Johar and others v. College of Veterinarians of British Columbia (No. 4), 2025 BCHRT 244
Date Issued: October 15, 2025
File: CS-000963
Indexed as: Johar and others v. College of Veterinarians of British Columbia (No. 4), 2025 BCHRT 244
IN THE MATTER OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS CODE,
RSBC 1996, c. 210 (as amended)
AND IN THE MATTER of a complaint before
the British Columbia Human Rights Tribunal
BETWEEN:
Bhupinder Singh Johar, Anil Sharma, Jasdeep Grewal, and Renu Sood
COMPLAINANTS
AND:
College of Veterinarians of British Columbia
RESPONDENT
REASONS FOR DECISION
APPLICATION FOR AN IN-PERSON HEARING
Tribunal Member: Robin Dean
Counsel for the Complainant: Clea Parfitt
Counsel for the Respondent: Nazeer K. Mitha, K.C.
I INTRODUCTION
[1] The College of Veterinarians of British Columbia [College] applies for an order that the hearing of this matter be conducted in person rather than by videoconference over Microsoft Teams, as is the Tribunal’s usual practice since the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic. The College says that an in-person hearing is necessary given the credibility issues at play. The Complainants oppose the application and ask that the hearing proceed entirely by videoconference.
[2] For the following reasons, I deny the application for an in-person hearing. Even if credibility were a major issue, which is something that the parties dispute, demeanour is but one, limited, factor in assessing credibility. And, in any event, I am satisfied that demeanour can be adequately observed through videoconference. Weighing the relative prejudice to the parties, I order that the hearing proceed by Microsoft Teams.
II BACKGROUND
[3] A detailed background to the complaint is set out in the Tribunal’s decision denying the College’s application to dismiss: Johar and others v. College of Veterinarians of British Columbia (No. 3), 2024 BCHRT 342 [Dismissal Decision]. I will not repeat this extensive background here.
[4] In brief, the Dismissal Decision describes the complaint as follows at para. 2:
This complaint picks up where a previous human rights complaint against the College’s predecessor, the BC Veterinary Medical Association, left off. In Brar and others v. BC Veterinary Medical Association and Osborne (No. 22), 2015 BCHRT 151, after over a decade of litigation and 356 days of hearing, the Human Rights Tribunal concluded that the Association had discriminated against a group of Indo-Canadian veterinarians based on their race, colour, and place of origin. In the present complaint, Dr. Bhupinder Singh Johar, Dr. Anil Sharma, Dr. Renu Sood, and Dr. Jasdeep Grewal [together, the Complainants] allege that, since the evidence in Brar was submitted and the Tribunal issued its final decision, the College has continued to discriminate against Indo-Canadian veterinarians operating low-cost clinics. Specifically, each of the Complainants alleges that the College has pursued disciplinary action against them in ways that the Tribunal found in Brar were rooted in and indicative of racial discrimination. This includes over-zealous pursuit of complaints, application of unreasonable standards, and protracted, harsh, and procedurally unfair complaint proceedings. They say this is discrimination based on their race, colour, and place of origin, in violation of ss. 8 and 14 of the Human Rights Code.
[5] In the Dismissal Decision, the Tribunal dismissed several of the allegations against the College; however, it allowed six of the allegations to proceed to a hearing. These allegations are referred to in the Dismissal Decision as the SPCA Complaint, the Coupons Complaint, the Cassie Complaint, the Technician’s Complaint, the Benson Complaint, and the Lucho Complaint.
