Redmond v. The John Howard Society Okanagan & Kootenay (No.2), 2025 BCHRT 215
Date Issued: August 28, 2025
File: CS-002285
Indexed as: Redmond v. The John Howard Society Okanagan & Kootenay (No.2), 2025 BCHRT 215
IN THE MATTER OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS CODE,
RSBC 1996, c. 210 (as amended)
AND IN THE MATTER of a complaint before
the British Columbia Human Rights Tribunal
BETWEEN:
Megan Redmond
COMPLAINANT
AND:
The John Howard Society Okanagan & Kootenay
RESPONDENT
REASONS FOR DECISION
APPLICATION TO RECONSIDER A DECISION
Rule 36
Tribunal Member:
Jonathan Chapnick
On her own behalf:
Megan Redmond
For the Respondent:
No submissions sought
I INTRODUCTION
[1] This matter is scheduled for an upcoming hearing. On August 18, 2025, the complainant, Megan Redmond, applied for reconsideration of a letter decision that I issued on August 5, 2025 [Letter Decision]. In the Letter Decision, I had denied requests by Ms. Redmond for my recusal and to adjourn the hearing until March 2026.
[2] On August 25, 2025, I wrote to the parties to provide my bottom line decision on Ms. Redmond’s application for reconsideration of the Letter Decision. I denied the application with reasons to follow. These are my reasons for denying Ms. Redmond’s application for reconsideration of the Letter Decision.
II Background
[3] The Tribunal first received Ms. Redmond’s complaint against the John Howard Society Okanagan & Kootenay [Respondent] on October 9, 2020. It was subsequently amended by Ms. Redmond’s submissions of complaint and amendment forms on October 10, 2020, November 30, 2021, and December 6, 2021.
[4] In October 2022, the Respondent applied to dismiss the complaint. In a decision on July 31, 2024, the Tribunal denied the dismissal application: Redmond v. The John Howard Society Okanagan & Kootenay, 2024 BCHRT 219.
[5] The Tribunal convened a case conference on January 15, 2025, during which the parties agreed to a three-day hearing on July 8-10, 2025.
A. Initial applications
[6] On May 16, 2025, Ms. Redmond emailed the Tribunal and the Respondent to request an adjournment to late August 2025. On June 2, 2025, with the assistance of a new representative [Representative], Ms. Redmond asked that the hearing be rescheduled to between April 27 and July 3, 2026. She also asked that I recuse myself from the hearing. On June 15, 2025, Ms. Redmond revised her availability for a rescheduled hearing to between June 1 and August 30, 2026.
[7] Ms. Redmond filed a formal recusal application on June 3, 2025. Later that day, I conducted a hearing readiness case conference with the parties [First Case Conference]. Shortly after the First Case Conference ended, Ms. Redmond wrote to the Tribunal to formally withdraw her recusal application.
[8] The Respondent responded to Ms. Redmond’s adjournment application on June 20, 2025. It argued that an adjournment to September 22, 2025 was appropriate, but opposed adjourning the hearing to June 1, 2026. Submissions on the adjournment application closed on June 24, 2025. The next day, counsel for the Respondent emailed the Tribunal, raising issues regarding the Representative’s status under Rule 7 of the Tribunal’s Rules of Practice and Procedure [Rules] and s. 15 of the Legal Profession Act.
[9] On June 26, 2025, I temporarily adjourned the hearing, while deferring my decision regarding the length of the adjournment. On June 30, 2025, Ms. Redmond advised that the Representative was no longer representing her and asked that the hearing be rescheduled to sometime between March 2 and 27, 2026.
[10] On July 7, 2025, the Tribunal directed the parties to attend a further case conference at the end of the month. The purpose of the case conference was to schedule new hearing dates by mutual agreement, failing which the Tribunal would hear final oral arguments on the adjournment application. A case conference was scheduled for July 31, 2025.
B. New application
[11] On July 29, 2025, Ms. Redmond filed a new, 82-page, written application, seeking (1) to adjourn the hearing until March 2026 and (2) my recusal from this proceeding [July 29 Application]. Regarding my recusal, Ms. Redmond claimed that the circumstances in this case met “the criteria for a reasonable apprehension of bias.”
