Wright v. Hall, 2025 BCHRT 253
Date Issued: October 15, 2025
File: CS-007973
Indexed as: Wright v. Hall, 2025 BCHRT 253
IN THE MATTER OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS CODE,
RSBC 1996, c. 210 (as amended)
AND IN THE MATTER of a complaint before
the British Columbia Human Rights Tribunal
BETWEEN:
Stephen Wright
COMPLAINANT
AND:
Penelope Hall
RESPONDENT
REASONS FOR DECISION
TIMELINESS OF COMPLAINT
Section 22
Tribunal Member: Steven Adamson
On his own behalf: Stephen Wright
Counsel for Penelope Hall: Anil Aggarwal
I. INTRODUCTION
[1] On March 7, 2022, Stephen Wright filed a complaint of discrimination in services and tenancy based on mental and physical disability, sexual orientation and sex contrary to s. 8 and s. 10 of the Human Rights Code, against his former property manager, Penelope Hall.
[2] Mr. Wright’s complaint initially named his former rental management service provider as another respondent; however, he withdrew that aspect of the Complaint with a Form 6 – Complaint Withdrawal, received by the Tribunal on September 5, 2025. I accept Mr. Wright’s withdrawal of the Complaint against this previously named respondent and proceed to consider whether his complaint against Ms. Hall should be allowed to proceed late filed with the Tribunal.
[3] The issue before me is whether to accept the Complaint against Ms. Hall. I make no findings of fact regarding the merits of this complaint.
[4] For the reasons that follow, it is not in the public interest to allow the Complaint to proceed late filed: Code, s. 22(3).
II. BACKGROUND
[5] Mr. Wright is a gay man with a complex mix of mental disabilities and hypothyroidism.
[6] From 2015 to 2017, Mr. Wright rented an apartment that was managed by Ms. Hall.
[7] On October 13, 2020, after the tenancy had long since ended Mr. Wright alleges Ms. Hall had a telephone conversation with his then current landlord, Ms. M, and shared numerous false statements about him linked to his personal characteristics. Mr. Wright alleges Ms. Hall told Ms. M that he used his mental disabilities to take advantage of others such that he had to be bought out to end the previous tenancy. He further alleges that Ms. Hall informed Ms. M about his accusations that the former landlord had tried to force him into prostitution work for them. Ms. Hall also allegedly informed Ms. M that Mr. Wight falsely accused his former landlord of entering his suite and trying to kill him. Mr. Wright alleges Ms. Hall’s conversation with Ms. M was essentially a negative tenancy reference based on the stereotypical view that mentally ill people are unpredictable, immoral, unethical, dangerous and a threat to the safety of others [the October 13, 2020, Allegation].
[8] Mr. Wright alleges the reference contributed to Ms. M’s decision to force him out of the subsequent tenancy with her. I note the circumstances leading to the end of the tenancy with Ms. M are the subject of another complaint at the Tribunal which is currently at the hearing stage.
III. ANALYSIS AND DECISION
[9] The time limit set out in s. 22 of the Code is a substantive provision which is intended to ensure that complainants pursue their human rights remedies diligently: Chartier v. School District No. 62, 2003 BCHRT 39.
A. Time Limit
[10] The Complaint was filed on March 7, 2022. To comply with the one-year time limit under s. 22(1) of the Code, the alleged act of discrimination had to occur on or after March 7, 2021.
[11] Mr. Wright’s complaint contains one allegation occurring on October 13, 2020. As such, the Complaint was late filed.
[12] Having found the allegation in this case was late filed, I proceed to an analysis of whether the Tribunal should exercise its discretion to accept the complaint outside the one-year time limit because it is in the public interest to do so, and no substantial prejudice will result to any person because of the delay: Code s. 22(3). I begin with the public interest determination.
B. Public Interest
[13] Whether it is in the public interest to accept the late-filed complaint is a multi-faceted analysis. The enquiry is fact and context specific and assessed in accordance with the purposes of the Code: Hoang v. Warnaco and Johns, 2007 BCHRT 24 at para. 26. The Tribunal considers a non-exhaustive list of factors, including the length of the delay, the reasons for the delay, and the public interest in the complaint itself: British Columbia (Ministry of Public Safety and Solicitor General) v. Mzite, 2014 BCCA 220 [Mzite] at para. 53. These are important factors, but they are not necessarily determinative: Goddard v. Dixon, 2012 BCSC 161 at para. 152; Mzite at para. 55.
