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Home » Law Library » B.C. Human Rights Tribunal decisions » Recently released decisions » 2025 BCHRT 217

Lazarowich v. BC Ministry of Health (Health Link), 2025 BCHRT 217

Date Issued: September 4, 2025
File(s): CS-004533

Indexed as: Lazarowich v. BC Ministry of Health (Health Link), 2025 BCHRT 217

IN THE MATTER OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS CODE,
RSBC 1996, c. 210 (as amended)

AND IN THE MATTER of a complaint before
the British Columbia Human Rights Tribunal

BETWEEN:

Jennifer Lazarowich

COMPLAINANT

AND:

His Majesty the King in right of the Province of British Columbia as represented by the Ministry of Health (Health Link)
RESPONDENT

REASONS FOR DECISION
APPLICATION TO DISMISS A COMPLAINT
Sections 27(1)(g)

Tribunal Member: Laila Said Alam

On their own behalf: Jennifer Lazarowich

Counsel for the Respondent: Jaclyn Salter

I          INTRODUCTION

[1]               On July 21, 2021, Jennifer Lazarowich filed a complaint against His Majesty the King in right of the province of British Columbia as represented by Ministry of Health (Health Link) [Ministry]. She alleges the Ministry discriminated against her in employment on the grounds of disability and sex, in violation of s. 13 of the Human Rights Code. In particular, she alleges that the following acts were discriminatory:

a.    Knowing that she was on medical leave, her subordinates held a meeting in May 2019 to discuss how to manage their work during her medical leave. Her subordinates circulated a follow-up email that impugned her ability to lead the team [May 2019 Meeting]. She says both the discussion and the contents of the email were discriminatory and breached the Ministry’s Standards of Conduct for employees.

b.    The Ministry conducted an internal investigation and found Ms. Lazarowich’s concerns that the May 2019 meeting breached the Ministry’s Standards of Conduct were unsubstantiated. Mr. C met with Ms. Lazarowich on August 8, 2019, to advise her of the outcome of the internal investigation.

c.     On the afternoon of August 8, 2019, after his meeting with Ms. Lazarowich, Mr. J and Ms. C debriefed over instant messenger. Mr. J relayed Ms. Lazarowich’s disappointment in the outcome, to which Ms. C made discriminatory remarks such as “she is a big girl” and “and she needs to put on her positive leadership pants”.

d.    The Ministry’s internal investigation of the May 2019 Meeting was improper. In particular, she alleges Ms. B, Mr. J, and Ms. C bullied and harassed her in the process, and engaged in inappropriate management action, in violation of the Ministry’s Standards of Conduct and/or article 1.10 of the collective agreement.

e.    On December 6, 2019, Mr. J constructively dismissed her when he denied her request for a lateral move.

f.      Between December 2021 and January 2022, the Ministry was unresponsive to her inquiries about seeing her job position posted online. The response she finally received was “threatening.”

[2]               The Ministry denies discriminating. It applies to dismiss the complaint under s. 27(1)(c) of the Code because it argues there is no adverse impact and no connection between what Ms. Lazarowich alleges and her protected characteristics. It also applies to dismiss the complaint under s. 27(1)(g) of the Code because it says the complaint was filed late and does not allege a continuing contravention.

[3]               I find it most efficient to decide the application under s. 27(1)(g). On this application, I must decide whether the complaint is late filed and whether older allegations are part of a continuing contravention. I must also decide whether to exercise my discretion to accept the late filed complaint because it is in the public interest to do so and there is no substantial prejudice to any person because of the delay.

[4]               For the following reasons, I allow the application and dismiss Ms. Lazarowich’s complaint. To make this decision, I have considered all the information filed by the parties. In these reasons, I only refer to what is necessary to explain my decision.

II       BACKGROUND

[5]               On January 3, 2017, the Ministry hired Ms. Lazarowich as Lead, Directory Services. She was the direct supervisor of a team of five data stewards and a Provincial Data Coordinator [PDP].

