Meyer v. City of Victoria and others, 2025 BCHRT 200
Date Issued: August 19, 2025
File: CS-006006
Indexed as: Meyer v. City of Victoria and others, 2025 BCHRT 200
IN THE MATTER OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS CODE,
RSBC 1996, c. 210 (as amended)
AND IN THE MATTER of a complaint before
the British Columbia Human Rights Tribunal
BETWEEN:
John (Brad) Meyer
COMPLAINANT
AND:
City of Victoria and Victoria and Esquimalt Police Board and Victoria Police Department
RESPONDENTS
REASONS FOR DECISION
APPLICATION TO DISMISS A COMPLAINT
Section 27(1)(g)
Tribunal Member: Andrew Robb
On his own behalf: John (Brad) Meyer
Counsel for the Respondents: Anila Srivastava
I INTRODUCTION
[1] John (Brad) Meyer was a police officer with the Victoria Police Department [the Department]. He identifies as Cree, and as a member of White Bear First Nation. He says he experienced racism from other police officers and Department management during his career, including racial slurs, denials of opportunities for training and promotion, being subject to disciplinary investigations and held to a higher standard than other, non-Indigenous officers, and being denied access to Department facilities due to those disciplinary investigations. He also says the Department failed to accommodate his return to work after he went on leave, but accommodated non-Indigenous officers in similar situations. He filed a human rights complaint on the grounds of his Indigenous identity, race, ancestry, and colour. He says the Department, the Victoria and Esquimalt Police Board [the Board][1], and the City of Victoria [together, the Respondents] are responsible for discriminating against him.
[2] The Respondents apply to dismiss the complaint on the basis that it has no reasonable prospect of success, and because it is untimely. For the reasons set out below, I allow the application, and I dismiss the complaint based on the timeliness issue. I find the complaint was filed past the one-year deadline for filing complaints set out in the Human Rights Code, and I am not persuaded that I should exercise my discretion to accept it. The complaint itself does not say when the incidents described in the complaint happened, but information provided by the parties shows they happened more than one year before the complaint was filed, and some of them happened many years before the complaint was filed. Mr. Meyer does not explain why he did not file a complaint sooner, and I find his arguments about the public interest in proceeding with his complaint do not outweigh the delay in filing it.
[3] To make this decision, I have considered all the information filed by the parties. In these reasons, I only refer to what is necessary to explain my decision.
II BACKGROUND
[4] Mr. Meyer says the Respondents subjected him to greater scrutiny than white officers, and denied him opportunities for training and promotions. He alleges that other officers made racial slurs about Indigenous people, and management ignored these slurs.
[5] Mr. Meyer says he was the subject of three investigations by the Department, under the Police Act. The first investigation was about a heated argument between Mr. Meyer and a white police officer. He says the other officer was not investigated. Mr. Meyer’s complaint does not describe the other two investigations, except to say they were about his off-duty conduct, and there were no complainants. As a result of the investigations, Mr. Meyer says he had been denied access to Department facilities, including his work email and phone and the Department’s gym facilities, for more than three years.
[6] Mr. Meyer says he was diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder as a result of the treatment he endured during his 20-year policing career. He says the Department’s management team was aware of this diagnosis, but failed to accommodate it, despite accommodating other officers.
[7] Mr. Meyer’s complaint does not provide any further details about his allegations, such as the dates of any alleged incidents, the identities of any individuals involved, the nature of the racial slurs, the accommodations he required, or the Department’s response to his requests for accommodations. Nor does he give any examples of when he was denied training or promotions.
[8] In response to a question on the complaint form about the date of the most recent conduct that he listed as discrimination, Mr. Meyer wrote January 24, 2022, the day before he filed the complaint. In response to a question about whether all of the alleged discrimination happened in the year before he filed the complaint, Mr. Meyer said yes.
[9] In the application to dismiss, the Respondents pointed out that the complaint lacked details. In response, Mr. Meyer provided his notes about incidents that occurred from 2006 to 2008. Most of these notes allege other officers or Department management were dismissive or overly critical of Mr. Meyer, or otherwise treated him worse than other officers. Some of the notes describe overtly anti-Indigenous statements made by officers, in Mr. Meyer’s presence, that went unaddressed by management. Mr. Meyer also referred to an email that was circulated in the Department, which made negative references to his Indigenous background, and an order that required him to cut his hair, despite the importance of long hair to his cultural identity. Based on the evidence he provided, these events happened approximately 15 years before he filed his complaint.
[10] In response to Mr. Meyer’s claim that he was denied access to the Department for over three years, the Respondents say he was placed on administrative leave in September 2018, pending the first Police Act investigation. After he was placed on administrative leave, the Respondents say he went on medical leave, and a psychologist found he was not capable of returning to work as a police officer. Mr. Meyer does not deny this, in the materials before me.
