Greenfield v. Parking Corporation of Vancouver d.b.a. EasyPark and another, 2025 BCHRT 237
Date Issued: September 18, 2025
File: CS-005077
Indexed as: Greenfield v. Parking Corporation of Vancouver d.b.a. EasyPark and another, 2025 BCHRT 237
IN THE MATTER OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS CODE,
RSBC 1996, c. 210 (as amended)
AND IN THE MATTER of a complaint before
the British Columbia Human Rights Tribunal
BETWEEN:
Jeffrey Greenfield
COMPLAINANT
AND:
Parking Corporation of Vancouver d.b.a. EasyPark and Aaron Nuque
RESPONDENT
REASONS FOR DECISION
APPLICATION TO DISMISS A COMPLAINT
Section 27(1)(c)
Tribunal Member: Laila Said Alam
On their own behalf: Jeffrey Greenfield
Counsel for the Respondent: Lucy Williams
I INTRODUCTION
[1] The complaint arises in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic and relates to vaccination policies. Jeffrey Greenfield has one kidney which he says makes it dangerous for him to receive the COVID-19 vaccines. He alleges that he lost his employment in September 2021 because the respondents, Parking Corporation of Vancouver d.b.a. EasyPark and Aaron Nuque [together, the Respondents] had a mandatory vaccination policy without any means of accommodation or risk assessment. He says this is discrimination in employment based on physical disability contrary to s. 13 of the Code.
[2] The Respondents deny discriminating. They apply to dismiss the complaint under s. 27(1)(c) on the basis it has no reasonable prospect of success. They also apply to dismiss the complaint under s. 27(1)(d)(ii) on the basis it would not further the purposes of the Code to proceed against Mr. Nuque. They say, among other things, the complaint has no reasonable prospect of success because he does not make any allegations against Mr. Nuque; there is no employment relationship between Mr. Greenfield and EasyPark; he was not adversely impacted in employment; and the Respondents had no knowledge of Mr. Greenfield’s alleged physical disability.
[3] Mr. Greenfield did not respond to this application. Nonetheless, I am satisfied on the materials before me that Mr. Greenfield had notice of this application and an opportunity to respond.
[4] I find that I can decide this application under s. 27(1)(c). The only issue I need to decide is whether the Respondents are reasonably certain to prove a defence at the hearing.
[5] For the following reasons, I allow the application and dismiss the complaint. To make this decision, I have considered all the information filed by the parties. In these reasons, I only refer to what is necessary to explain my decision. I make no findings of fact.
II BACKGROUND
A. Relationship between Mr. Greenfield and the Respondents
[6] EasyPark is a company that provides parking services to businesses in and around the Lower Mainland. During the period relevant to the complaint, Mr. Nuque was employed by EasyPark as the Supervisor, Safety and Security.
[7] EasyPark contracts with the City of Vancouver to provide parking management services to certain City owned parking lots. The contract requires EasyPark to adhere to the City’s applicable policies and procedures.
[8] As part of its operations, EasyPark engages subcontractors to provide security services to the parking facilities operated and/or managed by EasyPark. One such subcontractor hired Mr. Greenfield as a Site Supervisor at a City-owned parking lot. Mr. Greenfield was at all times employed by the security subcontractor.
[9] The security subcontractor and EasyPark are parties to an EasyPark Security Services Agreement dated July 16, 2017 [Subcontractor’s Security Agreement]. According to the Subcontractor’s Security Agreement, the security subcontractor is responsible for the following:
(a) providing security services to EasyPark;
(b) hiring, training, managing and disciplining the security subcontractor’s employees;
(c) ensuring that the security subcontractor has sufficient employees to provide the services to EasyPark; and
(d) providing replacement employees when necessary.
[10] Neither the Subcontractor nor the City are parties to this complaint. The only respondents are EasyPark and Mr. Nuque.
B. The City’s, EasyPark’s, and Security Subcontractor’s COVID-19 response
[11] On or about March 11, 2020, the World Health Organization declared the COVID-19 pandemic outbreak a global emergency.
[12] In or around July 2021, the City informed EasyPark that it would be implementing a mandatory COVID-19 vaccination policy that required all contractors operating on the City’s premises (including EasyPark) to be vaccinated against COVID-19.
[13] On September 7, 2021, EasyPark notified its service providers (including the security subcontractor that employed Mr. Greenfield) that it would require that all contractors working in EasyPark’s facilities be fully vaccinated. EasyPark requested that each of its service providers confirm that they had a vaccination policy in place, the requirements of the policy, and that they were willing to ask their employees to provide proof of vaccination if requested by EasyPark or one of EasyPark’s clients.
