Clark v. Mount Pleasant Neighbourhood House, 2025 BCHRT 193
Date Issued: August 15, 2025
File: CS-006069
Indexed as: Clark v. Mount Pleasant Neighbourhood House, 2025 BCHRT 193
IN THE MATTER OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS CODE,
RSBC 1996, c. 210 (as amended)
AND IN THE MATTER of a complaint before
the British Columbia Human Rights Tribunal
BETWEEN:
Carlyne Clark
COMPLAINANT
AND:
Mount Pleasant Neighbourhood House
RESPONDENT
REASONS FOR DECISION
TIMELINESS OF COMPLAINT
Section 22
Tribunal Member: Steven Adamson
On her own behalf: Carlyne Clark
On behalf of the Respondent: Devika Ramkhelawan
I. INTRODUCTION
[1] On February 1, 2022, Carlyne Clark filed a complaint of discrimination in services based on race, ancestry, physical and mental disability, age, family and marital status contrary to s. 8 of the Human Rights Code [Code], against Mount Pleasant Neighbourhood House [MPNH].
[2] On March 26, 2024, the Tribunal allowed the complaint to proceed on one allegation, dated January 10, 2022, involving Ms. Clark’s exclusion from all programs and services at the MPNH for reasons related to her physical and mental disabilities. However, the Tribunal decided Ms. Clark’s earlier allegations appeared to be late filed and referred the matter to a decision on whether these allegations form part of a continuing contravention of the Code or should be accepted as late filed because it is in the public interest to allow them to proceed.
[3] The issue before me is whether to accept the Complaint against the MPNH. I make no findings of fact regarding the merits of this complaint.
[4] For the reasons that follow, I confirm the Tribunal’s previous decision to allow the complaint to proceed on the January 10, 2022, allegation. However, the complaint does not contain any other timely allegations, and it’s late-filed allegations do not form part of a continuing contravention of the Code: s. 22(2), and it is not in the public interest to allow them to proceed late filed: s. 22(3).
II. BACKGROUND
[5] Ms. Clark was 74 years old when she filed this complaint in February 2022. She identifies as Caucasian with English, Irish, French and Welsh ancestry. Ms. Clark has various physical and mental disabilities, including chronic pain, glaucoma and autism. She is single and impoverished with a reported family history of neglect and abuse. Ms. Clark’s now deceased dog provided her with emotional support when it accompanied her at the MPNH.
[6] It is necessary to review Ms. Clark’s allegations in some detail to determine whether they contain any arguable contraventions of the Code, and if any such allegations occurred in succession and were of a similar nature capable of forming a continuing contravention of the Code.
[7] On April 23, 2018, Ms. Clark alleges the MPNH accused her of being “mental” and a racist and tricked her into signing an agreement as a condition for allowing her to participate in future MPNH activities and services.
[8] In August 2018, Ms. Clark alleges the MPNH nevertheless put up “subtle obstructions” to her participation in food programs, field trips and a volunteer celebration party.
[9] On August 15, 2018, Ms. Clark alleges people at the MPNH blocked her from taking her dog in certain places at its facility and segregated her to sit at the end of aisles because others attending despised her and the dog. Ms. Clark also alleges someone took her scissors while she was working on a craft that day.
[10] On December 6, 2018, Ms. Clark alleges that a huge two-sided anonymous sign “from a neighbour” was conspicuously posted on her fence. She did not share any details about what the sign said and how it was connected to the MPNH.
[11] On March 21, 2019, Ms. Clark alleges the MPNH acknowledged receipt of “sensitive materials” she had sent to the organization, which included information about one of its staff members misbehaving. Ms. Clark did not provide any particulars regarding the alleged misbehaviour.
[12] On February 14, 2021, Ms. Clark alleges receiving an offensive Valentine’s Day card in the mail at home that referenced her as being old, among other things. She believes the card came from a collection given away at the MPNH. Ms. Clark believes someone at the MPNH, specifically its director, should have taken responsibility for her receiving the offensive card.
