Beason v. Coast Foundation Society (1974) dba Coast Mental Health, 2025 BCHRT 190
Date Issued: August 15, 2025
File: CS-007744
Indexed as: Beason v. Coast Foundation Society (1974) dba Coast Mental Health, 2025 BCHRT 190
IN THE MATTER OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS CODE,
RSBC 1996, c. 210 (as amended)
AND IN THE MATTER of a complaint before
the British Columbia Human Rights Tribunal
BETWEEN:
Michelle Beason
COMPLAINANT
AND:
Coast Foundation Society (1974) dba Coast Mental Health
RESPONDENT
REASONS FOR DECISION
APPLICATION TO DISMISS A COMPLAINT
Section 27(1)(c) and (g)
Tribunal Member: Kylie Buday
Counsel for the Complainant: Aman Oberoi
Counsel for the Respondent: Taryn Mackie and Lauren Chomyn
I INTRODUCTION
[1] This is a decision about whether to send Michelle Beason’s human rights complaint to a hearing. On December 7, 2021, Ms. Beason filed a complaint against her employer, Coast Foundation Society (1974) dba Coast Mental Health [CMH], alleging discrimination in employment contrary to s. 13 of the Human Rights Code. Ms. Beason identifies as a Black woman of African descent. She alleges that between February 10 and March 4, 2020 an employee whom she supervised [Employee], bullied her in connection with her race and colour, including by maliciously reporting her to the BC College of Midwives and Nurses [the College]. Ms. Beason also alleges that when she complained about the bullying, CMH did not respond adequately. Ms. Beason further alleges CMH reprimanded her for making mistakes at work and suspended her. She says this is discrimination because CMH did not reprimand white employees for making similar mistakes.
[2] Following the alleged bullying, Ms. Beason was diagnosed with several mental health conditions in 2020. In addition to the above allegations, Ms. Beason alleges CMH discriminated against her in connection with her mental disability while she was on leave by interfering with her long-term disability enrollment in July 2021.
[3] CMH denies discriminating. They do not dispute the Employee bullied Ms. Beason. However, they say there is no information in the complaint that is capable of connecting the bullying to Ms. Beason’s race and colour. Consequently, the bullying was not discrimination in employment under the Code. CMH also denies it discriminated against Ms. Beason in its response to her bullying complaint. CMH says it investigated the bullying complaint; however, the Employee left her employment before they could discipline her for the bullying behaviour. CMH says this response was adequate and, in any event, unconnected to Ms. Beason’s protected characteristics. CMH also denies the allegation that they reprimanded and then suspended Ms. Beason. Finally, CMH denies they interfered with Ms. Beason’s long-term disability application in 2021.
[4] CMH asks the Tribunal to dismiss the complaint in full under s.27(1)(c) of the Code because it has no reasonable prospect of success. CMH also asks the Tribunal to dismiss the allegations about events in 2020 under s. 27(1)(g) of the Code, as untimely.
[5] To make this decision, I have considered all the information filed by CMH. Ms. Beason’s legal counsel submitted her response to the application on June 18, 2025, ten-months late. Counsel did so without making an application asking that the Tribunal accept the late-filed submissions, despite being informed that this was the procedure to follow. As a result, I found it appropriate to consider CMH’s application without considering Ms. Beason’s response. I had, however, read Ms. Beason’s late-filed submissions and, for reasons explained at the end of this decision, would not have changed my decision even if I had considered them.
[6] About one month later, on July 21, 2025, Counsel filed an application to ask the Tribunal to accept the late-filed submissions. By that point, I had already written this decision. As noted, I had already determined that I would not change my decision even if I considered Ms. Beason’s late-filed submission. There is no purpose in considering the late-filed application and I decline to do so.
[7] For the following reasons, I allow the application and dismiss the complaint in full under s. 27(1)(c). In these reasons, I only refer to what is necessary to explain my decision. I make no findings of fact.
II Background
[8] CMH is a non-profit organization that provides employment and education, support services, and housing to people living with serious mental health conditions in the province. CMH hired Ms. Beason as a Community Home Nurse Manager on September 4, 2018. At that time, Ms. Beason was a Registered Psychiatric Nurse.
