Card v. Fraser Health Authority and another, 2025 BCHRT 231
Date Issued: September 12, 2025
File: CS-005533
Indexed as: Card v. Fraser Health Authority and another, 2025 BCHRT 231
IN THE MATTER OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS CODE,
RSBC 1996, c. 210 (as amended)
AND IN THE MATTER of a complaint before
the British Columbia Human Rights Tribunal
BETWEEN:
Lindsey Card
COMPLAINANT
AND:
Fraser Health Authority and
United Food and Commercial Workers’ International Union, Local 1518
RESPONDENTS
REASONS FOR DECISION
APPLICATION TO DISMISS A COMPLAINT
Section 27(1)(c)
Tribunal Member: Devyn Cousineau
On her own behalf: Lindsey Card
Counsel for the Fraser Health Authority: Annie Olson and Karen Orr
Counsel for UFCW 1518: Chris Buchanan
I INTRODUCTION
[1] Lindsey Card worked for the Fraser Health Authority as a community health worker. She was represented in her employment by the United Food and Commercial Workers’ Union, Local 1518 [UFCW 1518]. On October 14, 2021, the Provincial Health Officer [PHO] issued the Hospital and Community (Health Care and Other Services) COVID-19 Vaccination Status Information and Preventive Measure Order [Order], which required all staff in regional heath boards to be vaccinated against COVID-19. Ms. Card says she was concerned about the safety and efficacy of the vaccine, especially because she was breastfeeding and planning to get pregnant. She did not receive the vaccine. As a result, on October 26, she was placed on an unpaid leave of absence and, on November 17, her employment was terminated. UFCW 1518 grieved her termination but later withdrew the grievance after it determined there was insufficient merit.
[2] In this human rights complaint, Ms. Card argues that her decision not to take the COVID-19 vaccine was based on her disability (“mental illness condition and arthritic pain”), sex (breastfeeding/planning pregnancy), and religion (“Spirit if the light religious teachings”, as written). As a result, she says that Fraser Health discriminated against her by terminating her employment in violation of s. 13 of the Human Rights Code. She alleges that UFWC 1518 discriminated against her by failing to properly support her and aligning itself with the employer, in violation of s. 13 of the Code.
[3] Both Respondents apply to have Ms. Card’s complaint dismissed without a hearing on the basis that it has no reasonable prospect of success: Code, s. 27(1)(c). Fraser Health argues that Ms. Card has no reasonable prospect of connecting her decision not to be vaccinated to a characteristic protected by the Code. UFCW 1518 argues that Ms. Card has no reasonable prospect of proving that it participated in the formulation of a discriminatory work rule or impeded an accommodation, so as to trigger s. 13 of the Code. It argues that Ms. Card’s complaint relates to the quality of its services, which is a matter that has already been addressed by the Labour Relations Board.
[4] For the following reasons, I am satisfied that Ms. Card’s complaint has no reasonable prospect of success. Her decision not to get vaccinated was based on her personal objections and concerns about the vaccine and was not connected to any characteristic protected under the Code. The consequences that flowed from that decision could not be discrimination. The complaint is dismissed under s. 27(1)(c) of the Code.
II Issue: no reasonable prospect of success
[5] I have found I can resolve both Respondents’ applications under s. 27(1)(c) of the Code. This section gives the Tribunal a gatekeeping authority to dismiss complaints that have no reasonable prospect of success. The onus is on the Respondents to establish the basis for dismissal.
[6] In this application, I do not make findings of fact. Instead, I look at the evidence to decide whether “there is no reasonable prospect that findings of fact that would support the complaint could be made on a balance of probabilities after a full hearing of the evidence”: Berezoutskaia v. British Columbia (Human Rights Tribunal), 2006 BCCA 95 at para. 22, leave to appeal ref’d [2006] SCCA No. 171. I base my decision on the materials filed by the parties, and not on speculation about what evidence may be filed at the hearing: University of British Columbia v. Chan,2013 BCSC 942 [Chan] at para. 77.
