Varghese v. Dueck Richmond Chevrolet Buick Cadillac GMC Ltd. (No.2), 2025 BCHRT 219
Date Issued: September 9, 2025
File: CS-001988
Indexed as: Varghese v. Dueck Richmond Chevrolet Buick Cadillac GMC Ltd. (No.2), 2025 BCHRT 219
IN THE MATTER OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS CODE,
RSBC 1996, c. 210 (as amended)
AND IN THE MATTER of a complaint before
the British Columbia Human Rights Tribunal
BETWEEN:
Reggie Varghese
COMPLAINANT
AND:
Dueck Richmond Chevrolet Buick Cadillac GMC Ltd.
RESPONDENT
REASONS FOR DECISION
Tribunal Member: Theressa Etmanski
On their own behalf: Reggie Varghese
Counsel for the Respondent: Natasha Liu
Dates of Hearing: February 11 and 12, 2025
Location of Hearing: Virtual
I INTRODUCTION
[1] Reggie Varghese was employed by Dueck Richmond Chevrolet Buick Cadillac GMC Ltd. for just over a month. Dueck terminated Mr. Varghese’s employment, during his probationary period, after Mr. Varghese suffered mental health episodes at work. Mr. Varghese alleges this constitutes discrimination based on his mental disability, contrary to s. 13 of the Human Rights Code.
[2] Dueck denies discriminating and says it had decided to terminate Mr. Varghese due to his poor performance before he had the mental health episodes at work. It disputes that Mr. Varghese had a disability within the meaning of the Code at the material time, and that his disability was a factor in the termination of his employment. Rather, Dueck says it has a non-discriminatory explanation for its conduct.
[3] The primary issue I must decide is whether the timing of the termination establishes that Mr. Varghese’s mental disability, either real or perceived, was a factor in Dueck’s termination of his employment.
[4] For the following reasons, I find the complaint is justified.
[5] I have reviewed and considered all the evidence admitted at the hearing, which includes witness testimony and documents. After the hearing the parties provided closing submissions in writing. In this decision, I recount only the evidence and arguments required to explain my decision.
II BACKGROUND
[6] Dueck is a car dealership located in Richmond, British Columbia.
[7] Mr. Varghese began working in Dueck’s sales department on January 27, 2020. Mr. Varghese signed an employment agreement stipulating that he would be subject to a three-month probationary period during which time Dueck was entitled to assess his suitability for the position.
[8] On March 4, 2020, Mr. Varghese attended work and experienced what he describes as a “nervous breakdown”. He testified that he was very upset because a close friend was dying in the hospital, and Dueck had denied his request to take the day off to be with her. Management at Dueck was concerned about his behaviour and called the paramedics, leading to Mr. Varghese being involuntarily detained by the RCMP under the Mental Health Act. He was hospitalized until March 6, 2020, at which point he self-discharged against medical advice.
[9] On March 9, 2020, Mr. Varghese went to Dueck to speak to the General Sales Manager at the time, Eric Knight. The parties disagreed on whether this meeting had been arranged in advance; however, this dispute is inconsequential to the material issues in this decision. Shortly after Mr. Varghese arrived, he was brought into an office with Mr. Knight and Carlyn Porteous, the then Director for Fixed Operations. Mr. Knight and Ms. Porteous were concerned enough about Mr. Varghese’s condition during this conversation that Ms. Porteous called an emergency mental health services telephone number provided on the hospital discharge papers Mr. Varghese shared with them.
[10] The RCMP attended Dueck with Registered Nurse, and Mr. Varghese was again detained under the Mental Health Act. As confirmed by subsequent communications between Mr. Varghese and the RCMP’s Professional Standards Unit, the RCMP handcuffed Mr. Varghese during this exchange in preparation to transport him to the hospital. While he was handcuffed, Mr. Varghese says, and I accept, Mr. Knight handed him a termination letter.
[11] Mr. Varghese was hospitalized involuntarily for a second time following this incident. He was subsequently diagnosed with Bipolar I disorder.