[12] The scheduled case conference went ahead on July 31, 2025 for the sole purpose of completing submissions (i.e., Respondent’s response, Ms. Redmond’s reply) on the adjournment part of the July 29 Application [Second Case Conference]. No submissions were sought on the recusal part of the July 29 Application. At the Second Case Conference, the Respondent provided an oral response submission and Ms. Redmond provided an oral reply submission.
[13] I issued the Letter Decision on August 5, 2025, dismissing the July 29 Application. I denied Ms. Redmond’s request to adjourn the hearing until March 2026. I also dismissed her claims of bias and declined to recuse myself. The Tribunal scheduled the hearing for October 6-10, 2025, with additional dates if necessary.
III Application for reconsideration
[14] Ms. Redmond now applies for reconsideration of the Letter Decision, seeking orders for:
a. my recusal from deciding this reconsideration application, and its reassignment to another Tribunal member;
b. an interim stay pending the Tribunal’s decision regarding this reconsideration application;
c. the Letter Decision to be set aside in its entirety;
d. the adjournment of the hearing until March 2026;
e. my recusal from the remainder of this proceeding;
f. costs against the Respondent for the conduct of their legal counsel at the Second Case Conference;
g. the censure of the Respondent’s legal counsel for their conduct at the Second Case Conference; and
h. further orders and directions as are just in the circumstances.
IV Decision
[15] In this part of my decision, I explain why Ms. Redmond’s application for reconsideration is denied in its entirety. I considered all of Ms. Redmond’s evidence and arguments in reaching my decision. In these reasons, I only refer to what is necessary to explain what I decided.
A. Request for recusal from reconsideration application
[16] When a party applies for reconsideration of a decision, the Tribunal practice is to assign the application to the member who made the decision in the first place, because they are most familiar with the file and best placed to efficiently determine whether there are grounds for reconsideration: Bruschini v. EDP Software Inc. (No. 3), 2023 BCHRT 144 at para. 3, citing Karbalaeiali v. British Columbia (Human Rights Tribunal), 2010 BCSC 1130 at para. 65; see also University of British Columbia v. University of British Columbia Faculty Association, 2007 BCCA 201 at para. 84. An exception to this practice is where the member who made the original decision recuses themselves because of a reasonable apprehension of bias: Bruschini at para. 4.
[17] Ms. Redmond argues that I am disqualified from deciding her reconsideration application because it “is based on a well-documented claim of reasonable apprehension of bias.” In other words, she claims that I am biased and as a result I cannot reconsider a decision in which I dismissed her claims that I am biased. I do not accept this. I will not recuse myself based on an argument that I have already considered and rejected. If Ms. Redmond disagrees with my original denial of her recusal request because she believes that that part of the Letter Decision was wrong, her recourse is to seek judicial review: Prosko v. District of Taylor (No. 3), 2024 BCHRT 319 at para. 19.
[18] Ms. Redmond’s request for my recusal from deciding this reconsideration application is denied.
B. Application to reconsider Letter Decision
[19] Ms. Redmond puts forward three grounds for reconsideration of the Letter Decision.
1. Letter Decision was infected by errors of law and reason, and process was unfair
[20] First, she says the Letter Decision was “infected by fundamental errors of law and reason that … resulted in a denial of natural justice and created an unfair process.” She argues that: I failed to follow Pintea v. Johns, 2017 SCC 23; part of the Letter Decision was unreasonable; and part of my analysis was legally flawed. An application for reconsideration is not the place for these types of arguments.
[21] The Tribunal is not authorized to sit in appeal of its own decisions; it cannot reopen a decision “because one party or another feels that the decision is wrong”: Eddy v. Toby’s Pub and Grill and another (No. 2), 2013 BCHRT 48 at para. 27. Under the Tribunal’s limited reconsideration power, I cannot retry Ms. Redmond’s July 29 Application to determine whether the Letter Decision was unreasonable: Fraser Health Authority v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Tribunal, 2014 BCCA 499 at paras. 158-161. Nor would it be efficient or fair to tie up the Tribunal in such potentially endless proceedings: Tuson v. The Board of Education of School District No. 5 (No. 5), 2021 BCHRT 14 at para. 8.
[22] Under this first ground for reconsideration, Ms. Redmond also argues that the Second Case Conference was procedurally unfair. She says I gave the Respondent 30 minutes for its oral response to her written application for adjournment, while she was only allotted 10 minutes for oral reply. She also says that I “didn’t check if she needed breaks or more time, failing [my] duty to ensure fairness.”
