Chow v. Save-on-Foods and another (No.4), 2025 BCHRT 184
Date Issued: August 13, 2025
File: CS-000852
Indexed as: Chow v. Save-on-Foods and another (No.4), 2025 BCHRT 184
IN THE MATTER OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS CODE,
RSBC 1996, c. 210 (as amended)
AND IN THE MATTER of a complaint before
the British Columbia Human Rights Tribunal
BETWEEN:
Iris Chow
COMPLAINANT
AND:
Pattison Food Group Ltd. (dba Save-On-Foods) and Guardteck Security Corp.
RESPONDENTS
REASONS FOR DECISION
APPLICATION TO RECONSIDER A DECISION
Rule 36
Tribunal Member: Jonathan Chapnick
On her own behalf: Iris Chow
For the Respondents: No submissions sought
I INTRODUCTION
[1] On June 30, 2020, Iris Chow filed a human rights complaint arising from an incident with a security Guard [Security Guard] at a Save-On-Foods store owned and operated by Pattison Food Group Ltd. [PFG]. The Tribunal later added Guardteck Security Corp. [Guardteck] as another respondent in the complaint.
[2] A hearing of the complaint took place on December 10 and 11, 2024. In a final decision on June 13, 2025, I dismissed the complaint and denied applications for costs made by Ms. Chow and Guardteck: Chow v. Save-on-Foods and another (No. 3), 2025 BCHRT 140 [Final Decision]. On June 27,2025, Ms. Chow applied for reconsideration of the Final Decision. She disagrees with the Final Decision and raises several procedural fairness issues.
[3] I do not find it necessary to seek submissions from PFG and Guardteck [collectively, Respondents]. For the reasons that follow, I decline to reconsider the Final Decision. Ms. Chow’s application for reconsideration is denied.
II Background
[4] Security services at the Save-On-Foods store – including the services of the Security Guard – were provided under a contract between PFG and Guardteck. Guardteck delivered the services through another company [Subcontractor], which employed the Security Guard.
[5] The incident between Ms. Chow and the Security Guard happened on April 15, 2020 [Incident]. An employee of PFG also interacted with Ms. Chow and the Security Guard at the end of the Incident [Employee]. The Employee’s involvement in the Incident is described at para. 31 of the Final Decision.
[6] Ms. Chow alleged that the Security Guard discriminated against her by repeatedly denying her entry into the store because of her race and sex. She also said that her subsequent reports regarding the Incident were not properly addressed by PFG.
[7] On April 1, 2021, PFG applied for an extension of time to file an application to dismiss the complaint [Extension Application]. On April 14, 2021, Ms. Chow applied to add Guardteck as a respondent [Application to Add]. Ms. Chow was not aware of the Subcontractor at that time.
[8] On November 3, 2023, the Tribunal denied the Extension Application: Chow v. Save-on-Foods Limited Partnership, 2023 BCHRT 188 [Extension Decision] at para. 49. Submissions on the Application to Add followed.
[9] In its response to the Application to Add, Guardteck raised the possibility that the Security Guard would not testify as a witness at the hearing, saying it had not worked with the Security Guard since 2020 when he moved out-of-province, and he had been unwilling to respond to communications: see Chow v. Save-on-Foods Limited Partnership (No. 2), 2024 BCHRT 95 [Guardteck Decision] at para. 36. On March 27, 2024, the Tribunal granted the Application to Add: Guardteck Decision at para. 60.
[10] On October 31, 2024, the Tribunal conducted a hearing readiness case conference with the parties [First Case Conference], during which the parties indicated that they were agreeable to submitting written closing arguments within a short period of time following the completion of the upcoming oral hearing. In a letter to the parties on November 4, 2024, I set a tentative submissions schedule with page restrictions for written closing arguments (15 pages for closings, three pages for reply), stating that the schedule and page restrictions would be discussed and confirmed at the hearing.
