Francis v. Teamsters Local Union No. 155 (No. 2), 2025 BCHRT 268
Date Issued: October 21, 2025
File: CS-005928
Indexed as: Francis v. Teamsters Local Union No. 155 (No. 2), 2025 BCHRT 268
IN THE MATTER OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS CODE,
RSBC 1996, c. 210 (as amended)
AND IN THE MATTER of a complaint before
the British Columbia Human Rights Tribunal
BETWEEN:
Peter Francis
COMPLAINANT
AND:
Teamsters Local Union No. 155
RESPONDENT
REASONS FOR DECISION
APPLICATION TO DISMISS A COMPLAINT
Section 27(1)(c) and 27(1)(f)
Tribunal Member: Jessica Derynck
For the Complainant: No submissions
Counsel for the Respondent: Bennett M. Arsenault
I INTRODUCTION
[1] Peter Francis filed a complaint against Teamsters Local Union No. 155 [Respondent] alleging discrimination regarding employment and by a trade union. Mr. Francis says he was working on a film production [Production] when colleagues bullied him and insulted him related to his race, age, colour, and a perceived mental disability. He says one of these colleagues then fired him from the Production. Mr. Francis says the Respondent did not assist him with these issues, and unfairly revoked his permittee status, which had allowed him to work on film productions under a collective agreement.
[2] The Respondent says it was not Mr. Francis’ employer and there is no support for the allegation that it discriminated against him regarding employment. The Respondent applies to dismiss the complaint of discrimination regarding employment on the basis that there is no reasonable prospect it will succeed.
[3] The Respondent applies to dismiss the complaint of discrimination by a trade union on the basis that a proceeding at the Labour Relations Board [LRB] appropriately dealt with the substance of the complaint. The Respondent says the LRB has already decided that its response to Mr. Francis’ workplace issues, and its decision to revoke his permittee status, were not discriminatory.
[4] For the following reasons, I find that the allegation of discrimination regarding employment has no reasonable prospect of success, and the LRB proceeding appropriately dealt with the substance of the complaint of discrimination by a trade union. I dismiss the complaint under ss. 27(1)(c) and (f) of the Human Rights Code.
[5] Mr. Francis did not respond to the application to dismiss the complaint. To make my decision, I have considered the Respondent’s application materials and all the information Mr. Francis included in his complaint and an amendment to his complaint. In these reasons, I only refer to what is necessary to explain my decision.
II DECISION
A. There is no reasonable prospect that the allegation of discrimination regarding employment will succeed
[6] Section 13 of the Code prohibits discrimination regarding employment based on protected characteristics including race, colour, age, and mental disability.
[7] The Respondent applies to dismiss this part of Mr. Francis’ complaint on the basis that it has no reasonable prospect of success: Code, s. 27(1)(c) The onus is on the Respondent to establish the basis for dismissal.
[8] Section 27(1)(c) is part of the Tribunal’s gate-keeping function. It allows the Tribunal to remove complaints which do not warrant the time and expense of a hearing.
[9] The Tribunal does not make findings of fact under s. 27(1)(c). Instead, the Tribunal looks at the evidence to decide whether “there is no reasonable prospect that findings of fact that would support the complaint could be made on a balance of probabilities after a full hearing of the evidence”: Berezoutskaia v. British Columbia (Human Rights Tribunal), 2006 BCCA 95 at para. 22, leave to appeal ref’d [2006] SCCA No. 171. The Tribunal must base its decision on the materials filed by the parties, and not on speculation about what evidence may be filed at the hearing: University of British Columbia v. Chan,2013 BCSC 942 at para. 77.
[10] A dismissal application is not the same as a hearing: Lord v. Fraser Health Authority,2021 BCSC 2176 at para. 20; SEPQA v. Canadian Human Rights Commission,[1989] 2 SCR 879 at 899. The threshold to advance a complaint to a hearing is low. In a dismissal application, a complainant does not have to prove their complaint or show the Tribunal all the evidence they may introduce at a hearing. They only have to show that the evidence takes their complaint out of the realm of conjecture: Workers’ Compensation Appeal Tribunal v. Hill, 2011 BCCA 49 at para. 27.
[11] Many human rights complaints raise issues of credibility. This is not, by itself, a sufficient reason to deny an application to dismiss: Evans v. University of British Columbia, 2008 BCSC 1026 at para. 34. However, if there are foundational or key issues of credibility, the complaint must go to a hearing: Francescutti v. Vancouver (City), 2017 BCCA 242 at para 67.
[12] To establish a case for discrimination regarding employment at a hearing, Mr. Francis will have to prove that the Respondent adversely impacted him regarding his employment, and that his race, age, colour, or a perceived mental disability was a factor in the adverse impact: Moore v. BC (Education), 2012 SCC 61 at para. 33.
[13] I find that there is no reasonable prospect of Mr. Francis proving that the Respondent adversely impacted him regarding employment. This means there is no reasonable prospect that his complaint under s. 13 of the Code will succeed.