[23] I do not accept that the Second Case Conference was procedurally unfair. I allotted more time (30 minutes) for the Respondent’s oral arguments because they were responding to written arguments with case citations and roughly 20 pages of documentary evidence regarding the medical basis for Ms. Redmond’s adjournment request. I allotted less time (10 minutes) to Ms. Redmond due to the limited scope of reply submissions. In any event, the Respondent ended up completing its oral arguments in under 15 minutes, which left over 30 minutes remaining in the Second Case Conference for Ms. Redmond’s reply. However, she did not use all the remaining time; in total, she spoke for under 10 minutes.
[24] It is not true that I failed to check if Ms. Redmond needed breaks or more time. Ms. Redmond initially delivered her reply in under five minutes, at which point I asked her if she wanted to take some time to review her notes or collect her thoughts to determine if there was anything else she wanted to say. I acknowledged that oral submissions processes can sometimes feel like they are moving quickly, and I offered to sit and wait quietly if she wished to take some time before she concluded. Ms. Redmond took a moment and then delivered further reply submissions, during which she became emotional. When she said she was done, I acknowledged that we were engaged in a difficult process, and I told her that my approach was not to impose a break on a person who becomes emotional, but rather to allow them to tell me if they want or need a break. I then said: “If you do need a break, just let me know.” Ms. Redmond did not request a further break, so I said I would take her at her word that she had completed her oral reply.
[25] I am sorry that Ms. Redmond experienced the Second Case Conference negatively. I appreciate that the Tribunal’s adversarial processes can be unpleasant and overwhelming, particularly for a self-represented party who may face other challenges related to their protected characteristics. In my view, however, there was no procedural unfairness to Ms. Redmond in the Second Case Conference.
2. Error in application of law on bias
[26] Second, regarding the analysis in the Letter Decision with respect to claims of bias, Ms. Redmond says the Tribunal’s approach was “a fundamental error in the application of the controlling legal test from [Wewaykum Indian Band v. Canada, 2003 SCC 45] and [Yukon Francophone School Board, Education Area #23 v. Yukon (Attorney General), 2015 SCC 25] and is, on its own, sufficient to warrant reconsideration.” An application for reconsideration is the wrong place for this argument. If Ms. Redmond believes there were errors in the legal analysis in the Letter Decision, her recourse is to seek judicial review.
3. Failure to address procedural unfairness
[27] Third, Ms. Redmond says I issued the Letter Decision without the benefit of an additional written submission [Additional Submission] that she intended to ask to file after the Second Case Conference, but which she was unable to submit before the Tribunal issued the Letter Decision “in just 3 working days” [reproduced as written]. She says the Additional Submission includes new information that affected the procedural fairness of the Second Case Conference.
[28] I have now reviewed the Additional Submission, the stated purpose of which was “to (a) correct the record regarding multiple significant factual misrepresentations made by Respondent’s counsel [at the Second Case Conference]; (b) identify related violations of the Tribunal’s Rules of Practice and Procedure, the Law Society Rules and Code of Professional Conduct for British Columbia [BC Code] and the Members’ Code of Conduct [at the Second Case Conference]; and (c) respectfully request guidance that will ensure fair resolution of my adjournment application.” In the Additional Submission, Ms. Redmond alleges that: Respondent counsel “made several material misrepresentations of fact and engaged in conduct that breached their [professional] duties” at the Second Case Conference; the Tribunal actively contributed to the unfairness of the Second Case Conference; and certain concerns held by Ms. Redmond regarding my adherence to the Tribunal’s Members’ Code of Conduct [Code of Conduct] remain unresolved.
[29] I am not satisfied that fairness requires me to reconsider the Letter Decision in light of the Additional Submission. I have already stated that I do not accept that the Second Case Conference was procedurally unfair. I have also, in the Letter Decision, already strongly rejected Ms. Redmond’s “unfounded claim that I have somehow violated the Code of Conduct”: Letter Decision at 10. And, as I discuss below, I find that Respondent counsel’s conduct at the Second Case Conference was not improper.
