Trudelle v. Camargue Properties Inc., 2025 BCHRT 222
File: CS-004723
Indexed as: Trudelle v. Camargue Properties Inc., 2025 BCHRT 222
IN THE MATTER OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS CODE,
RSBC 1996, c. 210 (as amended)
AND IN THE MATTER of a complaint before
the British Columbia Human Rights Tribunal
BETWEEN:
Lee Trudelle
COMPLAINANT
AND:
Camargue Properties Inc.
RESPONDENT
REASONS FOR DECISION
APPLICATION TO DISMISS A COMPLAINT
Section 27(1)(c)
Tribunal Member: Beverly Froese
Counsel for the Complainant: Mariyam Ali, Articling Student
Counsel for the Respondent: Spencer C.J. Evans
I INTRODUCTION
[1] In August 2021, Lee Trudelle made a complaint against Camargue Properties Inc. alleging discrimination regarding his tenancy based on physical disability contrary to s. 10 of the Human Rights Code. Specifically, Mr. Trudelle alleges he was discriminated against when his respiratory condition was not accommodated while toxic chemicals were used during renovation work in his building.
[2] Camargue denies discriminating. Camargue says it has an obligation to maintain the buildings and units that it manages. It says it used approved products during the renovation work and took measures to ensure there was adequate ventilation when the work was being done. Camargue also says that it met its duty to reasonably accommodate Mr. Trudelle’s health condition.
[3] Camargue applies to dismiss the complaint under s. 27(1)(c) of the Code on the basis that it has no reasonable prospect of success. For the following reasons, Camargue’s application is denied. Based on the materials before me, I am not persuaded that Mr. Trudelle has no reasonable prospect of proving that at the material time he had a disability protected under the Code and that the adverse impacts he experienced were connected to that disability. Nor I am persuaded that it is reasonably certain Camargue would be able to establish at a hearing that it accommodated Mr. Trudelle to the point of undue hardship.
[4] To make this decision, I have considered all the information filed by the parties. In these reasons, I only refer to what is necessary to explain my decision. I apologize to the parties for the length of time it has taken to issue this decision.
II BACKGROUND
[5] The background is taken from the materials filed by the parties. I make no findings of fact.
[6] Mr. Trudelle has lived in the building at issue since around August 2001. At all material times, Camargue managed the building.
[7] It is not clear from the materials before me, but sometime after moving into the building, Mr. Trudelle was diagnosed with Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary Disease [COPD]. Mr. Trudelle says that because of his COPD, he is acutely sensitive to airborne chemicals and fumes and that exposure to certain chemicals exacerbates his condition.
[8] The parties do not appear to dispute that in December 2017, Mr. Trudelle provided Camargue with a note from his doctor that said he has “severe COPD and sensitivity to fumes” and “[c]ertain fumes can severely exacerbate his breathing”. They also do not appear to dispute that when repairs were done in Mr. Trudelle’s unit at that time, Camargue used non-toxic paint and caulking that Mr. Trudelle provided and gave him advance notice of when the repairs would be done.
[9] Around May 2021, Camargue started renovation work in the building to “re-skin” interior doors. The work involved first repairing any minor scuffs or dents on the doors, then cleaning their surface, and then applying a peel-and-stick vinyl covering to the front and back of the door. Camargue gave notice to the tenants in the building that to complete the work, their units would have to be accessed.
[10] For the metal fire doors, Camargue used a mixture of an automobile body filler and a hardener to repair any scuffs or dents. After curing, the filler was finished with non-powered hand sanding and a vacuum fitted with a HEPA filer was used to control the dust. Finally, the door skin was applied to the front and back of the door. For the units’ wooden doors, Camargue used a wood filler to repair scuffs and dents and then used a particular cleaning/degreasing solvent to clean the door’s surface before applying the skin. Camargue says it had previously tried different solvents that were more volatile. For ease of reference, I refer to all of the products that were used during the re-skinning work as the Products.
[11] The entire re-skinning process took about 15 to 20 minutes for each door. Camargue says specific measures were taken to ventilate the building while the work was being done, including mixing the Products used in a separate area, propping open exterior doors and windows to increase air flow, using fans on the top floor, and turning off the ventilation system that services the hallways to prevent migration of odours and dust.
[12] Mr. Trudelle says that soon after the work started, he passed by a work area where at least some of the Products were being used and felt dizzy and disoriented. Mr. Trudelle says he quickly began to also experience severe exacerbations of his COPD symptoms.
