Singh v. F&G Delivery Ltd. and another, 2025 BCHRT 255
Date Issued: October 15, 2025
File: CS-005197
Indexed as: Singh v. F&G Delivery Ltd. and another, 2025 BCHRT 255
IN THE MATTER OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS CODE,
RSBC 1996, c. 210 (as amended)
AND IN THE MATTER of a complaint before
the British Columbia Human Rights Tribunal
BETWEEN:
Parvinder Singh
COMPLAINANT
AND:
F&G Delivery Ltd. and Lloyd Ford
RESPONDENT
REASONS FOR DECISION
APPLICATION TO DISMISS A COMPLAINT
Section 27(1)(c) and (d)(ii)
Tribunal Member: Edward Takayanagi
On their own behalf: Parvinder Singh
Counsel for the Respondents: Christopher Dyson
I INTRODUCTION
[1] Parvinder Singh alleges his former employer, F&G Delivery Ltd. and its owner, Lloyd Ford, discriminated against him in employment on the grounds of race, ancestry, place of origin, and religion contrary to s. 13 of the Human Rights Code. Mr. Singh says the Respondents discriminated against him when they did not pay his full wages and terminated his employment.
[2] The Respondents say their decision to layoff Mr. Singh was purely a business decision unrelated to Mr. Singh’s protected characteristics. They say his allegation about wages was fully resolved by a settlement agreement reached through a union grievance. The Respondents apply to dismiss the complaint under s. 27(1)(c), (d)(ii), or (f) of the Code.
[3] For the reasons below, I allow the application and dismiss the complaint. I first consider under s. 27(1)(d)(ii) if proceeding with the part of the complaint alleging Mr. Singh was not paid his full wages would not further the purposes of the Code. Based on the materials before me, I am persuaded that it would not because the parties entered into a settlement agreement fully resolving this portion of the complaint.
[4] Next, I consider under s. 27(1)(c) if there is no reasonable prospect Mr. Singh could establish that his protected characteristics were a factor in the Respondents’ decision to end his employment. I am satisfied the Respondents are reasonably certain to establish they had legitimate non-discriminatory reasons for their actions.
[5] To make this decision, I have considered all the information filed by the parties. In these reasons, I only refer to what is necessary to explain my decision. I make no findings of fact.
II BACKGROUND
[6] Mr. Singh worked as a crane operator for F&G. The terms and conditions of Mr. Singh’s employment was governed by a collective agreement between F&G and Mr. Singh’s union. Under the terms of the collective agreement crane operators are assigned to operate a specific truck and are not permitted to operate multiple trucks. Mr. Singh was the operator of a 125-ton knuckle boom crane truck.
[7] On November 10, 2020, F&G laid off Mr. Singh. The reason F&G provided to Mr. Singh for the layoff was a shortage of work for Mr. Singh’s crane truck.
[8] On November 17, 2020, Mr. Singh filed a formal grievance through his union disputing his layoff. He also alleged that his pay was incorrect during his employment, and he was owed his full wages.
[9] On December 22, 2021, Mr. Singh, his union, and F&G settled his dispute about unpaid wages and entered a settlement agreement. The portion of Mr. Singh’s complaint disputing his layoff was not resolved. That issue was scheduled to proceed to arbitration in January 2022 but was adjourned and has not been rescheduled as of the date of this application.
III DECISION
A. Section 27(1)(d)(ii) – Proceeding would not further the purposes of the Code
[10] Section 27(1)(d)(ii) allows the Tribunal to dismiss a complaint where proceeding with it would not further the purposes of the Code. These purposes include both private and public interests: s. 3. Deciding whether a complaint furthers those purposes is not only about the interests in the individual complaint. It may also be about broad public policy issues, like the efficiency and responsiveness of the human rights system, and the expense and time involved in a hearing: Dar Santos v. UBC, 2003 BCHRT 73, at para. 59, Tillis v. Pacific Western Brewing and Komatsu, 2005 BCHRT 433 at para. 15, Gichuru v. Pallai (No. 2), 2010 BCHRT 125, at paras. 113-118.
[11] The Tribunal may dismiss a complaint under s. 27(1)(d)(ii) where the parties have settled the complaint. While a settlement agreement does not deprive the Tribunal of jurisdiction over a complaint, there is a strong public interest in honouring settlement agreements: Thompson v. Providence Health Care, 2003 BCHRT 58 at para. 38. T
[12] The Respondents submit that the settlement agreement appropriately dealt with the substance of at least part of the complaint. It says the issue of unpaid wages was conclusively resolved through the settlement agreement.
[13] Mr. Singh agrees that his unpaid wage complaint was fully resolved through the settlement. He says the issue was resolved in his favour with the Respondents paying him in full his unpaid wages. Mr. Singh argues that the Respondents settling his complaint and giving him back pay is evidence that they discriminated, and his complaint should therefore proceed.
[14] The Tribunal has found it to be inconsistent with the purposes of the Code to proceed in a case where a complaint has been settled: Williamson v. Mount Seymour Housing Co-operative, 2005 BCHRT 334 at paras. 10-11. In my view, this is one of those cases where it would not further the purposes of the Code to proceed. Both parties agree that the wage complaint has been resolved through the grievance process and the settlement agreement. In these circumstances, where the Respondents have shown they have addressed and conclusively resolved the alleged discrimination, I cannot say it would further the purposes of the Code to proceed with this portion of the complaint.