[9] Around early 2020, the Employee began to criticize Ms. Beason at work. Ms. Beason alleges the Employee undermined her authority and refused to follow her instructions, ridiculed and insulted her, invaded her personal space, and spoke about her negatively to other employees.
[10] In the complaint, Ms. Beason describes three specific incidents with the Employee. CMH does not dispute that these incidents occurred as follows.
[11] Nursing Station Incident: On or around February 5, 2020, the Employee photocopied a medication package and medication sheet and hung them up in the nursing station window. Ms. Beason says the Employee did this to humiliate her by informing their colleagues that she had made an error. A copy of an email from Ms. Beason to the Director of Housing Services appears to confirm that this incident occurred as described.
[12] Yelling Incident: On February 13, 2020, the Employee entered Ms. Beason’s office and yelled at her in front of another manager. The Employee accused Ms. Beason of failing to provide a doctor with accurate information about medication dosage.
[13] After the yelling incident, Ms. Beason was diagnosed with several mental health conditions.
[14] Gossiping Incident: On or around March 4, 2020, a colleague called Ms. Beason and told her the Employee was making disparaging comments about her medication errors and work performance. Ms. Beason was on leave at the time.
[15] In addition to engaging in the above-described behaviour, the Employee made two complaints about Ms. Beason. First, the Employee made a complaint to CMH on or around February 12, 2020. That complaint included allegations about the quality of Ms. Beason’s work, and allegations that Ms. Beason bullied and harassed the Employee.
[16] Second, the Employee submitted a written complaint about Ms. Beason to the College on or around February 26, 2020. The complaint to the College included allegations that Ms. Beason made errors daily when administering medication and documenting medication. A copy of the College’s Investigation Report dated September 30, 2020 is before me. It suggests the College started an investigation into the allegations about Ms. Beason on March 12, 2020.
[17] On or around February 19, 2020, Ms. Beason made a complaint to CMH that the Employee was bullying her. I will refer to this as the “Bullying Complaint.” Ms. Beason says that, when she complained of the bullying, CMH reprimanded her for making mistakes at work, told her it was not possible for her to be bullied because she is a manager, said it was her fault she was being bullied, and told her they could not investigate her complaint because she did not have a shop steward. Ms. Beason also alleges CMH suspended her. CMH disputes this was their response.
[18] On the allegation that CMH suspended Ms. Beason, CMH says they did not suspend her but rather they offered her the opportunity to stay at home with pay during their investigation into the Employee’s allegations against her, which is their usual practice. In any event, they also say Ms. Beason went on paid sick leave on or around February 27, 2020. In addition, Ms. Beason had scheduled vacation from March 9-24, 2020 for her wedding and would not have been at work.
[19] Information set out in the College’s Investigation Report appears to suggest Ms. Beason stopped working at CMH around March 2, 2020, when her physician suggested she no longer work there because of her mental health.
[20] CMH says that on March 25, 2020, after Ms. Beason returned from vacation, she went on a leave of absence. Evidence before me also suggests she did not return to work after her vacation because she had to isolate at home on account of the Covid-19 pandemic.
[21] CMH also denies they reprimanded Ms. Beason for any mistakes she made at work. They say Ms. Beason has not returned to work and they have not taken any disciplinary measures against her.
[22] CMH disputes the allegation that they told Ms. Beason they could not investigate her complaint. CMH says it investigated Ms. Beason’s complaint about the Employee and concluded the Employee had violated its Respectful Workplace and Code of Conduct Policy. However, CMH states they could not finish their investigation and impose any discipline because the Employee retired. Documents before me appear to confirm that the Employee left CMH around September 12, 2020.
[23] In or around March 4, 2020, Ms. Beason filed a claim with WorkSafeBC saying she had been diagnosed with several mental health conditions because of the Employee’s treatment of her at work. WorkSafeBC approved Ms. Beason’s claim for compensation for a mental disorder caused by her interactions with the Employee. A copy of the WorkSafeBC claim decision dated July 27, 2020 is before me.
[24] CMH says that around April 8, 2021, WorkSafeBC informed them that Ms. Beason’s workplace injury had “stabilized into a permanent condition.” CMH also says WorkSafeBC determined Ms. Beason could work on a return-to-work plan while receiving vocational rehabilitation planning benefits. Around the same time, WorkSafeBC appears to have informed Ms. Beason she could be assessed for permanent disability benefits.
