Davison v. Civil Resolution Tribunal, 2025 BCHRT 249
Date Issued: October 15, 2025
File: CS-007727
Indexed as: Davison v. Civil Resolution Tribunal, 2025 BCHRT 249
IN THE MATTER OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS CODE,
RSBC 1996, c. 210 (as amended)
AND IN THE MATTER of a complaint before
the British Columbia Human Rights Tribunal
BETWEEN:
Mark Davison
COMPLAINANT
AND:
Civil Resolution Tribunal
RESPONDENT
REASONS FOR DECISION
APPLICATION TO DISMISS A COMPLAINT
Section 27(1)(c)
Tribunal Member: Devyn Cousineau
On his own behalf: Mark Davison
Counsel for the Respondent: Jordan A. Bank
I INTRODUCTION
[1] Mark Davison has filed a human rights complaint alleging that the Civil Resolution Tribunal [CRT] discriminated against him when it required him to communicate directly with his former employer during its dispute resolution processes, which severely exacerbated a mental disability. He seeks remedies for a violation of s. 8 of the Human Rights Code.
[2] The CRT applies to dismiss the complaint. It invokes a common law immunity for quasi-judicial decision makers, as well as the statutory immunity afforded to it under s. 84 of the Civil Resolution Tribunal Act [Act].
[3] The only issue in this application is whether, absent bad faith, the CRT is immune from liability under the Code. In my view, the language of the Act is clear and unambiguous, and bars Mr. Davison’s human rights complaint. As a result, it is dismissed.
II DECISION
[4] I gave the CRT permission to make its submissions under s. 27(1)(a) of the Code, which allows the Tribunal to dismiss complaints that are outside its jurisdiction. However, on reflection, the issue in this application is not a jurisdictional one. Mr. Davison’s complaint alleges discrimination in a service. This is squarely within the Tribunal’s jurisdiction.
[5] Rather, I find this issue is better considered under s. 27(1)(c), which allows the Tribunal to dismiss complaints that have no reasonable prospect of success. Like in the civil context, a complaint that is barred by a statutory or common law immunity has no reasonable prospect of success: Walkom v. Law Society of British Columbia, 2019 BCCA 391 at paras. 15 and 19. There is no prejudice to the parties in considering the application under s. 27(1)(c) rather than s. 27(1)(a) because the issue remains the same.
[6] I begin with a brief background to the CRT and Mr. Davison’s complaint. In setting out Mr. Davison’s allegations, I am relying on the information in his complaint and response to this application. I do not make any findings of fact.
A. Background
[7] The CRT is an online tribunal. Its mandate is to deliver dispute resolution services that are “accessible, speedy, economical, informal, and flexible”, applying “principles of law and fairness”, and in a manner that “accommodates … the diversity of circumstances of the persons using the services of the tribunal”: Act, s. 2(2). To do this, it first encourages parties to resolve their dispute directly and, failing that, decides their claim: Act, s. 2(3).
[8] There are two phases to a CRT dispute:
a. A case management phase, in which the CRT facilitates “resolution by agreement between the parties” and prepares for a hearing, if necessary; and
b. A tribunal hearing phase, in which the CRT hears and decides the dispute: Act, s. 17.
[9] During the case management phase, a CRT case manager helps the parties with facilitated settlement discussions: Act, s. 23. In doing so, they have authority to decide which facilitated settlement service to use and to require parties to participate in that service: Act, s. 25.
[10] Mr. Davison’s complaint is about the CRT’s services in its case management phase.
[11] Mr. Davison was a defendant to a claim brought against him by his former employer. At the beginning of its process, the CRT asked him whether he needed accommodations. Mr. Davison said yes. He explained that, due to his mental health condition, he could not communicate directly with his former employer. Mr. Davison says that he was initially allowed to communicate through CRT staff. Later, however, he says that he was told he would have to speak directly to his employer to try to come to an agreement. He objected, but was told he had no choice. Negotiations were unsuccessful. Mr. Davison says that, because of the contact, his mental health condition was exacerbated and he became very ill. He says he was later told by someone else at the CRT that the negotiations were voluntary. He alleges that, by making him communicate directly with his employer, the CRT discriminated against him based on his mental disability, in violation of s. 8 of the Code. He asks for remedies, including orders that the CRT stop the discrimination and take steps to prevent it happening it again, and damages for injury to his dignity, feelings and self-respect.