[14] I have first considered the length of the delay in filing. The single allegation in this complaint occurred on October 13, 2020. As such, the delay in this case is approximately five months, which is not insignificant and weighs against the acceptance of the complaint: Allen v. Kruger and CEPU, 2008 BCHRT 153 at para. 22.
[15] Mr. Wright provided multiple reasons for his delay in filing. First, he submits that he did not know about the October 13, 2020, Allegation until October 7, 2021. Mr. Wright alleges receiving freedom of information request information from his subsequent landlord on August 1, 2021. At that time the summary of the conversation between Ms. Hall and Ms. M was disclosed to him, however it only referred to Ms. M speaking to his landlord without identifying that it was Ms. Hall. It was not until October 7, 2021, that Mr. Wright alleges the former landlord’s counsel confirmed that it was Ms. Hall who had spoken to Ms. M on October 13, 2020.
[16] Mr. Wright appears to assert that his time limit for filing this complaint started on the date he discovered the October 13, 2020, Allegation evidence. In the Complaint Form 1.1 – Individual Complaint he notes that he filed well within one year of discovering the evidence and no harm would come from filing during that timeframe. If Mr. Wright is arguing that the principle of discoverability applies to the time limit under s. 22 of the Code, I disagree with him since section 22 clearly states that a complaint must be filed within one year of the alleged contravention, and there is nothing in the statute which deals with the postponement of the running of that time: ICBC v. Yuan, 2008 BCSC 1073 at paras. 21-23. The question of whether the Complainant’s discovery of the October 13, 2020, Allegation at is properly considered as a factor under s. 22(3) of the Code and will be discussed below.
[17] In my view, the discovery of the October 13, 2020, Allegation evidence attracts some public interest in allowing the Complaint to proceed late filed. In circumstances where Mr. Wright does not appear to have any reason to suspect that his former landlord’s property manager, Ms. Hall, was communicating to his then current landlord, Ms. M, years after the tenancy related to Ms. Hall had ended there is no basis for concluding that this evidence should have been discovered sooner by Mr. Wright such that he could have acted more diligently in filing the Complaint.
[18] The more difficult issue in this application concerns the timeframe after Mr. Wright discovered the October 13, 2020, Allegation evidence in August 2021 until the Complaint was filed in March 2022. I appreciate that Mr. Wright did not immediately know who from his former tenancy spoke to Ms. M, and he appears to have reached out to the former landlord’s counsel fairly quickly to receive confirmation on October 7, 2021, that it was Ms. Hall. As such, the period from August 25, 2021, to October 7, 2021, also attracts some public interest because Mr. Wright worked fairly diligently to find out who spoke to Ms. M.
[19] On the other hand, a further five months lapsed between October 7, 2021, when Ms. Hall’s alleged actions were fully discovered and March 7, 2022, when Mr. Wright filed the Complaint. In my view, public interest in allowing the Complaint to proceed during this period must be considered in the overall enquiry into whether Mr. Wright’s reasons for late filing attract the public interest.
[20] Mr. Wright candidly reports that after becoming aware of the October 13, 2020, Allegation he advised the Respondent that he was taking actions against them and gave them an opportunity to discuss the matter privately. He notes, however, that the Respondent refused to discuss the matter and, therefore, chose the path of being named in the Complaint. While acknowledging that Mr. Wright tried to find a solution by raising the matter with the Respondent, I find this reason for delay is not in the public interest. The Tribunal has repeatedly said that pursuing another process does not suspend the time limit under the Code and that exhausting internal avenues and resources is not sufficient, on its own, to relieve against the time limit: Sones v. District of Squamish, 2016 BCHRT 99, at para. 44 and Devitt and Hargrove obo others v. School District No. 43 and another, 2011 BCHRT 218, at paras 20-21. In this case, pursuing other avenues of redress, on its own, is not a sufficient reason to relieve time limits by meeting the public interest requirements.
[21] Mr. Wright also appears to argue that he received poor legal advice, which led him to believe that he was subject to a one year from discovery of the allegations evidence deadline for filing his complaint. With this in mind, he appears to have miscalculated the time limit for filing based on the October 7, 2021, discovery of the evidence and thought in error that he was not even halfway through the one-year limitation period.