[25] There is no dispute that CMH contacted Ms. Beason on or around June 1, 2021, to schedule an interview with her. CMH says the interview was for its investigation in the Employee’s allegations against Ms. Beason, which had been postponed. Ms. Beason does not appear to dispute this. She says CMH asked her to attend a meeting to discuss client treatment and medication handling.
[26] Ms. Beason also says CMH told her that WorkSafeBC had cleared her to return to work. She says WorkSafeBC had not informed CMH she could return to work. She alleges CMH knew she was in the process of enrolling with her Long-Term Disability benefits provider. She further states that CMH told her she had to sign “something” during the meeting, and she did not understand what she was being asked to sign given that she was not cleared to return to work.
[27] CMH says that after contacting Ms. Beason, she informed them that she was unable to participate in an interview for medical reasons. In response, CMH says they put the investigation into Ms. Beason on hold indefinitely. The meeting did not occur. CMH says they did not tell Ms. Beason she had to return to work.
[28] There does not appear to be any dispute that Canada Life accepted Ms. Beason’s claim for LTD benefits on or around April 5, 2022. CMH says WorkSafeBC confirmed on or around August 15, 2022 that Ms. Beason was entitled to permanent disability benefits retroactive to April 12, 2021.
III DECISION
[29] I find it most efficient to deal with this application under s. 27(1)(c) of the Code. Section 27(1)(c) is part of the Tribunal’s gate-keeping function. It allows the Tribunal to remove complaints which do not warrant the time and expense of a hearing.
[30] The Tribunal does not make findings of fact under s. 27(1)(c). Instead, the Tribunal looks at the evidence before it to decide whether “there is no reasonable prospect that findings of fact that would support the complaint could be made on a balance of probabilities after a full hearing of the evidence”: Berezoutskaia v. British Columbia (Human Rights Tribunal), 2006 BCCA 95 at para. 22, leave to appeal ref’d [2006] SCCA No. 171. The Tribunal must base its decision on the materials filed by the parties, and not on speculation about what evidence may be filed at the hearing: University of British Columbia v. Chan,2013 BCSC 942 at para. 77.
[31] A dismissal application is not the same as a hearing: Lord v. Fraser Health Authority,2021 BCSC 2176 at para. 20; SEPQA v. Canadian Human Rights Commission,[1989] 2 SCR 879 at 899. The threshold to advance a complaint to a hearing is low. In a dismissal application, a complainant does not have to prove their complaint or show the Tribunal all the evidence they may introduce at a hearing. They only have to show that the evidence takes their complaint out of the realm of conjecture: Workers’ Compensation Appeal Tribunal v. Hill, 2011 BCCA 49 [Hill] at para. 27.
[32] To prove her complaint at a hearing, Ms. Beason will have to prove she has one or more characteristics protected by the Code, she was adversely impacted in her employment, and one or more of her protected characteristics were a factor in the adverse impact: Moore v. British Columbia (Education), 2012 SCC 61 at para. 33. On this third element, nexus, a person’s protected characteristics only need to be a “factor” in the adverse treatment, not a “significant” factor or a “material” factor: Francis v. BC Ministry of Justice (No 3), 2019 BCHRT 136 at para 282-290.
[33] The Tribunal refers to these three elements as the Complainant’s case: Vik v. Finamore (No. 2), 2018 BCHRT 9 at para. 48. If Ms. Beason proves her case, the burden would shift to CMH to justify the impact as a bona fide occupational requirement. If the impact is justified, there is no discrimination.
[34] For the following reasons, I find there is no reasonable prospect Ms. Beason will succeed with her case at a hearing.
