Monkman v. CUPE 561 and others, 2025 BCHRT 189
Date Issued: August 13, 2025
File: CS-007867
Indexed as: Monkman v. CUPE 561 and others, 2025 BCHRT 189
IN THE MATTER OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS CODE,
RSBC 1996, c. 210 (as amended)
AND IN THE MATTER of a complaint before
the British Columbia Human Rights Tribunal
BETWEEN:
Deborah Monkman
COMPLAINANT
AND:
Canadian Union of Public Employees (CUPE 561) and Jane Gibbons and Kirsten Daub
RESPONDENTS
REASONS FOR DECISION
APPLICATION TO DISMISS A COMPLAINT
Section 27(1)(b) and (d)(ii)
Tribunal Member: Laila Said Alam
On their own behalf: Deborah Monkman
Counsel for the Respondents: Russell Green
I INTRODUCTION
[1] Deborah Monkman alleges that her union, Canadian Union of Public Employees (CUPE 561), the former President of the union, Jane Gibbons, and a former union staff representative, Kirsten Daub, [collectively, the Respondents] discriminated against her in the area of unions and associations on the ground of political belief, contrary to s. 14 of the Human Rights Code. In particular, she alleges that after she made several posts on social media, the Respondents excluded her from participation in union activities because of her political beliefs.
[2] The Respondents deny discriminating. They say Ms. Monkman is currently a member of the union and has been a member of the union at all material times during this dispute. At no point has she been expelled or suspended from the union.
[3] The Respondents apply to dismiss the complaint under s. 27(1)(b), on the basis that the acts or omissions alleged in the complaint do not contravene the Code. They also say the complaint should be dismissed against the individual respondents, Ms. Gibbons and Ms. Daub, under s. 27(1)(d)(ii) of the Code on the basis that proceeding with them would not further the purposes of the Code because s. 14 does not support liability against individuals. Finally, they say the complaint should be dismissed under s. 27(1)(f) of the Code on the basis that the substance of the complaint or that part of the complaint has been appropriately dealt with in another proceeding before the Labour Relations Board [LRB].
[4] I find that I can decide the entire application under s. 27(1)(b) and (d)(ii) and therefore do not need to address the application under s. 27(1)(f). The only issues I need to decide are whether complaints against individuals can be made under s. 14 of the Code, and whether the acts or omissions alleged in the complaint do not contravene the Code.
[5] For the following reasons, I dismiss the complaint in its entirety. To make this decision, I have considered all the information filed by the parties. In these reasons, I only refer to what is necessary to explain my decision.
II BACKGROUND
[6] CUPE 561 is the union for employees, except teachers, of the Board of School Trustees of School District No. 43.
[7] Ms. Monkman has been an employee of the School District and a member of the union since 2012.
[8] On April 10, 2021, the union held its Annual General Meeting. At the meeting, Ms. Monkman ran for the position of Vice President but was unsuccessful. Following the election, Ms. Monkman declined nomination for two other positions.
[9] On April 14, 2021, Ms. Monkman met with Ms. Gibbons. At the meeting, Ms. Monkman requested that she be appointed to the positions of Shop Steward and Metro Vancouver District Council Delegate, both of which were left vacant following the Annual General Meeting. Ms. Gibbons told Ms. Monkman that if she was interested, she could make a request to the union’s Executive Board to be appointed. Ms. Monkman then expressed her interest to the Board.
[10] On April 19, 2021, a union member contacted the union with concerns about two social media posts made by Ms. Monkman. One post was a video clip of a debate entitled, “Brandon Straka DEBATES a Black Lives Matter activist then this happens”. The parties describe one post to be a video of a baby with a “voice over sounding like a gangster”. Ms. Monkman commented, “Warning(!) cultural appropriation, stereotyping and profanity. AND HILARIOUS (laughing emoji)”.
[11] The Board met on April 20, 2021. The Board discussed Ms. Monkman’s request for appointment to the two positions. In that context they also discussed the two social media posts and the concerns raised by the other union member. The union’s Executive Board decided not to appoint Ms. Monkman to the positions she requested.
