Student C v. Kari-Ann Thor and others, 2025 BCHRT 256
Date Issued: October 15, 2025
File: CS-015719
Indexed as: Student C v. Kari-Ann Thor and others, 2025 BCHRT 256
IN THE MATTER OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS CODE,
RSBC 1996, c. 210 (as amended)
AND IN THE MATTER of a complaint before
the British Columbia Human Rights Tribunal
BETWEEN:
Student C
COMPLAINANT
AND:
Kari-Ann Thor and Derrick Klaassen and Rochelle Chapman and Daniel Parker
RESPONDENTS
REASONS FOR DECISION
APPLICATION TO LIMIT PUBLICATION
TIMELINESS OF COMPLAINT
Rule 5 and Section 22
Tribunal Member: Jonathan Chapnick
On her own behalf: Student C
On her own behalf: Kari-Ann Thor
On their own behalf: Derrick Klaassen, Rochelle Chapman, and Daniel Parker
I INTRODUCTION
[1] Student C has filed a complaint against Kari-Ann Thor, Derrick Klaassen, Rochelle Chapman, and Daniel Parker [collectively, Respondents]. She alleges that the Respondents discriminated against her in the area of services based on her race and Indigenous identity, in contravention of s. 8 of the Human Rights Code.
[2] The alleged discrimination happened between January 23, 2022 and August 2, 2023. The filing date for Student C’s complaint is March 21, 2025. The complaint was therefore filed almost eight months after the one-year time limit for doing so under s. 22 of the Code.
[3] This decision is about whether to accept Student C’s late-filed complaint against the Respondents. It is also about whether to grant a request she has made to anonymize her name in this proceeding.
[4] For the reasons that follow, I grant Student C’s anonymization request, but decline to accept her late-filed complaint. Under the circumstances, I am satisfied that Student C’s privacy interests outweigh any public interest in publishing her name. I am not, however, persuaded that it is in the public interest to allow her late-filed complaint to continue forward. As a result, the complaint against the Respondents is not accepted, and the complaint file is closed.
[5] Below, I first deal with the preliminary issue of Student C’s anonymization request. After that, I set out background information related to the timeliness issue, and then move on to provide my reasons for not accepting Student C’s late-filed complaint.
[6] To make my decision, I have considered all the information filed by Student C and the Respondents. In my reasons, I only refer to what is necessary to explain what I decided. I make no findings of fact related to the merits of the complaint.
II PRELIMINARY ISSUE: ANONYMIZATION REQUEST
[7] The Tribunal’s process is presumptively public: Mother A obo Child B v. School District C, 2015 BCHRT 64 at para. 7. For example, the Tribunal publishes its hearing schedule and most of its decisions on its website, and Tribunal hearings are generally open to members of the public. This openness serves the public interest and aligns with the purposes of the Code: see Edmonton Journal v. Alberta (Attorney General), [1989] 2 SCR 1326 at para. 61; JY v. Various Waxing Salons, 2019 BCHRT 106 at para. 25; A. v. Famous Players Inc., 2005 BCHRT 432 at para. 14; Code, s. 3. In some circumstances, however, a person’s privacy or other interests may outweigh the public interest in full and open access to the Tribunal’s proceedings. In these situations, the Tribunal has discretion to limit publication of identifying information: BC Human Rights Tribunal, Rules of Practice and Procedure [Rules], Rule 5(6); Stein v. British Columbia (Human Rights Tribunal), 2020 BCSC 70 at para. 64. In exercising this discretion, the Tribunal may consider factors like the stage of the proceeding, the nature of the allegations, private details in the complaint, reputational harms, or any other potential harms: JY at para. 30. It may also consider whether the proposed limitation relates to only a “sliver” of information that minimally impairs the openness of the proceeding: CS v. British Columbia (Workers’ Compensation Appeal Tribunal), 2019 BCCA 406 at para. 37.
[8] Student C requests the anonymization of her name in this proceeding. She is primarily concerned about the public disclosure of her private medical information and the potential impacts of such disclosure on her and her family. Mr. Klaassen, Ms. Chapman, and Mr. Parker consent to Student C’s anonymization request. Ms. Thor opposes it.
[9] I have considered Ms. Thor’s submissions opposing Student C’s request for anonymization. However, for the following reasons, I am granting the request.
[10] The complaint is at the earliest possible stage (i.e., screening) and I have decided that it will not proceed any further. Student C seeks to limit the publication of only a sliver of information, which will not impact the public’s interest in knowing the nature of her complaint or its disposition. In my view, nothing in the scope, nature, or substance of the complaint gives rise to any need for public awareness of Student C’s identity. In these circumstances, I cannot see any meaningful public interest in publishing her name. On the other hand, I am satisfied that the privacy interests described in Student C’s application for anonymization are real and not inconsequential. I am therefore persuaded that her privacy interests in this case outweigh the public interest – if any – in publishing her name.
[11] Student C’s application to limit publication under Rule 5(6) is granted. I order that:
a. The Tribunal will anonymize any reference to Student C in this decision; and
b. The Tribunal will not publish or make available to the public any information that could identify Student C in this complaint.