[7] A dismissal application is not the same as a hearing: Lord v. Fraser Health Authority,2021 BCSC 2176 at para. 20; SEPQA v. Canadian Human Rights Commission,[1989] 2 SCR 879 at 899. The threshold to advance a complaint to a hearing is low. In a dismissal application, a complainant does not have to prove their complaint or show the Tribunal all the evidence they may introduce at a hearing. They only have to show that the evidence takes their complaint out of the realm of conjecture: Workers’ Compensation Appeal Tribunal v. Hill, 2011 BCCA 49 at para. 27.
[8] To prove her complaint at a hearing, Ms. Card will have to prove that she has characteristics protected by the Code, was adversely impacted in her employment, and her protected characteristics were a factor in that adverse impact: Moore v. British Columbia (Education), 2012 SCC 61 at para. 33. If she did that, the burden would shift to the Respondents to justify the adverse impact as a bona fide occupational requirement. In this application, neither Respondent has relied on this defence and so I do not need to consider it.
[9] To make my decision, I have considered all the material filed by the parties. I only refer to what is necessary to make my decision. I do not address Ms. Card’s arguments about data protection laws, the Genetic Non-Discrimination Act, or occupational health and safety because they do not relate to any issue of discrimination arising under the Code. Finally, I have not found it necessary to seek further submissions from the parties in response to Fraser Health’s email drawing my attention to the Tribunal’s decision in Bruneau v. Port Coquitlam Senior Citizens’ Housing Society, 2025 BCHRT 22.
[10] I begin with Ms. Card’s complaint against Fraser Health Authority.
III Complaint against fraser health authority
[11] There is no dispute that the termination of Ms. Card’s employment is an adverse impact in her employment. It is unclear whether Ms. Card disputes that the reason for her termination was that she was not vaccinated against COVID-19. In her argument, she appears to suggest that Fraser Health’s reliance on the Order was a pretext for some other bad faith purpose. She argues: “My employer falsely claimed non-compliance with PHO Orders as just cause, but in reality, a new position was created one month after my termination, proving bad faith”. If this is indeed her argument, there is no evidence to explain what Ms. Card alleges the true reason for her termination was, or how that would connect to any of her characteristics protected by the Code. Because it is not developed, and does not relate to any apparent allegation of discrimination, I do not consider this argument further.
[12] Rather, I proceed on the basis that Ms. Card’s employment was terminated because she had not received the COVID-19 vaccine and, therefore, was ineligible to work because of the Order. This is the reason set out in Fraser Health’s letters which first put Ms. Card on unpaid leave and later terminated her employment. This is the reason that may engage human rights protections, if Ms. Card can connect her decision about the vaccine to a characteristic protected by the Code.
[13] It is apparent that Ms. Card has very strong opinions that the COVID-19 vaccine was dangerous, untested, and unnecessary, and that the mandate that she receive the vaccine in order to work was discriminatory, a violation of her bodily autonomy, and a criminal offence. There is substantial evidence that these strongly held beliefs underlay her decision not to receive the vaccine and the consequent termination of her employment with Fraser Health. However, the Code “does not protect people who refuse to get vaccinated as a matter of personal preference, because they do not believe in the efficacy of vaccinations, or because they disagree with the requirement to be vaccinated”: Lavoie v. Fraser Health Authority, 2025 BCHRT 8 at para. 16.
[14] The Code is only engaged where a decision not to be vaccinated is connected to a personal characteristic protected under s. 13. In this case, Ms. Card says her refusal to be vaccinated is connected to three protected characteristics: sex, disability, and religion. Fraser Health argues that she has no reasonable prospect of proving any connection to these characteristics. I will consider each in turn.
