Knowles v. Ontime Moving Corporation, 2025 BCHRT 183
Date Issued: August 8, 2025
File: CS-002815
Indexed as: Knowles v. Ontime Moving Corporation, 2025 BCHRT 183
IN THE MATTER OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS CODE,
RSBC 1996, c. 210 (as amended)
AND IN THE MATTER of a complaint before
the British Columbia Human Rights Tribunal
BETWEEN:
Vicki Knowles
COMPLAINANT
AND:
Ontime Moving Corporation
RESPONDENT
REASONS FOR DECISION
Tribunal Member: Devyn Cousineau
On their own behalf: Vicki Knowles
Agent for the Respondent: Derek Yuan
Date of Hearing: June 23-24, 2025
Location of Hearing: Via videoconference
I INTRODUCTION
[1] This decision is about sexual harassment in the workplace, and an employer’s duty to respond to it.
[2] Vicki Knowles worked for Ontime Moving Corporation. Throughout her employment, she was bullied and sexually harassed by a co-worker named Joe. The sexual harassment included sexual innuendos, inappropriate touching, derogatory language, and Joe lowering his pants.
[3] In this human rights complaint, Ms. Knowles alleges that she told her supervisors about Joe’s conduct and Ontime failed to effectively address it. As a result, she says she no longer felt safe coming to work and quit her employment. She argues that she was discriminated against in her employment, based on her sex, in violation of s. 13 of the Human Rights Code. Ontime disputes that Ms. Knowles effectively communicated about the extent of Joe’s conduct, and says that it did not have time to address it before Ms. Knowles quit. It argues that it is not responsible for the conduct of its staff which it does not know about.
[4] After Ms. Knowles quit, another Ontime employee named Aaron sent her a text message, threatening that she was “making a big mistake” and that “coming after the company” would “backfire” on her. Ms. Knowles argues that this text was retaliation in violation of s. 43 of the Code. Ontime’s representative says he does not know who Aaron is, and that the company was not aware of, or responsible for, the text message.
[5] I heard the complaint over two days. Ms. Knowles testified and called her friend Sarah Oman as a witness. Derek Yuan testified for, and represented, Ontime. I am grateful to both parties for their work in this process.
[6] For the following reasons, I find that Ontime discriminated against Ms. Knowles in her employment. As the employer, it was responsible for Joe’s conduct: Code, s. 44(2). Further, its managers were aware of the conduct and failed to take effective steps to address it. I order Ontime to compensate Ms. Knowles for wages lost and expenses incurred because of discrimination, and for damage to her dignity, feelings, and self-respect.
[7] I dismiss the allegation of retaliation. Section 43 only protects people in relation to human rights complaints. There is no dispute that Aaron’s text was a response to Ms. Knowles’ complaints to WorkSafeBC and not any potential human rights complaint. This is a matter for WorkSafeBC, and not this Tribunal.
[8] In this decision, I begin by explaining my finding of discrimination in employment.
II DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT
[9] Sexual harassment is discrimination based on sex: Janzen v. Platy Enterprises Ltd., 1989 CanLII 97 (SCC). It includes “any sexually-oriented practice that endangers an individual’s continued employment, negatively affects [their] work performance, or undermines [their] sense of personal dignity”: Arjun P. Aggarwal, Sexual Harassment in the Workplace (1987), cited in Janzen at para. 49. It may be blatant, like leering, grabbing, or sexual assault, or it may be more subtle, like sexual innuendos or propositions: Janzen at para. 49. It brings sexual behaviour into the workplace in a way that harms the victim’s working environment and attacks their dignity. At its root, sexual harassment is about an abuse of power: Ms. K v. Deep Creek Store and another, 2021 BCHRT 158 at para. 73; British Columbia (Human Rights Tribunal) v. Schrenk, 2017 SCC 62 at para. 43.