[22] In assessing whether a legal advice error attracts the public interest in allowing a complaint to proceed late, the Tribunal asks whether the complainant sought legal advice in a timely way, whether the complainant has provided some evidence about the nature of the advice and their reliance on it, and whether the complainant shows diligence in filing despite that advice: The Parent obo the Child v. The School District, 2020 BCCA 333 at para. 49. These are some of the factors to be considered in determining whether to accept a late-filed complaint for public interest reasons. The overarching question remains whether it is in the public interest to accept the late filed complaint.
[23] In this case, Mr. Wright has not articulated any details related to seeking advice, the nature of the advice and his reliance on it, or his diligence in filing despite that advice. Apart from stating that poor advice was received, he provided no other information about his interactions with an advisor. In my view, Mr. Wright has not provided sufficient reasons related to receiving poor legal advice to attract the public interest in allowing his complaint to proceed late filed.
[24] Mr. Wright further submits that his multiple disabilities delayed his filing of the Complaint. He swears that he filed the Complaint the “instant” he was physically and mentally able to do so. Mr. Wright provided two reports from psychiatrists in 2007 confirming his mental disabilities. He also describes having a limited ability to focus on more than one matter at a time with the need for a recovery period afterwards but does provide any details about his specific activities and level of functioning in the months before filing this complaint. Mr. Wright broadly submits that a five-month delay for someone in his circumstances, is entirely reasonable given his disabilities and the complexity of the process for self-represented litigants. He further submits that learning about Ms. Hall’s statements about him was a shock without setting out the specific health effects that had on him apart from stating the experience impacted his abilities such that greater recovery times were needed.
[25] I appreciate that Mr. Wright has complex mental and physical disabilities. In my view, however, his conduct demonstrates an ability to file a complaint during the five months after he learned of the October 13, 2020, Allegation. Mr. Wright appears to have taken up the issue of harms related to Ms. Hall’s conversation with Ms. M directly with the Respondent before filing a complaint with the Tribunal. While appreciating his limited capacity to act and the need for recovery times after acting, the choice to file a complaint could have come first. Without doubting Mr. Wright’s evidence, he has not provided any medical evidence from treating physicians to support his assertion that he was precluded from filing during the five months it took him to file after learning about Ms. Hall’s allegedly harmful phone call sufficient to attract the public interest.
[26] In determining whether acceptance of a late-filed complaint is in the public interest, the Tribunal also considers whether there is anything particularly unique, novel, or unusual about the complaint that has not been addressed in other complaints: Hau v. SFU Student Services and others, 2014 BCHRT 10 at para. 22; Bains v. Advanced Air Supply and others, 2013 BCHRT 74 at para. 22; Mathieu v. Victoria Shipyards and others, 2010 BCHRT 224 at para. 60. Where a complaint raises a novel issue on behalf of a vulnerable group, which advances the purposes of the Code, this factor may weigh in favour of finding a public interest in accepting the complaint: Mzite at paras. 65-66. The Tribunal has considered gaps in its jurisprudence, on the one hand, and the existence of good precedents, on the other hand, in determining whether to permit a complaint to proceed: Mzite at para. 67.
[27] Mr. Wright is seeking justice for Ms. Hall’s allegedly discriminatory reference to Ms. M about his previous tenancy. He submits that his case is unique as it involves the sharing of falsehoods by one landlord with another to detriment of a tenant that was believed because of various stereotypes of people with mental disabilities and his other personal characteristics. While acknowledging Mr. Wright’s desire to have his case move forward to advance the public’s understanding of discrimination generally, I am not satisfied that his complaint raises a novel issue that should be heard by the Tribunal to advance the purposes of the Code. Complaints involving disability, sex, and sexual orientation in tenancy and services are common and the jurisprudence is fairly settled.
[28] By way of summary, I appreciate that Mr. Wright’s discovering of the October 13, 2020, Allegation evidence well after that event occurred attracts the public interest in allowing his complaint to proceed for some of the timeframe for filing in this case. However, he has not provided any compelling reason for not filing during the five-month timeframe after the discovery was made sufficient to attract the public interest in allowing the Complaint to proceed. In my view, five months is a significant amount of delay even for a person with complex disabilities when that individual demonstrated the ability to canvass resolving the matter with the Respondent outside the Tribunal process as opposed to filing a complaint. While containing a serious allegation, Mr. Wright’s complaint is not sufficiently novel to attract the public interest in allowing it to proceed late filed.
[29] For these reasons, I do not find that it is in the public interest to accept the late-filed complaint, and I need not address the issue of whether substantial prejudice would result.
IV. CONCLUSION
[30] For these reasons, the complaint is not accepted for filing.
Steven Adamson
Tribunal Member