Wolfe v. West Kootenay Women’s Association and others (No. 2), 2025 BCHRT 246
Date Issued: October 15, 2025
File: CS-005665
Indexed as: Wolfe v. West Kootenay Women’s Association and others (No. 2), 2025 BCHRT 246
IN THE MATTER OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS CODE,
RSBC 1996, c. 210 (as amended)
AND IN THE MATTER of a complaint before
the British Columbia Human Rights Tribunal
BETWEEN:
Reasha Wolfe
COMPLAINANT
AND:
West Kootenay Women’s Association and Vita Luthmers and Donna Macdonald
RESPONDENTS
REASONS FOR DECISION
APPLICATION TO RECONSIDER A DECISION
Rule 36
Tribunal Member: Jonathan Chapnick
For the Complainant: Robbie Fleming
For the Respondents: Michael Bellomo
I INTRODUCTION
[1] In December 2021, Reasha Wolfe filed a human rights complaint against her former employer – the West Kootenay Women’s Association – and current or former members of its board of directors. The complaint was filed based on the grounds of sex, gender identity or expression, and political belief. The ground of mental disability was later added. Ms. Wolfe alleges that the Respondents harassed her and then terminated her employment while she was on medical leave because of her support for transgender persons.
[2] On August 18, 2022, the Tribunal issued a screening decision in which it determined that the complaint would not proceed on the grounds of sex and gender identity or expression [Screening Decision]. In this decision, I will refer to the ground of gender identity or expression as the ground of “gender identity.”
[3] On July 25, 2025, Ms. Wolfe applied for reconsideration of the Screening Decision. She says the Screening Decision reflects a legal error, and fairness required the Tribunal to let her make submissions before screening out the grounds of sex and gender identity. She argues that the Tribunal should accept her reconsideration application even though it was filed outside the applicable time limit.
[4] The Respondents oppose Ms. Wolfe’s application because it is roughly three years late and because they say it does not provide a proper basis for reconsideration.
[5] For the reasons that follow, (1) I find it appropriate to exercise my discretion to waive the time limit for filing an application for reconsideration, (2) I am persuaded that reconsideration of the Screening Decision is warranted, and (3) having reconsidered the Screening Decision, I have decided that the complaint will proceed based on all of the grounds put forward by Ms. Wolfe, including the grounds of sex and gender identity.
II Background
[6] A lot happened between the Screening Decision and the present application.
[7] Under s. 22 of the Human Rights Code, a complaint must be filed within one year of the alleged discrimination, failing which the Tribunal can only accept the complaint if it is in the public interest to do so and no substantial prejudice will result from the delay. Ms. Wolfe filed the complaint outside the one-year time limit. As a result, in the Screening Decision, the Tribunal told her it would seek “time limit submissions” from the parties to determine if the complaint could proceed. The Tribunal added that Ms. Wolfe could amend her complaint to add the ground of disability; however, she needed to do so within two weeks:
If we do not receive the amendment by August 31, 2022 we will move forward to the next step, which will be sending the complaint to the respondents and seeking submissions from all parties on whether the complaint should be accepted under s. 22.
[8] On August 31, 2022, Ms. Wolfe amended the complaint to add the ground of mental disability. A couple of days later, the Tribunal issued a second screening decision, confirming that the complaint would continue forward in the area of employment and on the grounds of political belief and mental disability. The Tribunal explained that the Respondents would be notified and the complaint would immediately proceed to time limit submissions.
[9] On September 8, 2022, a Tribunal case manager sent a letter to the parties regarding next steps in the process [Notice Letter], stating in relevant part [reproduced as written]:
I am the Case Manager who will be managing the screening process at this stage of the complaint. I will be your main contact person at the Human Rights Tribunal for this part of the complaint …
This letter tells the parties what you must do next. It sets dates and deadlines …
NOTICE OF LATE FILED COMPLAINT
It appears that all or part of this complaint may have been filed outside the one-year time limit in the Human Rights Code. However, the Tribunal may allow a complaint to be filed outside the one year time limit:
…
Respondents’ Next Steps and Deadlines
If the respondents want to make submissions about whether the Tribunal should proceed with all or part of the complaint you must:
1. Complete a Form 4 – Time Limit Response form …
…
If you do not file the form by October 6, 2022, the Tribunal will decide whether to proceed with the complaint without your input.