[13] On December 25, 2021, Ms. Clark alleges the MPNH received a second access to information request from her as her earlier request was ignored.
[14] On January 10, 2022, Ms. Clark alleges the MPNH banned her from participating in its programs and accessing its services after concluding she exhibited “disrespectful” behaviour against its staff without providing any information about such behaviour. Without knowing the reason for being denied access to services, Ms. Clark believes she was banished from the MPNH for reasons related to her disabilities and age. She alleges the MPNH generally believes that that elderly and disabled people are good for nothing except being hidden away, stolen from and blamed for everyone else’s problems.
III. ANALYSIS AND DECISION
[15] The time limit set out in s. 22 of the Code is a substantive provision which is intended to ensure that complainants pursue their human rights remedies diligently: Chartier v. School District No. 62, 2003 BCHRT 39.
A. Time Limit, Arguable Contravention, and Continuing Contravention
[16] The Complaint was filed on February 1, 2022. To comply with the one-year time limit under s. 22(1) of the Code, the alleged act of discrimination had to occur on or after February 1, 2021.
[17] A complaint is filed in time if the last allegation of discrimination happened within one year, and older allegations are part of a “continuing contravention”: Code, s. 22(2); School District v. Parent obo the Child, 2018 BCCA 136 at para. 68 [School District]. A continuing contravention is “a succession or repetition of separate acts of discrimination of the same character” that could be considered separate contraventions of the Code, and “not merely one act of discrimination which may have continuing effects or consequences”: Chen v. Surrey (City), 2015 BCCA 57at para. 23; School District at para. 50.
[18] I start by considering whether Ms. Clark set out any timely allegations that are arguable contraventions of the Code. For an allegation to arguably be discrimination under the Code, Ms. Clark must show, if proven, that she has various personal characteristics (in this case age, physical and mental disabilities, family and marital status, race and ancestry), experienced an adverse impact with respect to services provided by MPNH, and that her personal characteristics were factors in the alleged adverse impacts for these timely allegations: Moore v. British Columbia (Education) [Moore], 2012 SCC 61 at para 33.
[19] I agree with the Tribunal’s March 26, 2024, decision that Ms. Clark’s January 10, 2022, allegation is an arguable contravention of the Code, however, I do not find the February 14, 2021, and December 25, 2021, allegations are arguable contraventions.
[20] Turning first to the February 14, 2021, allegation, Ms. Clark reports receiving an offensive Valentine’s Day card in the mail at home that references her age. While this allegation satisfies the Moore requirements that she has a personal characteristic of age, receiving the offensive card, and had an adverse impact, in my view Ms. Clark has not provided any information that the adverse impact is related to the MPNH. Ms. Clark appears to indicate the card came from a free supply of cards at the MPNH, but she has not provided any evidence indicating MPNH staff were responsible for sending her the card or knew about a client at the MPNH sending the card. I appreciate Ms. Clark’s wish to have someone take responsibility for the offensive card, but she has not provided any information to indicate the adverse impact is related to the MPNH. As such, the complaint cannot proceed on the February 14, 2021, allegation.
[21] I also reject Ms. Clark’s December 25, 2021, allegation as an arguable contravention of the Code. Here, Ms. Clark appears to allege that she filed a second access to information request because the MPNH ignored her earlier request. While this allegation involves the MPHN and can be considered to cause an adverse impact on Ms. Clark because she was forced to wait for access to information, in my view there is nothing to indicate the allegation is related to her personal characteristics, such as race, ancestry, physical and mental disability, age, family and marital status. Since this allegation fails to provide any relationship between the adverse impact of having to wait longer for access to information and any of Ms. Clark’s personal characteristics, it fails to satisfy the Moore requirement that arguable contraventions must include information indicating that Ms. Clark’s personal characteristics were factors in the alleged adverse impacts. As such, the December 25, 2021, allegation will not proceed as an arguable contravention.