[6] The College says on this application that credibility will be key to resolving three significant factual disputes in the SPCA, Coupons, and Benson Complaints. It summarizes these factual disputes as follows:
a. For the SPCA Complaint, which involved a pet owner’s complaint that Dr. Johar threatened to report her to the SPCA if she did not take down a negative review she had posted online, the College proposed ethics training to resolve the complaint file. In the Amended Complaint … Dr. Johar says he complied with the College’s proposal. However, the College says he refused;
b. For the Coupons Complaint, Dr. Johar alleged … that the College’s complaint file had not yet been formally closed, which had caused him significant stress. The College says that by letter dated June 16, 2017, it had informed Dr. Johar that that complaint had been closed; and
c. For the Benson Complaint, one of the terms of the remedial action by consent (“RAC”) that Dr. Grewal signed to resolve the complaint file was that Dr. Grewal receive in‐person training from a veterinary anesthesiologist. After the College learned that the training sessions were not taking place in person, it agreed to amend the RAC to permit virtual training. However, Dr. Grewal ultimately refused to continue sessions with that veterinary anesthesiologist because he claimed she had a lack of independence from the College and was trying to get him to admit to an anaesthetic error in relation to the complaint file, for the benefit of the College. The College says none of this is true.
[7] The Complainants disagree that there are significant factual disputes in this complaint. They say in their response to this application:
We further strongly disagree that credibility is a major factor in this matter. This is for the most part not a “he said, she said” case about extensive verbal or other types of in-person interactions. Almost all of the communications between the College and their registrants in the course of disciplinary matters take place in writing. Findings here about what happened will depend on the documentary record that is established, with perhaps some gloss added through oral evidence.
The examples cited by the respondent may have an element of credibility, but even the issues cited by the Respondent are largely going to turn on documents and circumstances, and the meaning to be ascribed to those circumstances at the end of the day. These issues will not involve differing accounts provided by two persons present at the time of a particular event. In other words, they will not involve credibility determinations.
[8] The hearing of this complaint is currently scheduled for 28 days, beginning in April 2026.
III DECISION
[9] Section 27.2(1) of the Code speaks to how the Tribunal may receive evidence:
A member or panel may receive and accept on oath, by affidavit or otherwise, evidence and information that the member or panel considers necessary and appropriate, whether or not the evidence or information would be admissible in a court of law.
The Tribunal has interpreted this section of the Code as permitting it hear evidence by videoconference: Sleightholm v. METRIN and another (No. 2), 2013 BCHRT 43 at para. 7. Indeed, since the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic, videoconference has become the default mode for hearings at the Tribunal.
[10] In deciding whether to deviate from the default and grant an in-person hearing, the Tribunal must weigh the relative prejudice to the parties, as well as the impact of the decision on the integrity of the process: Sleightholm at para. 8. In doing so here, I am not persuaded to order that the hearing proceed in person. Even if credibility is a significant factor, which is something I do not need to decide, credibility can be adequately assessed when hearings are virtual. Therefore, I see no prejudice to the College in proceeding by Microsoft Teams. On the other hand, I am persuaded that there is some prejudice to the Complainants by proceeding in person.
[11] First, the College says that the Complainants will not be prejudiced by an in-person hearing because the parties, their legal counsel, and significant witnesses are in the Vancouver area. The Complainants disagree, noting that three of them operate busy practices in the Lower Mainland at offices that lie far from Vancouver’s downtown core, where the Tribunal is located. The final Complainant now lives and works in Ontario. Having an in-person hearing, the Complainants say, would cost them in terms of money and time away from their veterinary practices. This is particularly so for the Complainant who lives extra-territorially. A virtual hearing would allow all Complainants more ability to participate in the hearing of the complaint. I am satisfied that this is evidence of prejudice to the Complainants.
[12] Second, while demeanour is a factor that a court can consider in assessing a witness’ credibility, Beigi v. FMS Medical Systems Ltd., 2025 BCSC 1663 at para. 9, it is only one factor to consider. Other factors include:
a. the witness’s ability and opportunity to observe events;
b. the firmness of the witness’s memory;
c. the witness’s ability to resist the influence of interest to modify his or her recollection;
d. whether the witness’s evidence harmonizes with independent evidence that has been accepted;
e. whether the witness changes his or her testimony during direct and cross-examination;
f. whether the witness’s testimony seems unreasonable, impossible, or unlikely; and
g. whether a witness has a motive to lie: Gichuru v. Smith, 2013 BCSC 895 at para. 129, aff’d 2014 BCCA 414, leave to appeal to SCC ref’d, [2014] S.C.C.A. No. 547.
