Patient A v. The Doctor, 2025 BCHRT 270
Date Issued: October 21, 2025
File: CS-009055
Indexed as: Patient A v. The Doctor, 2025 BCHRT 270
IN THE MATTER OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS CODE
R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 210 (as amended)
AND IN THE MATTER of a complaint before
the British Columbia Human Rights Tribunal
BETWEEN:
Patient A
COMPLAINANT
AND:
The Doctor
RESPONDENT
REASONS FOR DECISION
TIMELINESS OF COMPLAINT
Section 22
Tribunal Member: Steven Adamson
On her own behalf: Patient A
On behalf of the Respondent: Brett Weninger
I Introduction
[1] On March 6, 2023, Patient A filed a complaint of discrimination based on mental disability contrary to s. 8 of the Human Rights Code [Code], against her former family physician, the Doctor.
[2] Since the complaint appears to have been filed outside the one-year limit under s. 22 of the Code, the Tribunal sought submissions from the parties.
[3] The issue before me is whether to accept the complaint for filing against the Doctor given it appears to have been filed outside the one-year time limit established under s. 22(1) of the Code. I make no findings regarding the merits of this complaint.
[4] For the reasons that follow, I find it is not in the public interest to accept the late-filed complaint for filing.
II ORDER LIMITING PUBLICTION
[5] The Doctor requested that any public decision concerning timeliness limit the publication of her name because her privacy interests outweigh the public interest in publishing the names of the parties at the preliminary stages of the Tribunal’s process. She submits that publication would negatively affect her professional reputation and possibly impact her ability to form therapeutic relationships with future patients. The Doctor notes that the Tribunal has additionally acknowledged that a physician’s professional reputation does impact the livelihood of a medical doctor and is a factor to consider. In her view, the purposes of the Code will be adequately and appropriately served despite limiting publication of her name as the decision will be accessible to the public. Any guiding principles that emerge from this case are not dependent on the identity of the Doctor.
[6] Patient A opposes the Doctor’s application to limit publication. In her view, the Doctor should not have the privilege of anonymity as this case is extremely relevant to the public and Patient As she is currently treating.
[7] I have decided to limit the publication of both parties names in this decision according to Rule 5(6) of the Tribunal’s Rules of Practice and Procedure. As concerns Patient A, I am limiting publication on my own motion as it is necessary to discuss her mental and physical disabilities in some detail in relation to the timeliness of her complaint. I have decided to order a limitation on the publication of her name to protect Patient A’s privacy regarding this sensitive information.
[8] I have also allowed the Doctor’s application to limit the publication of her name in this decision. At the very early stages of this Complaint I recognize that the allegations made by Patient A are serious and unproven. As such, I agree with the Doctor that publishing her name without an opportunity to provide any evidence to dispute such allegations could damage her reputation and livelihood unnecessarily.
[9] In making this order, I recognize there is a strong public interest in the Tribunal maintaining open and public processes to promote the awareness of the Code, education about its application, and access to its processes. However, there are exceptions to an open process where strong grounds for limiting publication of personal information exist: A v. University and Dr. B and C and D and E, 2014 BCHRT 235, at para. 5. In this case, I am persuaded that public knowledge of the parties’ names, when the decision must identify both Patient A’s mental and physical disabilities and the unproven allegations against the Doctor, could affect both parties in pursuit of their livelihood and possibly stigmatize each of them within the community where they reside, and in their profession in the case of the Doctor. These are compelling grounds for limiting publication for the purposes of preliminary decisions on this complaint.
III Background to complaint
[10] Patient A has PTSD from childhood sexual abuse.
[11] In the fall of 2020, Patient A alleges suffering from excruciating physical pain associated with polycystic ovary syndrome, endometriosis, twisted fallopian tubes and a fused uterus.