A. Connection to sex
[15] Ms. Card says that, at the time that Fraser Health was advising her that she had to receive the COVID-19 vaccine, she was breastfeeding one child and planning to get pregnant with another. She describes the vaccine as an “experimental drug therapy”, which was unnecessary given the survival rates for COVID-19. She says that, in 2019, she was vaccinated with a Measles Mumps Rubella booster, which she later learned she should not have received because she was pregnant. She lists what she says are harmful ingredients in the COVID-19 vaccines, and says that there were serious risks to taking the vaccine, including death. She says she did not want to vaccinate her children “through milk or my body”.
[16] The challenge is that Ms. Card has not presented evidence that the Tribunal could rely on to conclude that taking the COVID-19 vaccine posed any risk for her or her children because she was breastfeeding and/or might get pregnant. To the contrary, Fraser Health has submitted the PHO’s guidance on contraindications to the vaccine, which says:
Pregnant women benefit from COVID-19 vaccination. The vaccine is not contraindicated for use at any stage of pregnancy or when breastfeeding.
Fraser Health has also submitted information from the federal government, citing benefits to receiving the COVID-19 vaccine during pregnancy and breastfeeding and referencing large scale studies proving that the vaccine was safe and efficacious for people who were pregnant or breastfeeding.
[17] Ms. Card says she went to four doctors, none of whom would support her request to be exempt from the vaccine requirement. While she attributes this to a culture of fear and oppression, it is evidence that those doctors did not share her concerns about taking the vaccine while breastfeeding and/or considering pregnancy. One doctor that she consulted about this issue provided her with a note that simply said: “As Patient requested a letter regarding she is currently lactating and hoping to conceive in the near future” [as written]. If anything, this evidence undermines, rather than supports, her complaint.
[18] Ms. Card has submitted excerpts from a document that she says was produced by the US Food and Drug Administration authorizing the emergency use of the Pfizer-Biontech Covid-19 vaccine in November 2021. She says the document highlights “the experimental status and risks associated with the COVID-19 vaccine, particularly for women of childbearing age” and shows an “unknown impact on fertility”. However, the document does not identify any risks for pregnant or breastfeeding people or otherwise support her arguments.
[19] There is no evidence before me that could establish a sex-based reason for Ms. Card’s decision not to take the COVID-19 vaccine. As a result, her complaint of discrimination based on sex has no reasonable prospect of success and is dismissed.
B. Connection to religion
[20] The Code’s protection against religious discrimination encompasses a person’s right to practice their religion and act consistently with their faith: Syndicat Northcrest v. Amselem, 2004 SCC 47 [Amselem] at para. 46.
[21] To trigger protection based on religion, Ms. Card will have to prove two things:
a. Her belief that she should not take the COVID-19 vaccine has a connection to religion, either because:
i. it is objectively required by, or customary within, her religion; or
ii. she subjectively believes it is required by, or customary within, her religion; or
iii. she sincerely believes that her refusal to take the vaccine “engenders a personal, subjective connection to the divine or the subject or object of [their] spiritual faith”.
b. She is sincere in her religious belief.
Ameslem at paras. 56 and 69
[22] In Amselem, the Court explained what is meant by “religion”:
While it is perhaps not possible to define religion precisely, some outer definition is useful since only beliefs, convictions and practices rooted in religion, as opposed to those that are secular, socially based or conscientiously held, are protected by the guarantee of freedom of religion. Defined broadly, religion typically involves a particular and comprehensive system of faith and worship. Religion also tends to involve the belief in a divine, superhuman or controlling power. In essence, religion is about freely and deeply held personal convictions or beliefs connected to an individual’s spiritual faith and integrally linked to one’s self-definition and spiritual fulfilment, the practices of which allow individuals to foster a connection with the divine or with the subject or object of that spiritual faith. [para. 39]
[23] Respectfully, based on the material before me, Ms. Card has no reasonable prospect of proving that her opposition to the COVID-19 vaccine was based on a religious belief.