[13] However, demeanour is a factor that is “notoriously unreliable” as a measure of credibility: Beigi at para. 10. The physical manner in which a witness testifies can be affected by a variety of factors having nothing to do with whether the witness is telling the truth, including health, personality, cultural and social upbringing, and comfort level with testifying in a courtroom setting: Beigi at para. 10. For these reasons, demeanour is difficult to interpret when assessing credibility. Credibility determinations therefore should not be based on demeanour alone: Beigi at para. 10, citing R. v. N.S., 2012 SCC 72 at paras. 99-107.
[14] Demeanour therefore plays a limited role in assessing credibility. The College’s concerns about proceeding by videoconference are, in my view, not borne out when considering the law surrounding credibility assessments and the multifaceted nature of those assessments.
[15] The College points out the Tribunal’s 2013 comment that “Having a witness testify by video or telephone will make assessments of credibility more difficult”: Sleightholm at para. 12. In 2025, I have to disagree regarding video assessments. First, in my view, videoconferencing has proved to be a medium that allows a full view of the witness, often a closer view than would be available in a hearing room. Second, Sleightholm was decided in a different time. Since 2013, not only has technology evolved, so has the Tribunal’s experience with it. The Tribunal now regularly hears complaints by videoconference.
[16] The College takes the position that “While views of videoconference hearings have changed to some degree since the Covid‐19 Pandemic, there is still disagreement over whether credibility can be adequately assessed by videoconference.” It relies on two labour arbitration decisions from the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic, including BCPSEA/SD No. 68 v. BCTF/Nanaimo District Teachers’ Association, 2020 CanLII 89909 (BC LA) and BC Public School Employers’ Association/ SD No. 39 (Vancouver) v BC Teachers’ Federation, 2020 CanLII 76272 (BC LA). It also relies on academic articles. However, I have not considered these articles in my decision because they are not properly before me as expert evidence. I, however, agree with the reasoning adopted in British Columbia Public School Employers’ Association/A Certain School District v British Columbia Teachers’ Federation/A Certain Teachers’ Association, 2024 CanLII 72129 (BC LA) at para. 20:
It is no longer the case that testimony is normally presented in-person at the hearing. The experience of the last two and half years has shown that arbitrators are quite capable of assessing credibility of a witness participating by way of videoconferencing. To the extent that demeanour is a factor in assessing the credibility of witnesses, current videoconferencing technology permits observation which is comparable to in-person hearings. In my view, the benefit of compelled experience with videoconferencing over the last two and half years has changed “norms” and presumptions…
[17] The College says it is concerned about technology issues that may interrupt the flow of their cross-examination of the Complainants, causing it prejudice. I agree with the Complainants that this is an issue that could prejudice all parties equally. This is a neutral factor.
[18] Finally, the College seems to suggest that the integrity of the Tribunal’s process may be at stake by permitting the complaint to be heard virtually. It says there is a risk that the witnesses may consult materials off-screen or have others present while the witness testifies. Setting aside the speculative nature of this argument, the Tribunal has safeguards to protect the integrity of the process being affected in this way. The standard Tribunal instructions to witnesses inquires whether the witness has any papers with them and asks that any papers be set aside during their testimony unless they are instructed to consult them. Further, the Tribunal ensures that no one else is in the room offscreen with a witness in addition to the Tribunal’s general exclusion of witnesses from the virtual hearing room until they testify (unless they are a party). I am not satisfied that this is a reason to order an in-person hearing.
[19] The College has not persuaded me that the prejudice to it outweighs the prejudice to the Complainants. Weighing the relative prejudice, I order that the hearing will proceed by videoconference.
IV CONCLUSION
[20] I deny the College’s application for an in-person hearing. The hearing will proceed entirely by videoconference.
Robin Dean
Tribunal Member