Ikwuagwu v. Interior Health Authority (Royal Inland Hospital), 2025 BCHRT 275
Date Issued: October 29, 2025
File: CS-009062
Indexed as: Ikwuagwu v. Interior Health Authority (Royal Inland Hospital), 2025 BCHRT 275
IN THE MATTER OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS CODE,
RSBC 1996, c. 210 (as amended)
AND IN THE MATTER of a complaint before
the British Columbia Human Rights Tribunal
BETWEEN:
Linda Ikwuagwu
COMPLAINANT
AND:
Interior Health Authority (Royal Inland Hospital)
RESPONDENT
REASONS FOR DECISION
TIMELINESS OF COMPLAINT
Section 22
Tribunal Member: Steven Adamson
On her own behalf: Linda Ikwuagwu
Counsel for Interior Health Authority (Royal Inland Hospital): Annie Olson
I. INTRODUCTION
[1] On March 7, 2023, Linda Ikwuagwu filed a complaint of discrimination in employment based on race contrary to s. 13 of the Human Rights Code [Code], against the Interior Heath Authority [IH] (Royal Inland Hospital).
[2] On February 27, 2025, the Tribunal’s notice of the complaint proceeding decision allowed the complaint to proceed against IH. However, the Tribunal’s May 15, 2025, decision reconsidered the earlier decision and referred the matter for timeliness submissions.
[3] For the reasons that follow, the untimely portion of the Complaint does not form part of a continuing contravention of the Code: s. 22(2), and it is not in the public interest to allow that portion to proceed late filed: s. 22(3).
II. BACKGROUND
[4] Ms. Ikwuagwu is a Black and immigrated to Canada from Nigeria.
[5] I will now review Ms. Ikwuagwu’s allegations in some detail to assist me in determining whether they are arguable contraventions of the Code capable of forming a continuing contravention.
[6] In December 2016, Ms. Ikwuagwu started working for IH as a full time perioperative registered nurse at the Royal Inland Hospital [the Hospital].
[7] While working shifts at the Hospital from the end of 2016 until mid 2020, Ms. Ikwuagwu says she never felt welcomed as the only Black member of the 30-member nursing staff. Ms. Ikwuagwu alleges generally that she was micromanaged and criticized by co-workers for reasons related to her race.
[8] In her email, dated December 28, 2018, Ms. Ikwuagwu reminded her then manager, Ms. G, about requesting an investigation by her and HR, into a complaint made against her by a white co-worker, Mr. Z, who accused her of endangering a patient during a surgery. Ms. Ikwuagwu states that while she was willing to overlook multiple frivolous complaints made by others about her, she was not willing to let this one slide because of the seriousness of the accusation. From Ms. Ikwuagwu’s complaint information it appears that Mr. Z accused her of improper stent flushing because she chose to flush immediately before passing the stents to minimize the possibility bacterial infection, while Mr. Z chose to flusher earlier. Ms. Ikwuagwu alleges Mr. Z believed his method was the proper one for reasons related to her race. She alleges that the Hospital’s support for Mr. Z reinforced the harms he perpetrated [the 2018 Stent Allegations].
[9] Ms. Ikwuagwu alleges Mr. Z consistently approached her in a condescending manner. On one occasion when she called him out after he treated her disrespectfully for not placing a scope properly in a bin, she alleges that he responded with “if you were not so stupid I wouldn’t speak to you in that manner.” [undated Scope Allegation]
[10] Ms. Ikwuagwu further alleges that Mr. Z consistently announced every pan and instrument he opened for her when he was performing “circulating” duties. She alleges that this practice was not generally required, and Mr. Z did not do it for other nurses. Ms. Ikwuagwu alleges Mr. Z persisted with the announcement behaviour for reasons related to his racial bias [the Announcement Allegations].
[11] Ms. Ikwuagwu alleges that her assertive communication style, related to her African heritage, is sometimes misconstrued as “aggressive” or “angry”.
[12] On January 19, 2019, Ms. Ikwuagwu, resigned from her permanent full-time position to work in a casual position at the Hospital. She alleges making this move to reduce her work hours because coming into work was difficult due to her PTSD symptoms. She further alleges taking sick days to avoid working with certain co-workers.
[13] In July 2022, Ms. Ikwuagwu emailed an IH manager, Ms. H, to inform that she was unwilling to return to work at the Hospital until such time as an investigation was done into how she was previously treated and Mr. Z apologized for his false accusation against her concerning endangering a patient.