Complainant’s Next Steps and Deadlines
When you receive the respondents’ Form 4 – Time Limit Response form, if you want to reply you must:
1. Complete a Form 5 – Time Limit Reply form …
…
If you do not file a time limit reply form by October 27, 2022 the Tribunal will decide whether to proceed with your complaint without further information from you.
…
Information about Tribunal Process
Learn about the process at Human Rights Complaint Process. You are at the complaint screening stage. If the Tribunal decides to accept the complaint for filing, it will tell you the next steps.
[10] The parties made their submissions on the timeliness issue. In a letter decision on May 18, 2023, the Tribunal declined to exercise its discretion to accept the late-filed complaint [Letter Decision]. As a result, the complaint was dismissed. At that point, Ms. Wolfe applied for judicial review. On March 18, 2025, the BC Supreme Court found that the Letter Decision was based on an error of law and was patently unreasonable: Wolfe v. West Kootenay Women’s Association, 2025 BCSC 469. The Court set aside the Letter Decision and remitted the matter to the Tribunal for reconsideration.
[11] On reconsideration, the Tribunal exercised its discretion to accept the complaint for filing under s. 22(3): Wolfe v. West Kootenay Women’s Association and others, 2025 BCHRT 156 [Timeliness Decision]. Further background regarding the complaint is set out at paras. 23-28 of Timeliness Decision. I will not repeat it here.
III Decision
[12] There are three parts to my decision regarding Ms. Wolfe’s application. In the first part, I accept the application even though it was filed late. In the second part, I grant the request to reconsider the Screening Decision. In the final part, I reconsider the Screening Decision and decide that the complaint will proceed based on the grounds of sex and gender identity.
[13] In her submissions, Ms. Wolfe refers to the grounds of sex and gender identity as the “allyship” aspect of the complaint. For convenience, I will do the same in this decision.
A. Whether to accept the late-filed application
[14] There is a 14-day time limit for filing an application for reconsideration. A party must apply to reconsider a decision “within 14 days of the date on which the circumstances that form the basis of the application came to the party’s attention or could have come to the party’s attention if the party exercised reasonable diligence, whichever is earlier”: Tribunal’s Rules of Practice and Procedure [Rules], Rule 36(2). The purpose of this rule is to reduce uncertainty about the finality of Tribunal decisions by encouraging prompt applications for reconsideration: MacLennan v. BC Ministry of Public Safety and Solicitor General, 2018 BCHRT 214 at para. 16.
[15] Ms. Wolfe filed her application for reconsideration outside the time limit. The application should have been filed by September 1, 2022. Instead, it was filed on July 25, 2025, almost 3 years late.
[16] The Tribunal can waive its own rules or adjust applicable time limits as it considers appropriate in the circumstances: Rule 2(2). A party seeking to have the 14-day time limit under Rule 36(2) waived must persuade the Tribunal that waiver is required for the just and timely resolution of the complaint: MacLennan at para. 17. The assessment of each waiver request is a highly discretionary exercise. The Tribunal considers all of the circumstances to make its assessment in a way that best furthers not only the fair and efficient resolution of the complaint but also the purposes of the Code: MacLennan at para. 19. Fairness and equity are guiding principles. Relevant factors may include, but are not limited to: whether there are serious grounds for reconsideration; the length of the delay in filing; the explanation for the delay; and the prejudice to any person: MacLennan at para. 19; Mohamed and others (by Mansoory) v. Hertz Canada Limited and another, 2024 BCHRT 152 at para. 19.
[17] Ms. Wolfe acknowledges that a significant amount of time has passed since the Screening Decision. However, she says the delay is explicable and has caused no substantial prejudice, and her application for reconsideration raises matters of public interest.
[18] Regarding the explanation for the delay, Ms. Wolfe argues that, up until the Timeliness Decision, the parties were focussed on the timeliness issue. She adds that, despite the Screening Decision, the Tribunal “treated the allyship aspect of the complaint as a live issue” in the Letter Decision, and the issue was further kept alive – but left unresolved – in the judicial review of that decision.
[19] On the question of prejudice, Ms. Wolfe argues that: the evidence and events related to the allyship issue will already be before the Tribunal in relation to the political belief aspect of the complaint; the Tribunal’s process is still at a very early stage, with the Respondents having not yet submitted a response to the complaint; and accepting the late-filed reconsideration application will not interfere with any timelines. She says acceptance of her application will not substantially prejudice any person, but not accepting it could be prejudicial to her.
[20] The Respondents disagree with Ms. Wolfe. They say the Tribunal should dismiss the reconsideration application as manifestly out of time. They say the application is nearly three years late, offers no compelling explanation for the delay, and would materially prejudice them in this proceeding.