[22] By contrast, I confirm the Tribunal’s previous decision that Ms. Clark’s January 10, 2022, allegation that MPNH banned her from participating in its programs and accessing its services after concluding she exhibited “disrespectful” behaviour is an arguable contravention of the Code. On this occasion Ms. Clark alleges being denied access to services at the MPNH for reasons related to her being elderly and disabled. Here, Ms. Clark has set out an arguable contravention as she alleges the mistreatment by the MPNH is related to her being elderly and disabled because the organization has a reputation for mistreating these individuals. More specifically, Ms. Clark alleges that she was barred from accessing the MPNH’s services because she did not behave in the way MPNH believed the old and disabled should behave. As such, I have determined Ms. Clark’s complaint can proceed as an arguable contravention for the January 10, 2022, timely allegation.
[23] I have next considered whether Ms. Clark’s allegations from 2018 can be considered part of an arguable contravention of the Code because they are part of a succession or repetition of separate acts of discrimination of the same character tethered by the timely January 10, 2022, allegation.
[24] In my view some of the 2018 allegations were of a similar character to the January 10, 2022, allegation because they involve limitations on Ms. Clark’s participation in activities and access to services at the MPNH. While not as severe as being precluded from accessing services and participating in programs at the start of 2022, the 2018 allegations nevertheless contain limitations on Ms. Clark’s participation and access. In concluding the allegations are of a similar character I appreciate that different individuals were involved in the various allegations, however, all the allegations are of a similar character because they concern limitations on Ms. Clark’s access to the MPNH. For example, the 2018 allegations include such things as Ms. Clark having to sign an agreement about her behaviour to maintain her access to the MPNH, being subjected to subtle obstructions to accessing programs and activities and being told where she could sit with her dog in the facility.
[25] The more difficult question in determining if a continuing contravention of the Code exists in this case, however, is whether a succession or repetition of separate acts of discrimination occurred. Here, I am unable to conclude that the allegations in question form a continuing contravention because of the multi year gap between the similar 2018 allegations and the single timely allegation in January 2022. With such a lengthy gap of time between allegations in 2018 and 2022, which was not explained by Ms. Clark, the allegations in this case are not in succession for the purposes of s. 22(2) of the Code. As such, the 2018 allegations are late filed, and it is necessary to determine whether it is in the public interest to accept them against the MPNH and whether there would be any substantial prejudice.
B. Public Interest
[26] Whether it is in the public interest to accept the late-filed complaint is a multi-faceted analysis. The enquiry is fact and context specific and assessed in accordance with the purposes of the Code: Hoang v. Warnaco and Johns, 2007 BCHRT 24 at para. 26. The Tribunal considers a non-exhaustive list of factors, including the length of the delay, the reasons for the delay, and the public interest in the complaint itself: British Columbia (Ministry of Public Safety and Solicitor General) v. Mzite, 2014 BCCA 220 [Mzite] at para. 53. These are important factors, but they are not necessarily determinative: Goddard v. Dixon, 2012 BCSC 161 at para. 152; Mzite at para. 55.
[27] I have first considered the length of the delay in filing. The delay associated with the 2018 allegations is approximately two years, which is excessive, and militates strongly against the public interest: Naziel-Wilson v. Providence Health Care and another [Naziel-Wilson], 2014 BCHRT 170, at para. 13; Mzite at para. 59.
[28] Ms. Clark submits her complaint was not late filed. I agree with her to the extent that the January 10, 2022, allegation is timely and is proceeding. Ms. Clark appears to provide several reasons why the 2018 allegations were late filed in her gap explanation found in Step 4 of the complaint initiating form. First, she states that “no one would explain things to me”. If this statement means that Ms. Clark was unaware of her ability to file a complaint with the Tribunal, I am not satisfied that it is a reason attracting much public interest where ignorance of the Code, or the time required to become aware of one’s rights, is generally not an acceptable reason, on its own, for the delay in filing: Rashead v. Vereschagin (No. 2), 2006 BCHRT 74 at para. 12; Ferrier v. BCAA, 2009 BCHRT 412at para. 31. Here, Ms. Clark has not provided any explanation as to why her complaint should be taken out the general assumption that she should know her rights.