[10] In the hearing, Ontime did not dispute that Joe sexually harassed Ms. Knowles in her employment. Both parties agreed with the findings of a workplace investigator that the sexual harassment included the following incidents:
a. June 2019: Ms. Knowles was kneeling down to fix a photocopier. Joe wiggled his belt buckle and said, “while you’re down there”, insinuating that she should give him oral sex.
b. July 2019: Joe told Ms. Knowles he had lost a lot of weight, and told her “watch this”. He undid his belt buckle, and his pants fell down, revealing only underwear beneath.
c. August 2019: Joe smacked Ms. Knowles on the butt and said, “ok back to work [sweetie or some other pet name]”.
d. April 2020: Joe asked Ms. Knowles and another woman, “So, when is one of you ladies going to have sex with me?”
e. Throughout her employment: Joe called Ms. Knowles pet names like “sweets” or “sweetie pie”.
[11] These findings are also consistent with subsequent findings of WorkSafeBC. I confirm that this conduct constitutes sexual harassment in employment, in violation of s. 13 of the Code.
[12] I understand that Ontime argues that it is not responsible for Joe’s conduct because it was not aware of it. For reasons I explain in a moment, I do not accept that the company was unaware of Joe’s conduct. However, even if it were, it is still responsible for it.
[13] Under human rights law, employers are liable for the discriminatory acts of their employees, even if they don’t know about it: Curken v. Gastronome Enterprises, 2023 BCHRT 2 at para. 57. The employer controls the workplace and is in the best position to ensure a discrimination-free work environment. For that reason, the Supreme Court of Canada has long recognized that employers are liable for the acts of their employees in the course of their employment: Robichaud v. Canada (Treasury Board), 1987 CanLII 73 (SCC) at paras. 15-17. This principle is codified in s. 44(2) of the Code, which says:
An act or thing done or omitted by an employee, officer, director, official or agent of any person within the scope of the person’s authority is deemed to be an act or thing done or omitted by that person.
“Person” includes an employer: s. 1.
[14] Applying these principles, Ontime is responsible for the sexual harassment that Ms. Knowles experienced at work.
[15] The primary dispute between the parties in this case is whether Ontime responded reasonably to Ms. Knowles’ complaints about Joe. This engages Ontime’s duty to take reasonable steps to address complaints of discrimination in the workplace. An effective response can reduce the harm on the employee: Robichaud at para. 19. On the other hand, a failure to reasonably respond can exacerbate the harms of discrimination or even cause further harms: Hale v. University of British Columbia Okanagan (No. 5), 2023 BCHRT 121 at paras. 16-17.
[16] There are two requirements that trigger an employer’s duty to respond under human rights legislation. First, the employer must know there is a complaint or concern, typically because the complainant has communicated one. Second, the complaint must be about a potential violation of the Code: Clarke v. City of Vancouver and another, 2024 BCHRT 298 at para. 112. Once this duty is triggered, the Tribunal will assess the employer’s response considering factors including whether the employer has a proper understanding of discrimination, whether the employer treated the allegations seriously and responded sensitively, and whether the complainant was restored to a discrimination-free work environment: Laskowska v. Marineland of Canada Inc., 2005 HRTO 30 at paras. 52-53.
[17] Ontime’s defence was somewhat unusual. Its representative, Mr. Yuan, was also the company’s only witness. However, Mr. Yuan did not join the company until after Ms. Knowles had left. He had no firsthand knowledge of any of the facts at issue in the complaint. This meant that Ms. Knowles’ evidence about what she told her supervisors was effectively undisputed.
[18] Ms. Knowles started working at Ontime in April 2019. She was interviewed and hired by Joe. At that time, the CEO of the company was a man named Taso. Taso reported directly to the owner of the company, and was Ms. Knowles’ supervisor. Taso came into the office once or twice a week. The rest of the time Ms. Knowles was mostly alone with Joe. Ms. Knowles says, and I accept, that she repeatedly complained to Taso about Joe.