[11] The Respondents say that on February 1, 2021, WorkSafeBC advised the Department that Mr. Meyer remained unable to return to his previous duties. They provided a letter from the Department to WorkSafeBC, dated April 28, 2021, which referred to an earlier finding by WorkSafeBC that Mr. Meyer’s condition had reached a “medical plateau” and he was “restricted from first responder work and from work that would expose him to traumatic events related to policing”. The letter inquired whether these or other restrictions remained in place, and said the Department was seeking information in order to respond to Mr. Meyer’s requests and to assess the Department’s duty to accommodate him. There is no evidence before me about whether WorkSafeBC responded to the letter, or whether there was any other discussion about Mr. Meyer returning to work.
[12] In his response to the application to dismiss, Mr. Meyer says he requested accommodations so that he could return to work, after 2018, but the Respondents refused to accommodate him, even though the Department had previously accommodated white officers in similar circumstances. But he does not say when he requested accommodations, what accommodations he requested, or when the Respondents refused to accommodate him, and he does not give examples of other situations in which the Department accommodated other officers. He says his union contacted the Department on multiple occasions about the “ongoing discipline” against him, but he does not say when this happened, or what his union representatives said to the Department, or what response they received, if any.
[13] From the evidence before me, it appears that Mr. Meyer did not return to work after September 2018. He retired from the Department effective July 31, 2024.
III DECISION
[14] Under s. 22 of the Code, there is a one-year time limit for filing a human rights complaint. Section 22 is meant to ensure that complainants pursue their human rights remedies promptly so that respondents can go ahead with their activities without the possibility of a dated complaint: Chartier v. School District No. 62, 2003 BCHRT 39 at para. 12.
[15] The Respondents argue that all the allegations in the complaint are untimely and should be dismissed under s. 27(1)(g) of the Code. I must decide two issues: (1) whether the complaint is late filed, and (2) if so, whether to exercise my discretion to accept it because it is in the public interest to do so and there is no substantial prejudice to any person because of the delay: Code, s. 22(3), School District v. Parent obo the Child, 2018 BCCA 136 at para. 68.
A. Is the complaint late filed?
[16] For the following reasons, I find the complaint is late filed.
[17] A complaint is filed in time if the last allegation of discrimination happened with one year of filing, and older allegations are part of a “continuing contravention” within the meaning of s. 22(2) of the Code: School District v. Parent obo the Child, 2018 BCCA 136 at para. 68. A continuing contravention is “a succession or repetition of separate acts of discrimination of the same character” that could be considered separate contraventions of the Code, and “not merely one act of discrimination which may have continuing effects or consequences”: Chen v. Surrey (City), 2015 BCCA 57at para. 23; School District at para. 50.
[18] The complaint was filed on January 25, 2022. Mr. Meyer says it alleges discrimination that continued up to the date he filed his complaint and beyond, until the date of his retirement. He says that from the time he was placed on leave, in September 2018, until his retirement in 2024, the Respondents continually denied his requests for access to his email, the Department’s gym facilities, and his personal belongings. However, Mr. Meyer does not refer, in his complaint or in his response to the application to dismiss, to any specific communications or incidents that occurred in the year before he filed the complaint.
[19] Mr. Meyer says the Respondents failed to accommodate his return to work, after he went on leave in September 2018, despite repeated inquiries from him and his union, but he does not say when these inquiries were made, or when the Department made any decisions about accommodating him. Nor does he allege any incident in relation to the alleged failure to accommodate his return to work in the year before he filed his complaint. The letter from the Department to WorkSafeBC, dated April 28, 2021, suggests there was some discussion of returning him to work in the year before he filed his complaint. But Mr. Meyer does not address the letter, in his response to the application to dismiss, and he does not provide any information about what happened in the year before he filed his complaint. Without this information, I am unable to find a timely instance of discrimination regarding the alleged failure to accommodate him in contrast to non-Indigenous officers.
[20] The Respondents say the most recent events described in Mr. Meyer’s complaint appear to be the incidents in 2018 and 2019 that resulted in investigations under the Police Act. They say the allegations about racial slurs, denials of training and promotions, and differential treatment date back many years earlier. They say the alleged denial of access to Department facilities does not amount to a continuing contravention of the Code.
[21] I agree with the Respondents’ submission that the ongoing denial of access to Department facilities does not establish a continuing contravention of the Code. On the materials before me, it appears this denial was the result of Mr. Meyer being placed on administrative leave in 2018, and then going on medical leave. Even if putting him on leave was discriminatory, and had continuing effects on Mr. Meyer, that is not sufficient to establish a continuing contravention, absent a timely alleged instance of discrimination.