[14] The Respondent is part of a council of film unions, which has a collective agreement with film production entities including the company that made the Production [Company]. The Respondent dispatches its members and permittees to work in food catering on productions. Permittees are not union members but have a permit from the Respondent or another union in the council to work on productions under the collective agreement. Mr. Francis was a permittee when the Respondent dispatched him to work as an assistant chef for the Production.
[15] The Respondent submits that there is no support in the complaint for the allegation that it discriminated against Mr. Francis regarding employment.
[16] The Respondent submitted an affidavit from its Secretary-Treasurer/Principal Officer, David Holm, in which Mr. Holm explains that the Company agreed to hire Mr. Francis under the terms of the collective agreement, which makes the company his employer for the time he worked on the Production. Mr. Francis acknowledged this in an application to add the Company as a respondent to his complaint.[1]
[17] Mr. Francis did not provide any information in his complaint to support his claim that the Respondent discriminated against him regarding his employment. He alleges that his colleagues on the Production bullied him, including making negative comments about his race, age, and mental stability. For the purposes of this application, I assume that he may describe these incidents in evidence at a hearing and that the Tribunal may accept his evidence. This would be evidence of adverse impacts regarding employment in which Mr. Francis’ protected characteristics were a factor, but these allegations are not about the Respondent. Rather, these allegations describe Mr. Francis’ colleagues’ conduct.
[18] Likewise, Mr. Francis’ claim that one of his colleagues who bullied him also fired him is an allegation of an adverse impact in which his protected characteristics were a factor, but it is about his colleague’s and the Company’s conduct, not the Respondent’s.
[19] In his complaint Mr. Francis also alleges that he reported his colleagues’ conduct to a representative of the Respondent [Union Rep], who told him that nothing could be done for him because he was a permittee and the colleague who fired him was a full member, and that if he thought he was discriminated against then he should report it to the Production. Mr. Francis says the Respondent “ghosted” him and did not help him straighten the matter out.
[20] The Respondent submits that an allegation that a union discriminated by failing to assist with a workplace issue is one of discrimination in union representation under s. 14 of the Code, not one of discrimination in employment under s. 13.
[21] I agree that the allegation that the Respondent did not assist him with his issues involving workplace discrimination is an allegation under s. 14 of the Code, and I address it in the analysis under s. 14 below.
[22] I also considered that it is possible for a third party to discriminate regarding employment by engaging in discriminatory conduct with a sufficient nexus to the complainant’s employment: British Columbia Human Rights Tribunal v. Schrenk, 2017 SCC 62. I considered whether any of the conduct Mr. Francis alleged in his complaint is conduct of the Respondent with a sufficient nexus to employment to be discrimination regarding employment.
[23] I find that Mr. Francis did not include information in his complaint to suggest that the Respondent engaged in discriminatory conduct connected to his employment on the Production. His colleagues may be members of the Respondent, but it does not follow that they were acting on the Respondent’s behalf or that the Respondent is somehow responsible for their conduct. The collective agreement, which is an exhibit to Mr. Holm’s affidavit, says that employers will not discriminate or engage in discriminatory harassment, and does not place any responsibility for providing a non-discriminatory environment on the Respondent. The parts of Mr. Francis’ complaint that are about the Respondent’s conduct fall under s. 14 of the Code.
[24] There is no reasonable prospect of Mr. Francis establishing that the Respondent discriminated against him regarding employment. I dismiss this part of his complaint under s. 27(1)(c) of the Code.
B. The LRB appropriately dealt with the substance of the complaint of discrimination by a trade union
[25] The Tribunal may dismiss a complaint under s. 27(1)(f) of the Code if the substance of the complaint has been appropriately dealt with in another proceeding. The principles underlying s. 27(1)(f) flow from the doctrines of issue estoppel, collateral attack and abuse of process, and include finality, fairness, and protecting the integrity of the administration of justice by preventing unnecessary inconsistency, multiplicity, and delay: British Columbia (Workers’ Compensation Board) v. Figliola, 2011 SCC 52 [Figliola] at paras. 25 and 36.
[26] To decide whether the substance of a complaint has been appropriately dealt with in another proceeding, the Tribunal must ask itself three things:
a. Did the other proceeding have concurrent jurisdiction to decide human rights issues?
b. Was the previously decided legal issue essentially the same as what is being complained of to the Tribunal?
c. Did the complainant or their privies have the opportunity to know the case to be met and have a chance to meet it, regardless of how closely the previous process procedurally mirrored the one the Tribunal prefers or uses itself?
Figliola at para. 37
[27] Ultimately, the Tribunal must decide “whether it makes sense to expend public and private resources on the relitigation of what is essentially the same dispute”: Figliola at para. 37.
[28] Mr. Francis alleges that the Respondent discriminated against him by failing to assist him with his colleagues’ alleged discrimination while working on the Production, and by terminating his permittee status. The Respondent says an LRB decision dated October 11, 2022 [LRB Decision], which dismissed Mr. Francis’ application under s. 12 of the Labour Relations Code alleging that the Respondent did not fairly represent him, appropriately dealt with both issues.
