Kriger v. WorkSafeBC and others, 2025 BCHRT 218
Date Issued: September 4, 2025
File: CS-008028
Indexed as: Kriger v. WorkSafeBC and others, 2025 BCHRT 218
IN THE MATTER OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS CODE,
RSBC 1996, c. 210 (as amended)
AND IN THE MATTER of a complaint before
the British Columbia Human Rights Tribunal
BETWEEN:
Edward Kriger
COMPLAINANT
AND:
WorkSafeBC and LIfemark Health Services and Elaine Lucas
RESPONDENTS
REASONS FOR DECISION
TIMELINESS OF COMPLAINT
Section 22
Tribunal Member: Steven Adamson
On his own behalf: Edward Kriger
Counsel for WorkSafeBC and Elaine Lucas: Johanna Goosen
Counsel for Lifemark Health Services: Spencer Toffoli
I. INTRODUCTION
[1] On November 9, 2022, Edward Kriger filed a complaint of discrimination in services based on physical and mental disability contrary to s. 8 of the Human Rights Code [Code], against WorkSafeBC [WSBC], a WSBC case manager, Elaine Lucas, and a rehabilitation provider, Lifemark Health Services [Lifemark] [together the Respondents].
[2] The issue before me is whether to accept the Complaint against the Respondents. I make no findings of fact regarding the merits of this complaint.
[3] The Tribunal’s September 19, 2024, notice of complaint proceeding gave the parties an opportunity to make time limits submissions. While WSBC and Lifemark provided Form 4 – Time Limit Response submissions, to date Mr. Kriger has not provided any Form 5 – Time Limit Reply submissions. I, therefore, proceed to make this time limits decision based on the information found in Mr. Kriger’s complaint form information and the Respondents’ Form 4 – Time Limit Responses.
[4] For the reasons that follow, it is not in the public interest to allow them to proceed late filed: s. 22(3).
II. BACKGROUND
[5] Mr. Kriger suffered a brain injury at work resulting in various mental and physical disabilities.
[6] In the summer of 2018, Mr. Kriger alleges WSBC, Ms. Lucas, and Lifemark refused to believe his report of concussion symptoms while he was participating in a WSBC sponsored head injury rehabilitation program at Lifemark. He claims that his reports to Lifemark and Ms. Lucas about his health declining in the program because of dizziness and vomiting while walking were not believed. Mr. Kriger alleges the Respondents treated him as if he were lying and threatened him with having his WSBC claim benefits ended if he failed to continue attending.
[7] On September 18, 2018, Mr. Kriger stopped attending the Lifemark program until such time as he could be assessed independently by a neurologist.
[8] On October 2, 2018, Mr. Kriger alleges Ms. Lucas called him to discuss his WSBC claim despite him previously informing her to only contact his sister who was representing him. Mr. Kriger alleges that this ban on calls from Ms. Lucas was necessary because speaking to her directly agitated him, brought on headaches, and made him feel like he was “retarded”. During his call with Ms. Lucas this day, Mr. Kriger alleges having to hand the phone over to his sister as he was getting agitated.
[9] On October 10, 2018, Mr. Kriger alleges Ms. Lucas called him again despite being told to speak with his sister only. On this occasion he alleges Ms. Lucas treated him like a liar and was cruel.
[10] On January 8, 2019, Mr. Kriger was discharged from the Lifemark program after the independent assessment found him fit to return to work.
[11] In September 2019, Mr. Kriger alleges Ms. Lucas called him without permission on two occasions. He alleges informing her not to call him directly because speaking with her exacerbated his mental disability symptoms. He claims that Ms. Lucas’ manager confirmed she was not to call him directly. He further alleges that WSBC reassigned his claim to another case manager.
III. ANALYSIS AND DECISION
[12] The time limit set out in s. 22 of the Code is a substantive provision which is intended to ensure that complainants pursue their human rights remedies diligently: Chartier v. School District No. 62, 2003 BCHRT 39.
A. Time Limit
[13] The Complaint was filed on November 9, 2022. To comply with the one-year time limit under s. 22(1) of the Code, the alleged act of discrimination had to occur on or after November 9, 2021.
[14] From my review of Mr. Kriger’s complaint form information, the latest allegations appear to have occurred in September 2019. As such, the Complaint was late filed.
[15] In reaching this conclusion, I appreciate Mr. Kriger listed other later dates, including November 9, 2022, as the dates of the most recent discrimination. He also states that he had ongoing issues with the conduct of his WSBC claim. However, Mr. Krigers’ latest discrimination conduct dates were not accompanied by any corresponding details of discrimination. Setting out dates of discrimination alone do not make for any timely arguable contravention of the Code.
[16] Having found all of allegations in this case were late filed, I proceed to an analysis of whether the Tribunal should exercise its discretion to accept the complaint outside the one-year time limit because it is in the public interest to do so, and no substantial prejudice will result to any person because of the delay: Code s. 22(3). I begin with the public interest determination.
B. Public Interest
[17] Whether it is in the public interest to accept the late-filed complaint is a multi-faceted analysis. The enquiry is fact and context specific and assessed in accordance with the purposes of the Code: Hoang v. Warnaco and Johns, 2007 BCHRT 24 at para. 26. The Tribunal considers a non-exhaustive list of factors, including the length of the delay, the reasons for the delay, and the public interest in the complaint itself: British Columbia (Ministry of Public Safety and Solicitor General) v. Mzite, 2014 BCCA 220 [Mzite] at para. 53. These are important factors, but they are not necessarily determinative: Goddard v. Dixon, 2012 BCSC 161 at para. 152; Mzite at para. 55.