[19] Joe’s harassment started soon after Ms. Knowles began her employment. The incident when Joe insinuated that she should give him oral sex happened in June 2019. The incident when Joe dropped his pants happened around July 2019. Ms. Knowles reported these incidents to Taso at the time, along with Joe’s other bullying behaviours which included yelling at Ms. Knowles, insulting her intelligence, and making racist comments.
[20] By November 2019, Ms. Knowles was ready to leave the company because of Joe’s conduct. At that time, the company was in the process of transferring to new ownership. Taso convinced her to stay by offering her a promotion to “President” and a raise. He also arranged a meeting with Ms. Knowles and Joe, in which Joe promised to stop with the sexual harassment, bullying, and yelling. After this, Ms. Knowles was theoretically above Joe in the workplace hierarchy. However, she says, and I accept, that she exercised no real authority over him. Joe was an older man, and had been at the company much longer. When Ms. Knowles started at Ontime, Joe was supervising her. Ms. Knowles says, and I accept, that Joe did not take direction from her.
[21] Joe was on good behaviour for a brief period after his meeting with Taso. However, it didn’t last.
[22] Ms. Knowles continued to complain to Taso about Joe. This is supported by text messages. In one text exchange, Ms. Knowles thanked Taso for letting her “vent” about Joe and told him that “Half the staff want to leave”. Taso told Ms. Knowles to “B strong and follow ur gut” [as written]. In another exchange (which may have been the same day), Ms. Knowles told Taso that “there are a couple of major issues that need to be addressed and then people would surely stay around longer”. Taso responded, “Joe being an asshole again?” Ms. Knowles responded, “yes”.
[23] In around late January or early February 2020, Taso left the company. He was replaced by a man named Jeff Lee. Mr. Lee’s role was to represent the company’s new owner, who lived in China. Effectively, this meant that Mr. Lee was the highest-level manager on site in BC.
[24] Joe continued to harass and bully Ms. Knowles.
[25] On June 5, 2020, Ms. Knowles and Joe had a phone conversation. Joe was driving with Ms. Knowles on the speakerphone. At the end of the conversation, Ms. Knowles asked, “anything else?”. Joe replied, “tell the guys I’ll be there Sunday at 11 am. Thanks Sweets”. Ms. Knowles did not hang up immediately because her hands were busy. Joe did not realize that the call had not ended, and began to complain and insult Ms. Knowles to the passenger in the car. He called her a loser, pothead, detriment to the company, lazy stoner, who was going nowhere in her life and was not a good parent. He said everything she touched got “fucked up”. Ms. Knowles was stunned. She felt sick. She later confronted Joe about this incident, telling him she couldn’t stand him. Joe later texted her to apologize, explaining “just like you I’m stressed out and I guess I just vented”.
[26] The final straw was an incident on Friday, July 17, 2020. Ms. Knowles was on the last day of vacation with her child. An employee called her to report a scheduling issue. She then called Joe to talk about it. Joe screamed at her on the phone, calling her a “piece of shit”, saying “you’re no help to me. This company is better without you”. After their call, Ms. Knowles was still upset. She texted him “You fucking idiot. Good luck getting shit done … I’m giving my 2 weeks to Jeff right now so good fucking luck keeping this shit a float with out me” [as written].
[27] After this, Ms. Knowles called Mr. Lee and told him about Joe’s conduct over the previous year. She told him that she was in a bad mental space and needed to leave. Mr. Lee asked her not to leave, and asked if they could talk on the Monday. She agreed.
[28] On Monday, July 20, Ms. Knowles met with Mr. Lee. She reported Joe’s conduct, including the verbal abuse and sexual harassment. She told him that she did not feel safe at work and could not continue to work alongside Joe. She asked to be separated from Joe at work and to no longer have to communicate directly with him. She understood that Mr. Lee was going to talk to Joe.
[29] The next day, Ms. Knowles saw Joe go into Mr. Lee’s office for about 20 minutes. After this short meeting, Mr. Lee told her that Joe would not “do it anymore”, and that Mr. Lee would come into the office more frequently to monitor the situation. Ms. Knowles was deeply upset at this response, which – in her view – demonstrated that the company was not taking her complaints seriously, and required her to continue working with Joe. Nevertheless, she agreed to stay on at the company, at least until August.