[30] In sum, I am not persuaded that the interests of fairness and justice require the Tribunal to reconsider any part of the Letter Decision. I deny Ms. Redmond’s application for reconsideration, including her requests for:
a. an interim stay pending the Tribunal’s decision on the reconsideration application;
b. the Letter Decision to be set aside;
c. the adjournment of the hearing until March 2026; and
d. my recusal from the remainder of this proceeding.
C. Requests for costs and censure
[31] I also deny Ms. Redmond’s requests – in the application for reconsideration – for costs against the Respondent and censure of its counsel.
[32] Under section 37(4) of the Human Rights Code and Rule 4, the Tribunal can order costs against a party for “improper conduct during the course of the complaint.” The purpose of a costs award is punitive: Terpsma v. Rimex Supply (No. 3), 2013 BCHRT 3 at para. 102. It aims to deter conduct that has a significant and detrimental impact on the integrity of the Tribunal’s process: Oger v. Whatcott (No. 7), 2019 BCHRT 58 at para. 246. “Improper conduct” within the meaning of s. 37(4) is not necessarily limited to intentional wrongdoing, and may include conduct that has a significant prejudicial impact on another party: McLean v. B.C. (Min. of Public Safety and Sol. Gen.) (No. 3), 2006 BCHRT 103 at para. 8.
[33] Ms. Redmond says costs should be awarded against the Respondent because of the conduct of its legal counsel at the Second Case Conference. As I set out above, Ms. Redmond alleges that Respondent counsel “made several material misrepresentations of fact and engaged in conduct that breached their [professional] duties” at the Second Case Conference. More specifically, she says counsel: trivialized her disabilities; claimed that a letter from her doctor – which she had submitted as evidence – was unsigned; made assertions of fact that were unsupported by the evidentiary record; characterized her medical evidence as self-serving and questioned its credibility; and mislead the Tribunal. Ms. Redmond asserts that counsel’s conduct “was not a series of isolated errors but a calculated pattern designed to undermine [her] credibility by targeting [her] disability, misstating evidence, and asserting facts not on the record.”
[34] I will not deal with Ms. Redmond’s allegations as they relate to professional regulatory rules for lawyers. In this decision, I only consider her allegations as they relate to the Code and the Rules.
1. Respondent counsel did not trivialize disabilities
[35] Ms. Redmond says that a “central theme of Respondent counsel’s behaviour [at the Second Case Conference] was the systematic delegitimizing of [her] diagnosed disabilities.” She alleges the following instances of such conduct:
a. Counsel referred to her disability “as a mere ‘claim,’ implying that it might not be real or that her medical evidence was not genuine.”
b. Counsel referred to her disability-related impairments “as the ‘ordinary stress and anxiety’ experienced by ‘any participant’” in the Tribunal’s process. In doing so, counsel stereotyped and demeaned her, and exploited the power imbalance between them.
[36] Ms. Redmond describes counsel’s conduct as being “discrimination that corrupts the fairness of the [Tribunal’s] process.” She says counsel engaged “in ableist and stereotypical attacks,” which “undermines the core principles of the Human Rights Code.” She states that: “Miller v. Treasure Cove Casino and Supply Ltd. established, ‘Using stereotypical labels to demean participants has no place in the Tribunal’s processes.’”
[37] I note that this is a misquote of Miller v. Treasure Cove Casino and others, 2009 BCHRT 126 at para. 92, where the Tribunal actually stated that:
The assignment of stereotypical labels (such as “broomstick” and “short pants”) to participants in Tribunal processes and the use of those labels to demean and humiliate have no place within the Tribunal’s processes. Threats have no place within the Tribunal’s processes. No participant before the Tribunal should be subjected to these types of attacks [citation omitted].
[38] Miller involved conduct by the complainant that the Tribunal found to be so egregious that it warranted dismissal of his complaint. For example, the complainant referred to the other parties as:
… “scum”, “corrupt”, “pompous liars”, “little twerp”, “corrupt scum”, “sorry excuse for human being clients”, “heartless, self serving ‘animals’”, “monsters”, “evil people”, “thugs”, “masquerade as human beings”, “assholes”, “not much less than a murderer”, “mutts”, “true evil”, “f…ing heartless murdering f…ing thugs”, “bastards”, a “f…ing heartless evil f…ing bunch of pricks”, “ignorant f…ing criminals” and “sons of bitches”: para. 33.
