Peters v. Wal-Mart Canada Corp. and another, 2025 BCHRT 269
Date Issued: October 21, 2025
File: CS-009177
Indexed as: Peters v. Wal-Mart Canada Corp. and another, 2025 BCHRT 269
IN THE MATTER OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS CODE
R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 210 (as amended)
AND IN THE MATTER of a complaint before
the British Columbia Human Rights Tribunal
BETWEEN:
Floyd Peters
COMPLAINANT
AND:
Wal-Mart Canada Corp. and William Turner
RESPONDENTS
REASONS FOR DECISION
TIMELINESS OF COMPLAINT
Section 22
Tribunal Member: Steven Adamson
On his own behalf: Floyd Peters
Counsel for the Respondents: Kim Nusbaum
I INTRODUCTION
[1] On March 21, 2023, Floyd Peters filed a complaint of discrimination in services based on Indigenous identity and race contrary to s. 8 of the Human Rights Code [Code], against the Wal-Mart Canada Corp. [Wal-Mart] and one of its employees, William Turner [together the Respondents].
[2] The issue before me with respect to timeliness is whether to accept the complaint against the Respondents. I make no findings regarding the merits of this complaint.
[3] In reaching this decision I reviewed Mr. Peters’ complaint and the Respondents’ time limit response submission. I note Mr. Peters was provided an opportunity to make a reply submission but did not avail himself of the opportunity to do so.
[4] For the reasons that follow, I find that it is not in the public interest to accept the late filed complaint for filing.
II BACKGROUND TO COMPLAINT
[5] Mr. Peters is Indigenous from the Lytton First Nation. He describes himself as visibly Indigenous.
[6] Some time before October 22, 2020, Mr. Peters alleges that Mr. Turner, a Wal-Mart asset protection associate, followed him around the store while shopping and checked his name on a receipt for the purchase of a TV for reasons related to his Indigenous identity and race.
[7] On October 22, 2020, Mr. Peters alleges that Mr. Turner again followed him around the store while he was shopping. On this day, Mr. Turner allegedly contacted the police who appeared at the store and arrested Mr. Floyd on driving while prohibited charges.
III ANALYSIS AND DECISION
[8] Section 22 of the Code provides:
(1) A complaint must be filed within one year of the alleged contravention.
(2) If a continuing contravention is alleged in a complaint, the complaint must be filed within one year of the last alleged instance of the contravention.
(3) If a complaint is filed after the expiration of the time limit referred to in subsection (1) or (2), a member or panel may accept all or part of the complaint if the member or panel determines that:
(a) it is in the public interest to accept the complaint, and
(b) no substantial prejudice will result to any person because of the delay.
[9] The time limit set out in s. 22 of the Code is a substantive provision which is intended to ensure that complainants pursue their human rights remedies diligently: Chartier v. School District No. 62, 2003 BCHRT 39.
A. Time Limit
[10] The complaint was filed on March 21, 2023. To comply with the one-year time limit under s. 22(1) of the Code, the alleged act of discrimination had to occur on or after March 21, 2022.
[11] The latest specific allegations of discrimination in this case occurred on October 22, 2020. As such, the complaint is late-filed and I proceed to an analysis of whether the Tribunal should exercise its discretion to accept the complaint outside the one-year time limit because it is in the public interest to do so, and no substantial prejudice will result to any person because of the delay: Code s. 22(3). I begin with the public interest determination.
B. Public Interest
[12] Whether it is in the public interest to accept the late-filed complaint is a multi-faceted analysis. The enquiry is fact and context specific and assessed in accordance with the purposes of the Code: Hoang v. Warnaco and Johns, 2007 BCHRT 24 at para. 26. The Tribunal considers a non-exhaustive list of factors, including the length of the delay, the reasons for the delay, and the public interest in the complaint itself: British Columbia (Ministry of Public Safety and Solicitor General) v. Mzite, 2014 BCCA 220 [Mzite] at para. 53. These are important factors, but they are not necessarily determinative: Goddard v. Dixon, 2012 BCSC 161 at para. 152; Mzite at para. 55.
[13] I have first considered the length of delay in filing. As noted above, the allegations of discrimination in this case occurred up to October 22, 2020. As such, the complaint allegations were approximately one year and five months, or 17 months late-filed, which is considered by the Tribunal to be excessive and militates strongly against the public interest: Naziel-Wilson v. Providence Health Care and another 2014 BCHR 170 at para. 13.
[14] Mr. Peters’ reasons for delay focus on him waiting for the Crown to charge him in relation to the arrest on October 22, 2020. He further claims that once charges were laid it took a while for his defence lawyer to figure out how and why he was being charged with driving offences. Mr. Peters alleges that once he was advised of the particulars of the criminal offence, he learned that the Respondents had been watching him for a whole year by the time he came to shop on at Wal-Mart on October 22, 2020. It also appears that Mr. Peters learned from the Crown’s disclosure that Mr. Turner gave his name to police after the TV receipt checking incident, which resulted in his subsequent arrest in the store.