[30] Later that same day, Ms. Knowles met again with Mr. Lee. Ms. Knowles told Mr. Lee that that she could not continue to work this way. In response, Mr. Lee asked if she could help to find someone to replace her before she left. He also indicated that the owner did not want her to tell anyone what had happened, because it could make the company look bad. Ms. Knowles says that, at this point, her “head exploded”. She left work and called her doctor. A note from her doctor, dated July 22, says that Ms. Knowles was “unable to work or seek employment due to medical reasons”. Ms. Knowles never returned to Ontime.
[31] Ontime argues that Ms. Knowles left before it could effectively address her complaints about Joe. Respectfully, I disagree.
[32] First, I am satisfied that Ontime was aware of Joe’s conduct since at least the summer of 2019. Ms. Knowles reported it to Taso, who was the highest-ranking manager onsite at the company. Taso was aware that Ms. Knowles’ complaints included sexual harassment, which engages the protections of the Code. This was enough to trigger an obligation for Ontime to respond.
[33] I return now to the factors that the Tribunal often considers to assess an employer’s response: whether the employer has a proper understanding of discrimination, whether the employer treated the allegations seriously and responded sensitively, and whether the complainant was restored to a discrimination-free work environment. Considering these factors in this case, Ontime did not respond reasonably to Ms. Knowles’ complaints about Joe.
[34] First, Ontime did not have adequate policies in place to address sexual harassment. It is undisputed that when Ms. Knowles arrived, there was no harassment or discrimination policy. There was no education for management or staff about their human rights obligations. Ms. Knowles took it upon herself to draft a basic policy prohibiting discrimination and harassment. That policy is not before me, but I understand it was minimal.
[35] Importantly, Ontime did not have a clear policy about how to report sexual harassment. Ontime argues that Ms. Knowles should have made her complaints in writing or through “formal channels”, but it is unclear why she would have known to do that or what those formal channels would be. Ontime emphasises that its current owner is a woman, who understands the context and seriousness of sexual harassment and discrimination against women. However, there is no dispute that Ms. Knowles had no direct channel to the owner, who lived in China and spoke very little English. Rather, her only option was to report her concerns to her supervisors, which were Taso and, later, Mr. Lee. She did that.
[36] Second, when Ms. Knowles reported her complaints, Ontime did not take them seriously. Taso’s response was to simply allow her to “vent” and tell her to be “strong”. He had one meeting with Joe, which was ultimately ineffective.
[37] I appreciate that Ontime’s ownership changed in early 2020. Mr. Yuan argues that the new owner did not know about the sexual harassment until Ms. Knowles reported it to Mr. Lee in July 2020. Even if that is true, it is insufficient. There is no argument or evidence before me about how I could divide liability or responsibility between Ontime’s owners. From Ms. Knowles’ perspective, she continued to work for Ontime in a workplace poisoned by sexual and other harassment.
[38] In any event, when Ms. Knowles did report the issue to Mr. Lee in July, his response was also insufficient. He did not undertake any investigation beyond a brief conversation with Joe. He required Ms. Knowles to continue working alongside Joe, which she had told him she could not do. Aside from a commitment to be more present in the office and “monitor” the situation, Mr. Lee took no steps to protect Ms. Knowles in circumstances where she reported the harassment had been ongoing over a long time and she no longer felt safe. In its closing argument, Ontime says that its owner “required time to assess the situation thoroughly and seek professional guidance”. However, there is no evidence that the owner was aware of the situation or intended to take any further steps beyond what Mr. Lee had already done.