[18] I have first considered the length of the delay in filing. The delay associated with Mr. Kriger’s allegations, with the latest being in September 2019, is approximately two years late, which is excessive, and militates strongly against the public interest: Naziel-Wilson v. Providence Health Care and another [Naziel-Wilson], 2014 BCHRT 170, at para. 13; Mzite at para. 59.
[19] Mr. Kriger provided several reasons for late filing. He submits that his brain injury prevented him for focusing on more than one issue at a time. Mr. Kriger states that he chose to concentrate on pursuing his WSBC claim to secure benefits in circumstances where he was in danger of being homeless after losing his house and other assets for lack of WSBC benefits coverage. Once he had stable income and a settlement from WSBC Mr. Kriger states that he was able to proceed with this complaint.
[20] WSBC and Ms. Lucas argue that Mr. Kriger’s brain injury is not an acceptable explanation for his delay. These Respondents note that between April 2017 and November 2022 he was able to file and pursue reviews of 11 WSBC entitlement decisions. In addition, Mr. Kriger was also able to file and participate in three Workers’ Compensation Appeal Tribunal [WCAT] appeals of Review Division decisions during this period.
[21] Lifemark argues that the independent medical examination report indicates that as of January 8, 2019, Mr. Kriger had a mild traumatic brain injury and was functionally fit to return to work. This Respondent submits that Mr. Kriger was, therefore, cognitively able to file a complaint well before he filed in November 2022.
[22] Where delay is due to a disabling condition, the Tribunal has observed that it may be in the public interest to accept a late-filed complaint: MacAlpine v. Office of the Representative for Children and Youth, 2011 BCHRT 29 at para. 42. Disabling conditions can include physical and mental ailments resulting in great trouble coping with even the basic daily tasks of life: Naziel-Wilson, at para. 21.
[23] While appreciating Mr. Kriger’s inability to focus on multiple tasks due to his brain injury, I am doubtful that this prevented him from filing a timely complaint with the Tribunal. The fact that Mr. Kriger was able to successfully engage in more than a dozen WSBC reviews and appeals in a number of years, some of which must have overlapped, indicates to me that he had sufficient capacity to file a complaint concerning these same events with the Tribunal without waiting for his other quasi-judicial proceedings to conclude. In reaching this conclusion, Mr. Kriger has not provided any medical evidence of disability from filing a complaint with the tribunal to support his assertion that his brain injury precluded him from filing. Given Mr. Kriger’s demonstrated actions involving filing and pursuing multiple WSBC reviews and appeals, without more medical evidence of being precluded from filing a human rights complaint, I am not inclined to accept this reason for late filing with the Tribunal.
[24] I have also considered Mr. Kriger’s delay in terms of him making a strategic decision to focus his efforts on pursuing his WSBC claim as the best option for ensuring his financial stability. Once he achieved this, he was then in a position to purse a human rights complaint.
[25] The Tribunal has repeatedly said that pursuing another process does not suspend the time limit under the Code and that exhausting internal avenues and resources is not sufficient, on its own, to relieve against the time limit: Sones v. District of Squamish, 2016 BCHRT 99 at para. 44 and Devitt and Hargrove obo others v. School District No. 43 and another, 2011 BCHRT 218 at paras. 20-21. In my view, this case does not attract the public interest where it appears that Mr. Kriger strategically focused his efforts on continuing work injury compensation benefits to the exclusion of filing a human rights complaint. Without doubting the soundness of Mr. Kriger’s decision to pursue WSBC benefits before filing at the Tribunal, the decision to secure his financial stability first does not attract the public interest in his delay in filing at the Tribunal.
[26] In determining whether acceptance of a late-filed complaint is in the public interest, the Tribunal also considers whether there is anything particularly unique, novel, or unusual about the complaint that has not been addressed in other complaints: Hau v. SFU Student Services and others, 2014 BCHRT 10 at para. 22; Bains v. Advanced Air Supply and others, 2013 BCHRT 74 at para. 22; Mathieu v. Victoria Shipyards and others, 2010 BCHRT 224 at para. 60. Where a complaint raises a novel issue on behalf of a vulnerable group, which advances the purposes of the Code, this factor may weigh in favour of finding a public interest in accepting the complaint: Mzite at paras. 65-66. The Tribunal has considered gaps in its jurisprudence, on the one hand, and the existence of good precedents, on the other hand, in determining whether to permit a complaint to proceed: Mzite at para. 67.
[27] Mr. Kriger is seeking justice for being ignored by the Respondents in the course of his work injury rehabilitation. He claims that if he was treated sooner for his post concussion symptoms, he may not have become unemployable and have to suffer a lifetime of headaches and other symptoms. Mr. Kriger also filed this complaint to hold WSBC and its contractors accountable, which he believes will help other claimants who have also been ignored.
[28] While acknowledging Mr. Kriger’s concerns for himself and others, I am not satisfied that his complaint raises a novel issue that should be heard by the Tribunal to advance the purposes of the Code. Complaints involving disability in services are common and the jurisprudence is fairly settled.
[29] For these reasons, I do not find that it is in the public interest to accept the late-filed complaint, and I need not address the issue of whether substantial prejudice would result.
IV. CONCLUSION
[30] For these reasons, the complaint is not accepted for filing.
Steven Adamson
Tribunal Member