Zhou v. Fraser Health Authority, 2025 BCHRT 226
Date Issued: September 10, 2025
File: CS-005232
Indexed as: Zhou v. Fraser Health Authority, 2025 BCHRT 226
IN THE MATTER OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS CODE,
RSBC 1996, c. 210 (as amended)
AND IN THE MATTER of a complaint before
the British Columbia Human Rights Tribunal
BETWEEN:
Jenny Zhou
COMPLAINANT
AND:
Fraser Health Authority
RESPONDENT
REASONS FOR DECISION
APPLICATION TO DISMISS A COMPLAINT
Section 27(1)(c)
Tribunal Member: Devyn Cousineau
On her own behalf: Jenny Zhou
Counsel for the Respondent: Annie E. Olson and Karen N. Orr
I INTRODUCTION
[1] Jenny Zhou worked as a hospital food services worker for the Fraser Health Authority. On October 14, 2021, the Provincial Health Officer [PHO] issued the Hospital and Community (Health Care and Other Services) COVID-19 Vaccination Status Information and Preventive Measure Order [Order], which required all staff in regional heath boards to be vaccinated against COVID-19. Ms. Zhou strongly objected to taking the vaccine. As a result of her non-compliance with the Order, Fraser Health put her on an unpaid leave of absence and then terminated her employment.
[2] Ms. Zhou says she objected to taking the vaccine on political and religious grounds. She says the Order was politically motivated, not based on science, and violated various laws including the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Nuremberg Code, Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes Act of Canada, Criminal Code of Canada, and the Genetic Non-Discrimination Act. She also says that she is Protestant Christian. She says she believes that “fetal tissue was used in the development of the mRNA injections” and that taking the vaccine would conflict with her religious belief that “thou shall not kill”. She argues that the termination of her employment is discrimination based on her religion and political beliefs, in violation of s. 13 of the Human Rights Code.
[3] Fraser Health applies to dismiss the complaint on the basis that Ms. Zhou has no reasonable prospect of proving that her decision not to be vaccinated was connected to a sincerely held religious belief or that her political beliefs were a factor in her termination: Code, s. 27(1)(c).
[4] For the reasons that follow, I am satisfied that Ms. Zhou’s complaint has no reasonable prospect of success. It is dismissed.
II DECISION
[5] The onus is on Fraser Health to persuade me to dismiss Ms. Zhou’s complaint on the basis that it has no reasonable prospect of success: Code, s. 27(1)(c). In deciding the application, I look at the evidence to decide whether “there is no reasonable prospect that findings of fact that would support the complaint could be made on a balance of probabilities after a full hearing of the evidence”: Berezoutskaia v. British Columbia (Human Rights Tribunal), 2006 BCCA 95 at para. 22, leave to appeal ref’d [2006] SCCA No. 171. I base my decision on the materials filed by the parties, and not on speculation about what evidence may be filed at the hearing: University of British Columbia v. Chan,2013 BCSC 942 at para. 77. I do not make findings of fact.
[6] A dismissal application is not the same as a hearing: Lord v. Fraser Health Authority,2021 BCSC 2176 at para. 20; SEPQA v. Canadian Human Rights Commission,[1989] 2 SCR 879 at 899. The threshold to advance a complaint to a hearing is low. In a dismissal application, a complainant does not have to prove their complaint or show the Tribunal all the evidence they may introduce at a hearing. They only have to show that the evidence takes their complaint out of the realm of conjecture: Workers’ Compensation Appeal Tribunal v. Hill, 2011 BCCA 49 at para. 27.
[7] To prove her complaint at a hearing, Ms. Zhou will have to prove that:
a. At the time of her termination, she had a sincerely held religious belief that she should not receive the vaccine for COVID-19. Fraser Health argues that Ms. Zhou will not be able to prove that her opposition to the vaccine was based on a sincerely held religious belief.
b. Her views about the COVID-19 vaccine are a political belief within the meaning of the Code. Fraser Health argues that Ms. Zhou’s opposition to vaccines is not a political belief.
c. She was adversely impacted in her employment. There is no dispute that the suspension and termination of her employment were adverse impacts.
d. There is a connection between the termination of her employment and her religion and/or political belief. Fraser Health argues that Ms. Zhou will not be able to prove a connection between her political belief and her termination.