[13] About three weeks after the work started, Mr. Trudelle wrote to Camargue and said that the “ongoing use of toxic materials in this building has to stop”. Mr. Trudelle also said that on several occasions he tried to tell the building’s manager [Manager] that he has a “severe respiratory condition” but was ignored. Mr. Trudelle told Camargue that he was experiencing severe breathing problems, chest pain, headaches, insomnia, eye-watering, and a sore throat. It is not clear from the materials before me, but it appears that around this time, Mr. Trudelle also put a notice on his door requesting that his unit not be entered unless his health concerns had been adequately addressed.
[14] A few days later, WorkSafeBC inspected the re-skinning work. At that time, the inspectors did not detect any odours, and they discussed with Camargue ways to reduce nuisance odours.
[15] Mr. Trudelle says that in early June 2021, he suggested to Camargue that his door be replaced with a door that had already been re-skinned. Mr. Trudelle says he did not receive a response from Camargue. A few days later, there was an altercation between Mr. Trudelle and the Manager [Incident]. Mr. Trudelle says that despite the notice on his door, the Manager applied chemical products to the outside of his door. Mr. Trudelle says he told the Manager to stop because he was having breathing problems, but the Manager said he was going to use them anyway. Mr. Trudelle says the Manager used his key to unlock the door and stand in the doorway. Mr. Trudelle says he had no choice but to physically push the Manager out of his doorway and try to close the door. He says the Manager tried to force his way back into his unit, but he was able to close and lock the door. Mr. Trudelle says that because he was exposed to the chemicals the Manager had used, he had to turn his fans on high and go onto the balcony to get fresh air because his oxygen had lowered to dangerous levels. Camargue does not appear to dispute any of these allegations.
[16] Mr. Trudelle says that he emailed Camargue the next day to report the Incident. He says he again requested accommodation of his COPD and said he would allow his door to be re-skinned if two fans were placed in the hallway to vent the fumes away from his unit. Mr. Trudelle says he also asked Camargue to confirm that the Products were safe before any work was done on his door. Mr. Trudelle says he never received a response to his email. Camargue does not appear to dispute these allegations.
[17] It appears from the materials before me that nothing further happened until around mid-May 2023. At that time, Mr. Trudelle emailed Camargue and asked that the issue with finishing the work on his door be addressed and again suggested that his door be removed and re-skinned in a different area. Mr. Trudelle told Camargue that he believed the work could be completed in one day and asked for advance notice so he could make preparations. In response, Camargue told Mr. Trudelle that his request would be considered, thanked him for opening a dialogue about this matter, and said it hoped to get back to him with a plan.
[18] It does not appear that there have been any further communications between the parties about completing the work on Mr. Trudelle’s door. Camargue says that Mr. Trudelle continues to refuse entry to his unit so the work can be completed.
III DECISION
[19] Camargue applies to dismiss Mr. Trudelle’s complaint on the basis that it has no reasonable prospect of success: Code, s. 27(1)(c) The onus is on Camargue to establish the basis for dismissal.
[20] Section 27(1)(c) is part of the Tribunal’s gate-keeping function. It allows the Tribunal to remove complaints which do not warrant the time and expense of a hearing.
[21] The Tribunal does not make findings of fact under s. 27(1)(c). Instead, the Tribunal looks at the evidence to decide whether “there is no reasonable prospect that findings of fact that would support the complaint could be made on a balance of probabilities after a full hearing of the evidence”: Berezoutskaia v. British Columbia (Human Rights Tribunal), 2006 BCCA 95 at para. 22, leave to appeal ref’d [2006] SCCA No. 171. The Tribunal must base its decision on the materials filed by the parties, and not on speculation about what evidence may be filed at the hearing: University of British Columbia v. Chan,2013 BCSC 942 at para. 77.
[22] A dismissal application is not the same as a hearing: Lord v. Fraser Health Authority,2021 BCSC 2176 at para. 20; SEPQA v. Canadian Human Rights Commission,[1989] 2 SCR 879 at 899. The threshold to advance a complaint to a hearing is low. In a dismissal application, a complainant does not have to prove their complaint or show the Tribunal all the evidence they may introduce at a hearing. They only have to show that the evidence takes their complaint out of the realm of conjecture: Workers’ Compensation Appeal Tribunal v. Hill, 2011 BCCA 49 [Hill] at para. 27.
[23] To be successful at a hearing, Mr. Trudelle will have to prove that at the relevant time he had a disability protected by the Code, he was adversely impacted regarding his tenancy, and his disability was a factor in the adverse impact: Moore v. British Columbia (Education), 2012 SCC 61 at para. 33. If he did that, the burden would shift to Camargue to justify the impact as a bona fide reasonable justification. If the impact is justified, there is no discrimination.