[11] The Respondents filed their witness lists on November 6, 2024. Neither listed the Security Guard or the Employee. On November 19, 2024, the Tribunal conducted a second hearing readiness case conference to address outstanding issues [Second Case Conference]. At the Second Case Conference, Ms. Chow suggested that there were individuals with relevant evidence who were not listed on the Respondents’ witness lists. She asked if she could call them as witnesses for the purpose of cross-examining them. I advised that parties could file a Form 8 if they wished to compel a witness to attend the hearing, and that – given the fast approaching hearing dates – if Ms. Chow wished to call a person to testify who was not on her witness list, she would need to seek the Tribunal’s permission. Ms. Chow also inquired about adding the Subcontractor as a respondent in her complaint. I advised that she could apply to add the Subcontractor, to which she responded that it appeared the Subcontractor had gone out of business. She questioned whether an application to add the Subcontractor would be worthwhile.
[12] Ms. Chow filed at least six preliminary applications and submitted several other requests to the Tribunal between November 8 and 29, 2024, including an application on November 21 for an order compelling PFG to provide the name and last known contact information of the Employee. The Tribunal wrote to the parties on November 21, setting an expedited submissions schedule regarding Mr. Chow’s November 21 application and other requests for information and disclosure. Submissions closed at the end of the day on November 28.
[13] On November 29, 2024, Ms. Chow filed an application for costs against PFG. The same day, PFG filed an application to limit disclosure of certain emails based on a claim of litigation privilege. The Tribunal wrote to the parties that day, setting an expedited submissions schedule regarding PFG’s privilege claim. The Tribunal advised that it would not consider applications for costs in advance of the oral hearing; rather, a party seeking costs could make their application in their closing argument after the hearing.
[14] On December 4, 2024, the Tribunal granted Ms. Chow’s application for disclosure of the Employee’s contact information and ordered PFG to provide the information by the close of business on December 5 [Order for Employee Contact Information].
[15] I heard the complaint over a two-day period in December 2024. Various documents were entered into evidence. Ms. Chow testified on her own behalf. A witness with no first-hand knowledge of the Incident testified for PFG. Guardteck called no witnesses.
[16] At the end of the oral hearing, I asked the parties if they were comfortable with the submissions schedule and page restrictions I had tentatively set for written closing arguments back on November 4, 2024. Ms. Chow asked for more time to prepare her closing, while the Respondents preferred to keep the tentative dates. In the end, the parties agreed on certain extensions of the submissions deadlines, and no party asked for more pages. I subsequently wrote to the parties, confirming the agreed upon schedule and page limits. In my letter, I stated that a party could request the Tribunal’s permission to file an argument that was longer than the applicable page limit, but they would need to make their request at least a week prior to the argument’s due date and explain the reasons for the request.
[17] After the oral hearing concluded, the parties submitted their written closing arguments. During the submissions process, Ms. Chow applied for sur-reply and objected to the admissibility of a policy document [Policy] disclosed by PFG after the hearing. The Tribunal granted her application and objection.
[18] In the Final Decision, I accepted Ms. Chow’s evidence about what happened during the Incident. My findings of fact regarding the aftermath of the Incident were based on her testimony and contemporaneous documentary evidence. I also accepted Ms. Chow’s social context evidence. Ultimately, however, I dismissed her complaint because: she did not prove that the Security Guard treated her adversely within the meaning of the discrimination analysis under the Human Rights Code; on the evidence, I was unable to reasonably infer a connection between her protected characteristics and what happened during the Incident; and I was not satisfied that PFG’s response to the Incident amounted to discrimination.
[19] I denied Ms. Chow’s costs application because, to my knowledge and on the information and arguments before me, I was not satisfied that the Respondents had engaged in improper conduct during the course of the complaint that warranted punishment by the Tribunal.
