-Iverson’s employment was its conclusion that she had engaged in misconduct. The City’s position is that Ms. Berg-Iverson’s sexual orientation had nothing to do with the termination. Finally, it says that the termination was settled through a grievance process with the Canadian Union of Public Employees, Local 622 [Union].
[3] Ms. Berg-Iverson did not respond to the City’s application to dismiss despite being given notice and opportunities to respond.
[4] I find that I can resolve the application to dismiss under s. 27(1)(c) of the Code. I must decide whether there is no reasonable prospect Ms. Berg-Iverson will prove that the City’s response to the Comment was discriminatory. Second, I must determine whether there is no reasonable prospect of Ms. Berg-Iverson proving a connection between her sexual orientation and the end of her employment.
[5] For the following reasons, I grant the application. I am persuaded that there is no reasonable prospect of Ms. Berg-Iverson proving that the City’s response to the Comment was discriminatory. I am also satisfied that there is no reasonable prospect of Ms. Berg-Iverson proving that her sexual orientation was a factor in her termination. I dismiss Ms. Berg-Iverson’s complaint.
[6] To make this decision, I have considered all the information filed by the parties, including Ms. Berg-Iverson’s complaint. In these reasons, I refer only to what is necessary to explain my decision. I make no findings of fact.
II BACKGROUND
[7] The City employed Ms. Berg-Iverson as a CSO in its Community and Social Safety Initiatives Program [Program] from August 9, 2021 to October 28, 2021. As a CSO, Ms. Berg-Iverson liaised with individuals experiencing homelessness. The Union represented Ms. Berg-Iverson during her employment.
[8] AH was also employed by the City as a CSO. According to the City, AH identified as queer. She passed away in 2023 and is not a respondent to this complaint.[1]
[9] The City says that during Ms. Berg-Iverson’s employment with the City, she was also employed by ECOMM 911, a dispatch service for police, fire, and ambulance services. Through ECOMM she had access to the Canadian Police Information Centre [CPIC]. As I understand it, CPIC is a centralized police database maintained by the RCMP that law enforcement officers across the country can access. CPIC contains criminal intelligence and surveillance information and a summary of criminal records.
[10] The City says that it became aware of a number of “alleged breaches” of the Program’s Respectful Workplace Policy. On October 1, 2021, the City commenced an investigation into the alleged breaches [Investigation], which was conducted by the City’s Manager of Employee & Labour Relations [Manager]. The Investigation focused on allegations against Ms. Berg-Iverson and another staff member. The allegations against Ms. Berg-Iverson were that:
a. she had shown explicit photos to AH while at work;
b. she had made demeaning gestures to AH; and
c. she had, without authorization or consent, accessed CPIC to obtain information about an individual experiencing homelessness in Maple Ridge [Individual]. According to the City, the RCMP notified it in or around September 2021 that Ms. Berg-Iverson accessed the CPIC system to obtain information about the Individual.
[11] The City says from October 6-8, 2021, the Manager interviewed eight members of the Program staff, including Ms. Berg-Iverson. The Manager says that Ms. Berg-Iverson ultimately admitted to accessing CPIC without consent in order to look up the Individual.
[12] The Manager says he made the following findings during the Investigation:
a. Ms. Berg-Iverson and AH were not friendly;
b. Ms. Berg-Iverson had accessed the CPIC database to obtain information on the Individual;
c. Ms. Berg-Iverson showed no remorse for her actions; and
d. AH was going through some difficult personal issues while employed with the Program.
[13] At the conclusion of the Investigation, the Manager says he determined that Ms. Berg-Iverson had accessed CPIC and invaded the Individual’s privacy, been dishonest, failed or refused to admit that she had behaved inappropriately, and damaged or could have damaged the City’s reputation. At the close of the Investigation, the Manager recommended terminating Ms. Berg-Iverson.
[14] The City says that on October 28, 2021, it terminated Ms. Berg-Iverson’s employment as a result of her misconduct.