[24] In her complaint, Ms. Card describes her religion, and religious belief regarding the COVID-19 vaccine, as follows:
I follow Spirit if the light religious teachings and hold a sincere held belief [against] vaccination as I Believe it caused my medical conditions after researching vaccine ingredients and fact sheets for side effects is common to my daily symptoms. I am also currently nurturing (breastfeeding my 16 month old son) and am planning to get pregnant. My sincerely held beliefs are not to vaccinated my children not through milk or my body. [as written]
Ms. Card does not identify what her religion is or explain how her concern about the vaccine connects to her spiritual faith and/or a divine power. There is no evidence before me to explain whether “Spirit of the Light” is a religious group or belief system. She says expressly that her beliefs are related to the safety of the vaccine, rather than a religious objection.
[25] Ms. Card does not elaborate on her religious beliefs in her argument or affidavit responding to the dismissal applications. Rather, she relies on two documents to support her religious belief. The first is a note from a Senior Pastor in the Celebration Life Church. The note is dated November 26, 2021 – nine days after Ms. Card’s employment was terminated. It says:
With respect to current government instructions Ms. Lindsay Card requests a Religious Exemption from the present mRNA and Viral Vector inoculations.
· It is her firm belief that the Bible states that we are ‘fearfully and wonderfully made’ by God the Father, Creator of heaven and earth.
· That we are to respect the body as a ‘temple’ in which God dwells.
· Following that belief, it is vital to honour the physical body given and designed by Him and to do due diligence to keep it pure.
Ms. Card states that to accept the inoculation would be a violation of her good conscience and requests that her beliefs be respected as per her Human Rights.
[26] I acknowledge this is some evidence that connects Ms. Card’s beliefs to a God. However, this document does not explain what Celebration Life Church is, or – aside from references to God – how Ms. Card’s reported beliefs connect to the religion. From the references to the Bible, I take it that Celebration Life Church is a Christian church. Ms. Card does not identify her religion as Christianity but rather says she follows “Spirit if the light religious teachings”. She has not said these teachings are part of a Christian tradition, or explained how they overlap or intersect with Christianity. Therefore, there is insufficient evidence before me to find she has taken a sincerely held belief in Christianity, as practiced at the Celebration Life Church or otherwise, out of the realm of conjecture. In any event, the Pastor’s conclusion is that taking the vaccine would violate Ms. Card’s “good conscience” – not her religion.
[27] The second document is a “Certificate of Baptism”, indicating that Ms. Card was baptised by the Celebration Life Church on August 27, 2022 – nine months after her termination. Ms. Card does not explain how this could support a finding that her decision not to receive the COVID-19 vaccine nine months earlier was connected to a religious belief she had at the time.
[28] Aside from what I have set out above, Ms. Card does not explain how her refusal to take the vaccine connects to her religion or interferes with her relationship with the divine. In her communications with Fraser Health, UFCW 1518, and other entities, the substance of Ms. Card’s stated concerns about the vaccine are not based on a religious objection but on her perceptions of the safety, necessity, and efficacy of the vaccine. She appears to believe the vaccine could severely harm herself, her child, and any unborn children. For example, in response to information about how to apply to the PHO for an exception to the Order, Ms. Card told Fraser Health that she was “unable to get vaccine due to health conditions that are acknowledged by the human rights tribunal” [email dated September 24, 2021]. In her other communications to Fraser Health, she says:
a. she has a mental health condition; doctors do not want to help her; she feels “my life is being threatened and that I will lose job because of the big [bullying] government and media with these discriminating mandates” [email dated September 17, 2021];
b. it is a “criminal offence” to “punish employees or accuse anyone of having a disease”, citing the Genetic Non-Discrimination Act [email dated October 21, 2021]; and
c. she does not consent to “your experimental medical treatment that you are unlawfully prescribing”; she has been denied the right to give “informed consent”; Fraser Health is using her “Personal protected information for discriminatory policies”; the requirement to take the vaccine violates criminal law and amounts to “medical Malpractice, crimes against humanity” and “gross negligence”, “endangering my life and threatening my ability to provide for my family” [email dated November 8, 2021].