A. Mr. Trudelle’s case
[24] Camargue first argues that Mr. Trudelle has no reasonable prospect of proving that at the material time, he had a disability protected under the Code. Camargue says that the only medical evidence Mr. Trudelle has produced through the Tribunal’s disclosure process is the December 2017 doctor’s note. Camargue says that evidence is not sufficient to prove that Mr. Trudelle had COPD in 2021.
[25] I am not persuaded by Camargue’s argument. The evidence before me indicates that by December 2017, Mr. Trudelle had been diagnosed with severe COPD, a condition caused by damage to the lungs over several years that cannot be undone. It indicates that COPD gets worse over time and shortness of breath from COPD significantly affects a person’s ability to do simple things like get dressed or prepare a meal. Last, it indicates that people with COPD can experience sudden flare-ups of symptoms, including a chronic cough and shortness of breath.
[26] The evidence before me also indicates that in late May 2021, Mr. Trudelle told Camargue that he had a “serious respiratory condition” and that he was experiencing eye watering, a sore throat, chest pains, headache, and laboured breathing. It also indicates that at the time of the Incident, the Manager knew that Mr. Trudelle complained about toxic fumes when work was done in the building because he had “severe lung issues”. Mr. Trudelle has also provided medical records with his response to this application, including the results of a chest x-ray taken in January 2022 that states Mr. Trudelle has extensive scarring in one of his lungs. Mr. Trudelle also provided notes from various appointments with his doctor between January 2022 and January 2023 that refer to him experiencing shortness of breath and the need to use an oxygen tank.
[27] In my view, there is more than sufficient evidence before me to meet the low threshold under s. 27(1)(c) and take this part of Mr. Trudelle’s case out of the realm of speculation and conjecture.
[28] Camargue next argues that Mr. Trudelle has no reasonable prospect of proving that he experienced any adverse impacts regarding his tenancy that are connected to his alleged disability. Specifically, Camargue says that Mr. Trudelle has not disclosed any medical information that proves he suffered any negative health effects from exposure to the Products. Camargue also says Mr. Trudelle has no reasonable prospect of proving this part of his case because none of the Products were used in any proximity to Mr. Trudelle or in any quantity that required any precautions other than ventilation. It further says that the wood filler and solvent were only used on other tenants’ doors.
[29] Based on the following, I am not convinced that Mr. Trudelle has no reasonable prospect of proving that he experienced any adverse impacts connected to his alleged disability.
[30] First, the documentary evidence indicates, and Camargue does not dispute, that all of the warning labels for the Products state that they should not be inhaled. It appears from that evidence that fumes from the hardener used on the metal fire doors and the solvent used to clean the tenants’ doors could cause serious damage to a person’s respiratory system if inhaled. Mr. Trudelle disputes Camargue’s assertion that none of the Products were used in any proximity to him or in any quantity that required precautions other than ventilation. He says he was exposed to at least some of the Products when he passed by work areas and during the Incident. As key facts are in dispute, in my view a hearing is required so the Tribunal can make findings as to whether Mr. Trudelle was exposed to the Products and, if so, whether he experienced any adverse impacts from that exposure.
[31] Second, although Mr. Trudelle did not submit medical evidence to support his allegation that he experienced adverse impacts from the Products, that does not mean the complaint should be dismissed at this stage. The Tribunal has recognized that a complainant does not always need to rely on medical or expert evidence to prove a disability-related adverse impact, particularly on an application to dismiss: Bourque v. Mole Hill Community Housing Society and another, 2018 BCHRT 268 at para. 43.
[32] Last, in his complaint and statement attached to his response materials, Mr. Trudelle describes how exposure to the Products exacerbated his COPD symptoms. In particular, Mr. Trudelle alleges that exposure to fumes significantly impacted his health and ability to carry out daily activities. Mr. Trudelle alleges that he had severe reactions to the fumes such that he could not breathe or move for hours at a time. He alleges that the exacerbation of his COPD symptoms affected his ability to use his treadmill to control his breathing, exercise his lungs, and manage his diabetes. In my view, if Mr. Trudelle could prove these alleged facts, it would to be open to the Tribunal member hearing this complaint to find there was a nexus between the adverse impacts and Mr. Trudelle’s disability: Bourque at para. 41.