[14] In August 2022, Ms. Ikwuagwu emailed Ms. H to inform that she had not complained to HR directly about what happened to her while working at the Hospital. It was her understanding the Ms. G received complaints and passed them on to HR for action as this is what had happened when others accused her of wrongdoing.
[15] On January 18, 2023, Ms. Ikwuagwu alleges IH refused to allow her to be deployed to another hospital in Grand Forks that was having critical staffing shortages because she had a complaint about being mistreated by co-workers under investigation at the Hospital. She alleges that the IH’s denial of her re-deployment is related to her race-based complaint that went uninvestigated for 3.5 years [the January 18, 2023, Redeployment Allegation].
[16] On March 3, 2023, Ms. Ikwuagwu alleges that IH’s investigation into Mr. Z’s reports about her endangering a patient concluded with a finding that no wrongdoing had occurred. Ms. Ikwuagwu alleges the delay in conducting the investigation, and the biased conclusion favouring a white co-worker who made false accusations against her, are harms related to her race [the March 3, 2023, Investigation Outcome Allegation].
[17] Despite remaining on the Hospital’s casual list, Ms. Ikwuagwu notes that after mid 2020 she has worked elsewhere as a nurse. She provided evidence of other employers valuing her as an employee, including making her offers for permanent positions.
III. ANALYSIS AND DECISION
[18] The time limit set out in s. 22 of the Code is a substantive provision which is intended to ensure that complainants pursue their human rights remedies diligently: Chartier v. School District No. 62, 2003 BCHRT 39.
A. Time Limit and Continuing Contravention
[19] The Complaint was filed on April 11, 2023. To comply with the one-year time limit under s. 22(1) of the Code, the alleged act of discrimination had to occur on or after April 11, 2022.
[20] A complaint is filed in time if the last allegation of discrimination happened within one year, and older allegations are part of a “continuing contravention”: Code, s. 22(2); School District v. Parent obo the Child, 2018 BCCA 136 at para. 68 [School District]. A continuing contravention is “a succession or repetition of separate acts of discrimination of the same character” that could be considered separate contraventions of the Code, and “not merely one act of discrimination which may have continuing effects or consequences”: Chen v. Surrey (City), 2015 BCCA 57at para. 23; School District at para. 50.
[21] The assessment of whether discrete allegations are a continuing contravention is a “fact specific one which will depend very much on the individual circumstances of each case”: Dickson v. Vancouver Island Human Rights Coalition, 2005 BCHRT 209 at para. 17. A relevant consideration is whether there are significant gaps between the allegations: Dickson at paras. 16-17. Whether or not a gap is significant will be assessed contextually, considering the length itself and any explanations for the gap: Reynolds v Overwaitea Food Group, 2013 BCHRT 67, at para. 28. A significant, unexplained, gap in time will weigh against finding a continuing contravention: Bjorklund v. BC Ministry of Public Safety and Solicitor General, 2018 BCHRT 204 at para. 14.
[22] I start by considering whether Ms. Ikwuagwu set out any timely allegations against IH. After reviewing the complaint information, I have determined that Ms. Ikwuagwu alleges two timely allegations, the first being the January 18, 2023, Redeployment Allegation and the second being the March 3, 2023, Investigation Outcome Allegation. For the purposes of this application, I conclude that both allegations occurred in the parties’ employment relationship, and both contain harms related to Ms. Ikwuagwu being Black. She alleges that part of the reason IH would not allow her to be deployed at another hospital was the investigation into racism at work. Ms. Ikwuagwu further alleges that the negative outcome from IH’s investigation into Mr. Z’s conduct was related to her race.
[23] I have next considered whether Ms. Ikwuagwu has set out any other allegations during the untimely period where she worked shifts in the Hospital from late 2016 to mid 2020. While recognizing Ms. Ikwuagwu made general allegations about not feeling welcome and having her work micromanaged and criticized by her coworkers, most of these allegations have not been sufficiently particularized to form allegations of discrimination for the purposes of this application. However, I have determined that the allegations concerning Mr. Z are sufficiently particularized to form arguable contraventions of the Code. First, the 2018 Stent Allegations include details of an accusation about Ms. Ikwuagwu putting a patient at risk with evidence indicating she asked IH to investigate the incident as being tainted by racism, which was not actioned. Second, while Ms. Ikwuagwu has not provided a date for the Scope Allegation, she has provided sufficient details outlining a pattern of disrespectful communication with Mr. Z during her time working in the OR where her race was related to the harms alleged. Third, while the Announcement Allegations are also undated, I have determined that they contain sufficient details of a pattern of Mr. Z treating Ms. Ikwuagwu differently while working with her for reasons related to her race.
