Bowes v. Moores the Suit People and another, 2025 BCHRT 224
Date Issued: September 10, 2025
File: CS-008340
Indexed as: Bowes v. Moores the Suit People and another, 2025 BCHRT 224
IN THE MATTER OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS CODE,
RSBC 1996, c. 210 (as amended)
AND IN THE MATTER of a complaint before
the British Columbia Human Rights Tribunal
BETWEEN:
Holly Bowes
COMPLAINANT
AND:
Moores the Suit People and Amit Luthra
RESPONDENTS
REASONS FOR DECISION
TIMELINESS OF COMPLAINT
Section 22
Tribunal Member: Steven Adamson
On her own behalf: Holly Bowes
Counsel for Moores the Suit People: Jennifer McBean
No Submissions: Amit Luthra
I. INTRODUCTION
[1] On September 20, 2022, Holly Bowes filed a complaint of discrimination in employment based on sex and family status contrary to s. 13 of the Human Rights Code [Code], against Moores the Suit People [Moores] and one of its managers, Amit Luthra, [together the Respondents].
[2] The issue before me is whether to accept the Complaint against the Respondents. I make no findings of fact regarding the merits of this complaint.
[3] On June 19, 2024, and again on August 1, 2024, the Tribunal sent the Respondents a copy of the notice of complaint proceeding. The notices were sent by registered mail first to Moores’ head office and later to its relevant retail location in BC. On both occasions the notices were emailed to Mr. Luthra’s corporate email address. According to the Tribunal’s practice related to the service of complaints on respondents at that time, it was presumed that the corporate respondent’s manager, Mr. Luthra, was properly notified of the Complaint when notice was given to the corporate respondent, Moores. In this case, the presumption of service on Mr. Luthra was not reversed when counsel for Moores noted in the Form 4 – Time Limit Response that she was only riling a submission for Moores. If Mr. Luthra no longer works for Moores and service was not affected on him with notice to the employer, the Tribunal expected Moores to notify it that he was no longer employed by them and had not been notified of the complaint proceeding. As such, I am satisfied that Mr. Luthra was notified of the Complaint and was given an opportunity to make submissions in this application.
[4] For the reasons that follow, I find that it is in the public interest to accept the late filed complaint for filing: s. 22(3).
II. BACKGROUND
[5] Ms. Bowes appears to have worked as a salesperson in a Moores men’s clothing store from some time prior to November 2017 until not returning from a layoff in early 2020 related to the COVID-19 pandemic.
[6] Ms. Bowes alleges the following ongoing allegations of discrimination throughout her employment with the Respondents.
· Female staff at the store, who made up the majority of workers, were disciplined if they arrived late for work while male staff who were late were not subject to any repercussions.
· Male staff at the store were promoted while female staff did not receive similar opportunities.
· Customers whose purchases provided staff with commissions were directed at male salespeople as opposed to female salespeople.
· Mr. Luthra made daily comments to Ms. Bowes about her appearance and weight. For example, she alleges that he once said that he was disappointed in her for gaining weight as he had been “bragging to everyone” about how good she looked before.
Ms. Bowes states that only a few awful experiences were documented in her complaint form. She alleges the Respondents’ mistreatment of her was pervasive and left her with a mental condition directly resulting from the experience.
[7] Ms. Bowes’ set out specific allegations as follows.
[8] On November 13, 2017, Ms. Bowes alleges Mr. Luthra responded negatively to her request for time off work after she miscarried. She says Mr. Luthra told her to “get over it and just have another one”. Ms. Bowes alleges that Mr. Luthra subsequently refused to schedule her for any shifts for three months. She says that he only reinstated her for one shift a week after she threatened the Respondents with legal action.
[9] On December 23, 2019, Ms. Bowes alleges Mr. Luthra made lewd sexual comments to her while at work.
[10] On December 27, 2019, Ms. Bowes alleges a Moores assistant manager in the store where she worked assaulted her at work. She further alleges that when she reported the assault to management, the regional manager downplayed the incident as a “just a lovers’ quarrel” and head office and HR both failed to take any action despite her reporting it to them. Ms. Bowes also alleges the assistant manager was put on paid leave following the incident and the Respondents later assigned him to work the same shift as her when he returned.
[11] In December 2019 or January 2020, Ms. Bowes alleges that the Respondents inappropriately disciplined her after a male customer shouted at her aggressively and in close proximity to the point where she had to threaten him with calling security to settle him down. Instead of supporting her following this ordeal, Ms. Bowes alleges the Respondents cut her hours and blamed her for the incident because she was not providing good customer service.
[12] On an unknown date while Ms. Bowes was working for the Respondents, a customer who was harassing her attended the workplace after someone at work gave him her personal information and work schedule. She alleges that the customer acted aggressively towards her that day and had to be removed from the store. Ms. Bowes alleges Mr. Luthra told her the incident was “no big deal’. She then went off work ill for one month. Following her recovery, Ms. Bowes alleges having to threaten legal action to get back on the Respondents’ work schedule after waiting two weeks for a shift.