[6]               By all indications, Ms. Lazarowich was a dedicated employee. When Ms. Lazarowich started as Lead, she took over a team that had been struggling under multiple leaders in a short period of time. Her performance review recognized that leading the “floundering” team was not an easy assignment, particularly while onboarding three direct reports and being onboarded herself. Her ability to move the team to cohesion was described as “extraordinary.”

1.      May 2019 Meeting

[7]               On May 8, 2019, while Ms. Lazarowich was on a medical leave, the data stewards had a meeting to discuss how to manage the work in her absence [May 2019 Meeting]. After the May 2019 Meeting, the data stewards circulated an email, which contained the following language:

I think we should look at it as to how many days Jennifer is away and when she comes back we suddenly get an influx of feedback then she makes the same mistakes she’s not consistently here to learn things even by just doing the job. She makes the same mistakes they’re not huge but maybe because she’s not around a lot and hasn’t memorized which records/tasks belongs to whom. If she can’t help with certain tasks can she at least help out with QA. Let’s get the processes approved and move on. Get verification going they said it would be done by February. Lead coverage, someone to assign tasks when the lead is out.

[8]               When she returned to work, Ms. Lazarowich asked if there had been any action items to discuss from the monthly data steward meeting. A data steward said they had an unscheduled meeting outside of the monthly meeting and forwarded Ms. Lazarowich the email.

2.      Internal Investigation and subsequent appeals

[9]               By the May 2019 Meeting, Mr. J was Ms. Lazarowich’s manager. However, Ms. Lazarowich raised concerns to Ms. B, and human resources that the May 2019 Meeting was discriminatory because it discussed her ability to perform her work while on medical leave. Ms. B selected Mr. J to lead the investigation into Ms. Lazarowich’s complaint [Internal Investigation]. The Operations Manager, Ms. C, was made co-investigator and supported Mr. J. The investigation took place between May 31 to June 19, 2019. Mr. J and Ms. C issued a report on July 11, 2019, concluding there had not been a breach of the Standards of Conduct, as there was no evidence to support Ms. Lazarowich’s concerns about the May 2019 Meeting.

[10]           On August 8, 2019, Mr. J met with Ms. Lazarowich and advised her that her concerns regarding a violation of the Standards of Conduct were unsubstantiated. After the meeting, Mr. J and Ms. C debriefed over instant messenger. Mr. J relayed Ms. Lazarowich’s disappointment in the outcome, to which Ms. C made remarks such as “she is a big girl” and “and she needs to put on her positive leadership pants”. I note here that Ms. Lazarowich discovered these messages in 2021 during disclosure for this complaint, and she argues that these comments are both discriminatory and suggest that the investigation was not conducted fairly.

[11]           Following the August 8, 2019, meeting, Ms. Lazarowich went on a medical leave of absence due to work-related stress and anxiety. She did not return to work.

[12]           On January 14, 2020, Ms. Lazarowich filed a complaint pursuant to article 1.10 of her collective agreement [Article 1.10 Complaint]. The BC Public Service Agency retained an external, independent investigator to investigate her allegations, which included bullying, harassment and inappropriate management action by Ms. B, Mr. J and Ms. C, in violation of the Standards of Conduct and/or article 1.10 of the collective agreement [External Investigation].

[13]           In a report dated September 9, 2020, the external investigator concluded that there had been no bullying, harassment and inappropriate management action by Ms. B, Mr. J and Ms. C, and no violation of the Standards of Conduct and/or article 1.10 of the collective agreement.

[14]           On April 22, 2020, Mr. Lazarowich filed a grievance related to the same issues with the Internal Investigation. The grievance appears outstanding as of the date of this decision.

[15]           On November 19, 2020, Ms. Lazarowich’s union escalated the Article 1.10 Complaint to the Joint Mediation/Arbitration Panel [Panel]. The Panel was tasked to review the findings of the External Investigation. The Panel is chaired by a neutral arbitrator and includes a representative from both the Public Service Agency and the union.