[12] From September 2020 until January 2021, Patient A alleges that she saw the Doctor as a patient for pain related to her physical conditions. She alleges that when she shared information about her childhood abuse with resulting PTDS, the Doctor inappropriately discussed her own child’s report of abuse that she had discounted, which implied that the Doctor also rejected Patient A’s reports of abuse as untrue. Patient A further alleges that the Doctor disregarded her reports of physical pain symptoms as being caused by her PTSD and told her that she “just had to get mentally stronger” to overcome the pain. Patient A accuses the Doctor of refusing to treat her physical pain symptoms and failing to make the necessary medical referrals to investigate her conditions, which were later diagnosed and treated surgically.
[13] After January 2021, Patient A alleges that she had to fight to find a doctor that would investigate and treat her debilitating physical symptoms. She then reports undergoing several major surgeries from which she was just recovering from at the time the complaint was filed in March 2023.
[14] III ANALYSIS AND DECISION
[15] Section 22 of the Code provides:
(1) A complaint must be filed within one year of the alleged contravention.
(2) If a continuing contravention is alleged in a complaint, the complaint must be filed within one year of the last alleged instance of the contravention.
(3) If a complaint is filed after the expiration of the time limit referred to in subsection (1) or (2), a member or panel may accept all or part of the complaint if the member or panel determines that:
(a) it is in the public interest to accept the complaint, and
(b) no substantial prejudice will result to any person because of the delay.
[16] The time limit set out in s. 22 of the Code is a substantive provision which is intended to ensure that complainants pursue their human rights remedies diligently and to allow respondents the comfort of performing their activities without the possibility of a dated complaint: Chartier v. School District No. 62, 2003 BCHRT 39 at para. 12.
A. Time limit
[17] The complaint was filed on March 6, 2023. To comply with the one-year time limit under s. 22(1) of the Code, the alleged act of discrimination had to occur on or after March 6, 2022.
[18] Patient A’s complaint is related to events ending in January 2021. As such, the complaint is late-filed and I proceed to an analysis of whether the Tribunal should exercise its discretion to accept the complaint outside the one-year time limit because it is in the public interest to do so, and no substantial prejudice will result to any person because of the delay: Code s. 22(3). I begin with the public interest determination.
B. Public interest
[19] Whether it is in the public interest to accept the late-filed complaint is a multi-faceted analysis. The enquiry is fact and context specific and assessed in accordance with the purposes of the Code: Hoang v. Warnaco and Johns, 2007 BCHRT 24 at para. 26. The Tribunal considers a non-exhaustive list of factors, including the length of the delay, the reasons for the delay, and the public interest in the complaint itself: British Columbia (Ministry of Public Safety and Solicitor General) v. Mzite, 2014 BCCA 220 [Mzite] at para. 53. These are important factors, but they are not necessarily determinative: Goddard v. Dixon, 2012 BCSC 161 at para. 152; Mzite at para. 55.
[20] I have first considered the length of delay in this case. The events in question allegedly occurred up to January 2021. The delay in this case is, therefore, well over one year, which is considered by the Tribunal to be excessive and militates strongly against the public interest: Naziel-Wilson v. Providence Health Care and another, 2014 BCHRT 170 [Naziel-Wilson]at para. 13.
[21] Patient A offered several reasons for her delay in filing. First, she submits that while immediately filing a complaint against the Doctor with BC’s College of Physicians and Surgeons [the College], she decided to wait to file a complaint at the Tribunal until receiving a response in the other forum. It appears that she sought validation that her rights had been violated by the Doctor at the College before moving on to file a complaint at the Tribunal.
[22] While appreciating that Patient A decided to wait until complaint with the College was decided before starting a complaint here, the Tribunal has repeatedly said that pursuing another process does not suspend the time limit under the Code, on its own, to relieve against the time limit: Sones v. District of Squamish, 2016 BCHRT 99 at para. 44 and Devitt and Hargrove obo others v. School District No. 43 and another, 2011 BCHRT 218 at paras. 20-21. In this case, Patient A demonstrated she was capable of finding the College as a venue for redress related to her negative experience with the Doctor and she has not provided any compelling reason for her choice to pursue her option there before filing a complaint with the Tribunal.