[29] Mr. Francis filed his application with the LRB on May 6, 2022, alleging that his removal from the permittee list was arbitrary and was related to the discrimination he says he experienced on the Production. He alleged that the Respondent only removed him because he stood up to discriminatory harassment and bullying and the Respondent refused to confront the facts, and that the Respondent did not fairly represent him when he reported his issues with his colleagues.
[30] I find that the LRB Decision appropriately dealt with the complaint under s. 14 of the Code.
[31] First, the LRB had concurrent jurisdiction to decide human rights issues: Administrative Tribunals Act, s. 46.1, Labour Relations Code, s. 115.1, Shen v. Teamsters Local Union No. 31, 2007 BCHRT 457 at para. 31.
[32] Second, the legal issues in Mr. Francis’ complaint are whether the Respondent breached s. 14 of the Code by poorly representing him related to his issue about his colleagues for reasons in which his race, colour, age, or a perceived disability were a factor, or by any of these protected characteristics being a factor in the decision to terminate his permittee status: Code, s. 14, Redmond v. Hospital Employees’ Union, 2024 BCHRT 203 at para 27.
[33] I find that the LRB dealt with these legal issues.
[34] The LRB noted that discriminatory representation under s. 12 of the Labour Relations Code includes discrimination on prohibited grounds under the Human Rights Code: LRB Decision, para. 30.
[35] The LRB Decision addressed Mr. Francis’ allegation that the Respondent discriminated by poorly representing him when he reported his workplace issues at para. 36. The Vice Chair referred to emails related to Mr. Francis’ interactions with the Respondent, including one Mr. Francis sent to a Respondent representative referencing a decision he had made after speaking to the representative not to take further action in relation to his workplace conflicts. The LRB Decision says, “I am unable to find that the Applicant has established an apparent case that the [Respondent’s] failure to act on the Applicant’s complaint about other members was arbitrary, discriminatory, or bad faith representation.”
[36] The LRB Decision addressed Mr. Francis’ allegation that his removal from the permittee list was discriminatory at para. 35. The Vice Chair wrote that Mr. Francis believed his removal as a permittee must be a pretext because he only contravened dispatch rules on one occasion, in a context where his colleagues, who are well-connected members of the Respondent, bullied and harassed him. The Vice Chair said she was unable to conclude from Mr. Francis’ materials that he had made out an apparent case that the Respondent participated in that conduct, so she was unable to conclude that the Respondent acted on improper or irrelevant considerations.
[37] Finally, I find that Mr. Francis had an opportunity to know the case he had to meet and had a chance to meet it.
[38] The LRB did not hold an oral hearing on Mr. Francis’ application, but it is not necessary that another proceeding involve an oral hearing to appropriately deal with the substance of a complaint. Under s. 13 of the Labour Relations Code, the LRB must first determine whether or not an applicant has disclosed sufficient evidence of a breach of the duty of fair representation to make out an apparent case. The Vice Chair decided that Mr. Francis had not established an apparent case of discrimination based on the materials he filed and noted that an applicant must establish an apparent case of a contravention for their case to proceed beyond this step: LRB Decision, para. 37.
[39] Mr. Francis decided which materials to submit to the LRB in support of his allegations. He had legal representation. Filing his application was his opportunity to provide enough information to the LRB to make out an apparent case. This was also the case in Shen, in which the Tribunal explained at para. 33:
I recognize that the LRB did not hold a hearing into the complaint because it did not feel it was necessary. This accords with its mandate under s. 13, which is to invite submissions and decide whether the complaint discloses sufficient evidence to merit a hearing. I also note that the LRB’s reasons and analysis regarding discrimination are short. This is not surprising – and does not reveal a weakness in the decision. The LRB merely found that Mr. Shen had provided no evidence that would support his allegations of discrimination. Given this deficiency, not much analysis was possible. Therefore, in these circumstances, the LRB appropriately dealt with the substance of Mr. Shen’s complaint in regard to the Union’s handling of the five grievances.
[40] Likewise, the LRB found that Mr. Francis had not provided evidence to make out a case of discrimination related to either of his allegations, although he had an opportunity to do so in making his application.
[41] In summary, I find that the LRB appropriately dealt with essentially the same dispute that Mr. Francis asks the Tribunal to deal with under s. 14 of the Code. It does not make sense to expend Tribunal resources to hold a hearing on the same issues that the LRB addressed. I exercise my discretion to dismiss the complaint of discrimination in union representation under s. 27(1)(f) of the Code.
III CONCLUSION
[42] The complaint under s. 13 of the Code of discrimination regarding employment is dismissed under s. 27(1)(c) of the Code.
[43] The complaint under s. 14 of the Code of discrimination by a trade union is dismissed under s. 27(1)(f) of the Code.
Jessica Derynck
Tribunal Member
[1] The Tribunal denied this application, finding that it was not in the public interest to add the Company as a respondent when Mr. Francis had applied to do so 22 months after the time limit for filing a complaint: Francis v. Teamsters Local Union No. 155, 2024 BCHRT 225.