Hurst v. BC Ministry of Public Safety and Solicitor General (North Fraser Pretrial Centre) and others, 2025 BCHRT 234
Date Issued: September 18, 2025
File: CS-005273
Indexed as: Hurst v. BC Ministry of Public Safety and Solicitor General (North Fraser Pretrial Centre) and others, 2025 BCHRT 234
IN THE MATTER OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS CODE,
RSBC 1996, c. 210 (as amended)
AND IN THE MATTER of a complaint before
the British Columbia Human Rights Tribunal
BETWEEN:
Darcy Hurst
COMPLAINANT
AND:
His Majesty the King in Right of the Province of British Columbia as represented by the Ministry of Public Safety and Solicitor General (North Fraser Pretrial Centre) and Employees
RESPONDENTS
REASONS FOR DECISION
APPLICATION TO DISMISS A COMPLAINT
Section 27(1)(d)(ii)
Tribunal Member: Edward Takayanagi
On their own behalf: Darcy Hurst
Counsel for the Respondents: Julia Roe
I INTRODUCTION
[1] Darcy Hurst filed a complaint alleging that His Majesty the King in Right of the Province of British Columbia as represented by the Ministry of Public Safety and Solicitor General (North Fraser Pretrial Centre), and three of its employees, Employees B, C, and D, discriminated against him in services on the basis of race, colour, and ancestry contrary to s. 8 of the Human Rights Code. Mr. Hurst says that when he was incarcerated the Respondents made him take down his signs supporting the Black Lives Matter movement.
[2] The Respondents filed an application to dismiss the complaint in respect of the three individual Respondents under s. 27(1)(d)(ii) because proceeding with the complaint would not further the purposes of the Code. They also apply to anonymize the names of the individual Respondents.
[3] While I do not refer to it all in my decision, I have considered all of the information filed by the parties in relation to the applications. This is not a complete recitation of the parties’ submissions, but only those necessary to come to my decision. I make no findings of fact.
[4] I first consider the application for anonymization. For the reasons that follow, I find it appropriate to anonymize the names of the individual Respondents as their privacy interests at this stage outweigh the public interest in their identities.
[5] Next, I consider whether the purposes of the Code are served by having the complaint proceed against the individual Respondents. My decision turns on whether the conduct alleged has a measure of individual culpability that warrants proceeding against them. In my view, it does not, and it would not further the purposes of the Code to proceed against them.
II Preliminary issue – application to limit publication
[6] The Respondents seek an order to anonymize the names and identifying information of the Individual Respondents. Mr. Hurst opposes the application to anonymize and says the names of the Individual Respondents should be made public to hold them accountable for their alleged discrimination.
[7] The Tribunal has discretion to limit publication of identifying information where a person can show their privacy interests outweigh the public interest in full access to the Tribunal’s proceedings: Tribunal’s Rules of Practice and Procedure, Rule 5(6); Stein v. British Columbia (Human Rights Tribunal), 2020 BCSC 70 at para 64(a).
[8] The Tribunal may consider factors like the stage of the proceedings, the nature of the allegations, private details in the complaint, harm to reputation, or any other potential harm: JY v. Various Waxing Salons, 2019 BCHRT 106 at para. 30. It may also consider whether the proposed limitation relates to only a “sliver” information that minimally impairs the openness of the proceedings: CS v. British Columbia (Workers’ Compensation Appeal Tribunal), 2019 BCCA 406 at para. 37.
[9] I am persuaded to grant anonymization. This application arises in the early stages of the Tribunal’s process. The allegations are unproven, which affords greater scope for limiting public access. I have found that it would not further the purposes of the Code to proceed against the individual Respondents, which I find weighs in favour of an anonymization order: The Complainant v. BC Ministry of Social Development and Poverty Reduction and others, 2023 BCHRT 29 at para. 15.
[10] The complaint makes allegations of discrimination by the individual Respondents in their capacity as employees of the Ministry. The Respondents say that publishing their names in relation to unproven allegations would have a real and substantial impact on the professional reputation of the individual Respondents who continue to work with vulnerable peoples. I accept that there is a significant potential to harm the professional reputations and careers of the individual Respondents if their identities were made public on the basis of unproven allegations.
[11] Under the circumstances, I find it appropriate to order that the names and identifying information of all the individual Respondents, shall not be published by any party in relation to this complaint.
III BACKGROUND
[12] Mr. Hurst describes himself as Black and African-Canadian. On July 18, 2021, when he was incarcerated, Mr. Hurst posted a piece of paper on his cell door window on which he had written, “NFPC STAFF GET YOUR KNEE OFF OF MY NECK I CAN’T BREATH [sic]”. Mr. Hurst says the sign was referring to the Black Lives Matter movement and the murder of George Floyd.
