Nawaz (by Areeb Yasir) v. Justice Institute of British Columbia (No.2), 2025 BCHRT 278
Date Issued: October 30, 2025
File: CS-004302
Indexed as: Nawaz (by Areeb Yasir) v. Justice Institute of British Columbia (No.2), 2025 BCHRT 278
IN THE MATTER OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS CODE,
RSBC 1996, c. 210 (as amended)
AND IN THE MATTER of a complaint before
the British Columbia Human Rights Tribunal
BETWEEN:
Husnaa Nawaz (by Areeb Yasir)
COMPLAINANT
AND:
Justice Institute of British Columbia
RESPONDENT
REASONS FOR DECISION
APPLICATION FOR COSTS
Tribunal Member: Andrew Robb
Agent for the Complainant: Areeb Yasir
Counsel for the Respondent: Mark E. Colavecchia
I INTRODUCTION
[1] This decision is about an application for costs against Ms. Nawaz. The application was filed by Justice Institute of BC [JIBC] and Mary DeMarinis, before the Tribunal dismissed the complaint against Ms. DeMarinis. Although Ms. DeMarinis is no longer a respondent to the complaint, in this decision I refer to JIBC and Ms. DeMarinis, together, as the Respondents.
[2] For the reasons set out below, I find Ms. Nawaz engaged in improper conduct in relation to her response to the Respondents’ application to dismiss her complaint, and I order her to pay costs to the Respondents, in the amount of $200.
II Background
[3] The background to the complaint is set out in my decision about the Respondents’ application to dismiss the complaint: Nawaz (by Areeb Yasir) v. Justice Institute of British Columbia and another, 2025 BCHRT 238. Much of the background information relevant to my decision in this application was set out in my letter to the parties dated June 19, 2025. The main issue in this application arises from the two different versions of Ms. Nawaz’s affidavit that were sent to the Respondents’ counsel. The affidavit was part of her response to the application to dismiss.
[4] After giving Ms. Nawaz a series of extensions of time to file her response to the application to dismiss, the Tribunal set a final due date of June 19, 2024, with the Respondents’ reply submission due July 3, 2024. Ms. Nawaz’s representative, Areeb Yasir, attempted to send the response to the Tribunal by email after the close of business on June 19, 2024. But he received an error message saying the Tribunal could not receive the attachments due to the large file size, so he attempted to send the response again, early in the morning on June 20, 2024, via download link. The download link included an affidavit made by Ms. Nawaz in support of the response [the First Affidavit]. The Respondents received it, but the Tribunal did not, as the Tribunal does not accept documents submitted via download link, except as directed by the Tribunal.
[5] After the Tribunal informed Mr. Yasir that it could not accept the download link, Mr. Yasir sent the response to the Tribunal via courier, including a different version of Ms. Nawaz’s affidavit [the Second Affidavit]. The Tribunal received it on July 3, 2024. Mr. Yasir sent the Second Affidavit to the Respondents via download link on June 29, 2024, in an email that said, “We were advised to renotarize the same evidence from 2024-06-19 to ensure the correct order and readability of the exhibits. Please note that the evidence and arguments have not changed.”
[6] The Tribunal never received the First Affidavit, but there is no dispute that the exhibits to the First Affidavit were not identical to those in the Second Affidavit. On the materials before me, it is not clear whether the exhibits to the Second Affidavit included new documents that were not included with the First Affidavit, or whether they included the same documents, but in a different order. Both affidavits included many exhibits; the Second Affidavit had over 200.
[7] The Respondents filed their reply submission on July 3, 2024. It referred to the exhibits to the First Affidavit.
[8] On May 22, 2025, the Tribunal wrote to the parties and expressed concern that the reply submission referred to exhibits to Ms. Nawaz’s affidavit that did not correspond to the affidavit that the Tribunal received from Ms. Nawaz. After receiving the Second Affidavit from the Tribunal, the Respondents confirmed that it differed from the First Affidavit. Based on this discrepancy and the prior history of the matter, the Respondents asked the Tribunal to disregard Ms. Nawaz’s response to the application to dismiss.