III WITNESS CREDIBILITY
[12] I heard from three witnesses in this hearing. Mr. Varghese testified on his own behalf, and Dueck called two employees: Mr. Knight and Ms. Porteous. Mr. Knight is the current General Manager at Dueck’s Richmond location, and Ms. Porteous is the current Vice President of Fixed Operations.
[13] To assess the accuracy or trustworthiness of a witness’s testimony, I consider factors like “the witness’ ability and opportunity to observe events, the firmness of their memory, their objectivity, whether the witness’ evidence harmonizes with independent evidence that has been accepted, whether the witness changes their pre-trial evidence by the time of trial or their testimony at trial during direct and cross-examination, whether the witness’ testimony seems implausible, and the demeanor of a witness generally”: Youyi Group Holdings (Canada) Ltd. v. Brentwood Lanes Canada Ltd., 2019 BCSC 739 at para. 90. In some cases, a witness’s evidence may not be trustworthy because they have “made a conscious decision not to tell the truth”: Youyi at para. 89. In other cases, a witness may testify honestly but their evidence may not be reliable because of their inability to accurately observe, recall, or recount the event: R. v. H.C., 2009 ONCA 56 at para. 41; Youyi at paras. 89-90. In that case, I may not safely rely on their testimony where it conflicts with others who are better positioned to give accurate testimony.
[14] I found Ms. Porteous to be a credible witness, who was clear about the extent of her involvement in the events of March 9, 2020, and the limits of her memory from that day.
[15] Mr. Varghese and Mr. Knight recited largely conflicting versions of the events giving rise to this complaint. I had concerns about the reliability of certain elements of both their evidence. For example, I found Mr. Varghese downplayed his behaviour associated with his mental health episodes on March 4 and March 9, 2020, and imputed blame on Dueck for decisions made by the RCMP and medical personnel. On the other hand, I found Mr. Knight’s testimony to be largely self-serving. He was able to recall in specific detail elements that favoured Dueck’s position, but unable to recall remarkable details that would cast him in a less favourable light, such as Mr. Varghese being handcuffed when he handed him the termination letter. Ultimately, I reconcile contradictions in their testimonies by considering the evidence as a whole, including corroborating evidence or lack thereof.
IV DECISION
[16] To prove his case, Mr. Varghese must establish, on a balance of probabilities, that he had a disability at the material time, that he experienced an adverse impact in employment, and that his disability was a factor in that adverse impact: Moore v. BC (Education),2012 SCC 61 at para. 33. If Mr. Varghese does not prove the three elements of his case, then there is no breach of the Code.
[17] Dueck says Mr. Varghese has not established that he had a disability protected under the Code, as he did not present expert evidence to establish this element of his complaint. I disagree.
[18] Mr. Varghese is not required to present expert evidence to prove that he has a disability: Gichuru v. Purewal and another, 2017 BCHRT 19 at para. 275. He provided various medical documents, including a letter from Dr. Jay Bondar at Richmond Mental Health Services, dated May 12, 2021. This letter confirms that Mr. Varghese was hospitalized from March 4-6, 2020, and again from March 9-24, 2020, related to a “recent manic episode”, “the need to rule out alcohol use disorder” and a Bipolar I disorder diagnosis. Other evidence confirms that he was hospitalized in the Mental Health and Addiction department. Based on this documentary evidence, I am satisfied that Mr. Varghese had a mental disability when Dueck terminated him and in the days leading up to it.
[19] I am also satisfied that Dueck perceived Mr. Varghese to have a mental disability at the time he was terminated.
[20] Mr. Knight said he was “deeply concerned” about Mr. Varghese’s behaviour on March 4, 2020, and he could “tell that something was wrong.” He described Mr. Varghese shaking a colleague who was holding a cup of hot water and then grabbing Mr. Knight’s arm when he came to investigate. Then, when speaking in Mr. Knight’s office, he described Mr. Varghese as “not making sense,” being “very worked up,” and “sweating profusely.” Mr. Varghese says he informed Mr. Knight that he suffered from anxiety and depression on March 4, 2020, but Mr. Knight could not recall this. Regardless, Mr. Varghese’s condition was perceived as concerning enough that someone at Dueck, Mr. Knight did not specify who, called the paramedics.