[29] On the other hand, if Ms. Clark’s statement that “no one would explain things to me” meant that she was trying to pursue resolution of the 2018 allegations by contacting the MPNH directly and was waiting for a response, this reason similarly does not attract the public interest. The Tribunal has repeatedly said that pursuing another process does not suspend the time limit under the Code and that exhausting internal avenues and resources is not sufficient, on its own, to relieve against the time limit: Sones v. District of Squamish, 2016 BCHRT 99, at para. 44 and Devitt and Hargrove obo others v. School District No. 43 and another, 2011 BCHRT 218, paras. 20. In this case, Ms. Clark has demonstrated the capacity to initiate a complaint with the Tribunal and has not said anything about thinking she needed to wait before filing a complaint.
[30] Ms. Clark also appears to indicate that dealing with her own health issues, along with the health problems faced by her aging dog, precluded her from filing a complaint about the 2018 allegations in time. Where the delay is due to a disabling condition, the Tribunal has observed that it may be in the public interest to accept a late-filed complaint: MacAlpine v. Office of the Representative for Children and Youth, 2011 BCHRT 29 at para. 42. Disabling conditions can include physical and mental ailments resulting in great difficulty coping with even the basic daily tasks of life: Naziel-Wilson at para. 21.
[31] Without doubting Ms. Clark’s struggles with her various disabilities, along with the negative mental health effect the illness of her dog had on her, I do not find these health issues precluded her from filing a complaint with the Tribunal sufficiently to attract the public interest in allowing the late filed portion of her complaint to proceed. In reaching this conclusion I accept that Ms. Clark was dealing with serious health issues, including the diagnoses of glaucoma and autism, at the relevant time for filing. While those events may have demanded a great deal of Ms. Clark’s time and energy, she has not provided any information indicating they precluded her from filing a complaint about the 2018 allegations.
[32] In determining whether acceptance of a late-filed complaint is in the public interest, the Tribunal also considers whether there is anything particularly unique, novel, or unusual about the complaint that has not been addressed in other complaints: Hau v. SFU Student Services and others, 2014 BCHRT 10 at para. 22; Bains v. Advanced Air Supply and others, 2013 BCHRT 74 at para. 22; Mathieu v. Victoria Shipyards and others, 2010 BCHRT 224 at para. 60. Where a complaint raises a novel issue on behalf of a vulnerable group, which advances the purposes of the Code, this factor may weigh in favour of finding a public interest in accepting the complaint: Mzite at paras. 65-66. The Tribunal has considered gaps in its jurisprudence, on the one hand, and the existence of good precedents, on the other hand, in determining whether to permit a complaint to proceed: Mzite at para. 67.
[33] Ms. Clark is seeking justice to prevent other disabled and elderly people from being “swept to the curb”. She is also filing to protect herself from further hurtful items being sent to her in the mail. Further, she wants to be heard so that she does not become depressed. While acknowledging this complaint raises allegations of discrimination associated with the MPNH’s treatment of those seeking access to its services generally, I am not satisfied that Ms. Clark’s complaint raises a novel issue that would advance the purposes of the Code, if heard. The Tribunal commonly hears age, disability, family and marital status, race and ancestry discrimination complaints against service providers and the jurisprudence is fairly settled in this area.
[34] For these reasons, I do not find that it is in the public interest to accept the late-filed portion of this complaint, and I need not address the issue of whether substantial prejudice would result.
IV. CONCLUSION
[35] For these reasons, the complaint against the Respondent will proceed for the timely January 10, 2022, allegation only. The complaint for the late filed allegations is not a continuing contravention of the Code, and it is not in the public interest to allow it to proceed late filed.
Steven Adamson
Tribunal Member