Zamorano Meza v. Capilano University and another (No.3), 2025 BCHRT 254 – CORRECTED
Date Issued: October 15, 2025
File: CS-003767
Indexed as: Zamorano Meza v. Capilano University and another (No.3), 2025 BCHRT 254
IN THE MATTER OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS CODE,
RSBC 1996, c. 210 (as amended)
AND IN THE MATTER of a complaint before
the British Columbia Human Rights Tribunal
BETWEEN:
Jose (Josema) Manuel Zamorano Meza
COMPLAINANT
AND:
Capilano University and Capilano Faculty Association
RESPONDENTS
REASONS FOR DECISION
APPLICATION TO DISMISS A COMPLAINT
Section 27(1)(c)
Tribunal Member: Edward Takayanagi
On their own behalf: Jose (Josema) Manuel Zamorano Meza
Counsel for the Respondent, Capilano University: Sabrina Anis and Alie Teachman
Counsel for the Respondent, Capilano Faculty Association: James Baugh
I INTRODUCTION
[1] Jose (Josema) Manuel Zamorano Meza alleges his employer, Capilano University, and the Capilano Faculty Association [the Union] discriminated against him based on his race, colour, ancestry, and place of origin, in connection with his application for teaching appointments between February 2019 and May 2022.
[2] The University and the Union [together, the Respondents] each deny discriminating and apply to dismiss the complaint under s.27(1)(c) and (g) of the Human Rights Code. The Respondents say the complaint contains allegations outside the Tribunal’s one-year time limit. Further, the University says that there is no connection between the alleged events and Mr. Zamorano Meza’s protected characteristics. It says that it followed the requirements of the collective agreement with respect to Mr. Zamorano Meza’s appointment and assignment of work. The Union says that it was not involved in the actions and decisions at issue in the complaint, and that the decisions at issue in the complaint are beyond its authority.
[3] For the reasons that follow, I grant the applications to dismiss the complaint. I find it most efficient to consider the application under s. 27(1)(c) on the basis that there is no reasonable prospect that the complaint will succeed. Based on the materials before me, I am persuaded that Mr. Zamorano Meza has no reasonable prospect of proving a connection between his protected characteristics and the adverse impacts.
[4] To make this decision, I have considered all the information filed by the parties. In these reasons, I only refer to what is necessary to explain my decision.
II PRELIMINARY APPLICATION – ANONYMIZATION OF THIRD PARTIES
[5] The University seeks an order that the Tribunal anonymize the names and identifying information of any employees or former employees who are not parties to the complaint. The Union and Mr. Zamorano Meza take no position on the University’s request. For the following reasons I grant the request and anonymize the names of third parties referred to in the complaint.
[6] The Tribunal has discretion to limit publication of identifying information where a person can show their privacy interests outweigh the public interest in full access to the Tribunal’s proceedings: Tribunal’s Rules of Practice and Procedure, Rule 5(6); Stein v. British Columbia (Human Rights Tribunal), 2020 BCSC at para 64(a).
[7] The Tribunal may consider factors like the stage of the proceedings, the nature of the allegations, private details in the complaint, harm to reputation, or any other potential harm: JY v. Various Waxing Salons, 2019 BCHRT 106 at para. 30. It may also consider whether the proposed limitation relates to only a “sliver” information that minimally impairs the openness of the proceedings: CS v. British Columbia (Workers’ Compensation Appeal Tribunal), 2019 BCCA 406 at para. 37.
[8] I am persuaded to grant the order sought. This application arises in the early stages of the Tribunal’s process. The allegations are unproven, which affords greater scope for limiting public access. I have ultimately dismissed the complaint below, which I find weighs in favour of an anonymization order: The Complainant v. BC Ministry of Social Development and Poverty Reduction and others, 2023 BCHRT 29 at para. 15.
[9] The complaint makes allegations of discrimination involving employees and former employees of the University. These individuals are not parties to the complaint. The Tribunal regularly exercises it discretion to not name individuals in public decisions where they are not direct parties to the complaint: Patron v. Landmark Cinemas Canada, 2020 BCHRT 127 at para. 9. I accept that there is a significant potential to harm the professional reputations and careers of the University’s employees who are implicated in the complaint if their identities were made public on the basis of unproven allegations about their conduct as employees. I also find it is unnecessary to refer to the names of the individuals to adjudicate this application. The Tribunal only sets out as much evidence as is necessary to arrive at a decision: Ms. K v. Deep Creek Store and another, 2021 BCHRT 158 at para. 57.
[10] Under the circumstances, I find it appropriate to order that the names and identifying information of all individual employees and former employees of the University, other than Mr. Zamorano Meza, shall not be published by any party.
III BACKGROUND
[11] Mr. Zamorano Meza is a teacher at the University and a member of the Union. He describes himself as a Mexican Mestizo immigrant with a foreign accent. The terms of his employment are set out in a collective agreement negotiated by the University and the Union.