III Decision
[20] Ms. Chow applies for reconsideration of the Final Decision. In doing so, she seeks an extraordinary remedy: Grover v. CUPE Local 2011 (Saanich) and another, 2020 BCHRT 205 at para. 36. The Tribunal’s power to reconsider a decision, once made, is very narrow: Tuson v. The Board of Education of School District No. 5 (No. 5), 2021 BCHRT 14 at para. 8. It may only do so when the interests of fairness and justice require it: BC Human Rights Tribunal, Rules of Practice and Procedure [Rules], Rule 36(1). In general, once the Tribunal decides an issue, the decision is final. The Tribunal’s jurisdiction to consider the issue is “spent”: Fraser Health Authority v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Tribunal, 2014 BCCA 499 at para. 160, upheld on this point in 2016 SCC 25. The decision “cannot be revisited because the tribunal has changed its mind, made an error within jurisdiction or because there has been a change of circumstances”: Chandler v. Alberta Association of Architects, [1989] 2 SCR 848 at 861. A party who disagrees with a Tribunal decision can seek judicial review, subject to which the parties should be able to count on the decision being final: Tuson at para. 8.
[21] Ms. Chow says the Final Decision should “be set aside and reconsidered due to procedural fairness.” She seeks the reversal of both the decision on the merits of the complaint and the decision to deny her costs application.
[22] Ms. Chow also suggests that I should not be the Tribunal member who decides her reconsideration application. I will deal with this first.
A. Assignment of application for reconsideration
[23] Ms. Chow’s complaint was received by the Tribunal in June 2020, but only assigned to me under s. 27.1 of the Code in October 2024. In the Final Decision, I said I had no knowledge of some of the pre-October 2024 conduct alleged in Ms. Chow’s costs application, and I said that she had not directed me to information or evidence in support of those allegations: Final Decision at para. 134. In response to this, Ms. Chow now says that “procedural fairness for reconsidering the Final Decision requires the same Tribunal member who was assigned” to decide the Extension Application and the Application to Add. Ms. Chow says it is unfair and unreasonable for a new Tribunal member to be assigned at each stage of the complaint process if they have no prior knowledge of what came before them.
[24] When a party applies for reconsideration of a decision, Tribunal practice is to assign the application to the member who made the decision in the first place. That member is most familiar with the evidence and issues in the complaint and is best placed to efficiently determine whether there are grounds for reconsideration: Bruschini v. EDP Software Inc. (No. 3), 2023 BCHRT 144 at para. 3, citing Karbalaeiali v. British Columbia (Human Rights Tribunal), 2010 BCSC 1130 at para. 65; see also University of British Columbia v. University of British Columbia Faculty Association, 2007 BCCA 201 at para. 84. An exception to this practice is where the member who made the original decision recuses themselves because of a reasonable apprehension of bias: Bruschini at para. 4. Ms. Chow has not alleged bias or put forward any evidence in that regard. I decline to recuse myself for reasons of bias.
[25] In my view, fairness does not require the reassignment of Ms. Chow’s present application to the member who decided her previous ones. I was assigned to decide Ms. Chow’s reconsideration application, and I will do so. I am the Tribunal member who is most familiar with the Final Decision and related evidence and issues. I am best placed to determine whether there is a basis for reconsidering the Final Decision.
[26] I will now move on to Ms. Chow’s arguments for reconsideration of the Final Decision, beginning with her submissions regarding the decision on the merits of the complaint.
B. Application for reconsideration of decision on the merits
[27] Ms. Chow says the Tribunal should reconsider the decision on the merits of the complaint. I have divided her arguments for reconsideration into three groups, which I will address in turn.
1. Complaint process
[28] Ms. Chow makes several arguments regarding the fairness of the complaint process prior to the hearing.
[29] First, she says it was unfair that PFG did not tell her about the Subcontractor before the expiry of the one-year time limit for filing a complaint under s. 22(1) of the Code. She says she was prevented from applying to add the Subcontractor to the complaint within the time limit, which was prejudicial. She says the Subcontractor might have had evidence supporting her complaint, but it was not added as a respondent, which was procedurally unfair. She says the public interest and the interests of fairness and justice require the Tribunal to name the Subcontractor in the Final Decision.