[15] From my review of the evidence on file, Mr. Peters’ information fails to indicate the criminal matter precluded him from filing this complaint. It appears, however, that Mr. Peters decided to make a complaint with the Tribunal when he discovered evidence of how pervasive and intrusive Wal-Mart’s monitoring of him in the store was in the year before his October 22, 2020, arrest.
[16] I have, therefore, considered whether Mr. Peters’ need to find out whether any evidence existed concerning Wal-Mart’s lengthy monitoring him for criminality while shopping attracts the public interest to accept a late-filed complaint because material facts were unknown prior to receiving disclosure from the Crown in the criminal matter. In cases where the complainant does not know the material facts upon which their complaint may be based, and could not with reasonable diligence have discovered those facts, then it would be unfair not to permit them to file their complaint upon becoming aware of those facts: Mehar and others v. International Forest Products, 2005 BCHRT 161 , Sidhu and Reyes and Bhatti v. Western Forest Products Inc., 2006 BCHRT 251, Yen v. Vancouver General Hospital and others, 2007 BCHT 328, AM v. BCHRT, 2017 BCSC 89.
[17] In this case, I have determined that Mr. Peters had all the material facts he needed to file a complaint prior to learning more about the extent of Wal-Mart’s surveillance of him in the store. On October 22, 2020, he reports being followed around the store by Mr. Turner for reasons related to his Indigenous identity and race. He also refers to another recent experience prior to that date where Mr. Turner followed him around and made him show proof of purchase for a TV he bought. While later learning about being monitored for theft at the store for a full year before the October 22, 2020, arrest may have strengthened Mr. Peters’ convictions that he was being racially profiled while shopping at Wal-Mart, in my view this evidence does not amount to discovering the kind of material evidence necessary to attract the public interest in allowing the late filed complaint to proceed. Here, Mr. Peters already knew he was being targeted for theft control measures because of his Indigenous identity and race. Learning how pervasive these measures were over the prior year does not attract the public interest in allowing the complaint to proceed late filed.
[18] In determining whether acceptance of a late-filed complaint is in the public interest, the Tribunal also considers whether there is anything particularly unique, novel, or unusual about the complaint that has not been addressed in other complaints: Hau v. SFU Student Services and others, 2014 BHCRT 10 at para. 22; Bains v. Advanced Air Supply and others, 2012 BCHRT 74 at para. 22; Mathieu v. Victoria Shipyards and others, 2010 BCHRT 244 at para. 60. Where a complaint raises a novel issue on behalf of a vulnerable group, which advances the purposes of the Code, this factor may weigh in favour of finding a public interest in accepting the complaint: Mzite at paras. 65-66. The Tribunal has considered gaps in its jurisprudence, on the one hand, and the existence of good precedents, on the other hand, in determining whether to permit a complaint to proceed: Mzite at para. 67.
[19] Mr. Peters argues that allowing his complaint to proceed will prevent further First Nations people from being targeted and watched when shopping because of prejudices held by retailers that they are just there to steal from them.
[20] The Respondents argue there is nothing unusual or unique about his complaint. While understating that all complainants feel their complaints are important, that alone is not a public interest basis upon which to allow them to proceed late filed.
[21] For the purposes of this application, I recognize that Mr. Peters’ circumstances, including his Indigeneity as an indicator of vulnerability – given the history of genocide, discrimination, and harm against its Indigenous Peoples – attracts some public interest in allowing his case to proceed. The Tribunal may consider whether the Code is accessible to the vulnerable persons it intends to protect in the assessment of the public interest: Mzite at paras. 65-66; L v. B.C. (Ministry of Children and Family Development), 2011 BCHRT 214 at para. 99; Mohammed v. BC Ministry of Children and Family Development (No. 2), 2017 BCHRT 159 at para. 44; Mr. C. v. Vancouver Coastal Health Authority and another, 2021 BCHRT 22 at para. 90.
[22] Ultimately, however, the filing delay in this case is excessive, and that strongly weighs against the public interest: Mohammed v. BC Ministry of Children and Family Development (No. 2), 2017 BCHRT 159, at para. 33. The reasons Mr. Peters has provided for the delay are not sufficient to overcome the strong weight against such a dated complaint. While appreciating the nature of Mr. Peters’ complaint attracts some public interest concerning his Indigeneity as an indicator of vulnerability, this alone does not tip the balance in favour of allowing the complaint to proceed late filed in this case.
[23] For these reasons, I do not find that it is in the public interest to accept the late-filed complaint, and I need not address the issue of whether substantial prejudice would result. However, in the circumstances of this case, where the delay is excessive, I am prepared to presume there would be substantial prejudice to the respondents: LeMoine v. B.C. (Ministry of Public Safety and Solicitor General) 2009 BCHRT 163, at para. 34.
IV CONCLUSION
[24] For these reasons, the complaint is not accepted for filing.
Steven Adamson
Tribunal Member