[21] The Respondents note that Ms. Wolfe filed her amendment in time in 2022. They argue that nothing prevented her from also filing her reconsideration application within the 14-day time limit or shortly thereafter. They say her “strategic decision to focus on the timeliness issues is not justification that engages the interests of justice.” Under the circumstances, they argue that accepting Ms. Wolfe’s application now would defeat the purpose of the 14-day time limit.
[22] The Respondents also say there would be substantial prejudice to them if the application proceeds. They submit that: Association staff who were present during the period relevant to the complaint have left the organization, and critical institutional memory is fading; they have relied on the Screening Decision to shape their litigation position and resource allocation; turnover in board members will complicate evidence gathering; and they have lost “real-time recollection regarding meetings and verbal exchanges related to the allyship issue.” The Respondents argue that allowing reconsideration “would duplicate evidence, expand hearing time, and undermine the Tribunal’s mandate for efficient resolution.”
[23] Finally, the Respondents assert that there is no serious ground for reconsideration here. They argue that reconsideration is not an appropriate remedy for errors of law, and Ms. Wolfe should have applied for judicial review of the Screening Decision if she disagreed with it.
[24] Both parties make strong arguments. There is no doubt that the length of the delay here factors heavily against the Tribunal accepting Ms. Wolfe’s late-filed application. In my view, however, it is outweighed by other, significant, countervailing factors.
[25] First, on the whole of the information before me, I find that it was reasonable for Ms. Wolfe to focus on the timeliness issue after the Screening Decision. The Screening Decision itself directed that the “next step” in the process was timeliness submissions. This direction was confirmed in the second screening decision a couple of days later, and then again the following week in the Notice Letter. The Notice Letter stated that the complaint remained in the Tribunal’s initial screening stage, and Ms. Wolfe’s next step in the screening process was to complete and file a Form 5 regarding the timeliness issue. The Notice Letter directed that, if the complaint made it past screening, the Tribunal would then tell the parties the next steps from there.
[26] To be clear, I am not suggesting that the 14-day time limit did not apply to the Screening Decision. Nor do I find that the Tribunal’s directions prevented Ms. Wolfe from seeking reconsideration within the time limit. Nor do I accept Ms. Wolfe’s argument that, until the Timeliness Decision, “there were no proceedings before the Tribunal within which the complainant could have brought an application for reconsideration on the allyship issue.” The Screening Decision was a decision of a Tribunal Member and therefore “a decision of the tribunal for the purposes of [the] Code”: Code, s. 37(5). Rule 36(2) applied to it. However, it is understandable that Ms. Wolfe’s focus was elsewhere at the time – and subsequently remained elsewhere because of the Letter Decision and the judicial review that followed.
[27] Second, on the parties’ submissions, I am unable to find any substantial prejudice to the Respondents arising from the lateness of the reconsideration application. I appreciate that roughly three years have passed since the Screening Decision, and I accept that memories may have faded as a result. But that is not attributable to the lateness of the present application. It is because of the lengthy proceedings regarding timeliness. Similar reasoning applies to the Respondents’ concerns regarding turnover at the Association and lost recollections of meetings and verbal exchanges.
[28] I am also not convinced that the Respondents have been prejudiced in terms of their reliance on the Screening Decision. They have not explained how the decision may have shaped their litigation position or resource allocation. Nor have they told me how those shapes may be changed by the reconsideration application, or how any such changes may be unfair or prejudicial to them. I agree with Ms. Wolfe that, in the complaint, the same events relate to the grounds of sex and gender identity as relate to the ground of political belief. I do not see how allowing reconsideration will result in any duplication of evidence in this proceeding, nor do I accept that it will necessarily expand any oral hearing that may take place.
[29] I also agree with Ms. Wolfe that the early stage of the Tribunal’s process in this case factors against a finding of prejudice. The Respondents have not yet filed their response to the complaint; the parties have not been asked to disclose their documents; the Tribunal has not yet assigned the complaint to a case path; and no dismissal applications have been decided or even requested. The reconsideration application will not cause any duplication of efforts or resources with respect to any of those steps of the Tribunal’s process.