A. The 2020 Allegations
[35] I start with Ms. Beason’s allegations from events that occurred in 2020. As stated earlier, Ms. Beason alleges the Employee bullied her at work in connection with her race and colour. Ms. Beason also alleges that CMH’s response to her bullying complaint adversely impacted her in connection with her race and colour because CMH reprimanded her for making similar mistakes to her white colleagues and suspended her from work. In addition, Ms. Beason says CMH told her it was not possible for her to be bullied because she is a manager, said it was her fault she was being bullied, and told her they could not investigate her complaint because she did not have a shop steward.
i. Workplace Bullying
[36] There is no dispute that, for the purposes of the Code, Ms. Beason is protected from discrimination in her employment because of her race and colour. There is also no dispute that the Employee bullied Ms. Beason between February 10 and March 4, 2020 and that this adversely impacted her employment: she was impacted to such a degree that she left work and made a successful WorkSafeBC claim. Whether Ms. Beason has no reasonable prospect of proving the Employee discriminated against her therefore turns on nexus.
[37] CMH submits there is no evidence from which one can draw an inference between the Employee’s treatment of Ms. Beason, and her race and colour. CMH argues Ms. Beason has based this part of her case on bald assertions. I agree and find the evidence before me does not take the alleged connection out of the realm of conjecture for the following reasons.
[38] The Tribunal’s case law recognises that racism is often difficult to prove. Racism can be subtle and insidious; it sometimes takes the form of unconscious or unintentional bias in the context of systemic forces that adversely impact racialized persons: Batson-Dottin v Forensic Psychiatric Hospital (No 2), 2018 BCHRT 246 at paras 82. Therefore, most complaints of racial discrimination, like Ms. Beason’s, turn on inference at the nexus stage. That said, the subtlety of prejudice, and the availability of inference, does not create a presumption of discrimination: Zhou v. Copper Mountain Mine (BC), 2017 BCHRT 22 at para. 51. Put another way, the fact that Ms. Beason is Black and had negative interactions at work does not necessarily mean she was discriminated against: Christopher Clarke v. City of Vancouver and Mike Greensill, 2024 BCHRT 298, at para. 102. Although a person who experiences racism may “know it when they see it,” for the purposes of a human rights complaint, to draw such an inference the Tribunal requires evidence from which an inference may be reasonably be drawn of a link between a complainant’s race and the specific adverse treatment alleged: Batson-Dottin v Forensic Psychiatric Hospital (No 2), 2018 BCHRT 246 at paras 82-83.
[39] In her description of the three examples of bullying behaviour in the Complaint, Ms. Beason does not refer to any evidence or make any statements about her race or colour. Rather, she describes the incidents on February 10 and 13, and March 4, 2020 as incidents where the Employee bullied her because of errors she made at work. These events are also described without reference to Ms. Beason’s race and colour in the WorkSafeBC claim decision. I am persuaded there is no reasonable prospect Ms. Beason could prove a connection between her race and colour and these three events as she describes them in the complaint and on the evidence before me.
[40] Reading the complaint contextually and in its entirety, there is also insufficient evidence from which one might draw an inferred connection between Ms. Beason’s race and colour and the bullying she experienced. Ms. Beason makes the general assertions that she was targeted, harassed, and bullied by her coworkers based on her race and the colour of her skin. However, aside from making these statements, Ms. Beason does not elaborate on how the Employee’s behaviour was connected to her race and colour. Instead, in the complaint Ms. Beason says the Employee would “constantly insult and ridicule” her in front of other staff; invade her personal space; call her insulting names and “speak negatively of her to other staff.” Without examples of the kinds of insults the Employee made or other evidence to support a reasonable inference, I find there is no reasonable prospect Ms. Beason can succeed in proving a nexus between her race and colour and the Employee’s bullying behaviour. She has not taken this part of the complaint out of the realm of conjecture. I dismiss this allegation.
ii. CMH’s treatment of Ms. Beason
[41] I now address Ms. Beason’s allegation that she “was targeted and reprimanded for making similar mistakes her white colleagues have made in the past.” To prove this part of her case, Ms. Beason must prove both the adverse impact, namely her assertion that CMH targeted and reprimanded her for making mistakes at work, and nexus, her assertion that when white colleagues made similar mistakes CMH did not reprimand them for those mistakes. In my view, even if Ms. Beason could prove CMH targeted and reprimanded her for making mistakes at work, which is doubtful on the evidence before me, I find there is no reasonable prospect she would prove nexus at a hearing because she has not taken her assertion that CMH did not reprimand white employees for making mistakes at work out of the realm of conjecture.