III DECISION
[15] The City applies to dismiss Ms. Berg-Iverson’s complaint on the basis that it has no reasonable prospect of success: Code, s. 27(1)(c). The onus is on the City to establish the basis for dismissal.
[16] Section 27(1)(c) is part of the Tribunal’s gate-keeping function. It allows the Tribunal to remove complaints which do not warrant the time and expense of a hearing.
[17] The Tribunal does not make findings of fact under s. 27(1)(c). Instead, the Tribunal looks at the evidence to decide whether “there is no reasonable prospect that findings of fact that would support the complaint could be made on a balance of probabilities after a full hearing of the evidence”: Berezoutskaia v. British Columbia (Human Rights Tribunal), 2006 BCCA 95 at para. 22, leave to appeal ref’d [2006] SCCA No. 171. The Tribunal must base its decision on the materials filed by the parties, and not on speculation about what evidence may be filed at the hearing: University of British Columbia v. Chan,2013 BCSC 942 at para. 77.
[18] A dismissal application is not the same as a hearing: Lord v. Fraser Health Authority,2021 BCSC 2176 at para. 20; SEPQA v. Canadian Human Rights Commission,[1989] 2 SCR 879 at 899. The threshold to advance a complaint to a hearing is low. In a dismissal application, a complainant does not have to prove their complaint or show the Tribunal all the evidence they may introduce at a hearing. They only have to show that the evidence takes their complaint out of the realm of conjecture: Workers’ Compensation Appeal Tribunal v. Hill, 2011 BCCA 49 at para. 27.
[19] Many human rights complaints raise issues of credibility. This is not, by itself, a sufficient reason to deny an application to dismiss: Evans v. University of British Columbia, 2008 BCSC 1026 at para. 34. However, if there are foundational or key issues of credibility, the complaint must go to a hearing: Francescutti v. Vancouver (City), 2017 BCCA 242 at para 67.
[20] To prove her complaint at a hearing, Ms. Berg-Iverson will have to prove that she has a characteristic protected by the Code, she was adversely impacted in employment, and her protected characteristic was a factor in the adverse impact: Moore v. British Columbia (Education), 2012 SCC 61 at para. 33. If she did that, the burden would shift to the City to justify the impact as a bona fide occupational requirement. If the impact is justified, there is no discrimination.
[21] The City says that Ms. Berg-Iverson has no reasonable prospect of proving an adverse impact because it reasonably responded to her complaint about the Comment. It further says that there is no reasonable prospect that Ms. Berg-Iverson will be able to prove that her sexual orientation was a factor in her termination.
A. The City’s Response to the Comment
[22] The first dispute between the parties is whether the City responded reasonably to Ms. Berg-Iverson’s complaint about the Comment—i.e. whether Ms. Berg-Iverson experienced adverse impacts because the City did not properly investigate and respond to her complaint about the Comment. This engages the City’s duty to take reasonable steps to address complaints of discrimination in the workplace. An employer’s failure to respond reasonably and appropriately to a complaint of discrimination in their employment may itself amount to discrimination: see Bigam by MacDonald v. Board of Education of School District No. 23 (Central Okanagan) and others, 2024 BCHRT 288 at para. 47 (discussing similar requirements in the service context). An unreasonable or inadequate response may be discrimination regardless of whether the conduct complained about is found to be discriminatory: Bigam at para. 47.
[23] There are two requirements that trigger an employer’s duty to respond under human rights legislation. First, the employer must know there is a complaint or concern, typically because the complainant has communicated one. Second, the complaint must be about a potential violation of the Code: Clarke v. City of Vancouver and another, 2024 BCHRT 298 at para. 112. On the first requirement, an employer does not have a duty to address a specific instance of discrimination that they are not aware of: Fletcher v. Lifestyle Hearing Corporation, 2025 BCHRT 93 at para. 111. On the second requirement, the Code is concerned with an employer’s response to possible discrimination rather than any other type of workplace complaint: Fletcher at para. 111.