[9] In my letter dated June 19, 2025, I decided not to disregard Ms. Nawaz’s response, but out of fairness to the Respondents I gave them an opportunity to file a revised reply submission. I also said Mr. Yasir should have brought the differences between the two affidavits to the Respondents’ attention, and he was wrong to say the evidence had not changed.
[10] The Respondents filed a revised reply submission on July 24, 2025.
III Application for costs and response
[11] The Respondents say Ms. Nawaz engaged in improper conduct by failing to adhere to Tribunal deadlines, and by misrepresenting the nature of her evidence in response to the Respondents’ application to dismiss the complaint. They say an order for costs is necessary to deter similar conduct in the future.
[12] The Respondents say they relied on Mr. Yasir’s assurance that the evidence had not changed, in his email dated June 29, 2024, and they drafted their reply submission based on the First Affidavit. They say Ms. Nawaz’s improper conduct caused over a year of delay in the Tribunal’s process and increased their legal expenses. They did not provide any information about the amount by which their legal expenses increased.
[13] In response to the application, Ms. Nawaz makes a number of arguments. She notes that Mr. Yasir is not a lawyer and she says she has done her best to comply with the Tribunal’s rules and deadlines. She says that any delays in the process caused by her failure to adhere to deadlines were minor. She says she cannot afford to pay costs, as she has been off work due to health issues since 2023.
[14] Regarding the two versions of the affidavit, Ms. Nawaz says Mr. Yasir’s statement that “the evidence and arguments have not changed” was “accurate in substance” in that the “core evidence” had not changed, and the only changes were “minor administrative differences.” She says she acted reasonably in re-notarising the affidavit, and she was relying on the advice of the notary.
[15] If the Respondents incurred additional legal costs to prepare a revised reply submission, Ms. Nawaz says this was due to their own negligence, in failing to review the Second Affidavit before filing their reply submission, especially after Mr. Yasir advised the Respondents’ counsel that the Second Affidavit had been re-notarised “to ensure the correct order”. She provided server logs that appear to show the Respondents’ counsel downloaded the Second Affidavit, from the link provided by Mr. Yasir, on 10 separate occasions between June 29 and July 4, 2024.
[16] Ms. Nawaz says the Respondents are opportunistically using the discrepancy between the First and Second Affidavits to manufacture grounds for costs. She says there was no need for the Respondents to file a revised reply submission, in July 2025, as the Tribunal did not require it, and they could have relied on their original reply submission.
[17] Ms. Nawaz also says she was unfairly prejudiced by the Tribunal’s file size limits on emails. If there were no such limits, she says the Tribunal and the Respondents would have both received the First Affidavit on June 19, 2024, and there would be no issue about the two versions of the affidavit.
[18] Finally, Ms. Nawaz says the Respondents are responsible for improper conduct towards her and Mr. Yasir, in relation to document disclosure and the Respondents’ counsel’s conduct during case conferences, among other issues.
IV Law
[19] The Tribunal may award costs “against a party to a complaint who has engaged in improper conduct during the course of the complaint”: Human Rights Code, s. 37(4). The purpose of a costs award is punitive: Terpsma v. Rimex Supply (No. 3), 2013 BCHRT 3 at para. 102. It aims to deter conduct that has a significant and detrimental impact on the integrity of the Tribunal’s process: Oger v. Whatcott (No. 7), 2019 BCHRT 58 at para. 246.
[20] Improper conduct is “not necessarily limited to intentional wrongdoing”: McLean v. B.C. (Min. of Public Safety and Sol. Gen.) (No. 3), 2006 BCHRT 103 at para. 8. Rather, “[a]ny conduct which has a significant impact on the integrity of the Tribunal’s processes, including conduct which has a significant prejudicial impact on another party, may constitute improper conduct”: McLean at para. 8.
[21] In deciding the appropriate amount of costs to order the Tribunal considers the nature and severity of the improper conduct, and the impact of that conduct on the integrity of the Tribunal’s processes. In addition, the Tribunal may also consider the party’s relative culpability with respect to the conduct, the party’s ability to pay, any factors that may have contributed to the conduct, and any other consequences that have arisen as a result of the sanctioned behaviour: Kelly v. Insurance Corporation of British Columbia, 2007 BCHRT 382 at para. 91.