[42] CMH argues Ms. Beason has not pointed to any evidence that can support her assertion that it treated her differently than white employees. CMH further argues Ms. Beason’s mistakes were not routine. Rather, they were so serious that the College cancelled Ms. Beason’s license to practice, with no ability to reapply for two years. In addition, CMH submits the Employee had an obligation to report Ms. Beason under the s. 32.2 of the Health Professions Act. I infer from this submission that CMH takes the position that Ms. Beason has no reasonable prospect of proving nexus considering the evidence they have provided the Tribunal. I agree.
[43] I find there is no reasonable prospect Ms. Beason would prove this part of the complaint because CMH is reasonably certain to prove it investigated the Employee’s allegations about Ms. Beason because they included several serious allegations, not just routine mistakes, and race or colour did not factor into that decision. CMH has submitted a copy of the College’s investigation into Ms. Beason, which appears to corroborate its assertion that Ms. Beason’s mistakes at work were not minor mistakes that one might overlook but rather serious practice issues that raised safety concerns. CMH says the Employee provided it with examples and documentation in support of her allegations about Ms. Beason, which she later provided to the College. The College Investigation Report appears to corroborate this as it shows the Employee made fifteen allegations to CMH and provided CMH with documents to support those allegations. Ms. Beason, on the other hand, has not pointed to any evidence to support the assertion that CMH overlooked these kinds of mistakes when they were made by white employees. She has not taken this allegation out of the realm of conjecture.
[44] On the allegation that CMH discriminated against her by suspending her, CMH submits they did not suspend her from work. They say they offered her the option of remaining at home with pay while they investigated the Employee’s allegations. CMH says this is its standard practice to ensure employees do not lose wages while investigations are ongoing. I infer from this that CMH argues being sent home with pay during an investigation is not an adverse impact in employment. CMH also notes Ms. Beason went on vacation from March 9-24, 2020.
[45] In my view, the success of this part of the complaint turns on nexus and not on whether there is no reasonable prospect Ms. Beason can prove CMH’s decision to send her home with pay amounted to an adverse impact regardless of how one characterises it. In my view, even if Ms. Beason proved she was adversely impacted by CMH’s decision to send her home with pay, she has no reasonable prospect of establishing at a hearing that there is a nexus between being sent home and her race and colour. I reach this conclusion for similar reasons to those outlined above. Namely, there is no reasonable prospect Ms. Beason would prove a nexus between her race and colour and CMH’s decision to send her home during its investigations into either or both the Employee’s allegations about Ms. Beason and Ms. Beason’s Workplace Complaint about the Employee because: she has not taken the allegation that the Employee bullied her in connection with her protected characteristics out of the realm of conjecture, and she has not taken her allegation that CMH treated her differently than white Employees out of the realm of conjecture.
[46] Ms. Beason also alleges that when CMH responded to her complaint about the Employee, CMH told her she could not be bullied, told her it was her fault she was bullied, and told her they could not investigate her complaint because she did not have a shop steward. I treat this as an allegation that CMH did not reasonably and adequately respond to her Workplace Complaint because it did not support her and did not investigate her allegations. CMH denies they responded in this manner. CMH says it investigated the Workplace Complaint, determined the Employee bullied Ms. Beason, but could not discipline the Employee because she retired.
[47] Disputes over key facts that are central to a complaint generally require a hearing on the merits to resolve: Francescutti v. Vancouver (City), 2017 BCCA 242 at para 67. However, in this instance, even if Ms. Beason could prove her version of events at a hearing, I am persuaded there is no reasonable prospect she would succeed in proving CMH’s response to her Workplace Complaint violated the Code.
[48] Employers have obligations under the Code to respond reasonably and appropriately to complaints of discrimination: Laskowska v. Marineland of Canada Inc., 2005 HRTO at paras. 52-53; Beharrell v. EVL Nursery Ltd., 2018 BCHRT 62 at para. 24. An unreasonable or inadequate response may amount to discrimination “regardless of whether the underlying conduct subject to the investigation is found to be discriminatory”: Employee v. The University and another (No. 2), 2020 BCHRT 12 at para. 272.
