Radheshwar v. Coté and others (No.2), 2025 BCHRT 204
Date Issued: September 3, 2025
File: CS-002765
Indexed as: Radheshwar v. Coté and others (No.2), 2025 BCHRT 204
IN THE MATTER OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS CODE,
RSBC 1996, c. 210 (as amended)
AND IN THE MATTER of a complaint before
the British Columbia Human Rights Tribunal
BETWEEN:
Sundar-Jovian Radheshwar
COMPLAINANT
AND:
Jonathan Coté and City of New Westminster (Office of the Mayor)
and New Westminster Police Board
RESPONDENTS
REASONS FOR DECISION
APPLICATION TO RECONSIDER A DECISION
RULE 36
Tribunal Member: Robin Dean
On his own behalf: Sundar-Jovian Radheshwar
For the Respondents: No submissions sought
I INTRODUCTION
[1] Dr. Sundar-Jovian Radheshwar filed a complaint with this Tribunal alleging that the Respondents handled his police complaint against the New Westminster Police Department in a discriminatory manner. In a decision dated April 2, 2025, I dismissed the complaint under s. 27(1)(c) of the Human Rights Code on the basis that there was no reasonable prospect it could succeed: Radheshwar v. Coté and others, 2025 BCHRT 83 [Dismissal Decision].
[2] Dr. Radheshwar now applies to have the Tribunal reconsider the Dismissal Decision. He argues the Tribunal made errors that made the process unfair and, as a result, didn’t consider issues that should have been considered.
[3] For the reasons that follow, I deny the reconsideration application. I do not reconsider my decision, which stands.
II BACKGROUND
[4] The background to Dr. Radheshwar’s complaint is set out in the Dismissal Decision and I will not repeat it here: Radheshwar at paras. 5-10. Briefly, Dr. Radheshwar says that when he made a police complaint about being racially profiled during a stop by officers of the New Westminster Police Department, the Respondents handled the complaint in a discriminatory manner. In particular, Dr. Radheshwar alleges that the Respondents attempted to cover up the racial profiling. As evidence of the alleged cover up, Dr. Radheshwar points to the language in a letter from then-Mayor Jonathan Coté, which omitted the fact that officers were looking for a “Middle Eastern male” on the day that Dr. Radheshwar says he was stopped by police. He says in doing so, the Respondents violated his human rights.
[5] I ultimately dismissed the complaint because I was satisfied that Dr. Radheshwar had not taken his complaint beyond the realm of speculation and conjecture. In particular, I was satisfied that it was speculative to suggest that the investigation was a racially motivated cover up meant to shield the police from accountability based on the omission of the words “Middle Eastern” in Mr. Coté’s letter.
III Analysis and DECISION
[6] The Tribunal has a limited jurisdiction to reconsider its own decisions: Rule 36 of the Tribunal’s Rules of Practice and Procedure. Specifically, the Tribunal may reconsider a decision if it is in the interests of justice and fairness to do so: Routkovskaia v. British Columbia (Human Rights Tribunal), 2012 BCCA 141 at para. 23. The Tribunal exercises this power sparingly, giving due consideration to the principle of finality in administrative proceedings: Grant v. City of Vancouver and others (No. 4), 2007 BCHRT 206 [Grant] at para 10.
[7] The burden is on the person seeking to have a matter re-opened to show that the interests of fairness and justice demand such an order: Grant at para. 10.
[8] The Tribunal does not have authority to reconsider a decision based on an argument that the decision was wrong or unreasonable or because there has been a change of circumstances: Fraser Health Authority v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Tribunal, 2014 BCCA 499 [Fraser Health] at paras. 135 and 160. The Tribunal will not reconsider a decision to address arguments that could have been made in the first instance but were not, or to hear a party reargue its case: Ramadan v. Kwantlen Polytechnic University and another (No. 2), 2018 BCHRT 56 at para. 13. When a party simply disagrees with a Tribunal decision, the appropriate recourse is judicial review by the BC Supreme Court.
[9] First, Dr. Radheshwar makes several arguments that my reasons were inadequate. He says:
a. my reasoning in the Dismissal Decision was dismissive of his experience as a person of colour who has experienced micro-aggressions;
b. paragraph 5 of the Dismissal Decision minimized the severity of the police stop. He says that minimizing the police stop permitted the Tribunal to then minimize the significance of what happened during the complaint process; and
c. I provided an incomplete recitation of the background to the complaint by omitting that the Office of the Police Complaint Commissioner recommended by letter that the New Westminster Police Board take further action to review their policies, practices, and training manuals.