[24] Ms. Ikwuagwu argues that IH’s ongoing failure to investigate the 2018 Stent Allegations is an allegation capable of forming part of a continuing contravention. She submits that the failure to investigate lasted from 2018 until mid 2022, when Ms. H checked in with her about whether she intended to return to work at the Hospital as a casual employee. Only in mid 2022, when Ms. Ikwuagwu informed IH that she would not return until an investigation occurred, did IH start its investigation. In her view, IH’s failure to investigate the 2018 Stent Allegations was ongoing and capable of forming a continuing contravention. As noted above, allegations must be considered separate contraventions of the Code, and not merely one act of discrimination which may have continuing effects or consequences. In this case, the complaint information indicates that Ms. Ikwuagwu knew before she stopped taking casual shifts at the Hospital in mid 2020 that IH was not investigating the 2018 Stent Allegations. At that time, she decided to work elsewhere to avoid the toxic workplace but still retained her causal employment status with IH. In my view, IH’s ongoing failure to investigate from mid 2020 onwards until mid 2022 is best characterized as the continuing effects of the 2018 Stent Allegations rather than ongoing allegations of individual acts of discrimination.
[25] Having found arguable timely allegations in 2023 and out of time allegations in the period from late 2016 to mid 2020 in this case concerning IH, it is now necessary to determine whether the complaint is a continuing contravention of the Code based on the timely allegations in 2023, tethering in the late 2016 to mid 2020 allegations as timely. Put another way, I must now consider whether a continuing contravention exists here. This analysis starts with a consideration as to whether the allegations are of a similar nature.
[26] The parties appear to agree that Ms. Ikwuagwu’s allegations are of a similar nature in that they involve anti-Black racism perpetrated by co-workers that was not property investigated and resolved by IH.
[27] The more difficult question in this case related to the existence of a continuing contravention of the Code is the large gap of multiple years between the 2018 Stent Allegations and the timely 2023 Redeployment and Investigation Outcome Allegations. A gap of this magnitude does not indicate a succession of allegations necessary under s. 22(2). Further, Ms. Ikwuagwu has not adequately explained why such a gap exists. While acknowledging Ms. Ikwuagwu decided not to return to the IH until an investigation occurred to address the matter, this explanation falls short of explaining such a large gap between two allegations separated by so many years. I agree with IH that Ms. Ikwuagwu’s not addressing the investigation with IH for a number of years while keeping a place on the casual list is a large gap in the allegations that remains unexplained. In this case, the evidence fails to indicate a succession of allegations necessary to form a continuing contravention.
[28] The 2016 to 2020 allegations of discrimination do not form part of a continuing contravention of the Code. I now move on to an analysis of whether the Tribunal should exercise its discretion to accept the 2016 to 2020 allegations outside the one-year time limit because it is in the public interest to do so, and no substantial prejudice will result to any person because of the delay: Code s. 22(3). I begin with the public interest determination.
B. Public Interest
[29] Whether it is in the public interest to accept the late-filed complaint is a multi-faceted analysis. The enquiry is fact and context specific and assessed in accordance with the purposes of the Code: Hoang v. Warnaco and Johns, 2007 BCHRT 24 at para. 26. The Tribunal considers a non-exhaustive list of factors, including the length of the delay, the reasons for the delay, and the public interest in the complaint itself: British Columbia (Ministry of Public Safety and Solicitor General) v. Mzite, 2014 BCCA 220 [Mzite] at para. 53. These are important factors, but they are not necessarily determinative: Goddard v. Dixon, 2012 BCSC 161 at para. 152; Mzite at para. 55.
[30] I have first considered the length of the delay in filing. The delay associated with the 2016 to 2022 allegations is more than two years, which is excessive, and militates strongly against the public interest: Naziel-Wilson v. Providence Health Care and another, 2014 BCHRT 170, at para. 13; Mzite at para. 59.
[31] Ms. Ikwuagwu provided several reasons for the delay in filing a complaint. First, she states that she was waiting for IH to investigate the harms perpetrated by Mr. Z, which did not start until mid 2022. Ms. Ikwuagwu submits that she filed the complaint the same day she received the results of IH’s investigation.