Moore v. British Columbia (Education), 2012 SCC 61 at para. 33
[8] If Ms. Zhou proved these elements of her complaint at a hearing, the burden would shift to Fraser Health to justify the termination based on a bona fide occupational requirement: British Columbia (Public Service Employee Relations Commission) v. British Columbia Government and Service Employees’ Union (Meiorin Grievance), [1999] 3 SCR 3 [Meiorin] at para. 54. Fraser Health alluded to this defence in its reply, when it argued that it could not “act in a manner that is contrary to legal requirements”: citing Jeppeson v. South Coast British Columbia Transportation Authority (Translink), 2015 BCHRT 113. However, it did not develop this argument or argue that the complaint should be dismissed because it is reasonably certain to prove a defence, and so I do not consider it further.
[9] In this decision, I focus on Fraser Health’s arguments that Ms. Zhou has no reasonable prospect of proving (1) a sincerely held religious belief that she should not take the COVID-19 vaccine, or (2) that the termination of her employment was connected to her political beliefs. I have considered all the material filed by the parties but only refer to what is necessary to make my decision.
A. Discrimination based on religion
[10] The Code’s protection against religious discrimination encompasses a person’s right to practice their religion and act consistently with their faith: Syndicat Northcrest v. Amselem, 2004 SCC 47 [Amselem] at para. 46. In this case, Ms. Zhou asserts that the Order’s requirement that she receive the COVID-19 vaccine conflicted with her Protestant Christian beliefs.
[11] To trigger protection based on religion, Ms. Zhou will have to prove two things:
a. Her belief that she should not take the COVID-19 vaccine has a connection to her Christian religion, either because:
i. it is objectively required by, or customary within, Christianity; or
ii. she subjectively believes it is required by, or customary within, Christianity; or
iii. she sincerely believes that her refusal to take the vaccine “engenders a personal, subjective connection to the divine or the subject or object of [their] spiritual faith”.
b. She is sincere in her religious belief.
Amselem at paras. 56 and 69
[12] I will consider each of these criteria in turn.
1. Practice or belief with a connection to religion
[13] The protection of religious beliefs and practices emphasises “personal choice of religious beliefs”: Amselem at para. 43. A complainant is not required to “prove the objective validity of their beliefs in that their beliefs are objectively recognized as valid by other members of the same religion”: Amselem at para. 43. The focus of the analysis is on the complainant’s beliefs “at the time of the alleged interference with [their] religious freedom”, rather than on their past practices or beliefs: Amselem at para. 53.
[14] Ms. Zhou says she is Protestant Christian. In her complaint form, she describes her religious belief as follows:
I believe in the Bible. In the Bible [it] clearly states that “thou shall not kill”. And [it] is publicly known that fetal tissue was used in the development of the mRNA injections, and I cannot accept that.
[15] Fraser Health argues that there are two reasons that Ms. Zhou has no reasonable prospect of proving that her belief that she should not take the COVID-19 vaccine were connected to her religion.
[16] First, Fraser Health argues that Ms. Zhou must prove “that her religion required her to decline the COVID-19 Vaccine” (emphasis by Fraser Health). Respectfully, this appears to be a misstatement of the test from Amselem. Contrary to this argument, Amselem is express that Ms. Zhou does not have to prove that declining the vaccine was “objectively required” by her religion, and that the freedom encompasses “both obligatory as well as voluntary expressions of faith”: para. 47. A religious requirement is only one way that she could prove her belief. She can also prove it through her own personal subjective or sincerely held belief.
[17] Second, Fraser Health argues that Ms. Zhou must prove “that her reasons for declining the COVID-19 Vaccine are based on fact”. I understand this argument to take issue with Ms. Zhou’s alleged concern about the use of fetal cells in the development of the vaccine. Fraser Health has submitted a fact sheet from healthlinkbc.ca regarding the use of fetal cell lines in the production of some COVID-19 vaccines. This document explains:
Some vaccines use human cell lines in the early stages of production, but the purification process removes nearly all the cell components so that only trace amounts of DNA and protein may be present in the vaccine… The fetal cells used for vaccines were obtained from abortions that happened decades ago, and those abortions were not done for vaccine production. These cells continue to grow in the lab, and no new fetal cells are used to make vaccines today.