[24] Once this duty is triggered, the Tribunal will assess the employer’s response considering factors including whether the employer has a proper understanding of discrimination, whether the employer treated the allegations seriously and responded sensitively, and whether the complainant was restored to a discrimination-free work environment: Laskowska v. Marineland of Canada Inc., 2005 HRTO 30 at paras. 52-53. The service provider’s response should be prompt, effective, and proportionate to the seriousness of the incident: Hale at para. 218.
[25] Here, I am satisfied that Ms. Berg-Iverson is reasonably certain to prove that the duty to respond was triggered.
[26] First, there appears to be no dispute on this application that Ms. Berg-Iverson communicated her concern to the City. Ms. Berg-Iverson says that she called her supervisor and emailed another manager, CC, about the Comment. The Manager acknowledges that he had heard about the Comment.
[27] Second, I am not satisfied that Ms. Berg-Iverson has no reasonable prospect of proving that the complaint was about a potential violation of the Code rather than other workplace misconduct. Ms. Berg-Iverson says that she told the City that AH had made a “homophobic” comment to her. I cannot say that under these circumstances, there is no reasonable prospect of Ms. Berg-Iverson proving that her complaint to management was about a potential violation of the Code. Depending on the circumstances, it could be a violation of the Code to make a homophobic comment to a co-worker: see Fletcher at para. 118. The City does not argue that the complaint was another type of workplace complaint, unrelated to discrimination.
[28] The City does argue that Ms. Berg-Iverson has no reasonable prospect of proving that the Comment was discriminatory, saying that the Comment was isolated and not particularly egregious or virulent. It relies on Pardo v. School District No. 43, 2003 BCHRT 71, where the Tribunal dismissed a complaint about a single comment. However, the Comment was not required to definitely be a violation of the Code in order to trigger a reasonable response on the City’s part. Rather, the test is whether it was potentially a Code violation. At this juncture, I am not required to determine whether the Comment was discriminatory. I am satisfied that Ms. Berg-Iverson has taken this aspect of her complaint out of the realm of conjecture.
[29] Having found that Ms. Berg-Iverson has taken out of the realm of conjecture the two requirements to trigger the City’s duty to respond under human rights legislation, I turn to the response itself to determine whether there is no reasonable prospect of Ms. Berg-Iverson proving that the City’s response was inadequate.
[30] The City says that AH apologized to Ms. Berg-Iverson. Because the City didn’t see the comment as discriminatory, in its view an apology was sufficient to remedy the situation. The City also says that it implemented training for CSO staff on conflict management and mental health awareness after the investigation into Ms. Berg-Iverson’s conduct, in part because of the “interpersonal conflict” between AH and Ms. Berg-Iverson. However, I do not have any information before me whether this training involved education on discrimination in the workplace or any other anti-discrimination efforts.
[31] Setting aside the staff training, I am satisfied here that there is no reasonable prospect of Ms. Berg-Iverson proving that the City should have done more once AH had apologized. I am persuaded the City is reasonably certain to show that its response was proportionate to the discrimination alleged. AH is said to have told Ms. Berg-Iverson that she would not wear a Pride flag because it triggered her. While offensive to Ms. Berg-Iverson, this was a single workplace comment that was not particularly egregious: Pardo at para. 12. The comment did not involve, for example, a virulent anti-2SLGBTQIA+ slur: see Sarba v. Ruskin Construction Ltd. and others, 2022 BCHRT 35 at para. 52. Further, an apology was offered in an effort to ameliorate the strained relationship between Ms. Berg-Iverson and AH. While an apology might not always be sufficient to return a complainant to a discrimination-free environment, I am satisfied, given the nature of the Comment, that there is no reasonable prospect of Ms. Berg-Iverson proving that the City did not reasonably respond to Ms. Berg-Iverson’s complaint of discrimination.