[12] It is undisputed that under the collective agreement the University commits to providing employees a minimum workload of teaching courses. The commitment is limited when there is insufficient work in an employee’s functional area, in which case the University conducts an assessment of the employee’s ability to see if they can teach in another functional area. The assessment is conducted by an ad hoc search committee, comprised of University staff and Union members. The only role of the search committee is to determine if the employee has the required qualifications and is competent to teach in another functional area. Among the criteria reviewed by the search committee is if an employee can provide a satisfactory teaching demonstration and answer interview questions. If the search committee determines that an employee is competent to teach in another functional area, they provide the name of the employee to the president of the University who makes the final determination on whether that employee can teach courses in the other functional area.
[13] In March 2019, Mr. Zamorano Meza requested to teach in another functional area of the University because there was a shortage of work in his functional area. Mr. Zamorano Meza suggested he be allowed to teach courses in a different functional area. The University convened a search committee to assess Mr. Zamorano Meza’s qualifications to teach in the other functional area. The search committee determined that Mr. Zamorano Meza was not qualified to teach in the other functional area.
[14] Mr. Zamorano Meza disagreed with the committee’s assessment of his qualifications. In April 2020, he reapplied for permission to teach in the other functional area. The University convened a new search committee, made up of new members who were not on the first search committee, to review Mr. Zamorano Meza’s qualifications. The second search committee also concluded that Mr. Zamorano Meza was not qualified to teach in the other functional area.
IV DECISION
[15] The Respondents argue that Mr. Zamorano Meza’s complaint has no reasonable prospect of success: Code, s. 27(1)(c) The onus is on the Respondents to establish the basis for dismissal.
[16] Section 27(1)(c) is part of the Tribunal’s gate-keeping function. It allows the Tribunal to remove complaints which do not warrant the time and expense of a hearing.
[17] The Tribunal does not make findings of fact under s. 27(1)(c). Instead, the Tribunal looks at the evidence to decide whether “there is no reasonable prospect that findings of fact that would support the complaint could be made on a balance of probabilities after a full hearing of the evidence”: Berezoutskaia v. British Columbia (Human Rights Tribunal), 2006 BCCA 95 at para. 22, leave to appeal ref’d [2006] SCCA No. 171. The Tribunal must base its decision on the materials filed by the parties, and not on speculation about what evidence may be filed at the hearing: University of British Columbia v. Chan,2013 BCSC 942 at para. 77.
[18] A dismissal application is not the same as a hearing: Lord v. Fraser Health Authority,2021 BCSC 2176 at para. 20; SEPQA v. Canadian Human Rights Commission,[1989] 2 SCR 879 at 899. The threshold to advance a complaint to a hearing is low. In a dismissal application, a complainant does not have to prove their complaint or show the Tribunal all the evidence they may introduce at a hearing. They only have to show that the evidence takes their complaint out of the realm of conjecture: Workers’ Compensation Appeal Tribunal v. Hill, 2011 BCCA 49 [Hill] at para. 27.
[19] Many human rights complaints raise issues of credibility. This is not, by itself, a sufficient reason to deny an application to dismiss: Evans v. University of British Columbia, 2008 BCSC 1026 at para. 34. However, if there are foundational or key issues of credibility, the complaint must go to a hearing: Francescutti v. Vancouver (City), 2017 BCCA 242 at para 67.
[20] To prove his complaint at a hearing, Mr. Zamorano Meza will have to prove that he has a characteristic protected by the Code, he was adversely impacted in employment, and his protected characteristic was a factor in the adverse impact: Moore v. British Columbia (Education), 2012 SCC 61 at para. 33.
[21] The Respondents do not dispute the first two elements of Moore. Rather, they say the complaint has no reasonable prospect of success because Mr. Zamorano Meza will not be able to prove a connection between his protected characteristics and any adverse impact related to the assessment of his qualifications to teach in other functional areas. They say Mr. Zamorano Meza’s allegation that his protected characteristics were at least a factor is purely speculative.
[22] Discrimination can and usually does take on subtle forms and is often proved by inference rather than direct evidence: Durrani v. ICBC and others, 2022 BCHRT 100 at para. 106. However, the recognition of the subtlety of prejudice does not transform it into a presumption of prejudice under the Code: Student A v. Institutional Respondent and others, 2017 BCHRT 13 at para. 94. A complainant must provide a factual basis for drawing an inference of discrimination. For the purposes of a human rights complaint, to draw such an inference the Tribunal requires evidence from which an inference may be reasonably be drawn of a link between a complainant’s protected characteristics and the specific adverse treatment alleged: Batson-Dottin v. Forensic Psychiatric Hospital (No. 2), 2018 BCHRT 246 at paras. 82-83.