B. Section 27(1)(c) – No reasonable prospect of success
[15] The Respondents apply to dismiss the portion of Mr. Singh’s complaint that he was laid off because of his protected characteristics. They say he has no reasonable prospect of proving a nexus: Code, s. 27(1)(c). The onus is on the Respondents to establish the basis for dismissal.
[16] Section 27(1)(c) is part of the Tribunal’s gate-keeping function. It allows the Tribunal to remove complaints which do not warrant the time and expense of a hearing.
[17] The Tribunal does not make findings of fact under s. 27(1)(c). Instead, the Tribunal looks at the evidence to decide whether “there is no reasonable prospect that findings of fact that would support the complaint could be made on a balance of probabilities after a full hearing of the evidence”: Berezoutskaia v. British Columbia (Human Rights Tribunal), 2006 BCCA 95 at para. 22, leave to appeal ref’d [2006] SCCA No. 171. The Tribunal must base its decision on the materials filed by the parties, and not on speculation about what evidence may be filed at the hearing: University of British Columbia v. Chan,2013 BCSC 942 at para. 77.
[18] A dismissal application is not the same as a hearing: Lord v. Fraser Health Authority,2021 BCSC 2176 at para. 20; SEPQA v. Canadian Human Rights Commission,[1989] 2 SCR 879 at 899. The threshold to advance a complaint to a hearing is low. In a dismissal application, a complainant does not have to prove their complaint or show the Tribunal all the evidence they may introduce at a hearing. They only have to show that the evidence takes their complaint out of the realm of conjecture: Workers’ Compensation Appeal Tribunal v. Hill, 2011 BCCA 49 [Hill] at para. 27.
[19] To prove his complaint at a hearing, Mr. Singh will have to prove that he has a characteristic protected by the Code, he was adversely impacted in employment, and his protected characteristic was a factor in the adverse impact: Moore v. British Columbia (Education), 2012 SCC 61 at para. 33.
[20] The Respondents do not dispute that Mr. Singh has protected characteristics or that being laid off is an adverse impact in employment. Therefore, the first two elements of Moore are not at issue. The issue I must decide is whether there is no reasonable prospect that Mr. Singh can establish that his protected characteristics were a factor in the Respondents’ decision to terminate his employment.
[21] The third part of the Moore test requires that there be a connection between the characteristics protected under the Code, in this case Mr. Singh’s race, ancestry, place or origin or religion, and the adverse impacts alleged. It is not necessary that it be the sole or even primary factor in the adverse impact, so long as it is a factor.
[22] Based on the information and materials before me, in my view there is no reasonable prospect the Tribunal would find after a full hearing that Mr. Singh’s protected characteristics were a factor in the adverse impacts.
[23] Mr. Singh argues that nexus can be inferred because he was laid off out of seniority while other, white employees, were not. He disputes that there was a shortage of work and says that under the collective agreement he should have been given an opportunity to bump into another position.
[24] The Respondents say their decision to layoff Mr. Singh was based solely on the shortage of work for the 125-ton crane truck Mr. Singh operated. They say Mr. Singh was not qualified to bump into another position and operate another vehicle and the collective agreement provides that layoffs are based on seniority subject to an employee’s qualifications. They concede that an employee hired after Mr. Singh was not laid off but say this was because they had qualifications to operate other vehicles.
[25] The Respondents have put before me a reasonable non-discriminatory explanation that is supported in the documentary evidence to show they are reasonably certain to dispute the inference alleged by Mr. Singh.
[26] The Respondents provided evidence showing that layoffs are based on seniority and qualifications. They have shown that the employees who were not laid off were either senior to Mr. Singh or had qualifications Mr. Singh did not. The materials before me support the Respondents’ assertion that Mr. Singh was the most junior employee, without qualifications to allow him to bump into any other position.
[27] The evidence supports the Respondents’ assertion that layoffs were issued on the basis of seniority of the employee. Further, while Mr. Singh says that employees who were hired after he was, kept their jobs, the collective agreement provides that seniority is not based solely on an employee’s tenure but on the employee’s qualifications and classification.
[28] The materials show that the 125-ton crane truck Mr. Singh operated was the least in demand, and that since his layoff no other employee has operated that truck. They have also put before me a list of employees showing that there were 11 operators who have higher seniority than Mr. Singh operating other similar sized crane trucks.
[29] Further, Mr. Singh points to online job postings he says were posted by the Respondents after he was laid off. However, these postings appear to be for positions requiring qualifications to drive vehicles other than the one Mr. Singh operated. The evidence supports the Respondents’ position that there was insufficient work to continue to employ Mr. Singh.
[30] Considering all the evidence, I find that if this matter proceeded to a hearing, the Respondents are reasonably certain to prove their decision to layoff Mr. Singh was for non-discriminatory reasons, which rebuts any possible inference that there is a connection between Mr. Singh’s protected characteristics and the adverse impacts. As such, there is no reasonable prospect that the complaint will succeed.
IV CONCLUSION
[31] I allow the application and dismiss the complaint in its entirety under s. 27(1)(c) and (f) of the Code.
Edward Takayanagi
Tribunal Member