[39] After certain respondents in Miller filed an application to dismiss the complaint, the complainant:
… continued the use of profanity and abusive language in his correspondence, likened the Respondents to Nazis, Gestapo and Hitler, indicated that he can be very aggressive and that he does not make threats, written that he wishes the respondents would have a “hot pitchfork up their asses for eternity”, poked fun at the ethnic background of one of the [respondent’s] employees who has an Italian last name, referred to [a respondent] as a “girl”, and suggested she would require a “parking spot for brooms”, and continue[d] to refer to the Respondents as criminals: para. 50
[40] I include these quotations from Miller because the facts in that case stand in stark contrast to what happened at the Second Case Conference.
[41] Respondent counsel did not trivialize Ms. Redmond’s disabilities at the Second Case Conference. He did not refer to Ms. Redmond’s disabilities as a “mere claim.” Rather, he asserted that one of Ms. Redmond’s arguments for adjourning the hearing until March 2026 was based upon “what she claims to be medical evidence that she is unable to proceed” due to her disabilities. I acknowledge that this language is adversarial, but counsel was engaging in legal argument in an adversarial process. In any event, at this pre-hearing stage of the Tribunal’s process, Ms. Redmond’s disabilities are unproven – they are allegations of fact that Ms. Redmond will need to establish through evidence at the hearing. It is not uncommon for a respondent to use words like “alleged,” “claimed,” or “unproved” at this stage of the process, so as not to be viewed as conceding that the complainant’s allegations and evidence should be accepted by the Tribunal. It is understandable that a complainant might experience this negatively. But in general – and specifically in this case – it is not improper for a respondent to do so.
[42] Nor were Respondent counsel’s comments about stress and anxiety improper at the Second Case Conference. During response submissions, counsel argued that Ms. Redmond’s medical evidence regarding her disabilities did not establish a basis for adjourning the hearing until March 2026. Counsel acknowledged that “any participant in a hearing is going to suffer some level of stress and anxiety,” but argued that this “is not a basis to postpone a hearing, and it’s particularly not a basis if there’s no suggestion that the level of stress and anxiety is to a point where a fair hearing couldn’t occur.” I can understand why Ms. Redmond may have experienced these arguments as minimizing her diagnosed health conditions and diminishing the seriousness of her concerns about proceeding with the hearing before March 2026. But again, within our adversarial system, in my view it was not improper for counsel to make these arguments in this way.
[43] Finally, I want to stress that I do not accept Ms. Redmond’s characterizations of Respondent counsel’s conduct at the Second Case Conference. He did not engage in “ableist and stereotypical attacks” or “discrimination that corrupts the fairness of the process.” There is no basis whatsoever for these characterizations. They are wholly inaccurate.
2. Respondent counsel did not make material misrepresentations
[44] Ms. Redmond says that the “second theme of counsel’s misconduct was a deliberate attempt to deceive the Tribunal” and undermine her and her doctor’s credibility. She alleges the following instances of such conduct:
a. Counsel misrepresented medical evidence by saying that a letter from Ms. Redmond’s doctor was unsigned, when it was in fact “verifiably digitally signed with a timestamp,” which meets the definition of “electronic signature” under the Electronic Transactions Act.
b. Counsel attempted to undermine the credibility of Ms. Redmond’s doctor by saying that Google searches of the doctor suggested he was a general practitioner.
c. Counsel “engaged in baseless speculation” by suggesting that the recovery timeline expressed by Ms. Redmond’s doctor matched the length of the adjournment she was seeking.
d. Counsel misrepresented a June 15, 2025 email to the Tribunal in which the Representative stated that Ms. Redmond was “fully committed to moving forward with the hearing” in June 2026, with or without representation.
[45] Ms. Redmond describes this conduct as a “pattern of behaviour [that] exceeds zealous advocacy, which fostered “an intimidating environment” and abused the Tribunal’s process. She argues that it amounted to improper conduct because it had “a ‘significant prejudicial impact’ on a party and fundamentally compromise[d] the ‘integrity of the Tribunal’s processes.’” For the following reasons, I do not agree.