[16]           The Panel convened a hearing on March 28, 2022. The Panel’s May 26, 2022 decision concluded there was no violation of Article 1.10, and the Article 1.10 Complaint was dismissed.

[17]           Ms. Lazarowich appealed the Panel’s May 26, 2022 decision to the Labour Relations Board. On December 28, 2022, the Board dismissed her application to review the Panel’s decision: Lazarowich v. The BC Public Service Agency on Behalf of the Province of British Columbia (Ministry of Health), 2022 BCLRB 145.

3.      WorkSafe BC Claim and subsequent appeals

[18]           On October 24, 2019, Ms. Lazarowich also filed a claim with WorkSafeBC for a mental disorder caused by workplace stressors, including the May 2019 meeting.

[19]           On April 9, 2021, WorkSafeBC denied the claim. Sometime between April 9, 2021 and September 2021, she appealed the decision to WorkSafeBC’s Review division, citing flaws in the claims process, including alleging the WorkSafe BC investigator led and coached the witnesses, only two people were interviewed and they did not include the witnesses she suggested, and the witnesses who were interviewed put forward evidence that was not true and therefore damaging to her employment record.

[20]           On October 29, 2021, the Review Division upheld the decision. Regarding the May 2019 meeting, the Review Officer found that it is not abusive for employees to raise workplace concerns, even if they are related to legitimate health-related absences. Ms. Lazarowich appealed the Review Division decision to the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Tribunal. An oral hearing took place on April 6, 2022. Ms. Lazarowich’s appeal was withdrawn on April 14, 2022.

4.      Constructive Dismissal

[21]           While WorkSafe BC was investigating her complaint, Ms. Lazarowich contacted Mr. J in November 2019 to reiterate her concerns about the May 2019 Meeting and internal investigation related to corresponding allegations that the Standard of Conduct had been violated. Mr. J communicated that he would not support her request to organize a teleconference with the union to discuss her multiple concerns while she was off sick. Sometime in November, Ms. Lazarowich organized the teleconference with the union and reiterated in her email to Mr. J that the meeting was to discuss the investigation, the issues raised by the outcome of the investigation, and “return to work and [….] a reasonable accommodation” through either “a lateral or accommodated transfer, to a position elsewhere”. In November, Mr. J advised her that he would not meet with her or her union during her medical leave without documentation from her physician that she was able to meet with her employer to have a “potentially stressful workplace conversation”.

[22]           The union then requested a meeting on Ms. Lazarowich’s behalf. On December 6, 2019, Ms. Lazarowich and her shop steward met with Mr. J. The parties do not say whether Ms. Lazarowich gave Mr. J documentation that satisfied him that she was able to meet with her employer. At the meeting, Ms. Lazarowich requested a lateral transfer. Mr. J replied to the request by email on December 11, 2019. The email reads, in relevant part:

When you return to your role here, we would be happy to work with you on applying for roles, supporting any development that may be required, and providing resume and interview support. If you are considering another role, we encourage you to explore available vacancies. For instructions on accessing internal job postings while you are on leave and while your IDIR is on hold, please see the Internal Applicants Who Cannot Access Internal Postingsfactsheet on MyHR. Let us know if we can assist you on this.

[23]           Ms. Lazarowich viewed this email as a constructive dismissal, because she says he denied her request for a lateral transfer so that she could continue her public service career.

5.      Canada Life

[24]           When Ms. Lazarowich went on a medical leave of absence due to work-related stress and anxiety, the leave was initially covered by the Ministry’s Short-Term Illness and Injury Plan [STIIP] and subsequently by Canada Life’s Long-Term Disability [LTD].

[25]           On April 7, 2020, Canada Life approved Ms. Lazarowich for a claim for “Totally Disabled re: Own Occupation” for the period of February 8, 2020 to June 30, 2020. She appealed the April 2020 LTD decision, and her LTD period was extended to cover February 8, 2020 to March 7, 2022.