[29] Consistent with the thrust of these communications, Fraser Health has submitted affidavits from Ms. Card’s manager, and the Human Resources Leader who led the implementation of the Order. Both say that they are unaware of Ms. Card ever informing Fraser Health of a religious objection to the vaccine.
[30] I acknowledge there are passing references in Ms. Card’s communications to “religious beliefs against this gene therapy” (email to union dated October 19, 2021) and “religious discrimination”. However, none of these communications identify what Ms. Card’s religious beliefs are or how they connect to the vaccine. Ms. Card says, expressly, that she has taken at least one other vaccine without a religious concern.
[31] Viewed as a whole, this evidence could not support a finding that Ms. Card’s refusal to take the vaccine was based on a sincerely held religious belief. Rather, the evidence overwhelmingly indicates that Ms. Card’s concerns were not connected to religion but to her strongly held opinions about the vaccine and the Order. These opinions are not protected under human rights legislation.
[32] Ms. Card’s complaint of religious discrimination against Fraser Health has no reasonable prospect of success and is dismissed.
C. Connection to disability
[33] The Code does not define “disability”. The Tribunal interprets the term liberally to achieve the purposes of the Code: British Columbia Human Rights Tribunal v. Schrenk, 2017 SCC 62 at para. 31. To decide whether a condition is a “disability”, the Tribunal generally considers the degree of impairment and any functional limitations, and any social construction of disability: Morris v. BC Rail, 2003 BCHRT 14 at para. 214. It considers factors like “whether the condition entails a certain measure of severity, permanence and persistence”: Viswanathapuram v. Canadian Alliance of Physiotherapy Regulators, 2017 BCHRT 29 at para. 40.
[34] Based on the evidence before me, Ms. Card has no reasonable prospect of proving that she has a disability protected under the Code, or that any disability was a factor in her refusal to take the vaccine.
[35] To begin, there is very little information before me about what Ms. Card says her disability is. In her complaint form, she described the disability as follows:
I have neurological and auto immune disability – mental illness condition and arthritic pain in entire body
[36] Elsewhere, Ms. Card has referred to a “mental illness”. A doctor’s note dated November 26, 2021, says simply: “This note is to confirm that the patient has been treated for a medical condition”. Ms. Card says that she saw four doctors, all of whom refused to support her request to be exempt from the PHO for medical reasons. She does not explain what these medical reasons are. She says she asked for a referral to a specialist, but is still waiting for an appointment. She does not explain what sort of medicine the doctor specializes in, or what they would be investigating or treating.
[37] Fraser Health provided Ms. Card with information about how to seek a medical exemption through the PHO. On October 21, 2021, it sent a letter directly to her attending physician attaching a questionnaire to determine whether Ms. Card had a “bona fide medical contraindication to the COVID-19 vaccination”. The physician did not complete the questionnaire, and Ms. Card did not provide any further information.
[38] I am required to decide this application based on the material the parties have presented, without speculating about what evidence might be available at a hearing: Chan at para. 77. Based on the limited information before me, Ms. Card has no reasonable prospect of proving that she has a disability protected by the Code or that any disability was a factor in her decision not to receive the vaccine and consequent termination. This part of her complaint against Fraser Health is dismissed.
D. Conclusion
[39] Ms. Card has no reasonable prospect of proving that Fraser Health discriminated against her when it terminated her employment. Her complaint against Fraser Health is dismissed under s. 27(1)(c) of the Code.
IV Complaint against UFCW 1518
[40] Most complaints against a union are brought under s. 14 of the Code, which prohibits discrimination in union membership. Ms. Card has brought her complaint against UFCW 1518 under s. 13 of the Code, which prohibits discrimination in employment.
[41] There are two ways that a union can become a party to employment discrimination: where it participates in the formulation of a discriminatory work rule (ie. in the collective agreement), or where it impedes the employer’s reasonable efforts to accommodate the employee: Central Okanagan School District No. 23 v. Renaud, 1992 CanLII 81 (SCC)at paras. 35-37. UFCW 1518 argues that Ms. Card has no reasonable prospect of proving that it did either of these things. I agree.