V Decision
[22] I will first explain the reasons why I find Ms. Nawaz has engaged in improper conduct, within the meaning of s. 37(4) of the Code. I then explain my decision about the appropriate amount of costs.
A. Improper conduct
[23] I first address the delays in the Tribunal process that the Respondents say Ms. Nawaz is responsible for, before she filed her response to the application to dismiss. The Respondents cite the following:
a. As part of the Tribunal’s screening process, the Tribunal asked Ms. Nawaz for more information about her complaint. The Tribunal wrote her a letter dated July 6, 2021, asking her to provide this information by August 13, 2021, but she did not provide it until September 29, 2021.
b. The Tribunal set a deadline of December 15, 2023, for Ms. Nawaz to file her response to the application to dismiss her complaint. She did not file the response at that time, but on December 18, 2023, she filed applications for additional disclosure from the Respondents, to add new respondents, and to cancel the dismissal application.
c. When she filed those applications on December 18, 2023, the Tribunal did not receive all her supporting documents because she sent them via download link. The Tribunal notified her that it could not accept supporting documents via download link, but she did not submit the supporting documents by courier until January 22, 2024.
[24] While some of these events did cause delays in the Tribunal’s process, I am not satisfied their impact was significant. The delay during the screening process did not have any impact on the process overall, since the Tribunal did not notify the Respondents about the complaint until April 2022. Regarding the delays as a result of her applications in December 2023, I note it is not uncommon for parties to file interim applications during an application to dismiss, or for the Tribunal to extend due dates for submissions in an application to dismiss, pending the resolution of interim applications.
[25] In some of these incidents Ms. Nawaz did not comply with the Tribunal’s directions, but it appears her non-compliance had a minimal impact on the integrity of the Tribunal’s processes. I would not have found the Respondents were entitled to costs based on these incidents.
[26] Ms. Nawaz’s failure to notify the Respondents about the differences between the First and Second Affidavit was improper conduct. Mr. Yasir should have pointed out the differences between the two versions of the affidavit, when she sent the Second Affidavit to the Respondents. His statement that that the affidavit had been re-notarized “to ensure the correct order and readability of the exhibits” was not sufficient notice of the differences, especially considering that he went on to say the evidence had not changed. Even if the only change was that the exhibits were in a different order, this change required revisions to the Respondent’s reply submission, since the reply submission referred to the exhibits by number. It was not unreasonable for the Respondents to revise their reply submission, in July 2025, so that its references to the exhibits to Ms. Nawaz’s affidavit corresponded to the Second Affidavit. This made it easier for the Tribunal to understand the Respondents’ arguments.
[27] The Respondents do not deny that they downloaded the Second Affidavit before filing their initial reply submission, as Ms. Nawaz suggests. But they say they did not review the Second Affidavit in detail, as they relied on Mr. Yasir’s assurance that the evidence had not changed. While it would have been prudent for the Respondents to review all the materials they received from Ms. Nawaz in detail, it was reasonable for them to rely on Mr. Yasir’s assurance. Both affidavits included many exhibits. While it appears that close inspection would have revealed there were differences between the First and Second Affidavit, I am satisfied the Respondents had no reason to believe close inspection was necessary, when they received the Second Affidavit.
[28] I do not find Ms. Nawaz’s submission that she was relying on a notary’s advice to be persuasive. She has not provided any evidence about the advice the notary gave her, or why the order of the affidavits was changed.
[29] Nor am I persuaded by Ms. Nawaz’s submission that she was prejudiced by the Tribunal’s file size limits on emails. Mr. Yasir had previously been informed about the Tribunal’s file size limits, when he attempted to file interim applications in December 2023, and had to send the supporting documents by courier, because the Tribunal was unable to receive the files by electronic means.