[30] Finally, as I explain in the next part of this decision, I disagree with the Respondents’ characterization of the ground for reconsideration put forward in Ms. Wolfe’s application. The basis for her request for reconsideration is procedural fairness. She seeks to be heard regarding the Tribunal’s decision not to proceed with the complaint on the grounds of sex and gender identity. It is within the Tribunal’s reconsideration power to reopen a decision for reasons of procedural fairness: Fraser Health Authority v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Tribunal, 2014 BCCA 499 [Fraser Health] at para. 160. In my view, the opportunity to be heard is a serious ground for reconsideration.
[31] For these reasons, on balance, I am persuaded that it is appropriate in this case to waive the time limit for filing an application for reconsideration. To facilitate the just and timely resolution of the complaint, it is necessary for the Tribunal to accept Ms. Wolfe’s late-filed application and consider what it says.
B. Whether to reconsider the Screening Decision
[32] The Tribunal’s acceptance of a late-filed application to reconsider a decision does not mean that the request for reconsideration is granted. My acceptance of Ms. Wolfe’s application gets her foot in the door. Now she must persuade the Tribunal to reconsider the Screening Decision, which is no easy task.
[33] Under the Code, the Tribunal’s core function is to make decisions. In principle, once a decision is made, it is final and the Tribunal cannot revisit it. There are only two narrow exceptions to this principle of finality.
[34] First, the Tribunal has the ability to correct non-substantive mistakes: Rule 35; Fraser Health at paras. 135-141.
[35] Second, the Tribunal can reconsider a decision if the interests of fairness and justice require it to do so: Rule 36(1); see Zutter v. British Columbia (Council of Human Rights), 1995 CanLII 1234 (BC CA). This reconsideration power is exercised carefully and restrictively, in deference to the principle of finality: see Zutter at para. 31. The Tribunal can only reopen a decision to properly carry out its function or complete its task. It can reconsider a decision if it failed to resolve an issue that required resolution, or if it made the decision without procedural fairness: Fraser Health at paras. 135-141 and 160.
[36] Timit limit issues aside, when an applicant asks the Tribunal to reconsider a decision, the Tribunal must initially determine whether or not to do so, given the above limitations on its ability to re-open matters it has already decided. If the Tribunal is persuaded to reconsider the decision, its second task is to do so. It must re-open the decision, and decide it again in light of the applicant’s submissions (and those of the other party or parties, if necessary).
[37] In the present case, the Respondents say the Tribunal should not reconsider the Screening Decision. They argue that the basis for Ms. Wolfe’s application is an alleged legal error in the Screening Decision (namely, the alleged misapprehension of certain authorities related to the allyship issue), which is not a proper ground for reconsideration. They add that there is no freestanding procedural right to make submissions before the Tribunal issues a screening decision, given the “post-decision remedies – reconsideration and judicial review” available when a screening decision is issued. They say Ms. Wolfe chose not to invoke these remedies until recently; there was no procedural error by the Tribunal.
[38] The Respondents make some strong points. I agree that the Tribunal cannot reconsider a decision on the basis that it is unreasonable or wrong substantively: Fraser Health at para. 160-161. I also agree with the Respondents’ submission that procedural fairness “is variable and contextual” and the Tribunal is not required to solicit submissions before making a preliminary screening decision. And I agree – and have found above – that Ms. Wolfe could have applied for reconsideration within the statutory time limit. It does not follow, however, that her present application should be denied.
[39] First, I have already decided the timeliness issue. I have waived the 14-day time limit for Ms. Wolfe’s application. As a result, her failure to apply three years ago is irrelevant to the question of whether the present application puts forward a valid basis for reconsideration.
[40] Second, the Respondents’ arguments conflate the basis for Ms. Wolfe’s application with the content of her submissions in the event that I grant it. As I stated above, the basis for her request for reconsideration is procedural fairness. The content of her submissions relate to the substance of the complaint. I will only deal with those substantive submissions below, after first deciding here to reconsider the Screening Decision.
[41] Ms. Wolfe seeks an opportunity to be heard regarding the Tribunal’s decision to dismiss the allyship part of her complaint. In terminating its consideration of that part of the complaint, the Tribunal exercised a statutory jurisdiction conferred under s. 27(1) of the Code: Skerry v. British Columbia (Human Rights Tribunal), 2023 BCSC 1819 at para. 3, aff’d 2024 BCCA 345. Often when it engages in this type of screening exercise, the Tribunal will tell the complainant why the complaint is not legally viable and offer them a chance to provide further information to address what the Tribunal sees as lacking: Skerry at para. 46. The Tribunal did not do so in this case. As a result, Ms. Wolfe did not have “the opportunity to correct the Tribunal’s understanding and submit additional information”: Skerry at para. 46. In these circumstances, I am satisfied that it would be procedurally unfair to maintain the Tribunal’s decision to dismiss part of Ms. Wolfe’s complaint without ever allowing her to make reconsideration submissions on the issue. I agree with her that the situation here is distinguishable from that in KS v. BC Ministry of Children and Family Development (No. 2), 2024 BCHRT 15, which is cited by the Respondents. In KS, the respondent applied for reconsideration of a Tribunal decision in part because it did not agree with the Tribunal’s analysis or ultimate disposition of the issue in question. The Tribunal denied that part of the respondent’s application in the context of the respondent having already made submissions on the issue in question.