[26]           Ms. Lazarowich had also filed a claim for “Totally Disabled re: Any Occupation”, which Canada Life denied on December 1, 2021 because her condition did not preclude her from an alternative occupation. She appealed this decision. She says at the June 13, 2022 hearing, three doctors were present at the hearing: one from her union, one from her employer, and an independent psychiatrist. On June 30, 2022, the LTD Plan Claims Review Committee denied her appeal, finding that she was not totally disabled from performing the duties of any occupation as of March 8, 2022.

6.      Ministry’s Communications between December 2021 and January 2022

[27]           Ms. Lazarowich learned through a friend that her position was posted while she was on medical leave. She emailed her new manager, Ms. A, and Ms. B on November 30, 2021 to ask about what position they had for her when she is cleared to return to work. Ms. Lazarowich then wrote to the executive director when she did not receive a response. In her email, Ms. Lazarowich said she was concerned that her new manager, who was not in their directory at the time of the events, was made aware of the events, though Ms. Lazarowich does not say by who. She asserts that confidentiality was breached and states, “it is most certainly retaliatory to spread this information about the investigation to individuals for no apparent reasons other than to slander my reputation”. Ms. Sundhu replied on December 15 saying she would get back to her.

[28]           Ms. Lazarowich again followed up with Ms. Sundhu on January 18, 2022. Ms. Sundhu sent her an email urging her to stop making unfounded assumptions about her colleagues and workplace operation, reminding her that all employees, including those on leave, are bound by the Standard of Conduct and there is no tolerance for making unfounded allegations about retaliation and unprofessionalism. She wrote, “this needs to stop, Jennifer”. Ms. Sundhu also said Ms. Lazarowich should not be attempting contact with anyone other than herself and the union staff representative while there was an ongoing active investigation led by her union and by the employer. She encouraged Ms. Lazarowich to take the time while she was on LTD to care for her health and wellbeing. She explained that until she provides medical clearance including details on any restrictions or limitations, the Ministry cannot decide what position to put her in. Ms. Sundhu said that she is the point person if Ms. Lazarowich needed any information regarding the workplace. Ms. Lazarowich views this email as “threatening” and says an employer representative contacted the union to advise the union to tell her not to contact her employer.

III     DECISION

1.      Is the complaint late filed? Are older allegations part of a continuing contravention?

[29]           There is a one-year time limit for filing a human rights complaint: Code, s. 22. Section 22 is meant to ensure that complainants pursue their human rights remedies promptly so that respondents can go ahead with their activities without the possibility of a dated complaint: Chartier v. School District No. 62, 2003 BCHRT 39 at para. 12.

[30]           Ms. Lazarowich filed her complaint on July 21, 2021. Allegations concerning events prior to July 20, 2020, are late filed.

[31]           Section 27(1)(g) permits the Tribunal to dismiss a late filed complaint.

[32]           A complaint is filed in time if the last allegation of discrimination happened within one year, and older allegations are part of a “continuing contravention”: Code, s. 22(2); School District v. Parent obo the Child, 2018 BCCA 136 at para. 68. A continuing contravention is “a succession or repetition of separate acts of discrimination of the same character” that could be considered separate contraventions of the Code, and “not merely one act of discrimination which may have continuing effects or consequences”: Chen v. Surrey (City), 2015 BCCA 57at para. 31; School District at para. 50.

[33]           The assessment of whether discrete allegations are a continuing contravention is a “fact specific one which will depend very much on the individual circumstances of each case”: Dickson v. Vancouver Island Human Rights Coalition, 2005 BCHRT 209 at para. 17. A relevant consideration is whether there are significant gaps between the allegations: Dickson at paras. 16-17. Whether or not a gap is significant will be assessed contextually, considering the length itself and any explanations for the gap: Reynolds v Overwaitea Food Group, 2013 BCHRT 67, at para. 28. A significant, unexplained, gap in time will weigh against finding a continuing contravention: Bjorklund v. BC Ministry of Public Safety and Solicitor General, 2018 BCHRT 204 at para. 14.