[12] On April 26, 2021, the Board met with Ms. Monkman and told her of the outcome of the meeting and expressed concern about the social media posts and advised her to remove the posts as they could prompt discipline from her employer. The union offered her an opportunity to attend educational workshops. Ms. Monkman declined the offer.
[13] Ms. Monkman then removed the posts and any others that she thought the union might view with the same “scrutiny and censorship,” as she characterizes it in her response to this application. She emailed the union after the meeting to say she had removed the social media posts and anything she thought “might be seen in the same light.” She committed to “better judgment” going forward on what she shared on social media. Ms. Monkman then requested an appeal of the Board’s decision. Though the union’s then-Bylaws did not have an appeal process for decisions regarding appointments, the union accepted her request to reconsider its decision.
[14] On May 6, 2021, the Board met to discuss Ms. Monkman’s appeal. The Board upheld its initial decision not to appoint her to the positions.
[15] Ms. Monkman then applied to the LRB under s. 10 of the Labour Relations Code, RSBC 1996, c. 244. Before the LRB, Ms. Monkmanalleged that the unionbreached her right to natural justice and acted in a discriminatory manner by not appointing her to a position as a union Shop Steward or a Metro Vancouver District Council delegate position and by applying a “discriminatory assessment” of her social media posts.
[16] Ms. Monkman also argued that she was treated differently than other union members because the union appointed members with less experience over her, and “scrutinized and censored” only her social media posts. In response, the Associate Chair noted that the constitution provides the union with authority and discretion to appoint members to union positions, and the union was entitled to consider her social media posts when assessing her request for an appointment. The Associate Chair was not persuaded that CUPE 561’s actions were illegal, arbitrary, or unreasonable.
[17] Ms. Monkman did not appeal the LRB decision.
III DECISION
A. Would it further the purposes of the Code to proceed against the Individual Respondents?
[18] Section 14 of the Code prohibits a “trade union, employers’ organization or occupational association” from excluding any person from membership, expelling or suspending any member, or discriminating against any person or member because of their political belief.The Supreme Court of Canada has recognized that the Code expressly limits the category of actors who can perpetuate discrimination under s. 14 in relation to various aspects of union membership: British Columbia Human Rights Tribunal v. Schrenk, 2017 SCC 62, at para. 47.
[19] It is settled law that s. 14 of the Code applies only to discriminatory conduct by the three categories of actors in s. 14: trade unions, employers’ organizations or occupational associations. A complaint under s. 14 cannot lie against an individual under s. 14 of the Code: Schrenk at para. 47; Manning v. Sooke Teachers’ Association and others, 2004 BCHRT 281, at para. 7. It follows that a complaint under s. 14 cannot lie against the individual respondents Jane Gibbons and Kirsten Daub. As such I am satisfied that it would not further the purposes of the Code to proceed with the complaint against Jane Gibbons and Kirsten Daub and dismiss the complaint against them under s.27(1)(d)(ii) of the Code.
A. Section 27(1)(b) – No arguable contravention
[20] Section 27(1)(b) of the Code gives the Tribunal the discretion to dismiss all or part of a complaint if it does not allege facts that could, if proven, contravene the Code. Under s. 27(1)(b), the Tribunal only considers the allegations in the complaint and information provided by the complainant. It does not consider alternative scenarios or explanations provided by the respondent: Bailey v. BC (Attorney General) (No. 2), 2006 BCHRT 168 at para. 12; Goddard v. Dixon, 2012 BCSC 161 at para. 100; Francescutti v. Vancouver (City), 2017 BCCA 242 at para. 49. The threshold for a complainant to allege a possible contravention of the Code is low: Gichuru v. Vancouver Swing Society, 2021 BCCA 103 at para. 56.
[21] In this case, Ms. Monkman must set out facts that, if proved, could establish that she has a characteristic protected by the Code (political belief), she was adversely impacted in her union membership, and her political belief was a factor in the adverse impact: Moore v. British Columbia (Education), 2012 SCC 61 at para. 33.
[22] The parties dispute whether the complaint alleges facts that, if proven, could establish Ms. Monkman has the protected characteristic of political belief.