[13] Employee B took down the paper and ordered Mr. Hurst not to post anything on his window obstructing the view of his cell. Mr. Hurst subsequently put up another piece of paper which said, “GET YOUR KNEE OFF OF MY NECK I CAN’T BREATH [sic].” Employee B discussed the situation with Employee C, and they removed Mr. Hurst’s sign and issued a notice of breach for disobeying staff direction.
[14] On July 27, 2021, Employee D, noticed there was a procedural error in the issuance of the notice of breach and withdrew it. Employee D informed Mr. Hurst that the notice of breach was withdrawn. They told Mr. Hurst no one is allowed to have anything on their cell windows obstructing the view of the cell.
IV DECISION
[15] The issue I must consider is whether the complaint, as against the individual Respondents, Employees B, C, and D, should be dismissed pursuant to s. 27(1)(d)(ii) because proceeding against them would not further the purposes of the Code. If the application is granted the individual Respondents would be removed as parties to the complaint but the complaint would still proceed against the Ministry.
[16] There are strong policy reasons that favour complaints against individual respondents. As the Supreme Court of Canada has acknowledged, “the aspirational purposes of the Code require that individual perpetrators of discrimination be held accountable for their actions”: British Columbia Human Rights Tribunal v. Schrenk, 2017 SCC 62 at para. 56.This is especially true for allegations of discrimination with a high degree of personal culpability, like sexual or racial harassment: Daley v. BC (Ministry of Health), 2006 BCHRT 341 at para. 53.
[17] On the other hand, naming individual respondents can complicate and delay the resolution of complaints, exacerbate feelings of personal animosity, and cause needless personal distress to individuals who are accused of discrimination: Daley at para. 54. Because employers and institutional respondents are liable for the acts of their agents, they will be responsible for any remedy ordered by the Tribunal: Code, s. 44(2); Robichaud v. Canada, [1987] 2 SCR 84. In those situations, the remedial aims of the Code may be most fairly and efficiently fulfilled without holding individuals liable.
[18] The Tribunal balances all these considerations to decide whether the purposes of the Code are best served by having a complaint proceed against individuals as well as an institutional respondent, or against the institutional respondent only. It has identified the following factors as relevant:
a. whether the complaint names an institutional employer as a respondent and that respondent has the capacity to fulfill any remedies that the Tribunal might order;
b. whether the institutional respondent has acknowledged the acts and omissions of the individual as its own and has irrevocably acknowledged its responsibility to satisfy any remedial orders which the Tribunal might make in respect of that individual’s conduct; and
c. the nature of the conduct alleged against the individual, including whether:
i. their conduct took place within the regular course of their employment;
ii. the person is alleged to have been the directing mind behind the discrimination or to have substantially influenced the course of action taken; and
iii. the conduct alleged against the individual has a measure of individual culpability, such as an allegation of discriminatory harassment.
Daley at paras. 60-62.
[19] In my view, each of the factors in Daley favours dismissing the complaint against the individual respondents.
[20] First, the Ministry has acknowledged as its own the acts of the individual Respondents when they were in their capacities as Ministry employees and takes responsibility for satisfying any remedial orders. I am satisfied that the Ministry has the capacity to satisfy any monetary award that may be ordered on account of the conduct of the individuals. Further, among the remedies Mr. Hurst seeks is steps or programs to address the discrimination and for the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms to be visibly posted throughout the Pretrial Centre. These are not remedies that individual employees have the ability to grant. It is the Ministry that has the capacity to fulfill such remedial orders.
[21] Second, the alleged discriminatory conduct occurred in the course of the individual Respondents’ employment with the Ministry. The undisputed evidence supports that each of the individual Respondents were acting within the course of their respective work duties when the conduct complained of is alleged to have occurred.
[22] Most significantly, I am unable to find the alleged conduct has a measure of personal culpability warranting proceeding against any of the individual Respondents. The alleged conduct is that Employees B and C took down Mr. Hurst’s postings and that Employee D told him no one is allowed to post things on the cell door windows. Mr. Hurst alleges the actions of the individual Respondents show that they are dismissive of the importance of the Black Lives Matter movement for Black people. In my view, nothing in the nature of the alleged conduct is capable of rising to a level of personal culpability that requires individual responsibility. The alleged conduct is about the actions of the individual Respondents performing their work duties. There is nothing in the alleged conduct that is the type of egregious behaviour, such as repeated sexual or racial harassment in the workplace, which attracts individual liability: Daley at para. 62; Murphy v. Lafarge of Canada and others, 2006 BCHRT 558 at paras. 35-36.
[23] Based on the information before me I am not persuaded that allowing the complaint to proceed against the individual Respondents would further the purposes of the Code.
V CONCLUSION
[24] I allow the application and dismiss the complaint as against the individual Respondents.
Edward Takayanagi
Tribunal Member
Human Rights Tribunal