[30] I am not satisfied that there has been any procedural unfairness related to the Subcontractor. Ms. Chow would have known about the Subcontractor at least six months before the hearing, when she received document disclosure from Guardteck in June 2024. She could have applied to add the Subcontractor as a respondent and tried to persuade the Tribunal to grant her application under s. 22(3) of the Code. She chose not to. She cannot now say that it was unfair that the Subcontractor did not participate in the complaint, having not tried to add it as a respondent when she had the opportunity.
[31] Second, Ms. Chow argues that it was procedurally unfair for the Tribunal to change the case manager assigned to her case during the course of the complaint process. She provides a June 2021 email exchange with the original case manager, in which she raised fairness questions regarding the timing of the submissions schedule related to her application for sur-reply in the Extension Application. She asserts that those questions were never answered. In my view, there is no unfairness here. The Extension Application was denied; Ms. Chow’s position on the application prevailed. On the information before me, I find that the change in case manager and the June 2021 email exchange were inconsequential and had no impact on the Final Decision. Neither event justifies reconsideration of the Final Decision under Rule 36(1).
[32] Third, Ms. Chow says that the Respondents have filed materials late without any repercussions, while she “cannot file late” or file a reconsideration application after the expiry of the 14-day time limit under Rule 36(2). She asserts that this is procedurally unfair. In my view, her assertion of unfairness has no merit. There has been no double standard in this complaint process. The Tribunal has granted both parties time extensions. Late filings have been dealt with on a case-by-case basis, with the aim of facilitating the just and timely resolution of the complaint. It is not true that there have been no repercussions for the Respondents. Notably, the Tribunal denied PFG’s request for leave to file its late application to dismiss: Extension Decision at para. 32. Finally, there is nothing unfair in this case in regards to the 14-day time limit for filing reconsideration applications. Ms. Chow did not seek an extension of the 14-day time limit. In any event, her application to reconsider the Final Decision was submitted on time and was accepted for filing by the Tribunal.
2. Hearing process
[33] Ms. Chow also makes arguments regarding the fairness of the hearing process.
[34] First, she says it was procedurally unfair that: the complaint was decided based solely on her testimony regarding the Incident; the Respondents did not call the Security Guard or the Employee as a witness; and she only received the Order for Employee Contact Information on December 5, 2024, which was just days before the hearing. In addition, she takes issue with the following provision in the Order for Employee Contact Information:
If Ms. Chow calls or emails the … Employee, it will be up to the … Employee to decide whether they wish to communicate with Ms. Chow. If they choose not to respond to Ms. Chow’s communications or tell her they do not wish to communicate with her, she will respect their wishes and will not continue to pursue them.
[35] Ms. Chow says this provision was procedurally unfair “because it was essentially a restriction on applying to obtain an order for [the Employee] to attend the hearing.”
[36] In my view, these claims of procedural unfairness are without merit. The complaint was decided based solely on Ms. Chow’s testimony regarding the Incident because the parties chose not to call other eyewitnesses. The Tribunal does not call witnesses or order witnesses to attend a hearing on its own motion. At least six months before the hearing, Ms. Chow would have known about Guardteck’s difficulties contacting the Security Guard and its concerns that he might not testify. She did not apply for an order compelling Guardteck to disclose the Security Guard’s contact information, she never tried to add the Security Guard to her witness list, and she never filed a Form 8 to seek to compel the Security Guard to attend the hearing.
[37] Similarly, Ms. Chow knew about the Employee’s existence long before the hearing, and knew, as of receiving witness lists on November 6, 2024, that neither Respondent intended to call the Employee to testify at the hearing. Ms. Chow had years to try to track down the Employee and add them to her witness list. She waited until the eleventh hour to obtain the Employee’s contact information, and she never added (or asked to add) the Employee to her witness list. The Order for Employee Contact Information restricted Ms. Chow from harassing the Employee; it did not prevent her from seeking a Tribunal order compelling the Employee to testify at the hearing. Ms. Chow could have filed a Form 8, but chose not to do so. In addition, she could have inquired or raised concerns regarding the meaning of the provision of the Order for Employee Contact with which she now takes issue. She did not.
