Champagne v. Synergy Day Spa and another (No. 3), 2025 BCHRT 220
Date Issued: September 5, 2025
File: CS-002416
Indexed as: Champagne v. Synergy Day Spa and another (No. 3), 2025 BCHRT 220
IN THE MATTER OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS CODE,
RSBC 1996, c. 210 (as amended)
AND IN THE MATTER of a complaint before
the British Columbia Human Rights Tribunal
BETWEEN:
Christine Champagne
COMPLAINANT
AND:
Synergy Day Spa and Joline Vanderwal
RESPONDENTS
REASONS FOR DECISION
APPLICATION TO RECONSIDER A DECISION
RULE 36
Tribunal Member: Edward Takayanagi
On their own behalf: Christine Champagne
Agent for the Respondents: Rhiannon Whitney
I INTRODUCTION
[1] Christine Champagne filed a human rights complaint alleging her former employer, Synergy Day Spa and former manager, Joline Vanderwal discriminated against her on the basis of physical disability contrary to s. 13 of the Human Rights Code when they terminated her employment after she provided a doctor’s note stating she required an eight-week medical leave. After a one-day hearing where the parties called witnesses and introduced evidence, the Tribunal found the Respondents breached the Code: Champagne v. Synergy Day Spa and another (No. 2), 2025 BCHRT 174 (the “Original Decision”).
[2] The Respondents now apply for reconsideration of the Original Decision pursuant to Rule 36(1) of the Tribunal’s Rules of Practice and Procedure. They argue that the Original Decision was unfair because I did not consider and accept their arguments.
[3] I have not found it necessary to seek submission from the Respondents.
[4] For the following reasons, I deny the application for reconsideration.
II BACKGROUND
[5] The background to Ms. Champagne’s complaint is set out in the Original Decision and I will not repeat it here: Champagne at paras. 10 to 23. Briefly, Ms. Champagne alleged that the Respondents terminated her employment immediately after she provided a doctor’s note stating she requires an eight-week medical leave.
[6] The Respondents did not dispute that they sent an email to Ms. Champagne in response to her request stating that she was being given notice and that they issued her a Record of Employment (ROE). The Respondents argued that there was an error on the ROE which they immediately corrected. They argued that the reason they issued the ROE was so that Ms. Champagne could apply for EI and CERB benefits, and they did not intend to terminate the employment.
[7] Based on the totality of the evidence in the particular circumstances of the case, including the email correspondence and the conduct of the parties, I concluded that the Respondents terminated Ms. Champagne’s employment, and her disability was a factor in that decision.
III Analysis and DECISION
[8] The Tribunal has a limited jurisdiction to reconsider its own decisions: Rule 36 of the Tribunal’s Rules of Practice and Procedure. Specifically, the Tribunal may reconsider a decision if it is in the interests of justice and fairness to do so: Routkovskaia v. British Columbia (Human Rights Tribunal), 2012 BCCA 141 at para. 23. The Tribunal exercises this power sparingly, giving due consideration to the principle of finality in administrative proceedings: Grant v. City of Vancouver and others (No. 4), 2007 BCHRT 206 [Grant] at para 10.
[9] The burden is on the person seeking to have a matter re-opened to show that the interests of fairness and justice demand such an order: Grant at para. 10.
[10] The Tribunal does not have authority to reconsider a decision based on an argument that the decision was wrong or unreasonable or because there has been a change of circumstances: Fraser Health Authority v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Tribunal, 2014 BCCA 499 [Fraser Health] at paras. 135 and 160. The Tribunal will not reconsider a decision to address arguments that could have been made in the first instance but were not, or to hear a party reargue its case: Ramadan v. Kwantlen Polytechnic University and another (No. 2), 2018 BCHRT 56 at para. 13.
[11] I find that the Respondents’ arguments do not present circumstances that engage the Tribunal’s narrow jurisdiction to review the Original Decision.
[12] The Respondents’ primary argument on the reconsideration application appears to be that the Tribunal ought to have preferred their evidence and submissions over that of Ms. Champagne and found in their favour.
[13] The Respondents repeat their argument that their issuing an ROE was not intended to permanently end the employment but was done so that Ms. Champagne could apply for EI and CERB benefits. They say they were advised on how to complete the ROE by Service Canada. They also reargue that Ms. Champagne was welcome to return to work when she recovered from her injuries. These are arguments that were considered and ultimately rejected in the Original Decision: Champagne at paras. 30 to 37.
[14] Reconsideration is not an opportunity to reargue issues that have already been conclusively determined in the original decision. It appears the Respondents are asking me to reweigh the evidence and find in their favour. They argue that Ms. Champagne’s disabilities was not a factor in their decision to issue an ROE, that their issuance of an ROE was not a termination, and that Ms. Champagne was welcome to return to work. These issues have already been considered and decided.
[15] I am not satisfied that the Respondents have met their burden of showing that it is in the interests of fairness and justice to reconsider the Original Decision.
IV Conclusion
[16] The application for reconsideration is denied. The Original Decision stands.
Edward Takayanagi
Tribunal Member
Human Rights Tribunal