[14] On September 16, 2021, the security subcontractor issued an updated “Security COVID-19 Safety Plan, Policies and Protocols” [Security Subcontractor’s COVID Policy], which included a Proof of Vaccination section that stated as follows:
To continue working at all [the security subcontractor’s] static and event sites, email your proof of vaccination (POVacc) – BC Vaccine Card to [e-mail address] (1st vaccination by or before September 13, 2021 and fullyvaccinated by October 24, 2021). To facilitate the change, a two-week grace period will be provided for submitting the first vaccination document by September 26, 2021. Include your full name and securitylicense number. Emails sent without the required information will not be considered. All new hires andsubcontracted staff from September 2021 onwards must have POVacc.
Businesses and clients have the prerogative to request for POVacc for entry into / work at their sites. If you cannot provide the POVacc, you will not be allowed to work at the site / be removed from the shifts. You will be moved to other sites and shifts (if available / where possible at site-specific payrates) where the clients have not mandated POVacc.
[Bolding in the original. Underlining added]
[15] On September 22, 2021, EasyPark issued a policy entitled Mandatory Vaccination Policy – COVID-19.
[16] The security subcontractor reassigned Mr. Greenfield to another of their client’s sites in accordance with the Security Subcontractor’s Security Agreement and the Security Subcontractor’s COVID Policy. Mr. Greenfield remained employed with the Security Contractor until the end of August 2022.
III DECISION
[17] The Respondents apply to dismiss Mr. Greenfield’s complaint on the basis that it has no reasonable prospect of success: Code, s. 27(1)(c) The onus is on the Respondents to establish the basis for dismissal.
[18] Section 27(1)(c) is part of the Tribunal’s gate-keeping function. It allows the Tribunal to remove complaints which do not warrant the time and expense of a hearing.
[19] The Tribunal does not make findings of fact under s. 27(1)(c). Instead, the Tribunal looks at the evidence to decide whether “there is no reasonable prospect that findings of fact that would support the complaint could be made on a balance of probabilities after a full hearing of the evidence”: Berezoutskaia v. British Columbia (Human Rights Tribunal), 2006 BCCA 95 at para. 22, leave to appeal ref’d [2006] SCCA No. 171. The Tribunal must base its decision on the materials filed by the parties, and not on speculation about what evidence may be filed at the hearing: University of British Columbia v. Chan,2013 BCSC 942 at para. 77.
[20] A dismissal application is not the same as a hearing: Lord v. Fraser Health Authority,2021 BCSC 2176 at para. 20; SEPQA v. Canadian Human Rights Commission,[1989] 2 SCR 879 at 899. The threshold to advance a complaint to a hearing is low. In a dismissal application, a complainant does not have to prove their complaint or show the Tribunal all the evidence they may introduce at a hearing. They only have to show that the evidence takes their complaint out of the realm of conjecture: Workers’ Compensation Appeal Tribunal v. Hill, 2011 BCCA 49 at para. 27.
[21] To prove his complaint at a hearing, Mr. Greenfield will have to prove that he has a characteristic protected by the Code, he was adversely impacted in employment, and his protected characteristic was a factor in the adverse impact: Moore v. British Columbia (Education), 2012 SCC 61 at para. 33. If he does that, the burden would shift to the Respondents to justify the impact as a bona fide occupational requirement. If the impact is justified, there is no discrimination.
[22] The Respondents say Mr. Greenfield has no reasonable prospect of proving that they discriminated against him, or that he experienced any adverse impact in employment. They also say they are reasonably certain to prove a defence at the hearing.
[23] As noted above, Mr. Greenfield has not submitted a response to this dismissal application. Nonetheless, I have considered the whole of the evidence before me, and I am satisfied that the Respondents have established a basis for dismissal.
[24] The Tribunal has held that a respondent is not responsible to accommodate a disability that it was not aware of or could not reasonably have been aware of: Klewchuk v. City of Burnaby (No. 6), 2022 BCHRT 29 at para. 367. In all of the circumstances, I am satisfied that the Respondents are reasonably certain to prove that they were not aware of and could not reasonably have been aware of Mr. Greenfield’s alleged disability-related barrier to getting a COVID-19 vaccine. Mr. Greenfield has not particularized anywhere in his complaint that he notified the Respondents that he had a disability or that his disability interfered with his ability to be vaccinated, or that he required an accommodation on account of his disability in relation to vaccination requirements. As a result, I am satisfied that the Respondents are reasonably certain to prove that their conduct was justified, and they did not owe Mr. Greenfield a duty to accommodate his disability-related barrier to being vaccinated against COVID-19.
IV CONCLUSION
[25] The complaint is dismissed in its entirety under s. 27(1)(c) of the Code.
Laila Said Alam
Tribunal Member