[38] Second, Ms. Chow argues that the submissions schedule and page restrictions for the parties’ written closing arguments were procedurally unfair. She asserts that: she should have been given 30 pages (rather than 15) for her closing argument, and an additional 20 pages for her submissions on costs; she should not have been required to ask for permission to file a closing argument that exceeded the agreed upon page limit; there should have been restrictions on the formatting of closing arguments; it was unfair that PFG used footnotes in its closing argument; and the Respondents had more time than she did to prepare their closing arguments.
[39] There was no unfairness in the submissions schedule or page restrictions for closing arguments. Ms. Chow agreed to both at the hearing without protest. She could have asked for more pages for her closing argument and sought an extension of the deadline for its submission. She did not do so. When she asked for more pages for her reply in order to respond to Guardteck’s costs application, she was granted additional pages, even though her request was submitted late.
3. Other arguments
[40] Finally, Ms. Chow makes other arguments in her reconsideration application that, while framed in terms of procedural fairness, are essentially expressions of disagreement with the decision on the merits, questions as to its reasonableness, or attempts to reargue her case. This is not what reconsideration is for.
[41] In her application, for example, Ms. Chow disagrees with the analysis at para. 56 of the Final Decision and reargues her position. She also disagrees with the findings of fact and analysis at paras. 83, 108, and 122 of the Final Decision. She takes issue with the factors considered in reaching certain determinations, questions the adequacy of the reasons provided in the Final Decision, disputes the reasonableness of certain findings, and reargues aspects of her claim of discrimination.
[42] I will not engage further with these parts of Ms. Chow’s application. I appreciate that she is dissatisfied with the Tribunal’s decision to dismiss her complaint. I know that she put an enormous amount of time and effort into this proceeding. I know that parts of the Tribunal’s process can be difficult, frustrating, and even distressing. However, I am not authorized to sit in appeal of the Final Decision – nor is any other Tribunal member. The Tribunal cannot reopen a decision because a party feels that it is wrong: Eddy v. Toby’s Pub and Grill and another (No. 2), 2013 BCHRT 48 at para. 27. The adequacy of the Tribunal’s reasons is not a standalone basis for reconsideration: Tuson at para. 22. Reconsideration is not a chance to repeat prior arguments or make new ones that could have been made previously: Prosko v. District of Taylor (No. 3), 2024 BCHRT 319 at para. 7. It is not an opportunity to reargue matters that were argued in the first instance in an attempt to achieve a different result: Ramadan v. Kwantlen Polytechnic University and another (No. 2), 2018 BCHRT 56 at para. 13.
[43] I am not persuaded that the interests of fairness and justice require the Tribunal to reconsider the decision on the merits of the complaint. If Ms. Chow believes that the legal analysis in the Final Decision was wrong, or the findings of fact were unreasonable, or the decision was based on the wrong factors, her recourse is to seek judicial review.
C. Application for reconsideration of decision on costs
[44] Ms. Chow says the Tribunal should reconsider the decision to deny her costs application.
1. Deferral of costs application
[45] First, Ms. Chow argues that the Tribunal’s decision to consider costs applications at the conclusion of the hearing was unfair. She says this decision was in conflict with information on the Tribunal website, which states that a party “can apply for costs at any time.”
[46] There was no unfairness in my decision, on November 29, 2024, to defer consideration of Ms. Chow’s costs application until the end of the oral hearing. At that time, the Tribunal and the parties were dealing with several outstanding pre-hearing applications from Ms. Chow, as well as PFG’s claim of privilege over potentially relevant documents. These matters needed to be resolved before the oral hearing; Ms. Chow’s costs application did not. Section 27.3(3) of the Code empowers the Tribunal to make any order aimed at facilitating the just and timely resolution of a complaint. With the hearing just over a week away, it was reasonable, fair, and efficient to defer consideration of costs applications, rather than engaging the parties in an additional submissions process. It was important for the parties to focus on hearing preparation without being required to address further preliminary applications: see Morgan-Hung v. Provincial Health Services and others (No. 3), 2008 BCHRT 329 at para. 7.