[30] For these reasons, and because the Tribunal did not receive any version of the response submission until two weeks after the due date, I am satisfied Ms. Nawaz engaged in improper conduct by filing her response late, and by failing to notify the Respondents about the differences between the First and Second Affidavit. This delayed the Tribunal’s process. The delay could have easily been avoided if the exhibits to the Second Affidavit had not been re-ordered, or if Mr. Yasir simply noted the new order of the exhibits in his email to the Respondents, when he filed the Second Affidavit.
[31] I make no finding about Ms. Nawaz’s allegation that the Respondents engaged in improper conduct. Ms. Nawaz has not applied for costs. She does not suggest that the Respondents’ conduct caused or contributed to her conduct which I have found to be improper. Even if the Respondents engaged in the conduct she alleges, that would not mean they are not entitled to an award of costs for Ms. Nawaz’s improper conduct.
B. Amount of costs
[32] The Respondents do not specify the amount of costs they seek. They cite Ma v. Dr. Ianin G. M. Cleator and another, 2014 BCHRT 180, where the Tribunal noted that in cases involving unfounded allegations, untruthfulness, or ulterior motivations for filing a complaint, the Tribunal has awarded costs in the range of $1,000 to $5,000: Ma at para. 315. In Ma, the Tribunal ordered costs in the amount of $5,000, after finding the complainant fabricated her complaint and deliberately misled the Tribunal about the evidence. The Respondents say Ms. Nawaz, through Mr. Yasir, has similarly misled the Tribunal, by erroneously indicating the evidence had not changed, from the First to the Second Affidavit.
[33] While Ms. Nawaz’s improper conduct had an impact on the Tribunal’s proceedings, I am not satisfied it was intentional. There is nothing in the materials before me that could prove the decision to re-order the exhibits in the Second Affidavit was part of a deliberate strategy to mislead the Respondents or the Tribunal, or to gain an advantage in the human rights complaint process.
[34] Ms. Nawaz’s failure to point out the differences between the two affidavits resulted in a delay in the Tribunal’s process, but I do not accept the Respondents’ submission that it caused over a year of delay. I understand the argument to be that their initial reply submission was filed in July 2024, and the Tribunal could not make a decision about the application to dismiss until they filed their revised reply, in July 2025. However, most of this delay was due to a backlog in the Tribunal’s process. Although the initial reply submission was filed in July 2024, the application to dismiss went into a queue of other applications waiting for a decision, and was not assigned to a Tribunal member for adjudication until April 2025. The delay attributable to Ms. Nawaz’s improper conduct was less than three months, from the time when the Tribunal noted the issue about the exhibits referred to in the Respondents’ reply submission, until the date when the Respondents filed their revised reply submission.
[35] The fairness issues arising from Ms. Nawaz’s improper conduct were cured relatively promptly, by the Respondents filing a revised reply submission. But the Respondents were still prejudiced by her conduct, in that they had to expend time and resources to prepare a revised reply submission. Although there is no information before me about the amount of additional legal expenses they incurred, I accept that they did incur some expenses.
[36] Turning to Ms. Nawaz’s ability to pay an award of costs, I note that the Respondents do not deny her assertion that she has been off work since 2023. I understand she is receiving disability insurance benefits. There is no other information before me about her ability to pay costs. I accept that her ability to pay is limited, since she is not currently working, but without more evidence I give less weight to this factor.
[37] Considering all these factors, I find $200 is an appropriate amount. The improper conduct in this case was much less serious than that of the complainant in Ma, both in terms of Ms. Nawaz’s apparent culpability and the impact on the Tribunal’s process. I might have ordered a different amount if I had more information about the amount of legal fees the Respondents incurred as a result of the improper conduct, or about Ms. Nawaz’s ability to pay a costs award. In the absence of this information I find $200 is sufficient to send Ms. Nawaz a message that the delay in filing her response submission and her failure to point out the differences between the two versions of the affidavit were unacceptable, without punishing her unduly for conduct of her representative that does not appear to have been deliberately obstructive.
VI Conclusion
[38] Ms. Nawaz must pay $200 in costs to the Respondents.
Andrew Robb
Tribunal Member