[18] Fraser Health has not cited any cases to support the argument that Ms. Zhou’s religious beliefs must be “based in fact” and I am not aware of any. To the contrary, regardless of the facts, decision makers have accepted that religious objections to the vaccine founded on a perception that they were developed using fetal cells are sufficient to trigger the protection of religious freedom: see e.g. Island Health v. United Food & Commercial Workers Local 1518 (Rostas Grievance), [2023] BCCAAA No. 2 and Island Health v. United Food & Commercial Workers Local 1518 (Zall Grievance), [2023] BCCAAA No. 3, both upheld on this point in Vancouver Island Health Authority (Cowichan Home Support) (Re), 2024 BCLRB 81. In Public Health Sudbury & Districts v. Ontario Nurses’ Association, 2022 CanLII 48440, Arbitrator Herman rejected a similar argument. While acknowledging that the connection to fetal cell lines appeared “quite remote”, to the point that the Pope and others in Church leadership did not view taking the vaccine as condoning abortion, the Arbitrator reasoned:
Nevertheless, Latin Mass condemns abortion and there is a connection, albeit objectively remote, between fetal cell lines and the COVID-19 vaccines. Whether that connection is too remote to amount to condonation, cooperation or participation, or whether the grievor on an objective basis has unreasonably balanced the competing interests in deciding not to get vaccinated, are decisions for her to make as long as they are based upon her sincere belief in her faith and her sincere belief [about] what that faith requires of her. In light of the Court’s direction in Amselem that one’s sincerely held belief can be subjectively justified, it is not for an arbitrator to provide his or her answers to these questions. [para. 53]
I agree with this reasoning, and find it applies equally to Ms. Zhou’s stated belief that taking the vaccine would conflict with a religious opposition to abortion.
[19] This reasoning is also consistent with the Court’s decision in Hoogerbrug v British Columbia, 2024 BCSC 794, which – in my view – is determinative of the issue. In that case, a group of Christian petitioners argued that mandatory vaccination orders infringed their Charter right to freedom of religion. Their religious objections echoed Ms. Zhou’s, and were summarised by Justice Coval as follows:
Most who refused on religious grounds referred to the conflict between their Christian beliefs and the use of fetal cells in the vaccines’ development. Some described accepting the vaccine as contravening their obligation to trust in God’s will and providential care, protect their body from contaminants, or make their own moral decisions without coercion. A senior director of two hospitals described the vaccine as containing contaminants that offended the teaching that the body is “the temple of the Lord”. [para. 28]
[20] The Court was satisfied that the Amselem criteria were met, and Charter protection was triggered, in respect of these petitioner’s religious objection to the vaccine: paras. 249 and 255-263. This reasoning applies equally to Ms. Zhou’s complaint. There is some evidence to connect her objection to Christian teachings about the body, and the treatment of unborn life: Hoogerbrug at para. 249. This is sufficient to take this element of her complaint out of a realm of conjecture.
2. Sincerity of belief
[21] Next, Fraser Health argues that Ms. Zhou has no reasonable prospect of proving that her objection to the vaccine was sincerely based on her religious beliefs. It argues that the evidence establishes that Ms. Zhou’s concerns were rooted in safety and efficacy, which were more about her personal preferences than a sincerely held religious belief. Based on the unique facts of this case, I agree.
[22] The sincerity of a complainant’s belief is a question of fact which can be determined “based on several non-exhaustive criteria, including the credibility of a claimant’s testimony … as well as an analysis of whether the alleged belief is consistent with his or her other current religious practices”: Amselem at para. 53. It is not necessary for the human rights analysis that Ms. Zhou’s objection to the COVID-19 vaccine be based only on religious beliefs and nothing else.
[23] That said, I am satisfied based on all the evidence before me that Ms. Zhou has no reasonable prospect of proving that her religious objection to the vaccine was sincerely held. This is because, throughout her copious communications with Fraser Health stating her strong opposition to the Order, she never mentioned a religious objection. This is consistent with her response to this application, where she has devoted one paragraph to her religious belief (which I address below) and the remainder of her arguments and evidence on non-religious based objections to the vaccine. Fraser Health says, and Ms. Zhou does not dispute, that the first time that Ms. Zhou raised a religious objection to the vaccine was in her human rights complaint. Considered as part of the evidence as a whole, the religious objection appears to be a pretext for Ms. Zhou’s real concerns about the vaccine, which were based on its safety, efficacy, and political implications.