[13] Once Moores staff were laid off during the COVID-19 pandemic, Ms. Bowes alleges the regional manager failed to keep her updated on the store closure. When she reached out to him, Ms. Bowes alleges he wrote back to confirm that she was laid off. Ms. Bowes further alleges that when she reached out to Moores’ human resources about her status, they told her that her leave of absence was being honoured, and she was not to talk to them again.
III. ANALYSIS AND DECISION
[14] The time limit set out in s. 22 of the Code is a substantive provision which is intended to ensure that complainants pursue their human rights remedies diligently: Chartier v. School District No. 62, 2003 BCHRT 39.
A. Time Limit
[15] The Complaint was filed on September 20, 2022. To comply with the one-year time limit under s. 22(1) of the Code, the alleged act of discrimination had to occur on or after September 20, 2021.
[16] From my review of Ms. Bowes’ complaint form information, the latest allegations appear to have occurred in early 2020. As such, the Complaint was late filed.
[17] Having found all of allegations in this case were late filed, I proceed to an analysis of whether the Tribunal should exercise its discretion to accept the complaint outside the one-year time limit because it is in the public interest to do so, and no substantial prejudice will result to any person because of the delay: Code s. 22(3). I begin with the public interest determination.
B. Public Interest
[18] Whether it is in the public interest to accept the late-filed complaint is a multi-faceted analysis. The enquiry is fact and context specific and assessed in accordance with the purposes of the Code: Hoang v. Warnaco and Johns, 2007 BCHRT 24 at para. 26. The Tribunal considers a non-exhaustive list of factors, including the length of the delay, the reasons for the delay, and the public interest in the complaint itself: British Columbia (Ministry of Public Safety and Solicitor General) v. Mzite, 2014 BCCA 220 [Mzite] at para. 53. These are important factors, but they are not necessarily determinative: Goddard v. Dixon, 2012 BCSC 161 at para. 152; Mzite at para. 55.
[19] I have first considered the length of the delay in filing. The delay associated with Ms. Bowes’ particularized allegations, with the latest being in January 2020, is approximately one and one half (1.5) years, which is substantial: Molefe v. United Church of Canada, 2004 BCHRT 147 at para. 12. I recognize that the delay for allegations stretching back to 2017 is even greater and does not weigh in favour of allowing the Complaint to proceed without good reasons provided by Ms. Bowes.
[20] Ms. Bowes’ reasons for her delay in filing focus exclusively on her erroneous belief that her complaint was successfully filed on time in December 2020 with the assistance of the Vancouver Island Human Rights Coalition [VIHRC] and the Retail Action Network [RAN]. She submits that when she approached the Tribunal months later about the status of the Complaint, she learned that the online form had not been received. Ms. Bowes submits the filing error was likely due to the RAN advocate’s improper use of an unsupported website browser. When she learned about the error in mid August 2022 by contacting the Tribunal, Ms. Bowes submits that she quickly moved to refile the Complaint as of September 2022.
[21] From my review of the email evidence submitted by Ms. Bowes, I accept her evidence that she was working with the VIHRC and RAN to file the Complaint in late 2020. On November 30, 2020, the RAN advocate working with Ms. Bowes sent a draft copy of the complaint to advocates at the VIHRC for their review before filing. On December 17, 2020, the VIHRC advocates informed the RAN advocate that they had nothing to add and reminded her that time was of the essence in terms of filing before the one-year deadline. The VIHRC advocates also noted their knowledge of Ms. Bowes feeling overwhelmed with the process for reasons related to her mental disabilities. A further email dated December 18, 2020, from the RAN advocate to Ms. Bowes confirmed that she had filed the Complaint with the Tribunal. I note the advocate added that it would be months until the Tribunal started processing her complaint and suggested to Ms. Bowes that she take some time away from the matter now that she had done all that she needed to do to address the situation. The RAN advocate told Ms. Bowes to contact her when she felt ready to chat about the process but told her that “this did not need to be any time soon”.
[22] On August 10, 2022, an email from Ms. Bowes to the RAN advocate noted that the two of them had previously touched base in February 2022 about the Complaint filed in December 2020. Ms. Bowes then informed the RAN advocate that she had contacted the Tribunal to learn that it had no record of her complaint and this discovery left her feeling distraught.
[23] On September 15, 2022, the RAN advocate’s email to Ms. Bowes confirmed that she had submitted the Complaint to the Tribunal online using Safari and not Google Chrome but did not recall seeing any requirement that only Chrome could be used to file the online form.
[24] Moores argues that it is not in the public interest to allow the complaint to proceed because of the RAN advocate’s error in attempting to file the Complaint using the Safari website browser. Moores submits that Ms. Bowes has not demonstrated that she is without fault in the misfiling of her complaint because she did not initiate the proper authorization form to have RAN represent her and failed to engage in any timely follow up with the Tribunal after the Complaint was allegedly filed by RAN on her behalf. Moores argues that allowing a third party, who has no formal standing to participate in these proceedings, prejudice the same is not in the public interest. To allow this would discourage complainants from taking ownership of their complaints by retaining proper representation who have the necessary legal or heightened professional obligations to ensure that filing procedures are properly followed.