[42] In contrast to the situation in KS, the Tribunal has not heard Ms. Wolfe’s submissions on the issue in question – i.e., the viability of the allyship part of her complaint. Under the circumstances, I am satisfied that, in the interests of fairness and justice, the Tribunal should re-open the Screening Decision so I can hear Ms. Wolfe’s submissions on that issue.
[43] I turn now to my reconsideration of the Screening Decision.
C. Reconsideration of the Screening Decision
[44] Screening is the first stage of the Tribunal’s process. At screening, the Tribunal reviews the complaint and decides whether it will proceed. To proceed with a complaint, the Tribunal must be satisfied that it alleges facts that, if proven, could be a contravention of the Code: Rule 12(2); Code, s. 27(1)(b); Gichuru v. Vancouver Swing Society, 2021 BCCA 103 at para. 52. This “arguable contravention test” sets a low bar: Gichuru at para. 56.
[45] Ms. Wolfe is a cisgender woman. She identifies as an ally of trans people and says she actively supported their inclusion at the Association. In her complaint, she alleges that she was harassed and penalized for doing so. She says this was discrimination based on several grounds, including sex and gender identity.
[46] The Screening Decision stated, in relevant part:
The grounds of sex and gender identity will not proceed as part of this complaint. The complaint was not adversely treated because of her own sex or gender identity as a cisgender woman, but for her support of gender diverse members of the organization.
[47] Ms. Wolfe argues that this allyship part of her complaint (i.e., discrimination based on the grounds of sex and gender identity) was viable and should not have been dismissed. She says the Tribunal has previously “left open the question of whether a direct complaint, based on allyship, can be sustained under the Code,” citing the Tribunal’s decisions in Balikama v. Khaira Enterprises, 2014 BCHRT 107 at paras. 565, 571-574, and 612 and Chilliwack Teachers’ Association v. Neufeld, 2021 BCHRT 6 at paras. 60-64, aff’d British Columbia Teachers’ Association v. Neufeld, 2023 BCSC 1460 at paras. 67-68.
[48] I agree that this is an open question. As the Tribunal recently stated in Liang v. Canadian Jerky Company and others, 2024 BCHRT 25 at para. 20:
This Tribunal has not foreclosed the possibility that a person may be discriminated against by conduct towards a group they are not a part of, and not perceived to be a part of: Chilliwack Teachers’ Association v. Neufeld, 2021 BCHRT 6 … at para. 119-121, upheld in British Columbia Teachers’ Association v Neufeld, 2023 BCSC 1460 at paras. 67-68. In that situation, however, the complainant must bring forward some evidence capable of proving that they were adversely impacted in their employment.
[49] In her complaint, Ms. Wolfe alleges that she was treated adversely in her employment because she was an ally of trans people. In light of cases she has cited, I find that these alleged facts, if proven, could be a contravention of the Code. The novel or unique nature of the allegations made in a complaint should not prevent it from proceeding, so long as the allegations meet the arguable contravention test, which is the case here. At a hearing or in response to a dismissal application (if one is allowed), Ms. Wolfe will need to put forward evidence capable of proving her allegations. In the meantime, considering the authorities above, I exercise my discretion to allow the complaint to proceed on the grounds of sex and gender identity.
[50] The complaint will proceed in the area of employment (Code, s. 13) and based on the grounds of sex, gender identity, political belief, and mental disability.
IV CONCLUSION
[51] The time limit for filing an application for reconsideration of the Screening Decision is waived.
[52] Ms. Wolfe’s application for reconsideration of the Screening Decision is granted.
[53] I have reconsidered the Screening Decision and decided that the complaint will proceed on the grounds of sex, gender identity, political belief, and mental disability.
[54] The case manager will contact the parties regarding next steps in the Tribunal’s process.
Jonathan Chapnick
Tribunal Member