[34]           The Ministry argues that the 2019 allegations are late filed and should be dismissed. They say Ms. Lazarowich’s remaining untimely and timely allegations have not made out either an adverse impact or a nexus between her protected characteristics and the alleged adverse impacts and her allegations. They say that the late filed complaints are not of a similar character as the timely allegations. They say the timely allegations are discrete allegations involving different people, rather than establishing any ongoing pattern. They say the gap between the 2019 allegations and the timely allegations is at least nine months and is significant. Lastly, the Ministry submits that the 2019 allegations should not be accepted under s. 22(3) of the Code because they do not rise to the level of engaging the public interest.

[35]           Ms. Lazarowich says her complaint is not out of time or, in the alternative, her complaint is a continuing contravention because all the conduct alleged in the complaint is similar in nature.

[36]           She also argues her older allegations are part of a continuing contravention because the timely allegations were only discovered when she received employee records. I understand her to say that through a request for documents she ”discovered” the discrimination, namely that the internal communication between Mr. J and Ms. C and Mr. J and human resources suggests that she was being “targeted” by her employer during the investigation, that the Ministry falsified her employment records by lying to WorkSafeBC during the investigation in an effort to cast her in a negative light, and that her position had been replaced by the PDP in August 2019. She says this all points to a finding of continuous harassment.

[37]           The discoverability principle is appropriately considered under whether there is a public interest in accepting her late filed complaint: Shalagin v. Mercer Celgar LLP and another, 2022 BCHRT 14, at para 46. I will return to Ms. Lazarowich’s discoverability argument in my consideration of whether to exercise my discretion to accept the late filed complaint.

[38]           For the following reasons, I am not persuaded that Ms. Lazarowich’s complaint establishes a continuing contravention.

a.    Arguable Contravention

[39]           The Tribunal has said that, in order to amount to a continuing contravention, the allegations must first disclose incidents which, if proven, could contravene the Code: Fraser v. College of New Caledonia and others, 2009 BCHRT 432. Pavlovic v. UBC and CUPE Local 116, 2006 BCHRT 329, para. 9, Fraser v. College of New Caledonia and others, 2009 BCHRT 432, at paras. 18-20; Alexander v. Real Estate Council, 2010 BCHRT 45; Mallenby v. Malaspina University College and others, 2009 BCHRT 208. If a potential contravention is alleged the Tribunal will assess whether a continuing contravention exists. If there are not, then the complaint is not a human rights complaint which can be accepted for filing, regardless of when the allegations are said to have occurred: Fraser at para. 18.

[40]           The core of Ms. Lazarowich’s complaint concerns discrimination stemming from the May 2019 meeting, the substance of the Internal Investigation, Mr. J and Ms. C’s internal messages after the investigation, and her allegation that she was constructively dismissed in December 2019. These allegations are out of time. The question is whether Ms. Lazarowich has made a timely allegation which, if proven, could contravene the Code and anchor the untimely allegations as part of a continuing contravention.

[41]           I am not persuaded that Ms. Lazarowich’s timely allegations constitute arguable contraventions of the Code. 

[42]           I am not satisfied that Ms. Lazarowich’s timely complaint about the Ministry’s communications between December 2020 to January 2021 are an arguable contravention of the Code. She says the Ministry “simply and intentionally ignored” her email, did not give her guidance on how to get in touch with her employer, and threatened her by saying she must stop making accusations against staff. Without more, Ms. Lazarowich has not set out facts that support an inference that her sex or disability were factors in the adverse treatment she alleged.

[43]           Further, I am satisfied that Ms. Lazarowich’s appeals of the Internal Investigation, including the External Investigation, Article 1.10 Investigation, Arbitration Panel review, and the Labour Relations Board review are the “aftermaths of discrimination played out in various forums” and are the effects of alleged discrimination and not, in themselves, an arguable contravention of the Code: Jaffar v. Yaletown Mini Storage, 2018 BCHRT 87, at para. 19. I have, however, considered the separate acts of discrimination that she alleges took place during the appeals and hearings.