[49] That said, there are two requirements that trigger an employer’s duty to respond under human rights legislation. First, the employer must know there is a complaint or concern, typically because the complainant has communicated one. Second, the complaint must be about a potential violation of the Code: Naidu v. Whitby Mental Health Centre, 2011 HRTO 1279 at para. 191; see also the application of this principle in Martinez Johnson v. Whitewater Concrete Ltd., 2022 BCHRT 129 at para. 62.
[50] Though there is no dispute that Ms. Beason made a complaint to CMH, the evidence before me suggests that the complaint was a bullying and harassment complaint and not a complaint about a potential violation of the Code. For this reason, I find there is no reasonable prospect Ms. Beason would succeed in proving the second requirement that would trigger CMH’s duty to investigate her allegations about the Employee under the Code. Consequently, there is no reasonable prospect she would succeed with this part of her complaint: Clarke v. City of Vancouver and another, 2024 BCHRT 298 at para. 111-113.
[51] For the foregoing reasons, I am satisfied Ms. Beason has no reasonable prospect of proving CMH’s responses to either the Employee’s complaint about her or her Workplace Complaint about the Employee violated the Code.
[52] Finally, though it is not entirely clear that Ms. Beason alleges discrimination based on mental disability for the 2020 allegations in the complaint, I address this for the sake of completeness. CMH does not dispute the Employee’s treatment of Ms. Beason caused Ms. Beason’s mental disability. This is one of the adverse impacts she experienced in her employment in connection with the bullying. I have already determined there is no reasonable prospect Ms. Beason can prove a connection between this adverse impact and her race and colour. There is also no reasonable prospect Ms. Beason could prove a connection between the adverse impact of the bullying in her employment and her mental disability. The mental disability is an impact of the alleged discrimination. It is not a standalone contravention of the Code. I reach this conclusion based on the documentary evidence before me which satisfies me that at a hearing CMH is reasonably certain to prove Ms. Beason had no medical conditions that could be considered mental disabilities under the Code prior to the events that led up to her departure from work. Ms. Beason also does not appear to argue otherwise.
B. The 2021 Allegations
[53] I also find there is no reasonable prospect Ms. Beason would prove she was adversely impacted in her employment in connection with her mental disability when CMH contacted her during her leave in June 2021. I reach this conclusion because there is no reasonable prospect Ms. Beason can prove CMH’s communications with her adversely impacted her in her employment. While the contact might have been stressful and impacted her mental health negatively, that on its own is not an alleged adverse impact in employment and not a contravention of the Code: Vandale v. Town of Golden and other, 2009 BCHRT 219 at para. 43. I dismiss this allegation.
IV Late-filed Submissions
[54] I did not consider Ms. Beason’s late-filed submissions in my decision on this application. However, even if I had considered them, my decision to dismiss the Complaint under s. 27(1)(c) of the Code would not change.
[55] Ms. Beason argues the complaint requires a hearing on the merits because the evidence before me is contested, incomplete and untested. She says the Tribunal must resolve these disputed facts and make credibility findings, which it is not permitted to do at this stage. I have already noted that disputes over key facts that are central to a complaint generally require a hearing on the merits to resolve. However, as my reasons above demonstrate, Ms. Beason has not persuaded me that the disputes in the facts in her case preclude me from dismissing the complaint in full. I based this decision on the information and evidence before me that satisfied me Ms. Beason did not take her case out of the realm of conjecture. I note that the information set out in Ms. Beason’s response, in particular the information asserting a nexus between CMH’s treatment of her and her protected characteristics, also does not take her case out of the realm of conjecture.
[56] Finally, I note Ms. Beason added new allegations to the complaint in her response submission. For example, for the first time, Ms. Beason alleges CMH did not facilitate her return to work or consider accommodating her disabilities. She says that instead CMH indefinitely excluded her from work because of its pending internal investigation. She alleges this was constructive dismissal. A complainant cannot add new allegations to a complaint in their submission on an application to dismiss without applying to do so: Rule 24(4)(b) of the Tribunal’s Rules of Practice and Procedure. Even if the response were filed in time, I would not have permitted what constitutes an amendment to the complaint.
V Conclusion
[57] For the foregoing reasons, I dismiss the complaint in full under s. 27(1)(c) of the Code.
Kylie Buday
Tribunal Member