III TIMELINESS ISSUE: BACKGROUND
[12] Student C was a long-time participant in training programs provided by an organization that offered training to counsellors and therapists [Organization]. Ms. Thor was an instructor in one or more of the programs. Mr. Klaassen, Ms. Chapman, and Mr. Parker were members of the Organization’s complaint committee [Committee].
A. Substance of the present complaint
[13] Student C alleges “interpersonal discrimination” by Ms. Thor in relation to training sessions in January and February 2022. She says Ms. Thor treated her in a way that was inequitable and culturally unsafe. For example, she alleges that Ms. Thor: permitted a hostile learning environment by failing to address inappropriate conduct by other students; failed to foster a discrimination-free learning environment; failed to follow up with her about her experience, despite having followed up with a white student; and placed blame on her and not the white student for a hostile exchange during a training session. These allegations are unproven, and I acknowledge that Ms. Thor strongly disputes them.
[14] Student C says the conduct of Ms. Thor (and another instructor) resulted in her experiencing ongoing emotional distress and withdrawing from a program that she had nearly completed. On February 13, 2023, Student C filed an internal complaint to the Committee regarding what had happened.
[15] Student C alleges that the Committee (i.e., Mr. Klaassen, Ms. Chapman, and Mr. Parker) discriminated against her by denying her the opportunity to have her discrimination concerns heard, and by treating her inequitably because of her race and Indigenous identity. She says the Committee’s process for investigating her complaint demonstrated a disregard for her wellbeing and the seriousness of her allegations of discrimination. For example, she alleges that the Committee: failed to adhere to its stated investigation protocol; failed to address the full scope of her allegations in its investigation findings; and failed to take any accountability for the harms she experienced. These allegations are unproven, and I acknowledge that Mr. Klaassen, Ms. Chapman, and Mr. Parker dispute them.
B. Procedural history
[16] The substance of Student C’s present complaint against the Respondents was originally set out in a discrimination complaint against the Organization. The original complaint against the Organization (Tribunal Case No. CS-008986) was filed by Student C on February 26, 2023 and amended in March 2025. I will refer to it as the Original Complaint.
1. Original Complaint
[17] When it was first filed in February 2023, the Original Complaint centred on the events involving Ms. Thor; it did not include the events involving the Committee.
[18] In December 2024, the Organization filed its response to the Original Complaint. The Organization denied discriminating. In the alternative, it asserted that it was “not responsible for any discriminatory actions or omissions” of its instructors, stating that they were “independent contractors” and it was “not vicariously liable for their actions.”
[19] On March 18, 2025, Student C amended the Original Complaint, adding the events involving the Committee. On March 20, 2025, Student C applied to add the Respondents to the Original Complaint [Application]. On March 24, 2025, the Tribunal invited submissions from the Organization and the Respondents on the Application. The submissions process concluded on May 30, 2025.
2. Withdrawal of Original Complaint
[20] On May 31, 2025, Student C filed a Form 6 to withdraw the Original Complaint, stating in relevant part:
This withdrawal applies solely to the [Organization] and is being made in order to properly direct the complaint toward the individuals I believe bear responsibility for the actions described.
The complaint against the [Organization] is being withdrawn because the [Organization] has stated that it does not accept responsibility for the actions of its contract employees. With that understanding, the parties – myself … and the [Organization] – have resolved the complaint between us only.
I respectfully request that the Tribunal proceed with my upcoming application to add the four individual respondents so the complaint can move forward appropriately.
[21] The Tribunal subsequently wrote to Student C to provide information and confirm her intentions. The Tribunal told Student C about s. 32(d) of the Code and s. 17(1) of the Administrative Tribunals Act. It explained that, if she was withdrawing the Original Complaint or if the parties had settled the matter, the Tribunal would dismiss the Original Complaint and the outstanding Application, and would close the file. The Tribunal directed Student C to confirm whether she wanted to withdraw the Original Complaint and, if so, whether she wanted the Tribunal to treat the Application as a new complaint against the Respondents, which would be screened by the Tribunal to determine if it could proceed forward.
[22] On June 12, 2025, Student C confirmed in writing that she was withdrawing the Original Complaint and wanted the Tribunal to treat the Application as a new complaint against the Respondents.
3. Present Complaint
[23] On July 10, 2025, the Tribunal granted Student C’s request to treat the Application as a new complaint (Tribunal Case No. CS-015719), which I will refer to as the Present Complaint.
[24] The Tribunal confirmed that the substance of the Present Complaint is set out in the Original Complaint (including its amendment) and in relevant parts of the Application (including relevant parts of Student C’s reply submission regarding the Application). The Tribunal confirmed that the Present Complaint was filed outside the one-year time limit, and directed the parties to make submissions regarding whether the Present Complaint should be accepted under s. 22(3) of the Code.
IV TIMELINESS ISSUE: DECISION
[25] The Present Complaint was filed late. As a result, the burden is on Student C to persuade the Tribunal to accept it. First, she must persuade me that it is in the public interest to accept the Present Complaint: Code, s. 22(3)(a). Second, she must persuade me that no substantial prejudice will result to any person because of the delay in filing the complaint: Code, s. 22(3)(b).