[21] Ms. Porteous testified that on March 9, 2020, Mr. Varghese informed them that he had left the hospital and was ready to come back to work. She says he handed them some discharge papers from his recent hospital stay which contained the phone numbers of his wife and some mental health services. Ms. Porteous testified that Mr. Varghese seemed “agitated”, appeared “sweaty” and looked “nervous” and “distressed”. She stated that she was “nervous” for both Mr. Varghese and herself due to his presentation.
[22] Mr. Knight testified that he perceived that the “same thing” was happening with Mr. Varghese on March 9 as had happened on March 4. He also testified that Mr. Varghese informed them that he had checked out of the hospital against medical advice. Ultimately, Ms. Porteous and Mr. Knight were concerned enough about Mr. Varghese’s behaviour and demeanour that Ms. Porteous telephoned first his wife, and then one of the mental health emergency numbers listed on his hospital discharge papers.
[23] Based on this evidence, I am satisfied that Mr. Knight and Ms. Porteous both perceived Mr. Varghese to be having symptoms associated with a mental disability, even if they were not aware of exactly what it was. It is well established that the Code’s protection extends to perceived disabilities: Caster v. Walter Evans (No. 2), 2012 BCHRT 163 at 184; Gehman v. Seyffert, 2020 BCHRT 180 at para. 88.
[24] With respect to the second element of Moore, it is undisputed that Mr. Varghese experienced an adverse impact when his employment was terminated. However, Dueck denies that Mr. Varghese’s disability was a factor in his termination and offers what they say is a non-discriminatory explanation for the decision to end his employment.
[25] The onus is on Mr. Varghese to show that there is a connection, or that his mental disability was a factor in the termination: Quebec (Commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse) v. Bombardier Inc. (Bombardier Aerospace Training Center), 2015 SCC 39 at para. 49. It is not necessary for him to prove that his mental disability was a significant factor or a material factor, only that it was a factor: Stewart v. Elk Valley Coal Corp., 2017 SCC 30 at para. 46.
[26] In this case, Mr. Varghese points to the circumstances and timing of the termination to demonstrate a connection to his mental disability.
[27] Evidence that a protected characteristic is a factor in an adverse impact is rarely explicit. Such a connection is often proven by reasonable inferences drawn from surrounding circumstances: Radek v. Henderson Development (Canada) Ltd. (No.3) (2005), 52 C.H.R.R. D/430, 2005 BCHRT 302 at para. 482; Mann v. JACE Holdings, 2012 BCHRT 234 at para. 105. An inference of discrimination may be drawn where the evidence, including circumstantial evidence, renders the inference more probable than other possible inferences or explanations: Brar and others v. B.C. Veterinary Medical Association and Osborne, 2015 BCHRT 151 at para. 703. The Tribunal may draw an inference from the timing of an event that a protected characteristic was a factor in a complainant’s adverse treatment: Parry v. Vanwest College, 2005 BCHRT 310 at paras. 63-65.
[28] Mr. Varghese says that on March 4, 2020, he attended a morning meeting wherein Dueck confirmed that he and other new salespeople would have permanent employment. He says this fact supports that his subsequent mental health events were the reason for his termination. However, I am not persuaded on the evidence before me that this occurred. First, Mr. Knight denies this fact. Second, Mr. Varghese has not presented any evidence, including other witnesses, to corroborate this claim even though he says others were present at the meeting. Third, this meeting occurred on the same day that Mr. Varghese was distraught about his friend and experienced a mental health episode, which may have reasonably rendered his memories of that day less reliable. Finally, Mr. Varghese was only one month into his three-month probationary period, during which time Dueck was entitled to assess the suitability of new employees. I find it more likely than not that Dueck would continue to assess its new sales employees for longer than one month before offering them permanent employment.
[29] Nevertheless, I am satisfied that in these circumstances the timing of the termination creates a strong presumption that Mr. Varghese’s mental disability was a factor. Mr. Varghese experienced mental health episodes at work on March 4 and March 9, 2020, and then was terminated on March 9, while detained by the police under the Mental Health Act.