[24] The first record of Ms. Zhou expressing her concerns to Fraser Health about the Order is her 14-page letter dated October 19, 2021, to the CEO of Fraser Health. Ms. Zhou expressed her concerns that:
a. COVID-19 vaccines are “a medical experiment” and people taking them are “test-subjects”;
b. COVID-19 vaccines were not subjected to “normal testing and safety protocols” and there has not been sufficient disclosure about their ingredients or risks to ensure “fully informed consent” to receive them;
c. COVID-19 vaccines are dangerous, and mandatory vaccinations will do more harm than good;
d. information released by the government about the COVID-19 vaccines is inaccurate, incomplete, and misleading;
e. there are safer, more effective options to prevent COVID-19 like ivermectin and hydroxychloroquine, but the government is prohibiting their use;
f. Fraser Health is violating the Food and Drugs Act by requiring employees to take a drug based on false, misleading, or deceptive information;
g. Fraser Health is violating the Criminal Code of Canada prohibitions against uttering threats, assault, consent, extortion, and intimidation;
h. Fraser Health is violating the Workers Compensation Act by threatening to penalize Ms. Zhou for expressing her “well-founded concerns about the safety and efficacy of requiring me to submit to experimental gene therapy as a condition of my continued employment”; and
i. Fraser Health is violating the Genetic Non-Discrimination Act of Canada by requiring her to “submit to a genetic test, such as the PCR or Rapid Antigen test”.
[25] Ms. Zhou’s letter also included a list of questions about the vaccine, including about its legal status, the process used to test it, the ingredients (including spike proteins, graphene oxide, nanotechnology), risks, and alternative treatments. She did not ask about, or address at all, the use of fetal cells to develop vaccines. She did not express any religious-based concerns about the vaccine.
[26] On October 26, Fraser Health placed Ms. Zhou on an unpaid leave of absence and told her that she was required under the Order to receive at least one dose of the vaccine by November 15, 2021. Two days later, it met with Ms. Zhou and her union representative to discuss the vaccine requirement and the fact that her position would be terminated on November 15, 2021, if she did not receive one dose of the vaccine. Fraser Health says, and Ms. Zhou does not dispute, that during this meeting Ms. Zhou expressed that she did not feel the COVID-19 vaccine was safe or effective, and that she did not feel she could give informed consent. She raised issues about the constitutionality and legality of the Order but did not raise any religious-based objections. Following the meeting, Fraser Health sent Ms. Zhou a list of resources about vaccine safety efficacy, the exemption process, and how to book a vaccine appointment.
[27] On November 12, Ms. Zhou sent a “Notice of Liability” and “Cease and Desist” letter to a Fraser Health Human Resources employee. She expressed that the requirement to be vaccinated was a “form of coercion on the part of the employer” and that she would hold the recipient of the letter “personally liable”.
[28] On November 23, Fraser Health terminated Ms. Zhou’s employment because she had not been vaccinated against COVID-19 and had not expressed any intention to be vaccinated. In response, Ms. Zhou emailed her manager indicating that she intended to file a grievance for “wrongful dismissal, making fraudulent claims, and potential criminal conduct by Fraser Health”. She argued:
a. the Order is not legal, and Fraser Health is “violating the law by enforcing an illegal order”;
b. the basis of the Order – to protect against the risk of COVID-19 – is “obviously false because we all know that the COVID-19 injections does not prevent transmission of the virus” and, as such, Fraser Health has “made a fraudulent claim”;
c. taking the vaccine carries a risk of death and demanding that she take that risk violates the collective agreement and amounts to criminal extortion; and
d. a requirement that she take a vaccine that would stay in her body long after her shifts are done is “a form of gross exploitation of workers”.
[29] This was followed, on December 15, with a “Personal Notice of Liability” that Ms. Zhou sent to her manager, for her “participation in the coercion process on behalf of Fraser Health”. This five-page “Vaccine Notice of Liability”, which does not appear to have been written by Ms. Zhou, warned the recipient:
a. “You are unlawfully practicing medicine”;
b. there is no evidence to substantiate that BC was experiencing a “public health emergency”;
c. “the emergency use of the COVID-19 experimental injection is not required or recommended”, and is akin to a medical experiment in violation of the Nuremberg Code;
d. the government is covering up vaccine-related deaths;
e. the government, and the recipient as a co-conspirator, is guilty of violating the Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes Act of Canada, Criminal Code of Canada, Genetic Non-Discrimination Act, and the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms; and
f. mandatory vaccines are “unconstitutional and/or illegal and unenforceable”.