[10] The Tribunal is alive to the stress and discomfort that can result from a police stop, and I do not doubt that the police stop here caused Dr. Radheshwar significant distress. Indeed, Dr. Radheshwar described the officers’ conduct during the stop as aggressive. However, the focus of the Dismissal Decision was on the Respondents’ conduct after Dr. Radheshwar filed his complaint about the police stop. The police stop itself is the subject of another complaint before the Tribunal (file number CS-002700). The conduct of the officers during the initial police stop was not at issue before me. It is referred to in paragraph 5 to explain the context of the matter that was before me: whether Dr. Radheshwar’s complaint against Mr. Coté, the City of New Westminster (Office of the Mayor), and the New Westminster Police Board had no reasonable prospect of success. Dr. Radheshwar’s dissatisfaction with how I summarized his initial encounter with the police is not a basis to reconsider the Dismissal Decision.
[11] Further, to make the Dismissal Decision, I considered all the information filed by the parties, including the letter from the OPCC suggesting that the New Westminster Police Board take further action in response to Dr. Radheshwar’s complaint. However, in my reasons, I referred only to what was necessary to explain my decision. As the Respondents’ decision was at issue here, the Dismissal Decision focuses on that portion of the police complaint process. In my view, the OPCC’s recommendation to the New Westminster Police Board did not help me answer the question of whether there was no reasonable prospect of Dr. Radheshwar proving that the Respondents discriminated against him in processing his complaint. Even if I agreed that my recitation of the background should have contained more information, this is not a basis for reconsideration. This is essentially an argument about the sufficiency of reasons. That is a matter for judicial review, not reconsideration: Tuson v. The Board of Education of School District No. 5 (No. 5), 2021 BCHRT 14 at para. 22.
[12] Second, Dr. Radheshwar says that the police officers have admitted in another Tribunal proceeding (CS-002700) to racially profiling Dr. Radheshwar when they stopped him. This is not a basis on which I can reconsider the Dismissal Decision. Again, the stop itself is the subject of another complaint. What was at issue before me in the Dismissal Decision was whether there was no reasonable prospect of Dr. Radheshwar proving that the complaint process after the police stop was discriminatory. While I understand that Dr. Radheshwar’s allegations of discrimination in this complaint involve the Respondents covering up the racial profiling, whether the racial profiling occurred was irrelevant to the issues before me in the application to dismiss process. Dr. Radheshwar clearly disagrees with me, but I do not have the ability to reconsider the Dismissal Decision on the basis that a party says a decision was wrongly decided.
[13] Next, Dr. Radheshwar argues that the Dismissal Decision was unfair because it implied that he was “venue shopping”. Dr. Radheshwar does not support his argument with reference to a particular paragraph in the Dismissal Decision, and I am unable to determine which section of the Dismissal Decision he means. Whether the Tribunal was the appropriate forum to resolve this complaint was not at issue before me, and I made no comment, implied or otherwise, about Dr. Radheshwar’s choice of venue. Further, while the Tribunal may reconsider a decision where there has not been procedural fairness, Fraser Health Authority v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Tribunal, 2014 BCCA 499 at para. 161, I do not understand Dr. Radheshwar’s argument to be that he was denied procedural fairness. Rather, I understand the argument to be about the adequacy of the reasons, which is again not a basis to reconsider the Dismissal Decision.
[14] Next, I understand Dr. Radheshwar to argue that it is not possible to determine the reasonable prospect of his complaint’s success without cross-examining Mr. Coté about the reasons why he omitted the words “Middle Eastern” from his letter to Dr. Radheshwar. In other words, he argues that a hearing is necessary to receive Mr. Coté’s evidence on this point. Dr. Radheshwar argued in his response to the application to dismiss that a hearing was necessary to test the evidence. Reconsideration is not an opportunity for a party to reargue its case, or to address arguments that could have been made in the first instance but were not: Ramadan v. Kwantlen Polytechnic University and another (No. 2), 2018 BCHRT 56 at para. 13.
[15] Next, Dr. Radheshwar says that I slandered him by saying that his complaint was founded on subjective belief, speculation, and conjecture at para. 26 of the Dismissal Decision. He says I maligned his intentions at para. 27 of the Dismissal Decision. Even if there was merit to how he characterizes these paragraphs, it would not be a basis on which I could reconsider the Dismissal Decision. The words Dr. Radheshwar points to in order to say I should reconsider the Dismissal Decision reflect the legal threshold applicable under s.27(1)(c) of the Code. His argument goes to whether I erred in how I applied the law or perhaps more broadly, that the law is wrong. In either case, as I’ve said, the Tribunal’s reconsideration power is narrow and does not extend to whether it erred in one of its decisions.
[16] Finally, Dr. Radheshwar says the Dismissal Decision was wrong at para. 27, where I say that he did not receive the desired outcome from the police complaint process. He says he did receive the desired outcome from the OPCC. Again, if Dr. Radheshwar thinks that I was wrong, his recourse is to the courts, not a reconsideration application. Further, para. 27 referred to the Respondents’ decision to dismiss his complaint, not the ultimate outcome from the OPCC. As I understand it, the Respondents’ decision was something he very much did not agree with based on his complaint to the Tribunal.
IV Conclusion
[17] I deny the application for reconsideration. The Dismissal Decision stands.
Robin Dean
Tribunal Member