[39] Ontime argues that Ms. Knowles should have exercised her authority to address the issue directly with Joe. In cross-examination, Mr. Yuan suggested that, as the President, she could have disciplined Joe. This is what her friend Ms. Oman was encouraging her to do. However, I accept Ms. Knowles’ explanation that it was not apparent she had any actual authority over Joe. He was senior to her, both in age and time at the company. He was quick to anger and aggression – which was the root of Ms. Knowles’ issue. There was no formal job description for Ms. Knowles’ position as President, and she was never involved in any other disciplinary matters. She was not trained or instructed about how to manage discipline. When she reported Joe’s conduct to her supervisors, neither of them suggested that she should exercise her authority to discipline Joe. When Mr. Lee arrived at the company, he seemed surprised to learn about Ms. Knowles’ title and did not understand her role. In the hearing, Mr. Yuan described the role as taking on more responsibility with clients and administrative functions.
[40] After Ms. Knowles left, she filed a complaint with WorkSafeBC. It was WorkSafeBC that ultimately required Ontime to investigate Ms. Knowles’ complaints. Its first investigation was deemed insufficient. As a result, in December 2020 – four months after Ms. Knowles left – Ontime hired an independent workplace investigator. This investigator issued her report on February 9, 2021, concluding that Ms. Knowles’ allegations were all substantiated and that Joe had engaged in harassment and sexual harassment towards her. After this, Ontime disciplined and eventually fired Joe. However, by this time it was too late for these steps to restore Ms. Knowles to a healthy work environment, which is what the Code requires.
[41] It is unfortunate that Ontime did not act promptly to effectively address Ms. Knowles’ complaints. If it had, it seems likely that the issue could have been addressed and Ms. Knowles could have continued to work there – which is what both parties wanted. As it stands, Ontime’s response to Ms. Knowles’ complaints was not reasonable and continued to expose her to sexual harassment at work, to the point that she felt she had no choice but to leave.
[42] Ms. Knowles has proven her complaint of sex discrimination in her employment, in violation of s. 13 of the Code. I turn now to her complaint of retaliation.
III RETALIATION
[43] Section 43 of the Code protects people in connection with complaints to the Human Rights Tribunal. Its purpose is to create safe conditions for people to bring forward issues of discrimination: Talkkari v. City of Burnaby and others, 2005 BCHRT 68 at para. 29. Although the word “retaliation” does not appear in this section, the term is frequently used as a shorthand to describe the conduct that it prohibits: Gichuru v. Law Society of BC, 2010 BCCA 543 at paras. 40-41.
[44] There are three elements that Ms. Knowles must prove to establish a violation of s. 43:
a. Ontime was aware that she had made, or might make, a human rights complaint;
b. Ontime evicted, discharged, suspended, expelled, intimidated, coerced, imposed a penalty on, denied a right or benefit to, or otherwise adversely treated Ms. Knowles; and
c. There is a sufficient connection between the impugned conduct and the previous complaint. This connection can be established by proving that Ontime intended to engage in that conduct or can reasonably have been perceived to have engaged in that conduct in retaliation, with the element of reasonable perception being assessed from the point of view of a reasonable complainant, apprised of the facts, at the time of the impugned conduct.
Gichuru v. Pallai, 2018 BCCA 78 at para. 58
[45] As I have said, an act of Ontime’s employees within the scope of their employment is deemed to be an act of Ontime: Code, s. 44(2).
[46] Ms. Knowles’ allegation of retaliation is based on a threatening text she got from a co-worker named Aaron on July 23, 2020, two days after she left Ontime. Though Mr. Yuan testified that he did not know who Aaron was, I prefer Ms. Knowles’ testimony that Aaron was a mover employed by the company. Ms. Knowles was more familiar with the staff and operations at Ontime, especially for the period before Mr. Yuan joined the company.
[47] Aaron’s text says:
I dont know whats going through your head right now. But you are making a big mistake.
You should take a step back and think things through properly. What ever is between you and Joe, is between you and Joe.
Coming after the company and putting all our jobs in jeopardy is going to back fire on you.
Joe is an asshole, yes.
But you’re no angel either.
Infact, you’ve broken several laws yourself. I suggest you give up whatever scam you are trying to run here and move on.