Again, there is no mention in this document about the use of fetal cell lines to develop the vaccine or any religious-based objection.
[30] These communications with Fraser Health are consistent with the thrust of Ms. Zhou’s response to the dismissal application. Ms. Zhou frames her argument as “predicated on the fact that the PHO’s mandate to vaccinate to work is discriminatory in nature, and rather than being based on science or data, this policy is largely politically motivated, and narrative driven, and anyone who did not comply with this policy automatically became a victim of political discrimination”. She then goes on to argue:
a. “the covid-19 pandemic and public health policies had been largely politicized”; the PHO’s handling of it was not transparent and excluded and silenced healthcare professionals who challenged the policies;
b. the Order was unreasonable, not based on science or evidence, and was coercive;
c. the Order did not allow any exemptions for “political believes”;
d. there was no pandemic, and no surge of deaths; and
e. the claim that the vaccines were “safe and effective” is “highly questionable and needs to be challenged”.
[31] Ms. Zhou’s only evidence and argument about her religious beliefs is:
… To me, religion or faith is a very personal matter, and I did not apply for a religious exemption to the PHO because I do not believe that it has the authority to judge me about my faith or how my faith should be practiced. In Christian faith, God is the only one who can judge us, and if I allow the PHO to judge whether my faith is true enough to be exempt from the procedure, then I’d be putting PHO above God. Exodus 20:3: “You shall have no other Gods before me”. James 4:12 “There is only one Lawgiver and Judge, the one who is able to save and destroy. But you – who are you to judge your neighbour?”, Matthew 7:1-2: “Do not judge or you too will be judged”. [emphasis in original]
[32] Viewing the evidence as a whole, I am satisfied that Ms. Zhou has no reasonable prospect of proving her religious belief about vaccines is sincerely held. The weight of the evidence overwhelmingly supports Fraser Health’s argument that Ms. Zhou’s opposition to the vaccine was based on her concerns about its safety and efficacy, and the political motivations underlying the Order. These concerns do not have a connection to religion.
3. Conclusion
[33] Based on the evidence she has presented in this application, Ms. Zhou has no reasonable prospect of proving that her decision not to take the COVID-19 vaccine was based on a sincerely held religious belief. This part of her complaint is dismissed under s. 27(1)(c) of the Code.
B. Discrimination based on political belief
[34] As I have explained above, Ms. Zhou’s opposition to the Order was based on her perception that it was politically motivated, not based on science or data, and amounted to an arbitrary and dangerous exercise of government power. The Tribunal has already acknowledged, and I agree, that “a genuinely held belief opposing government rules regarding vaccination could be a political belief within the meaning of the Code”: Complainant obo Class of Persons v. John Horgan, 2021 BCHRT 120 at para. 11.
[35] However, I agree with Fraser Health that Ms. Zhou has no reasonable prospect of proving that her political belief was a factor in the termination of the employment. On this point, I adopt the reasoning in Complainant. In that case, the Tribunal explained:
… protection from discrimination based on political belief does not exempt a person from following provincial health orders or rules. Rather, it protects a person from adverse impacts in their employment based on their beliefs. For example, in Bratzer [v. Victoria Police Department, 2016 BCHRT 50],the Tribunal found that the employer had discriminated against the complainant because of his advocacy in connection with drug laws. He still had to follow those laws despite his opposition to them, but his opposition to them could not be the basis for adverse treatment in his employment, subject to a bona fide occupational requirement.
[36] Likewise here, Ms. Zhou’s opposition to the Order, even if grounded in her political beliefs, does not exempt her from having to comply with it. To accept that argument would allow anyone to refuse to comply with a law that they politically disagreed with. This would undermine the rule of law and is not what the Code aims to achieve. Rather, the Code protects people in their employment based on their political beliefs. In this case, Ms. Zhou’s employment was not terminated because of her beliefs. It was terminated because she did not comply with the Order. There is no reasonable prospect that the Tribunal would conclude this was discriminatory.
III CONCLUSION
[37] Ms. Zhou’s complaint has no reasonable prospect of success. It is dismissed under s. 27(1)(c) of the Code.
Devyn Cousineau
Vice Chair