[42] Ms. Card’s employment was terminated by Fraser Health, for the stated reason that she could not work in compliance with the Order. UFCW 1518 was not involved in that decision, or the formulation of any rule relating to mandatory vaccination. There is no evidence that UFCW 1518 impeded any accommodation process in circumstances where Fraser Health took the position that there were no accommodations to be made, outside medical exemptions granted by the PHO. There is no evidence of anything UFCW 1518 did, or did not do, which contributed to the termination of Ms. Card’s employment. In this circumstance, there is no evidence capable of proving UFCW 1518 discriminated against Ms. Card in her employment.
[43] I agree with UFCW 1518 that the thrust of Ms. Card’s complaint against it is that she is upset with how the union represented her. This allegation falls more properly under s. 14 of the Code. Ms. Card did not bring her complaint under s. 14. However, even if she had, the allegation would have no reasonable prospect of success.
[44] UFCW 1518 says that, during the period of this complaint, it developed a policy to automatically grieve any termination related to COVID-19 and compliance with the Order. After the grievance was filed, it would review the merits of the grievance and determine whether to proceed. In Ms. Card’s case, it filed the termination grievance and asked her for a statement to explain her decision not to receive the vaccine, including evidence related to any medical or religious reason for not receiving the vaccine. Based on the information it received, it decided not to proceed with the grievance. It advised Ms. Card of her option to appeal that decision. Ms. Card filed an appeal, but did not participate in the hearing. Instead, she opted to file complaints with the Labour Relations Board and this Tribunal. UFCW 1518 withdrew the grievance on February 24, 2023.
[45] Ms. Card does not argue, and there is no evidence to support, that she was adversely impacted in UFCW 1518’s union services because of her sex, religion, or disability. She does not argue, and there is no evidence to support, that UFCW 1518 treated her badly, or represented her poorly, because of her sex, religion, or disability. This would be determinative of any complaint under s. 14 of the Code.
[46] Rather, it appears that Ms. Card feels that her union was not supportive in her efforts to forego the vaccine, and aligned itself with the employer to enforce the Order. She argues that UFCW 1518:
a. failed to grieve her suspension;
b. “did not properly pursue my grievance, leaving me without a remedy”;
c. “failed to provide a shop steward who could properly assist with the dispute”;
d. failed to inform its members of the health and safety risks of the vaccine, including that the vaccine was approved “for investigational research purposes”;
e. failed to file a “proper grievance” and allowed the employer to use her complaint to the Employee Disability Management Program “as a resolution method”;
f. failed to investigate and address inaccurate information in her employee file;
g. kept inaccurate records about her termination and payment of union dues;
h. purposely withheld critical information from her “to avoid accountability and duty of care”;
i. failed to follow “due process”;
j. failed to advocate for her rights because of pressure from the employer, thus colluding with the employer; and
k. dismissed her request to file a policy grievance.
[47] I acknowledge UFCW 1518’s arguments that some of these are new allegations raised in Ms. Card’s response to the dismissal application, but I do not need to resolve them. None of the allegations raise issues of discrimination under the Code. They are all issues for the Labour Relations Board, not this Tribunal. Ms. Card has availed herself of the process for complaining about her union’s representation under s. 12 of the Labour Relations Code. Her complaints there were dismissed: Lindsey Card, 2022 BCLRB 149 and Lindsey Card, 2024 BCLRB 39.
[48] Ms. Card has no reasonable prospect of proving that UFCW 1518 discriminated against her. Her complaint is dismissed under s. 27(1)(c) of the Code.
V CONCLUSION
[49] Ms. Card’s complaint has no reasonable prospect of success. It is dismissed under s. 27(1)(c) of the Code.
Devyn Cousineau
Vice Chair