[30] Next, I consider whether Dueck has provided a credible non-discriminatory explanation that would rebut this presumption. In view of all the evidence before me, I am not persuaded that Dueck’s explanation is non-discriminatory or credible.
[31] Dueck says it made the decision to terminate Mr. Varghese on March 2, 2020, for business reasons related to his performance. Dueck says their business is dependent on strong sales performance, professionalism and customer service, and Mr. Varghese failed to meet the expected standards for an employee on probation. Dueck argues that there is no evidence linking Mr. Varghese’s disability to his poor job performance, and that there was no basis for a duty to inquire prior to deciding, on March 2, to terminate his employment.
[32] In support of this position, Mr. Knight testified that he had had regular one-on-one meetings with Mr. Varghese to discuss his concerns about his progress in learning Dueck’s sales process. Dueck has provided handwritten notes it says were prepared by Mr. Knight during their one-on-one performance reviews. Mr. Knight testified that on February 28, 2020, he met with Mr. Varghese and told him to work on memorizing the sales process over the weekend. He says he informed Mr. Varghese that if he was not able to recite the sales process by the following Monday’s morning meeting, that “it would be in both parties’ interests to move on.” Mr. Knight testified that on Monday, March 2, Mr. Varghese was unable to recite the sales process during the morning meeting. He says that he met with other sales managers later that day, and together they decided to terminate Mr. Varghese’s employment. However, because they were still busy with month-end work, Mr. Knight said he intended to have the conversation with Mr. Varghese later in the week.
[33] Dueck did not present evidence from the other sales managers, whom Mr. Knight says were involved in the discussion on March 2, 2020, nor did they present any contemporaneous records from that day.
[34] Mr. Varghese denies having one-on-one performance reviews with Mr. Knight and says he had never seen the notes that Mr. Knight claimed to have given him. He says that Dueck fabricated these records after the fact.
[35] There were internal inconsistencies in Mr. Knight’s testimony about his notes that I have had trouble reconciling. He testified that he would prepare these notes during the meeting with Mr. Varghese and then give the notes directly to him. When asked if he would make a photocopy of the notes, he said no it was far less formal than that. He suggested that the evidence we were looking at were the very notes given to Mr. Varghese. Mr. Knight did not explain how Dueck was still in possession of the notes if they had been given to Mr. Varghese.
[36] Under cross-examination, Mr. Knight then said these notes formed part of Mr. Varghese’s employment file and it is Dueck’s practice is to keep employment files for seven years. This is inconsistent with his evidence on direct that he gave the notes directly to Mr. Varghese and did not make a copy. I find the inconsistencies in Mr. Knight’s testimony about what he did with these notes after he wrote them – gave them to Mr. Varghese or placed them on his employment file – casts doubt on the reliability and credibility of his evidence. Further, while Mr. Knight testified that this form of notetaking was his common practice that everyone he worked with was aware of, Dueck did not call any witnesses or advance any other evidence to corroborate this practice.
[37] Mr. Knight also testified that Mr. Varghese was not meeting expectations with respect to the number of cars he had sold. He said that while there is not an official quota for new sales staff during their probationary period, Dueck would expect to see six to eight sales per month to feel confident transitioning them to a permanent position. If they are not meeting these targets while on probation, Mr. Knight said it is unlikely they would successfully meet the quota of 10 to 12 sales per month that is in place for employees who have passed their probation period. According to Mr. Knight, Mr. Varghese only sold one vehicle during his first month with Dueck.
[38] In contrast, Mr. Varghese testified that Dueck did not inform him that there were any sales targets for his first month. Rather, he says he was expected to learn the sales process, and to treat customers with respect. He says he was encouraged to make appointments to bring customers into the dealership and then hand them over to the sales managers. Nevertheless, he says he sold approximately three or four cars in his first month.
[39] Neither party presented corroborative evidence regarding the number of sales Mr. Varghese made during his employment, although Mr. Knight stated that this information would be available to them. The parties also disagreed on approximately how many customers Mr. Varghese interacted with during this period.