[23] Ms. Monkman says she is afforded protection under the Code based on her political belief, which she describes as “supporting freedom to debate and share opposing videos.” The Respondents argue that the social media posts are not political belief recognized by the Code since they do not accord with categories of political belief established by the Tribunal’s case law to date. They say the social media posts are not associated with partisan politics, beliefs in Indigenous governance, or public discourse which would require action by government actors.
[24] The Tribunal has said that political belief “need not be confined to a partisan political belief [but it] should involve public discourse on matters of public interest which involves or would require action at a government level”: Fraser v. BC Ministry of Forests, Lands, and Natural Resource Operations (No 4), 2019 BCHRT 140 at para. 59. The Tribunal has recognized political belief in circumstances where a complainant is associated with partisan politics or is perceived to be affiliated with a political alliance: Trevana v. Citizens’ Assembly on Electoral Reform, 2004 BCHRT 24; Siemens v. Vanderhoof (District) and others, 2015 BCHRT 172. The Tribunal has also accepted as political beliefs those beliefs that are “core to a person’s concept of social cooperation”: Jamieson v. Victoria Native Friendship Centre, 1994 CanLII 18447 (BC HRT); Croxall v. West Fraser Timber, 2009 BCHRT 436 at para. 22. The Tribunal has distinguished between political beliefs and beliefs about how to effect social change, finding the latter is not political: Potter v. College of Physicians and Surgeons of BC, 1998 BCHRT 4.
[25] Trade unions have the authority to enforce their collective agreement and internal rules, subject to oversight by the LRB. However, a trade union may not discriminate against a member “purely as a result of their political beliefs or the expression of those beliefs, as opposed to their decision not to participate in collective action:” Manning at para. 19.
[26] The Respondents say the post portraying a baby speaking appears to be a silly video without clear social commentary, and the video is a debater’s commentary about race and violent crime in the United States. The video does not speak to any associated governmental action or any specific policy approach. The matter also concerns social phenomenon internal to a foreign country, so there is no associated action that could be taken by a governmental body in Canada.
[27] Ms. Monkman does not appear to dispute the Respondents’ description of the social media posts. Of the first post, Ms. Monkman says it was humorous satire regarding the early days of the COVID-19 pandemic when people were panic buying hand sanitizer and toilet paper and emptying shelves. She said the post was “sarcastic humour taken out of context”. It was “funny and nothing else.” Of the second post, she submits, “[Black Lives Matter] is a political party. The debate clip was pro and con Black Lives Matter. I made no comment about the video clip, I merely shared it as I have many American family members and therefore look for their opinions. I did not take a side.”
[28] In all of the circumstances, Ms. Monkman has not identified how her posts relate to a political belief. In my view, Ms. Monkman’s stated belief in “supporting freedom to debate and share opposing videos” is about how to effect social change and is not political: Potter. Further, I understand Ms. Monkman’s submission to be that the Black Lives Matter post did not reflect her own views, and she was simply sharing materials online to generate discussion, and the COVID-19 post was humorous satire, and nothing else. In other words, the posts were not a reflection of her political beliefs. She also raised concerns that she felt she was treated differently from others because, in her view, other appointed members had social media posts that were not scrutinized in the same way as her media posts. I understand her submissions on this point to mean the union scrutinized her social media posts in an arbitrary way. Even if her posts were used to prohibit her participation in union elections or being appointed while others were not, the protections of the Code are not triggered unless Ms. Monkman sets out facts that could connect those decisions to a political belief. Without a protected political belief, Ms. Monkman’s allegation of discrimination cannot be sustained.
[29] Finally, I acknowledge Ms. Monkman’s other concern, generally, with freedom of expression. There is no general protection of freedom of expression under the Code, nor does the Tribunal have jurisdiction over constitutional questions relating to the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms: Administrative Tribunals Act, SBC 2004, c. 45, s. 44.
IV CONCLUSION
[30] The complaint is dismissed against the individual respondents under s. 27(1)(d)(ii) of the Code.
[31] The complaint against CUPE 561 is dismissed under s. 27(1)(b) of the Code.
Laila Said Alam
Tribunal Member