[46] First, I do not accept that counsel “misrepresented” the letter from Ms. Redmond’s doctor. The letter had a signature line that was not completed (“Signature: __________”), albeit with an indication of a specific date and time below it (“Date: 18-07-2025 12:07:37 PM”). Counsel knew that the letter was in evidence and I had reviewed it. Under the circumstances, I find it unlikely that counsel sought to deliberately mislead the Tribunal. It is far more probable that he erroneously, but not unreasonably, perceived the letter as having no signature. It was open to counsel to question the veracity of the letter on this basis, particularly considering that – given the nature of the Second Case Conference – Ms. Redmond was not required to make the doctor available for cross examination.
[47] Second, I agree that counsel should not have referred to Google search results that were not in evidence. However, on the information before me, I do not view this mistake as forming part of any “calculated pattern” of conduct. In making the Letter Decision, I understood that counsel’s alleged Google searches were not in evidence, and I disregarded his references to them.
[48] Third, for reasons similar to those which I have already outlined, I do not agree that Respondent counsel’s questioning of the recovery timeline in the doctor’s letter was improper. In general, it is not offside for a party to challenge the accuracy and usefulness of another party’s evidence. At an oral hearing, Respondent counsel would be able to cross examine the doctor on the medical basis for the stated recovery timeline. But this avenue for challenging Ms. Redmond’s evidence was not an option at the Second Case Conference. As a result, counsel resorted to argument, in relevant part as follows:
… the sole piece of evidence in the … application appears to be a doctor’s note from [Ms. Redmond’s doctor]. There was also a doctor’s note in the previous [adjournment application] submissions from the same doctor … The Society does have concerns with these documents and frankly, the Society submits that before any weight [is given to] these documents, they ought to be able to test the veracity of these documents … Both of these letters came in direct response to submissions from the Society and there don’t appear to be notes that came prior to that. They seem to be directly responsive and they have the appearance of being a bit self-serving.
…
… there is a concern that it is just a bit too coincidental that the recovery timeline would be exactly what Ms. Redmond is proposing for an adjournment and I would submit that the timeline is not the result of any medical opinion or medical science, but more likely a suggestion from Ms. Redmond that she believes this is when she would be recovered to the doctor and he has provided a note that confirms the same. With that in mind … I would submit that [Ms. Redmond’s medical letters] are not sufficient to establish a basis for adjournment. They don’t provide a sufficient reason.
[49] I appreciate why Ms. Redmond felt that this line of argument was an attack on her integrity. However, in the context of our adversarial system, I find that it was more in the nature of a challenge to the probative value of her doctor’s letter and not improper. I do not view counsel’s arguments as suggesting that Ms. Redmond is a dishonest or deceptive person. The strength of a party’s evidence is not a reflection of the content of their character, and a challenge to the former is not necessarily an attack on the latter – nor was it in this case.
[50] Fourth, I do not agree that Respondent counsel misrepresented the Representative’s June 15 email at the Second Case Conference. Rather, counsel observed that Ms. Redmond had previously indicated (through the Representative in the June 15 email) a willingness to move forward with the hearing with or without representation. In contrast, counsel argued, in the July 29 Application, Ms. Redmond put forward her status as a self-represented litigant as a reason why the Tribunal should grant her adjournment request. At the Second Case Conference, Ms. Redmond explained that the June 15 email spoke only to her willingness to proceed, with or without representation, in June 2026. It was not a blanket statement regarding her ability to represent herself at anytime – and, in particular, it was not to be interpreted as reflecting her readiness to represent herself in October 2025, which was when the Respondent argued the hearing should commence. Ms. Redmond’s explanation made good sense to me at the Second Case Conference, and I accepted it. Now, however, in her reconsideration application, she asserts that the expression of her willingness to “self-represent” in the July 15 email “was dependent on receiving support.” I do not understand this assertion and it is not what Ms. Redmond explained at the Second Case Conference. In any event, I do not accept her argument that Respondent counsel’s submissions regarding the June 15 email were an attempt at “misleading [the Tribunal] on the record.”
[51] For these reasons, I see no prejudice to Ms. Redmond in this proceeding arising from counsel’s conduct at the Second Case Conference, and no detrimental impact on the integrity of the Tribunal’s process. The Respondent, through their counsel, did not engage in improper conduct within the meaning of the Code and the Rules. Ms. Redmond’s requests for an order of costs against the Respondent and a censure of its legal counsel are denied.
V CONCLUSION
[52] The application for reconsideration is denied, as are all of the orders sought by Ms. Redmond. The hearing will begin on October 6, 2025.
Jonathan Chapnick
Tribunal Member