This will not end the way you think it will. If this goes to court my sister will represent Ontime in court and she will shred your case to pieces.
My lawyer is free. How much will yours cost? [as written]
[48] I agree with Ms. Knowles that this text message threatens her not to take legal action against the company. However, the difficulty is that – as Ms. Knowles admits – the text message was not about a human rights complaint, or potential human rights complaint. It was about her complaints to WorkSafeBC. Ms. Knowles testified that, at the time of this message, she was not even aware or thinking about the possibility of a human rights complaint. Rather, she had filed a claim with WorkSafeBC. Her understanding is, and the timing supports, that Aaron’s text was about her WorkSafeBC complaint. There is no evidence to suggest it had anything to do with a potential complaint under the Code.
[49] In this circumstance, s. 43 of the Code is not engaged, and this part of Ms. Knowles’ complaint is dismissed. Aaron’s threatening text is properly a matter for WorkSafeBC.
IV REMEDIES
[50] I have found Ms. Knowles’ complaint of discrimination justified. I declare that Ontime’s conduct, as set out in this decision, was discrimination contrary to s. 13 of the Code. I order Ontime to cease the contravention and refrain from committing the same or similar contraventions: Code, s. 37(2)(a) and (b).
[51] In addition to these orders, Ms. Knowles asks for compensation for lost wages, expenses and injury to her dignity, feelings, and self-respect. I will address each of these remedies in turn.
A. Wage loss
[52] Section 37(2)(d)(ii) of the Code gives the Tribunal discretion to compensate the person discriminated against for “all, or a part … of any wages or salary lost … by the contravention”. This is a statutory remedy intended to further the Code’s purposes, which include providing a means of redress for people who have been discriminated against, as well as fostering a society where such discrimination does not occur: Code, s. 3. The object of an award for wage loss is to put the person in the position they would have been in had the discrimination not occurred: Gichuru v. Law Society of British Columbia (No. 9), 2011 BCHRT 185 [Gichuru] at para. 300, upheld in 2014 BCCA 396 [Gichuru Appeal].
[53] To support her claim for wage loss, Ms. Knowles must establish a causal connection between the discrimination and the lost wages: Gichuru at para. 302. Once that connection is established, then the Tribunal has discretion to award full or partial compensation, taking into account the remedial purposes of the Code: Gichuru at para. 303.
[54] Ms. Knowles is seeking an award to compensate her for wages lost during the five-year period between July 22, 2020, when she left her employment at Ontime, until July 22, 2025.
[55] I am satisfied there is a causal connection between the discrimination and Ms. Knowles’ wage loss. Ms. Knowles left her employment at Ontime because of Joe’s conduct, including his sexual harassment, and the company’s failure to respond reasonably to restore her to a discrimination-free work environment. I disagree with Ontime that her decision to leave was unreasonable in the circumstances. The harassment had been ongoing for over a year, and caused her to develop significant mental health injuries – a finding consistent with the conclusion of WorkSafeBC. Aside from Joe’s conduct, Ms. Knowles liked her job and Ontime valued her work. I accept that, but for the discrimination, she would have continued to work there.
[56] The Code grants the Tribunal discretion to award “all, or a part” of any wages lost. This discretion must be exercised on a principled basis: Gichuru at para. 300. The Tribunal may reduce a wage loss award where a complainant has failed to reasonably mitigate their damages, or to account for other contingencies: Benton v. Richmond Plastics, 2020 BCHRT 82at para. 92.
[57] Here, there is no suggestion that Ms. Knowles failed to mitigate her wage loss. After a period of receiving wage loss benefits from WorkSafeBC, Ms. Knowles was actively searching for work, and reporting her efforts to WorkSafeBC. She secured part time employment in late 2020. In 2021, Ms. Knowles found full time work briefly for a different company. That job ended around December 2021 and, about two months later, she found another full-time job, where she remains. Her annual salary is currently around $47,000.