[26] I will begin with the public interest.
[27] The public interest under s. 22 is assessed in light of the purposes of the Code. The assessment is fact and context specific. Relevant factors may include: the length of the delay; the reasons for the delay; the parties’ competing interests; whether the complainant had access to legal advice; and whether there is a public interest in the complaint itself: British Columbia (Ministry of Public Safety and Solicitor General) v. Mzite, 2014 BCCA 220 [Mzite] at para. 53 and 63; Hoang v. Warnaco and Johns, 2007 BCHRT 24 at para. 26; Complainant v. The Board of Education of School District No. 61 (Greater Victoria), 2022 BCHRT 44 at para. 18.
[28] In the circumstances of this case, I am not satisfied that it is in the public interest to accept the Present Complaint. The following are my reasons for this decision.
[29] To start, the most recent conduct alleged in the complaint occurred in August 2023, making the Present Complaint almost eight months late. This is a significant delay. In addition, there is a roughly one-year gap between the more recent allegations against the Committee members and the earlier allegations against Ms. Thor. I appreciate that Student C asserts that all of the allegations form part of a continuing contravention. Still, it is noteworthy that the events involving Ms. Thor occurred roughly three years before Student C brought the Present Complaint against her. Although it is not insurmountable, under the circumstances, I find that the length of the delay in this case factors strongly against accepting the Present Complaint.
[30] In terms of the reasons for the delay, I find that it makes sense that Student C sought to add the Respondents to the Original Complaint when she became concerned that the Organization might not be held liable for the alleged discrimination. I accept that these concerns first arose when she received the Organization’s response to the Original Complaint in December 2024. A few months later, Student C filed the Application, which later became the Present Complaint. I acknowledge that she was self-represented when she initially filed the Original Complaint in February 2023. I am satisfied that these reasons for the delay factor in favour of accepting the Present Complaint. In my view, however, they are substantially outweighed by the combination of the length of the delay and the following significant countervailing factors.
[31] First, I find that Student C’s interest in accessing the Tribunal is not a factor in this case. The substance of the Present Complaint was before the Tribunal in the form of the Original Complaint. The Original Complaint had been accepted and was proceeding through the Tribunal’s process. Student C chose to withdraw that complaint. There is nothing wrong or improper about her having done so, but it cannot be said that she has been denied access to this Tribunal in respect of her allegations of discrimination.
[32] Second, Student C has already obtained some measure of redress in respect of her allegations of discrimination. In May 2025, she met with the Organization regarding the Original Complaint. Student C and the Organization agreed to a settlement. On June 6, 2025, Student C told the Tribunal that the settlement agreement had been fulfilled and the matter was resolved. Given that the substance of the Present Complaint is the same as that of the Original Complaint, I find that the resolution of the latter by settlement weighs against there being a public interest in proceeding with litigation of the former.
[33] Third, I am not satisfied that the Present Complaint raises particularly unique or novel issues such that it may be in the public interest to accept it late: Mzite at paras. 65-76. I appreciate Student C’s submission that what happened to her “is an example of systemic discrimination, where patterns of inequality and violations of procedural fairness are prominent.” However, if the Tribunal were to accept the Present Complaint, it would centre on (1) discrete instances of alleged interpersonal discrimination in an education context, and (2) the specific, alleged deficiencies in the Committee’s response to Student C’s allegations of discrimination. While I accept that individual complaints can raise systemic discrimination issues, I do not see that happening in this case. At a hearing, the Tribunal will not be making decisions about patterns of inequity or broad questions of procedural fairness. The issues before it will relate to whether Student C was treated adversely in the area of services in connection to her protected characteristics, and whether the Committee dealt with Student C’s internal complaint in a way that was prompt, effective, and proportionate. I understand that Student C says that the alleged discrimination against her has had profound impacts. I do not mean to minimize what she says she experienced or to diminish the seriousness of her allegations. I appreciate that the Present Complaint relates to the ground of Indigenous identity, which is a relatively new addition to the Code. However, I am not satisfied that there is anything in the scope, nature, or substance of the Present Complaint that engages the public interest for the purposes of the assessment under s. 22(3).
[34] Finally, I acknowledge Student C’s submissions and medical note regarding her ongoing health issues. They point to a significant decline in her health and related impacts on her functioning following the alleged discrimination by the Respondents. However, given Student C’s demonstrated ability to file a human rights complaint against the Organization in February 2023, there is no basis for concluding that she was disabled from filing against the Respondents at that time or in the months that followed.
[35] In sum, I am not persuaded that it is in the public interest to accept the Present Complaint. As a result, I need not consider whether substantial prejudice will result to any person because of the delay in filing it.
V CONCLUSION
[36] Student C’s application to limit publication is granted. I order the limitations on public disclosure of personal information in this proceeding as set out above in this decision.
[37] I decline to exercise my discretion to accept Student C’s late-filed complaint under s. 22(3) of the Code. The Present Complaint is not accepted, and the complaint file is closed.
Jonathan Chapnick
Tribunal Member