[44]           These allegations concern discriminatory comments and decisions made during WorkSafe BC, the Panel, and Canada Life processes. Neither WorkSafe BC, the Panel or its chair, or Canada Life or the independent physician on its Claims Review Committee are named respondents to this complaint. The alleged discriminatory conduct was committed by parties external to the Ministry, and do not constitute an arguable contravention of the Code by the Ministry. I therefore do not consider her allegations against these unnamed parties in the s. 27(1)(g) analysis.

[45]           I understand Ms. Lazarowich takes issue with what Mr. J reported to WorkSafe BC during its 2021 investigation. He reported that before he took on a supervisory role and they were still colleagues, Ms. Lazarowich sometimes took personal calls in the office. He reported that he would not feel comfortable listening, so sometimes he would book a private meeting room to work from. I note the WorkSafe BC investigator does not cite Mr. J’s report about the occasional telephone calls as part of the facts or evidence that she relied upon to make her decision. Nevertheless, Ms. Lazarowich says that his statements are untrue. She also alleges that untrue statements were made suggesting that she “disrupted their worksite, […] the team performed much better with [her] gone.” She does not say who made these statements, in what context they were made, or when they were made. Without more, I am not persuaded that these untrue statements constitute an arguable contravention because there is no connection between the statements and her sex or disability.

[46]           Without a timely allegation to anchor the remaining untimely allegations, I turn to Ms. Lazarowich’s submissions under s. 22(3) of the Code.

2.      Is it in the public interest to accept the late filed complaint?

[47]           I now consider whether to exercise my discretion to accept the late filed complaint because it is in the public interest to do so and there is no substantial prejudice to any person because of the delay: Code, s. 22(3), School District v. Parent obo the Child, 2018 BCCA 136 at para. 68.

[48]           The burden is on the complainant to persuade the Tribunal to accept the complaint. I must consider two things: public interest and substantial prejudice.

[49]           The Tribunal assesses the public interest in a late filed complaint in light of the purposes of the Code. These include identifying and eliminating persistent patterns of inequality and providing a remedy for persons who are discriminated against: s. 3. It may consider factors like the length of the delay, the reasons for the delay, the complainant’s interest in accessing the Tribunal, the respondent’s interest in being able to continue its activities without worrying about stale complaints, whether the complainant got legal advice, and the public interest in the complaint itself: British Columbia (Ministry of Public Safety and Solicitor General) v. Mzite, 2014 BCCA 220 [Mzite] at para. 53 and 63; Hoang v. Warnaco and Johns, 2007 BCHRT 24; Complainant v. The Board of Education of School District No. 61 (Greater Victoria), 2022 BCHRT 44 at para. 18. These are important factors, but they are not necessarily determinative and not every factor will be relevant in every case: Goddard v. Dixon, 2012 BCSC 161 at para. 152; Mzite at para. 55. The inquiry is always fact and context specific.

[50]           I have also considered the time between the Ministry’s alleged conduct in 2019, Ms. Lazarowich’s discovering the records sometime in 2021 which she claims showed discriminatory conduct, and her filing of the complaint in July 2021. She attributes the gap in filing to challenges faced during the COVID-19 pandemic and the time spent pursuing a resolution of her complaint in other venues. I have considered each of these reasons and find they do not explain why she did not file her complaint earlier in relation to the Ministry’s alleged conduct in 2019.

[51]           First, with respect to discoverability, I am satisfied that Ms. Lazarowich knew of the Ministry’s alleged discriminatory conduct before she discovered the employee records and internal communication between Mr. J and Ms. C. As early as May 2019, Ms. Lazarowich believed that there was discrimination in the workplace on account of her disability because she reported the data steward meeting to her manager as such. She also believed as early as August 8, 2019, or as late as initiating the External Investigation through her union on January 10, 2020, that the Ministry’s response was discriminatory. Finally, she alleges that as early as December 2019, when the Ministry denied her request to be accommodated through a lateral transfer, she was constructively dismissed. Though Ms. Lazarowich may have discovered new evidence in support of her complaint, I do not accept that it was only after she received her employment record that she was made aware of possible discrimination in the workplace. The appropriate course of action would have been to file her complaint and seek to amend it with new particulars or allegations: Tribunal’s Rules of Practice and Procedure, Rule 24.