[40] I find it is unnecessary for me to determine precisely how many sales Mr. Varghese made during his employment with Dueck. I accept that Mr. Varghese did not sell six to eight vehicles that month.
[41] Regardless of whether Mr. Varghese was not meeting an unofficial sales target during his first month of work, I am not persuaded on the evidence that Dueck decided to terminate Mr. Varghese’s employment on March 2, 2020, as it asserts.
[42] As mentioned, Dueck has presented no evidence, other than Mr. Knight’s testimony, to prove that its decision to terminate crystalized on March 2, before it knew or ought to have known that Mr. Varghese had a mental disability and was, in fact, displaying acute symptoms in the workplace. Of note, Mr. Knight testified that he discussed his concerns about Mr. Varghese’s performance with the sales manager, Danny Bolina. Mr. Knight said Mr. Bolina was also present during the morning meeting on March 2, when he says Mr. Varghese was not able to recite the sales process which was the final straw in the decision to terminate him. However, Mr. Bolina was not called to testify at the hearing, and an explanation for his absence was not provided by Dueck. While I do not go so far as to draw an adverse inference based on the fact he did not testify, I find the lack of corroborating evidence leaves me only with Mr. Knight’s evidence which I have already found is not credible.
[43] Finally, even if I were to accept Dueck’s position that it decided to terminate Mr. Varghese on March 2, 2020, I would still find that his mental disability was a factor in the termination.
[44] As noted, Mr. Knight testified that the termination decision crystalized on March 2. He also testified that he intended to wait until after the month end work was complete to inform Mr. Varghese that he was terminated. His evidence was that on March 2 and March 3 they were still busy delivering cars and “cleaning up the month.” He did not specify what date he or the other sales managers anticipated the month end work would be complete so they could move to effect Mr. Varghese’s termination. I find that on Mr. Knight’s evidence, up to that point there was still ambiguity about when Mr. Varghese’s employment would end.
[45] As I have already said, Mr. Varghese came to work on March 4, 2020. He was not terminated that day. Rather, he participated in the morning meeting and, later in the day had his first mental health event and was hospitalized before the end of his shift. The termination letter eventually given to Mr. Varghese was dated March 9, 2020. Based on this and the absence of any evidence to the contrary, I find that Dueck did not prepare a termination letter for Mr. Varghese prior to that day. Rather, only once Mr. Varghese returned to work and again exhibited mental health symptoms did Dueck prepare the termination letter. Mr. Knight immediately delivered this by hand to Mr. Varghese, despite the circumstances of him being handcuffed and detained under the Mental Health Act. I find that this demonstrates an urgency to end Mr. Varghese’s employment that was not present prior to his disability-related events. This is sufficient to establish that Mr. Varghese’s disability was a factor in the termination even if the decision was made on March 2, 2020.
[46] Dueck has not argued that its conduct was based on a bona fide occupational requirement. Having found that Dueck has not provided a credible, non-discriminatory explanation for the termination of Mr. Varghese’s employment, I find this complaint is justified.
V REMEDY
[47] Mr. Varghese seeks orders declaring Dueck’s conduct discriminatory and ordering them to refrain from committing a similar contravention of the Code. I agree that both are appropriate in the circumstances of this complaint.
[48] I begin by ordering Dueck to cease the contravention of the Code and to refrain from committing the same or a similar contravention: Code, s. 37(2)(a).
[49] Next, I declare that Dueck discriminated against Mr. Varghese based on his mental disability, in violation of s. 13 of the Code: s. 37(2)(b).
[50] I do not order compensation for injury to dignity, lost wages, or other expenses incurred because Mr. Varghese has not sought them in this process. However, I find that his dignity was injured by Dueck’s conduct and he would have been entitled to compensation of this nature had he sought it.
VI CONCLUSION
[51] I have found that Dueck discriminated against Mr. Varghese contrary to s. 13 of the Code and have ordered declaratory remedies.
[52] I hope this decision brings Mr. Varghese the resolution he seeks from this experience.
Theressa Etmanski
Tribunal Member