[23] Based on the materials before me, I am persuaded that Mr. Zamorano Meza has no reasonable prospect of proving his race, colour, ancestry, or place of origin were a factor in the assessment of his credentials by the ad hoc search committees.
[24] The Respondents have put before me the collective agreement and their policies showing how an employee is assessed to see if they have the necessary qualifications to teach in functional areas other than their own. The job description for the other functional area Mr. Zamorano Meza was seeking to teach in sets out the necessary qualifications for that role. The Respondents also submitted their written reasons for their decision determining Mr. Zamorano Meza was not qualified including an assessment of his teaching demonstration and the specific skills he did not demonstrate he had. Further, the Union has provided documentary materials setting out the role of union representatives who sit on a search committee showing they are not advocates for the employee but rather decision makers whose role is to ensure a fair assessment of the employee’s qualifications.
[25] Mr. Zamorano Meza asserts the decision of the search committee must have been based on his protected characteristics. In support of this assertion, he argues that he had the requisite qualifications for the job. He says the search committee should have accepted his qualifications or that the University should have waived the requirement that he participate in the selection process and not doing so was because of his protected characteristics. He says he is aware of other, racialized employees of the University, who have made complaints of discrimination by the University and therefore there ought to be a presumption that the University is biased.
[26] Mr. Zamorano Meza also alleges the Respondents discriminated against him on other occasions by requiring him to co-teach a course with another teacher, not appointing him to participate in a committee he volunteered for, and posting a job that he should have been selected for. Mr. Zamorano Meza says that a teacher told him they disagreed with his views about a course they were teaching together. He says this is evidence that the University staff generally discriminate against people with different experiences and backgrounds.
[27] The central point of Mr. Zamorano Meza’s argument appears to be that he disagrees with the conclusion of the search committee and says they must have based their conclusion on his protected characteristics because he had the qualifications to teach in the other functional area. However, the Respondents have provided documentary evidence inconsistent with Mr. Zamorano Meza’s assertion that he was qualified to teach in the other functional area. The job description provides the qualifications necessary for the other functional area. The search committee’s assessment shows they reviewed Mr. Zamorano Meza’s curriculum vitae and other submissions, conducted an interview, and observed a teaching demonstration. The assessment shows that the committee found he did not meet the requirements including demonstrating an ability to help students meet their learning outcomes, generating research questions appropriate for the functional area, and ability to apply diverse research methods within a variety of settings and contexts. The Respondents provided a detailed assessment of Mr. Zamorano Meza’s application identifying the skills he did not demonstrate that are necessary to the functional area in which he wanted to be allowed to teach.
[28] I am persuaded there is no reasonable prospect Mr. Zamorano Meza could prove a connection between his characteristics and the denial of his application to work in another functional area in light of the evidence before me.
[29] On the whole of the evidence, I am persuaded that the University’s decision not to accept Mr. Zamorano Meza’s application to teach in other functional areas was for wholly non-discriminatory reasons. The materials before me support that Mr. Zamorano Meza did not have the necessary qualifications for the other functional area.
[30] The materials before me do not support that Mr. Zamorano Meza’s protected characteristics were a factor in the committee’s assessment. I am not assisted by his general assertion that there are other employees who complained of discrimination at the University because, without more, that is not evidence of whether the Respondents’ assessment of Mr. Zamorano Meza was based on his protected characteristics. Similarly, Mr. Zamorano Meza’s assertion that he was not selected for a different committee, that another teacher disagreed with him, or that he was required to co-teach a class does not assist me in assessing whether Mr. Zamorano Meza’s complaint has no reasonable prospect of success. These other alleged events, while they occurred during Mr. Zamorano Meza’s employment at the University, involve different time periods and different people, as compared with the time and people involved with the committee assessing Mr. Zamorano Meza.
[31] I appreciate that Mr. Zamorano Meza disagrees with the University’s assessment and believes that he is qualified to teach in the functional area he applied for. He asserts that because he has the requisite qualifications the decision to deny his application to teach in those areas must have been based on his protected characteristics.
[32] However, the Respondents have provided documentary evidence showing the requirement to co-teach classes and the selection of committee members is the same for all employees. They further say that teachers disagreeing with one another’s academic perspectives is not discrimination.
[33] Under the circumstances, the assertion that Mr. Zamorano Meza’s protected characteristics were a factor in the Respondents’ assessment of his application has not been taken out of the realm of conjecture and speculation. As such, the complaint has no reasonable prospect of success.
V CONCLUSION
[34] I allow the applications of the Respondents and dismiss the complaint under s. 27(1)(c) of the Code.
Edward Takayanagi
Tribunal Member
Human Rights Tribunal
This version of the Reasons for Decision has been amended in accordance with the Correction of December 03, 2025:
[1] This corrects an error in the short index on the cover page. Complainant’s complete last name and the decision number are added.
Edward Takayanagi
Tribunal Member
Human Rights Tribunal