[25] After reviewing Ms. Bowes’ reason for late filing, her email evidence surrounding the technical problem that prevented the Complaint from being filed and the parties submissions on this issue, I have concluded that this reason attracts the public interest in allowing the Complaint to proceed. The evidence clearly indicates that Ms. Bowes was working closely with advocates at the RAN and the VIHRC in late 2020 to file the Complaint. In my view, It further indicates that Ms. Bowes was suffering from some degree of mental disability such that she relied on these advocates to finalize and submit the complaint form to the Tribunal on her behalf. In reaching this conclusion, I note the sensitivity with which the RAN advocate treated Ms. Bowes in her December 20, 2020, email when she told her to take a break from thinking about the Complaint and suggested she take some time to get back to the advocate about next steps in the process. In these circumstances, it was reasonable for Ms. Bowes to rely on the RAN advocate to properly file the Complaint in time and take her time following up with the Tribunal on the status of the Complaint. I also note that the RAN advocate assured Ms. Bowes that it would take months for the Tribunal to engage in the initial processing of the Complaint, which also explains Ms. Bowes’ delay in contacting the Tribunal about the status of the Complaint proceeding.
[26] I disagree with Moores that Ms. Bowes needed to have formally named RAN as her representative in order to engage the public interest in allowing an error by RAN to attract the public interest. In my view, relying on a free advocate who has not been formally named as a representative in a complaint at the Tribunal was reasonable. Advocacy groups like those accessed by Ms. Bowes provide limited advice to their clients as they attempt to stretch their scant resources to assist as many individuals as possible. Just because RAN was helping Ms. Bowes without being her formal representative, I am not prepared to conclude that the public interest cannot attach to any mistakes associated with RAN. I also reject Moores’ argument that Ms. Bowes should have acted much sooner to ensure her complaint was proceeding. In my view, it was reasonable for Ms. Bowes to rely on the RAN advocate’s assurances that it was taking months for the Tribunal’s process to be initiated at the relevant time. Ms. Bowes would have learned about the Tribunal’s backlog if she had accessed the website on her own. I further accept that it was reasonable for Ms. Bowes to rely on RAN’s recommendation that she take a break from concentrating on the Complaint for some time after it was filed because nothing was going to happen for months in terms of the Tribunal processing her complaint. In these circumstances, I do not believe that the time between the supposed filing in December 2020 and Ms. Bowes’ follow up with the Tribunal in mid 2022 detracts from the public interest being engaged in this case related to RAN failing to file properly for technical reasons.
[27] Finally, I have considered Moores’ argument that ignorance of written filing procedures published by the Tribunal should not be an acceptable reason for delay in filing. In this case, I accept that the RAN advocate’s ignorance of the need to use a specific website browser to file an online complaint form resulted in the form not being received by the Tribunal in late 2020. However, in circumstances where the RAN advocate and Ms. Bowes were not aware of a technical online filing error occurring, this case is taken out of the general rule that ignorance of the Code, or the time required to become aware of one’s rights, is not an acceptable reason, on its own, for filing out of time: Rashead v. Vereschagin (No. 2), 2006 BCHRT 74 at para. 12; Ferrier v. BCAA, 2009 BCRHT 412at para. 31.
[28] After weighing all the factors, I have decided it is in the public interest to accept this late-filed complaint. The delay in this case is significant, but Ms. Bowes’ reason for late fling associated with believing that RAN had filed in time and checking up on this after a reasonable number of months is sufficient to attract the public interest in allowing it to proceed. It is now necessary to address the issue of whether any substantial prejudice would result.
C. Substantial Prejudice
[29] Ms. Bowes did not provide any submission on substantial prejudice apart from noting that it would be negligent for her former employer to not have any record of her sexual harassment complaints.
[30] Moores argues several of Ms. Bowes’ female co-workers are no longer working for them such that assessing their availability and memories is not possible at this time. Further, Moores notes that retention practices in the organization indicate that records from 2017 would no longer be available.
[31] In my view, no substantial prejudice would result to the Respondents because of the delay. Moores has not indicated that key witnesses, such as Mr. Luthra, the assistant manager and the regional manager are no longer employed with them or that any documents associated with events after 2017, which appears to cover the bulk of this complaint, have not been retained. As such, Moores has not provided the Tribunal with any substantial basis to consider the potential of prejudice to them.
[32] While it is true that the Ms. Bowes bears the burden of establishing both elements under s.22(3) of the Code, the circumstances which could give rise to substantial prejudice are far more likely to be within the Respondents’ knowledge as the employer than her: Shields v. Source Interlink Canada, 2007 BCHRT 164 at para. 14. In these circumstances, I am satisfied that the Ms. Bowes has met her onus under s. 22(3).
IV Conclusion
[33] For these reasons, the Complaint is accepted for filing.
Steven Adamson
Tribunal Member