[22] Since the alleged denial of access to the Department does not establish a continuing contravention, and the complaint does not allege any instances of discrimination in the year before it was filed, it was late filed.
B. Should the Tribunal accept the late filed complaint?
[23] Because the complaint was late filed, I now consider whether to accept it under s. 22(3) of the Code. The burden is on Mr. Meyer to persuade the Tribunal to proceed with the complaint, considering whether it is in the public interest to proceed with the complaint, and whether no substantial prejudice will result to any person because of the delay.
[24] The Tribunal assesses the public interest in a late filed complaint in light of the purposes of the Code. These include identifying and eliminating persistent patterns of inequality, and providing a remedy for persons who are discriminated against: s. 3. The Tribunal may consider factors like the length of the delay, the reasons for the delay, the complainant’s interest in accessing the Tribunal, a respondent’s interest in being able to continue its activities without worrying about stale complaints, whether the complainant got legal advice, and the public interest in the complaint itself: British Columbia (Ministry of Public Safety and Solicitor General) v. Mzite, 2014 BCCA 220 at para. 53 and 63; Hoang v. Warnaco and Johns, 2007 BCHRT 24; Complainant v. The Board of Education of School District No. 61 (Greater Victoria), 2022 BCHRT 44 at para. 18. These are important factors, but they are not necessarily determinative and not every factor will be relevant in every case: Goddard v. Dixon, 2012 BCSC 161 at para. 152. The inquiry is always fact and context specific.
[25] For the following reasons, I am not satisfied that it is in the public interest to proceed with the complaint.
[26] Mr. Meyer does not offer any explanation for why he did not file a complaint sooner. He says there is a public interest in the complaint proceeding because it alleges discrimination against an Indigenous person by public officials, and because the Respondents spent public funds trying to terminate his employment, which diverted police resources from more important responsibilities related to public safety.
[27] The Respondents say there is little public interest in proceeding with the complaint, given its unique circumstances, and considering that Mr. Meyer chose not to file a complaint sooner.
[28] As noted above, Mr. Meyer does not say when most of the events described in his complaint took place. He says the Department failed to accommodate him, in contrast to non-Indigenous officers, and there is information before me about discussions related to accommodation in 2021. But Mr. Meyer does not say what happened in these discussions, or describe how the Department failed to accommodate him. The most recent incident described in his materials was the decision to discipline Mr. Meyer after the third Police Act investigation, which was apparently completed by May 2020. This was approximately 20 months before he filed the complaint, or eight months after the expiry of the one-year deadline for filing complaints. Most of the events described in Mr. Meyer’s materials happened earlier, and the events described in his response to the application to dismiss appear to date back 15 or more years before he filed the complaint. The length of the delay in filing weighs against the public interest in proceeding with the complaint.
[29] Turning to Mr. Meyer’s arguments about the public interest, the fact that a respondent relies on public funds does not necessarily mean there is a public interest in proceeding with a late filed complaint against that respondent, even when those funds could have been used for public safety. I give limited weight to this factor.
[30] I accept that there is a public interest in complaints about racial discrimination against Indigenous people proceeding, especially in light of the Respondents’ public commitments to reconciliation with Indigenous people, which Mr. Meyer emphasises in his response to the application to dismiss. However, I am not persuaded that this public interest outweighs Mr. Meyer’s delay in filing the complaint, considering the long delay between the events described in his complaint and the date when he filed the complaint, and the lack of any explanation for the delay.
[31] I have considered whether Mr. Meyer’s delay in filing the complaint could have been because he did not know how to file a complaint, did not think filing a complaint would make a difference, or did not think he would be believed. These are the reasons identified by Justice Ardith Walpetko We’dalx Walkem, in Expanding Our Vision: Cultural Equality & Indigenous Peoples’ Human Rights (2020), that may explain why Indigenous people have been disproportionately underrepresented in complaints to the Tribunal. The Tribunal has found there may be a public interest in accepting complaints from Indigenous people who file their complaints late for these reasons. But Mr. Meyer does not say that any of these reasons applied in his case, and there is nothing in the materials before me that suggests he did not file his complaint sooner for these reasons.
IV CONCLUSION
[32] The complaint is dismissed.
[33] My decision does not mean Mr. Meyer did not experience racism and discrimination during his career. I do not doubt that, as an Indigenous police officer, he faced unique and difficult challenges, and these took a heavy toll on him. However, on the limited materials he provided, and in the absence of any explanation for why he did not file a complaint sooner, I am unable to find it is in the public interest to proceed with his complaint.
Andrew Robb
Tribunal Member
[1] Mr. Meyer’s complaint refers to the Victoria Police Board, but the Respondents say the correct name is the Victoria and Esquimalt Police Board, so I have changed the case name accordingly.