B. Camargue’s justification defence
[33] Camargue next argues that the complaint should be dismissed because it is reasonably certain to prove a defence at a hearing: Purdy v. Douglas College and others, 2016 BCHRT 117 at para. 50.
[34] To justify the adverse impacts at a hearing, Camargue would have to prove that: (1) it adopted the standard for a purpose rationally connected to the function being performed, (2) it adopted the standard in an honest and good faith belief that it was necessary to fulfill that legitimate purpose; and (3) the standard is reasonably necessary to accomplish that legitimate purpose. This third element encompasses a respondent’s duty to accommodate a complainant to the point of undue hardship: British Columbia (Superintendent of Motor Vehicles) v. British Columbia (Council of Human Rights), [1999] 3 SCR 868 at para. 20; Alexander v. PAL Vancouver (No. 4), 2006 BCHRT 461 at para. 44.
[35] To meet their duty under the Code, a respondent must show they took all reasonable and practical steps to accommodate the complainant’s disability. As the “search for accommodation is a multi-party inquiry”, a complainant “has an obligation to participate in the accommodation process, and to accept solutions that are reasonable, without insisting on perfection”: Bourque at para. 37; Central Okanagan School District No. 23 v. Renaud, [1992] 2 SCR 970 at 994‐995.
[36] The parties did not expressly identify the standard at issue in this case or make any submissions on the first two parts of the justification test. Rather, the focus of this application was only on whether it is reasonably certain that Camargue would be able to establish that it met its duty to reasonably accommodate Mr. Trudelle’s disability.
[37] Camargue says it accommodated Mr. Trudelle when work was being done outside his unit. Specifically, Camargue says that even though Mr. Trudelle did not provide any medical information stating that he would be impacted by the Products, it accommodated him by temporarily turning off the hallway fan so dust and fumes would not enter the units and opening the fire doors to make sure the fumes went elsewhere. Camargue also says that it accommodated Mr. Trudelle by not completing the re-skinning work on his door. Even if what Camargue alleges is true, I am not persuaded it is reasonably certain the Tribunal would find those actions were sufficient to meet its duty to accommodate Mr. Trudelle’s disability to the point of undue hardship.
[38] Camargue says it could not have taken any other reasonable or practical steps to accommodate Mr. Trudelle because doing what Mr. Trudelle suggested would not have alleviated his concerns about exposure to the Products. In support of its argument, Camargue refers to the letter Mr. Trudelle sent shortly after the re-skinning work began in May 2021. In that letter, Mr. Trudelle said that installing vinyl “will be off-gassing for its whole lifetime”, which I presume to mean, as Camargue says, that he did not want the work done at all because the re-skinned door would permanently release chemicals into the air. As Camargue also says, Mr. Trudelle said in his letter that he believed “ALL adhesives are dangerous but using Methyl hydrate to clean the doors is a knife in the back to the elderly, the children and those with serious health issues”.
[39] Camargue does not, however, refer to other sections of Mr. Trudelle’s May 2021 letter where he suggests that his door be re-skinned elsewhere and then replaced “after a few weeks so the off-gassing is diminished”. Further, the uncontradicted evidence indicates that between early June 2021 and May 2023, Mr. Trudelle told Camargue more than once that he was willing to have the work done if his door could be removed and re-skinned elsewhere.
[40] Camargue says it decided not to re-skin Mr. Trudelle’s door elsewhere because there was a “good chance” he would still find reasons to complain about whatever chemicals were used. Camargue also speculates that Mr. Trudelle’s suggestion would not be reasonable or practical because “Mr. Trudelle’s history at the Property shows he is prone to overreacting over trivial matters, often taking a threatening tone.” In support of this assertion, Camargue refers to Mr. Trudelle’s May 2021 letter, an email he sent in late May 2021 about an incident where someone was allegedly vacuuming the hallway outside his unit and using a spray that made it difficult for him to breathe, and a letter he wrote in January 2003 about an incident where the building manager’s son allegedly used his key to enter his unit without his consent. In my view, while those communications might contain inflammatory, inappropriate, and accusatory language, I am not persuaded it is reasonably certain a Tribunal member would find they are sufficient to prove that Mr. Trudelle had or would somehow frustrate the accommodation process had it continued.
[41] In summary, Camargue has not convinced me that Mr. Trudelle has no reasonable prospect of proving his case or that it is reasonably certain to prove at a hearing that its actions were justified.
IV CONCLUSION
[42] Camargue’s application to dismiss the complaint under s. 27(1)(c) of the Code is denied. The complaint will proceed to a hearing.
Beverly Froese
Tribunal Member
Human Rights Tribunal