[58] Ontime has not argued that the wage loss award should be reduced to account for other contingencies, or on any other basis. The evidence before me is that, except for her interactions with Joe, Ms. Knowles liked her job at Ontime and was good at it. Her salary allowed her to care for herself and her child. She was an important part of the company, and Ontime wanted her to continue to work there. I accept, then, that the difference between what Ms. Knowles would have earned at Ontime and what she has actually earned since she left are losses incurred because of discrimination, and are compensable.
[59] To calculate the amount of wages that Ms. Knowles has lost, I assume that she would have earned $50,000 annually from Ontime. I am not persuaded, as she has argued, that she would have earned 3% annual raises. Ms. Knowles based this assumption on her internet research about typical annual raises. However, there was no employment contract and no agreement or practice at Ontime that guaranteed annual raises. Mr. Yuan says, and I accept, that employees became eligible for bonuses based on individual and company performance. There is no evidence before me about any bonuses that Ms. Knowles received during her employment, or how I might estimate bonuses she may have been entitled to if she had stayed at Ontime.
[60] Based on this annual salary, Ms. Knowles would have earned $250,000 if she had continued to work for Ontime between July 22, 2020 until July 22, 2025.
[61] From this amount, I subtract the amounts that Ms. Knowles received in wage loss benefits from WorkSafeBC and other employment. I begin with WorkSafeBC.
1. Deduction of wage loss benefits that Ms. Knowles received from WorkSafeBC
[62] After Ms. Knowles left Ontime, WorkSafeBC approved her claim for compensation. She received wage loss benefits for the period from July 23, 2020, to October 31, 2020. Ontime has submitted Employer Claim Cost Reports, which reflect that Ms. Knowles received a total of $10,200.56 in short term disability benefits from WorkSafeBC for this period. I deduct this amount from her wage loss award.
[63] After her wage loss benefits for temporary disability ended, Ms. Knowles was referred to WorkSafeBC’s vocational rehabilitation services. A letter from WorkSafeBC dated April 27, 2021 stated that Ms. Knowles was eligible for “vocational rehabilitation planning benefits at wage loss equivalency”. Ontime’s Employer Claim Cost Reports show that WorkSafeBC paid $16,591.94 in vocational rehabilitation benefits for the period between March 15, 2021, and August 29, 2021. There is no evidence before me about whether this amount was paid directly to Ms. Knowles as a form of income replacement, or whether it simply reflects the value of benefits she received to support her return to work. It is Ms. Knowles’ burden to prove the amount of her wage loss. Considering these WorkSafeBC records, I am not persuaded on a balance of probabilities that her losses include the $16,591.94 that WorkSafeBC paid in vocational rehabilitation benefits. I deduct this amount from her wage loss award.
[64] In sum, I deduct $26,792.50 from Ms. Knowles’ wage loss award to account for wage loss or income replacement benefits she received from WorkSafeBC.
2. Deduction of other employment income
[65] Ms. Knowles has submitted T4 slips from 2020-2024, which show that she earned the following employment income after she left Ontime:
a. 2020: $2,626.63
b. 2021: $29,648.92[1]
c. 2022: $40,549.93[2]
d. 2023: $46,199.93
e. 2024: $47,109.78
[66] There are no records of what Ms. Knowles has earned in 2025. Based on her annual income of $47,109.78, it is reasonable to estimate that she will earn $27,480.71 for the seven months between January 1 and July 31, 2025.
[67] The total amount of these earning is $193,616.00. I deduct this amount from Ms. Knowles’ award.
3. Wage loss award
[68] I order Ontime to pay Ms. Knowles $29,591.51 to compensate her for wages lost because of discrimination.[3]
[69] To address any tax consequences for Ms. Knowles of receiving this amount in a single tax year, I also order Ontime to compensate Ms. Knowles for any additional income tax liability she may incur (commonly called a “tax gross up”): Morriss v. BC Railway Co., 2003 BCHRT 14 at para. 262. Ms. Knowles must advise Ontime of this amount, and supply any supporting tax documentation.