[32] While appreciating that Ms. Ikwuagwu decided to wait until the IH’s internal investigation process was decided before filing a complaint, the Tribunal has repeatedly said that pursuing another process does not suspend the time limit under the Code, on its own, to relieve against the time limit: Sones v. District of Squamish, 2016 BHCRT 99 at para. 44 and Devitt and Hargrove obo others v. School District No. 43 and another, 2011 BCHRT 218 at paras. 20-21. In this case, Ms. Ikwuagwu demonstrated she was capable of initiating an internal investigation at the IH. She also secured nursing work elsewhere after no longer taking shifts at the Hospital. In this case, Ms. Ikwuagwu has not provided any reason for choosing to pursue her option with the IH before filing a complaint with the Tribunal that attracts the public interest.
[33] I further acknowledge Mr. Ikwuagwu’s assertion that public interest should attract where IH intentionally delayed an investigation to ensure the time limit for filing ran out. As noted above, it remained Ms. Ikwuagwu’s decision to file a complaint and waiting for the IH’s internal investigation to occur does not attract the public interest in this case. Even if such interest could attract, Ms. Ikwuagwu has not provided any evidence that IH intentionally delayed its investigation to time limit expired.
[34] Ms. Ikwuagwu also referenced the COVID-19 pandemic a reason for her delay in filing. She stated that the pandemic “delayed some processes” without elaborating further on this reason. While appreciating the COVID-19 pandemic disrupted everyone’s lives for a period of time after 2020, without more specific information about how it precluded Ms. Ikwuagwu’s filing of this complaint I cannot conclude this reason attracts the public interest in allowing the late filed portions of the complaint to proceed.
[35] In determining whether acceptance of a late-filed complaint is in the public interest, the Tribunal also considers whether there is anything particularly unique, novel, or unusual about the complaint that has not been addressed in other complaints: Hau v. SFU Student Services and others, 2014 BCHRT 10 at para. 22; Bains v. Advanced Air Supply and others, 2013 BCHRT 74 at para. 22; Mathieu v. Victoria Shipyards and others, 2010 BCHRT 224 at para. 60. Where a complaint raises a novel issue on behalf of a vulnerable group, which advances the purposes of the Code, this factor may weigh in favour of finding a public interest in accepting the complaint: Mzite at paras. 65-66. The Tribunal has considered gaps in its jurisprudence, on the one hand, and the existence of good precedents, on the other hand, in determining whether to permit a complaint to proceed: Mzite at para. 67.
[36] Ms. Ikwuagwu is seeking justice for the 2016 to 2020 untimely allegations. Her purpose in filing the complaint is to create a respectful work environment for minority workers in the OR at the Hospital. She is also seeking justice for the negative effects travelling for work has caused her because she is not able to work in her chosen community where IH has jurisdiction.
[37] While I accept that the Tribunal frequently addresses allegations of discrimination in employment, including allegations of differential treatment and harassment, Ms. Ikwuagwu’s complaint also engages the specific context of anti-Black racism in the workplace, which has not been commonly dealt with at the Tribunal. I appreciate that the Tribunal has issued occasional decisions after a hearing on this subject, but their existence does make this type of case common: Young Worker v. Heirloom and another, 2023 BCHRT 137; Francis v. BC Ministry of Justice (No. 3), 2019 BCHRT 136; Balikama v. Khaira Enterprises Ltd., 2014 BCHRT 107.
[38] In Umolo v. Shoppers Drug Mart, 2021 BCHRT 166 at para. 29, the Tribunal acknowledged that anti-Black racism may share themes with other forms of racism but is distinct and should be assessed within its own context. In that case, the Tribunal considered the allegations of anti-Black racism to be a factor weighing in the public interest of accepting the late-filed complaint. I agree with the reasoning and find it applies to this case. I accept that this factor weighs in favour of finding it is in the public interest to accept the late filed portions of her complaint.
[39] Ms. Ikwuagwu’s late filed portion of her complaint is significantly late filed. Additionally, her explanation for her delay in filing related to waiting for the IH’s investigation to occur does not weigh in favour of the public interest in accepting this portion of the complaint for late filing. While appreciating that some public interest attracts to this portion of her complaint proceeding as it involves allegations of anti-Black racism, this factor is outweighed by the significant delay and lack of compelling explanation for the delay.
[40] For these reasons, I do not find that it is in the public interest to accept the late filed portion of Ms. Ikwuagwu’s complaint, and I need not address the issue of whether substantial prejudice would result.
IV. CONCLUSION
[41] The complaint for the 2016 to 2020 allegations does not form part of a continuing contravention of the Code, and it is not in the public interest to allow it to proceed late filed.
[42] As such, the Complaint proceeds against IH regarding the 2023 allegations only.
Steven Adamson
Tribunal Member