[52]           With respect to the COVID-19 pandemic, I agree with the Ministry that the events that gave rise to the allegations of discrimination took place before the start of the COVID-19 pandemic in BC in or around March 2020, and while Ms. Lazarowich was on Short-Term Illness and Injury Plan leave.

[53]           With respect to Ms. Lazarowich’s explanation that she sought to remedy her complaint in other venues, the Tribunal has repeatedly said that pursuing another process does not suspend the time limit under the Code, and is not enough, on its own, to relieve against the time limit: Sones v. District of Squamish, 2016 BCHRT 99 at para. 44 and Devitt and Hargrove obo others v. School District No. 43 and another, 2011 BCHRT 218 at paras. 20-21.  If a complainant wishes to pursue a grievance or other process, the proper course is to file a complaint in a timely manner and seek deferral pending the outcome of the other process, under s. 25 of the Code: Belcher v. University of Northern British Columbia, 2014 BCHRT 83, at para. 28.

[54]           Ms. Lazarowich further explains that she was under extreme stress from having to care for her children, prepare for review hearings, and having the Ministry cut off her pay and benefits. She said this exacerbated her medical conditions and made this process extremely difficult to take on without support or financial ability to hire support. Ms. Lazarowich says she sought support through a legal clinic, and on the third attempt she was “supported enough to start this process.” I note that Ms. Lazarowich has been able to advocate for herself with her employer, instruct her union, and engage in multiple process and appeals simultaneously. I am not persuaded that she could not have filed a human rights complaint earlier. Additionally, while she does not explicitly say that her delay in filing her complaint was due to an ignorance of the law, I understand her argument to say that the more discretion should be afforded to a lay litigant. The Tribunal has said that ignorance of the law is not, by itself, a sufficient justification for filing a complaint outside the statutory time limit: Joubarne v. Great West Life Assurance Co. and others, 2004 BCHRT 183, para. 18.

[55]           Ms. Lazarowich says accepting this complaint is in the public interest because it will assist the Ministry in its efforts to change its culture, improve its reputation, and allow for longstanding issues within the Ministry and BC Public Service to be addressed. It will also protect other individuals from the type of treatment and discrimination she says she experienced. The nature of an employer or the work that it performs does not, in and of itself, render it in the public interest to accept a late-filed complaint: see, for example, Bland v. The Board of School Trustees of School District No. 60 (Peace River) and others, 2004 BCHRT 97.  As noted by the Tribunal in that case, the question is not whether the complaint is in the public interest, but whether it is in the public interest to accept a late-filed complaint. Further, I consider Ms. Lazarowich’s allegations to be lacking any unusual or systemic aspect. The nature of a complaint of employment discrimination based on sex or disability contains nothing to persuade me that it is in the public interest or would further the purposes of the Code if it were accepted: Mathieu v. Victoria Shipyards and others, 2010, BCHRT 224; Senger v. BMO Nesbitt Burns and another, 2013 BCHRT 236.

[56]           For these reasons, I am not persuaded that it is in the public interest to accept the late filed parts of the complaint. It is therefore unnecessary for me to consider whether accepting the late filed complaint would give rise to substantial prejudice.

IV    CONCLUSION

[57]           For Ms. Lazarowich, “a few words” from her employer to her staff might have gone a long way in helping her feel supported: a commitment to speak with her team, a reminder to the team about the Standards of Conduct and setting expectations around the types of emails circulated. Although that did not happen, I find that Ms. Lazarowich’s allegations are untimely. The complaint is dismissed under s. 27(1)(g) of the Code.

Laila Said Alam

Tribunal Member

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