[23] Patient A also submits her complaint was late filed for reasons related to her ongoing disabilities with resulting surgeries. In support of this she provided a note from her current family doctor, dated March 31, 2025, which states that they have been seeing her since January 2021. The current doctor’s report notes that Patient A has been disabled from January 2021 until March 2025 to the extent that her executive functioning is delayed. This delay requires her to seek out additional help and support from family to complete tasks like filing a complaint. Patient A’s own evidence admits that her ex-husband helped her complete complaint forms to start processes at both the College and the Tribunal because she was too disabled to complete the paperwork on her own.
[24] Where the delay is due to a disabling condition, the Tribunal has observed that it may be in the public interest to accept a late-filed complaint: MacAlpine v. Office of the Representative for Children and Youth, 2011 BCHRT 29 at para. 42. Disabling conditions can include physical and mental ailments resulting in great difficulty coping with even the basic daily tasks of life: Naziel-Wilson at para. 21.
[25] I accept Patient A’s evidence that she suffered from various disabilities during the timeframe for filing that challenged her ability to file in time. However, the evidence on file indicates that Patient A had support from her ex-husband to file a complaint in a timely manner. Patient A’s actions demonstrate that she had the ability to provide direction to someone assisting her in order to file a complaint with College at the start of 2021 immediately following her negative experience with the Doctor. Her information further indicates that she was again provided assistance in March 2023 to file this complaint with the Tribunal. Despite Patient A’s limited capacity to file a complaint on her own, I am not convinced that she was precluded from filing during the timeframe allotted for reasons related to her disabilities. As noted above, Patient A made strategic decisions about pursuing redress at the College before coming to the Tribunal. This approach, while unfortunate in terms of her ability to move forward with this complaint, does not attract the public interest in this case.
[26] In determining whether accepting a late-filed complaint is in the public interest, the Tribunal may also consider whether there is anything particularly unique, novel, or unusual about the complaint that has not been addressed in other complaints: Hau v. SFU Student Services and others, 2014 BCHRT 10 at para. 22; Bains v. Advanced Air Supply and others, 2013 BCHRT 74 at para. 22; Mathieu v. Victoria Shipyards and others, 2010 BCHRT 224 at para. 60. Where a complaint raises a novel issue on behalf of a vulnerable group which advances the purposes of the Code, this factor may weigh in favour of finding a public interest in accepting the complaint: Mzite at paras. 65-66. The Tribunal has considered gaps in its jurisprudence, on the one hand, and the existence of good precedents, on the other hand, in determining whether to permit a complaint to proceed: Mzite at para. 67.
[27] Patient A seeks justice for the alleged suffering she experienced because the Doctor refused to investigate and treat her multiple physical conditions. She wants her complaint to proceed to protect others from such practices generally and to ensure the Doctor does not injure other patients. Finally, Patient A believes her case unique because it involves patients with endometriosis who notoriously suffer at length before receiving proper medical treatment. While acknowledging this complaint raises allegations of discrimination associated with a medical doctor’s treatment decisions being clouded by their perception of Patient A’s mental disabilities, I am not satisfied that Patient A’s complaint raises a novel issue that would advance the purposes of the Code, if heard. The Tribunal has heard mental disability discrimination complaints against doctors as service providers, and the jurisprudence is fairly settled in this area. See for example: The Parent obo the Child v. Fraser Health Authority operating as the Hospital and another, 2024 BCHRT 45.
[28] For these reasons, I do not find that it is in the public interest to accept the late-filed complaint, and I need not address the issue of whether substantial prejudice would result.
IV CONCLUSION
[29] For these reasons, the complaint is not accepted for filing.
Steven Adamson
Tribunal Member