B. Statutory immunity
[12] The CRT is protected from legal action by a qualified immunity, set out in s. 84 of the Act:
Immunity protection
84(1) In this section:
“protected function” means
(a) the consideration of requests for tribunal resolution,
(b) the case management phase in relation to a dispute, or
(c) a tribunal hearing in relation to a dispute;
“protected person” means a tribunal member, a case manager or other tribunal officer, or a person conducting facilitated settlement.
(2) Subject to subsection (3), no legal proceeding for damages lies or may be commenced or maintained against a protected person, the tribunal or the government because of anything done or omitted
(a) in the exercise or intended exercise of any power under this Act in relation to a protected function, or
(b) in the performance or intended performance of any duty under this Act in relation to a protected function.
(3) Subsection (2) does not apply to a person referred to in that subsection in relation to anything done or omitted by that person in bad faith.
[13] This immunity is paired with confidentiality and non-compellability provisions, which prohibit:
a. the disclosure of confidential information obtained in the discharge of tribunal member and staff duties (s. 87); and
b. the compulsion of tribunal members and staff to testify or produce evidence in any non-criminal proceeding, about information or records obtained in the discharge of their duties (s. 88).
[14] There is no dispute that Mr. Davison’s complaint is about the conduct of a “protected person” (likely a CRT case manager) doing a “protected function” (facilitated settlement services during the case management phase). Mr. Davison does not allege, or set out any facts that could prove, that the CRT was acting in bad faith by requiring him to communicate directly with his former employer. This means that the bad faith exception to immunity does not apply.
[15] Section 84 of the Act is dispositive of the issue before me. Exceptions to human rights legislation must be made expressly and s. 84 of the Act is express: Winnipeg School Div. No. 1 v. Craton, 1985 CanLII 48 (SCC) at para. 8. The CRT’s statutory immunity is clear and unambiguous: MacAlpine v. H (T), 1991 CanLII 5722 (BCCA) at para. 128; Madadi v. BC (Ministry of Education), 2012 BCHRT 380 at para. 47. On its face, the effect of s. 84 is to bar Mr. Davison’s human rights complaint.
[16] Mr. Davison argues that the CRT does not have “blanket immunity for their behaviour”. He points out that, in his parallel complaint to the BC Ombudsperson, the Ombudsperson investigated and made recommendations for the CRT to improve its practices. The CRT did not directly respond to this argument. However, I note that a complaint to the BC Ombudsperson is not a “legal proceeding for damages”. Rather, the Ombudsperson is empowered to investigate complaints against certain public authorities, including quasi-judicial bodies like the CRT.
[17] Mr. Davison does not point to any other basis on which his complaint may succeed, in the face of s. 84 of the Act. Based on the material before me, it cannot.
[18] In light of this conclusion, it is not necessary to address the CRT’s able submissions about whether the Tribunal’s decision in Madadi remains good law. In Madadi, the Tribunal held that the judicial immunity which protects quasi-judicial decision makers from civil suit did not immunize them from complaints under the Code: para. 44. The CRT argues forcefully that this principle is inconsistent with the modern understanding of immunity for quasi-judicial decision-makers, and has been expressly rejected by four judges of the Supreme Court of Canada in Ernst v. Alberta Energy Regulator, 2017 SCC 1. However, Madadi did not involve a qualified immunity conferred by statute and so is distinct from this case. In my view, the issue of how to interpret and apply Madadi in light of Ernst is better left for a case where it is squarely raised and thoroughly argued on both sides. That is not this case.
III CONCLUSION
[19] This complaint is dismissed under s. 27(1)(c) of the Code.
Devyn Cousineau
Vice Chair