[47] I disagree that my decision to defer consideration of costs applications conflicted with the information on the Tribunal website. In any event, no party raised concerns regarding the deferral decision when it was made.
2. Requirement for supporting information
[48] Ms. Chow also takes issue with my statements in the Final Decision that I had no knowledge of some of the pre-October 2024 conduct alleged in her costs application, and that she had not directed me to information or evidence supporting those allegations. She says it was unfair for the Tribunal to say it “had no prior knowledge of the breeches [sic] of procedure and other improper conduct before October 2024.”
[49] With respect, that is not what was said in the Final Decision. At para. 134, I wrote that I did not know about “some of the conduct alleged in Ms. Chow’s application” (emphasis added). In fact, most of the pre-October 2024 allegations in Ms. Chow’s costs application were within my knowledge when I denied the application. They were within my knowledge either because Ms. Chow raised such matters at the hearing or in the pre-hearing case conferences, or because they were canvassed and/or dealt with in the Extension Decision or in the pre-hearing applications I decided, or because Ms. Chow sufficiently particularized or directed me to information regarding such matters in her written closing argument.
[50] On the other hand, however, I have no knowledge of certain allegations in Ms. Chow’s costs submissions related to her direct communications with PFG several years ago. For example, she alleged that PFG disregarded her 2021 communications seeking the name of its security services contractor (i.e., Guardteck), and she claimed to have emailed PFG on April 12 and 13, 2021 regarding same. I do not have knowledge of these communications – nor should I. Participants are prohibited from providing the Tribunal with copies of their communications to one another, unless the communications are filed in direct support of an application: Rule 10(6). If Ms. Chow’s 2021 communications with PFG supported her costs application, she could have put them before me. She did not do so.
[51] In any event, contrary to Ms. Chow’s assertions, it is not unfair or prejudicial for the Tribunal to expect a party to submit information or documentation as necessary to support their costs application, even if it was previously disclosed in the context of other preliminary applications. Ms. Chow filed at least 10 interim applications with supporting documents during the course of the complaint process. The onus is not on a Tribunal member to search their memory or comprehensively review the existing case file for potentially supportive information and documents every time a party makes an application. In each application, it is up to the applicant to provide whatever it thinks is important for the Tribunal to consider.
3. Notice of requirement for supporting information
[52] Ms. Chow makes a third procedural fairness argument related to her costs application. She says it was unfair that I did not tell her at the hearing that she needed to provide information or documentation as necessary to support her request for a costs award. She says Rule 4(3) stipulates that, in a costs application, the applicant must state how the other party engaged in improper conduct and/or contravened the Tribunal’s rules or directions; Rule 4(3) does not say that the applicant must provide supporting information or documents.
[53] I do not accept this unfairness argument. Ms. Chow cannot now suggest she did not know what was required to substantiate a claim for costs. Her November 29, 2024 costs application against PFG not only included supporting information, but also attached supporting documentation, which ultimately formed part of her book of documents at the hearing. Similarly, her costs submissions during closing arguments (which included her November 29 submissions against PFG) included supporting information and directed me to documents that were in evidence or otherwise before me.
[54] Ms. Chow’s costs application in her closing arguments did not fail because of procedural unfairness. It failed on its merits.
4. Other arguments
[55] Finally, in her reconsideration submissions, Ms. Chow points to additional reasons why her costs application should be granted (e.g., PFG did not disclose the Policy during the complaint process) and disagrees with my findings at para. 136 of the Final Decision. As I discussed above, these types of arguments are not what reconsideration is for.
[56] In sum, I am not persuaded that the interests of fairness and justice require the Tribunal to reconsider the decision to deny Ms. Chow’s costs application.
IV CONCLUSION
[57] I am not persuaded that the interests of fairness and justice require the Tribunal to reconsider any part of the Final Decision. Ms. Chow’s application for reconsideration is denied. The Final Decision stands.
Jonathan Chapnick
Tribunal Member