[32] I am persuaded that this situation does not warrant state intervention. This aspect of the complaint is dismissed.
B. The Termination
[33] Ms. Berg-Iverson says that the investigation into her conduct, which ultimately led to her termination, was discriminatory. Here, nexus is at issue. In her complaint, she says that the timing of the investigation, which began three weeks after she reported the Comment, gives rise to an inference that her protected characteristics were a factor in her termination.
[34] The Tribunal has consistently held that the timing of an event can support an inferred connection between a protected characteristic and an adverse impact: Parry v. Vanwest College, 2005 BCHRT 310 at para. 63; Morris v. BC Rail, 2003 BCHRT 14. Timing alone, however, is not always sufficient to prove nexus. While the Tribunal may draw inferences based on the timing of events. The Tribunal has explained that:
…an inference [arising from] the timing of a termination…is just that, an inference. It can be strengthened by other evidence to support discrimination, or, conversely [it can be] displaced by evidence of a non-discriminatory reason for the termination: Harris v. Rize Alliance Properties and another, 2019 BCHRT 223 at para. 31.
[35] Even if an inference could be drawn given the timing of the termination and its proximity to Ms. Berg-Iverson reporting AH’s comment, I am satisfied that such an inference is reasonably certain to be displaced. There is no evidence before me that could strengthen the inference of discrimination. On the other hand, I am persuaded that the City is reasonably certain to prove it had a solely non-discriminatory reason why it investigated Ms. Berg-Iverson’s conduct and terminated her employment.
[36] The City says that the decision to terminate Ms. Berg-Iverson’s employment was exclusively based on her accessing the CPIC system improperly and then being dishonest about it. This is supported by the timing of the RCMP’s notification in or around September 2021, around the same time the Comment was made. After the RCMP notified the City that Ms. Berg-Iverson had accessed the CPIC system, the City promptly investigated this information in October 2021 and ended Ms. Berg-Iverson’s employment on October 28, 2021. In my view, the evidence that the timing of the RCMP notification and the Comment coincide, weakens the inference of discrimination that could be drawn from timing alone.
[37] The City’s position is also supported by its affidavit evidence, including a report from the City’s investigation and the City’s termination letter. The investigation report concluded that Ms. Berg-Iverson had accessed the CPIC database to obtain information on an unhoused individual in Maple Ridge and that she showed “little to no remorse for her actions.” It recommended that Ms. Berg-Iverson’s employment be terminated to ensure no repeat occurrences and to demonstrate the high standards to which its CSO officers are held. The investigation report mentions Ms. Berg-Iverson’s poor relationship with AH but only in the context of the investigation into whether Ms. Berg-Iverson had shown AH graphic photographs (the report concluded that she had not).
[38] The termination letter states that Ms. Berg-Iverson was terminated solely for accessing the CPIC system:
Your unauthorized use of the [CPIC] database to obtain information about a citizen in Maple Ridge, and in connection with your role as [CSO] was unwarranted and falls outside the scope, role and authority of a [CSO].
[39] I am satisfied that the City is reasonably certain to establish non-discriminatory reasons for the termination, Ms. Berg-Iverson’s purported misconduct, which would displace any inference that could be drawn from the timing of the termination. While Ms. Berg-Iverson was terminated soon after she reported the Comment, she was also terminated in close proximity to the City discovering that she had accessed the CPIC database. The City then investigated this allegation and found that it had occurred. The investigation report and termination letter both list her misconduct as the reason for her termination. On the whole of the materials before me, I am satisfied there is no reasonable prospect that Ms. Berg-Iverson could establish a connection between her sexual orientation and the termination. This aspect of the complaint is dismissed.
IV CONCLUSION
[40] The complaint is dismissed in its entirety under s. 27(1)(c). It will not proceed.
Robin Dean
Tribunal Member
Human Rights Tribunal
[1] The complaint was withdrawn against AH in December 2024.