B. Expenses
[70] Section 37(2)(d)(ii) of the Code grants the Tribunal discretion to order compensation for expenses incurred by the discrimination. Again, the object is to place the person in the position they would have been in but for the discrimination.
[71] Ms. Knowles seeks compensation for expenses she incurred to buy medication to deal with the discrimination. She has submitted receipts from October and November 2020, in the amount of $19.58 each. I am satisfied that this expense, which was to treat depression, was incurred as Ms. Knowles was coping with the effects of the discrimination. I order Ontime to compensate Ms. Knowles $39.16 as expenses incurred by the discrimination.
C. Injury to dignity, feelings, and self-respect
[72] A violation of a person’s human rights is a violation of their dignity. The purpose of an award for injury to dignity, feelings, and self-respect is to compensate a person for that violation. It is not punitive. To determine an appropriate amount, the Tribunal generally considers three broad factors: the nature of the discrimination, the complainant’s social context or vulnerability, and the effect on the complainant. The quantum is “highly contextual and fact-specific”, and the Tribunal has considerable discretion to award an amount it deems necessary to compensate a person who has been discriminated against: Gichuru at para. 256; University of British Columbia v. Kelly, 2016 BCCA 271 at paras. 59-64. In this case, Ms. Knowles seeks an award in the range of “$25,000 – $40,000 or more”.
[73] I begin with the nature of the discrimination. There were four explicit incidents of sexual harassment, which included sexual innuendo, unwanted touching, and Joe lowering his pants. In addition, throughout her 15 months of employment, Joe frequently called Ms. Knowles gendered pet names that were infantilizing and degrading.
[74] Ontime’s failure to respond effectively to Ms. Knowles’ complaints culminated in the ultimate employment-related consequence: loss of a job. There is no question that is a severe outcome in any circumstance. There are many cases which eloquently describe the significance of a person’s employment to their financial and emotional wellbeing. I will only invoke one:
Work is one of the most fundamental aspects in a person’s life, providing the individual with a means of financial support and, as importantly, a contributory role in society. A person’s employment is an essential component of [their] sense of identity, self-worth and emotional well-being.
Reference Re Public Service Employee Relations Act (Alta.), 1987 CanLII 88 (SCC) at para. 91 (per Dickson CJ)
Because of the significance of employment to a person’s dignity, cases which involve the loss of employment have often attracted the top end of this Tribunal’s awards: see e.g. Senyk v. WFG Agency Network (No. 2), 2008 BCHRT 376 at paras. 463-470.
[75] Next, I consider the power dynamics between the parties. As an employee, Ms. Knowles was vulnerable in the context of her work: British Columbia Human Rights Tribunal v. Schrenk, 2017 SCC 62 at para. 44. Ms. Knowles relied on her job as the sole source of income to support herself and her child. At the same time, Joe exercised gendered power over Ms. Knowles: Schrenk at para. 43. He was significantly older than Ms. Knowles, had been at the company much longer, and was her supervisor when she began at the company. Ms. Knowles’ vulnerability was then exacerbated by the fact that she was often left to work alone with Joe. She was reliant on her supervisors – Taso, and later Mr. Lee – to address Joe’s conduct and protect her in her workplace. When they failed to take effective steps to do so, she felt she had no choice but to leave.
[76] This brings me to the most significant factor in this case: the impact of the discrimination on Ms. Knowles. I accept that it was profound.
[77] Before her employment at Ontime, Ms. Knowles described herself as a bright, happy, bubbly person. Ms. Oman agreed, describing Ms. Knowles as very outgoing, boisterous, the “life of the party”, and “happy go lucky”. However, both Ms. Knowles and Ms. Oman testified that, over the course of her employment with Ontime, Ms. Knowles’ mental health gradually deteriorated to the point that she was no longer the same person.
[78] Ms. Oman says that, by the last few months of her employment at Ontime, Ms. Knowles needed a lot of emotional support. She called and messaged Ms. Oman frequently throughout the day, complaining about work and expressing that she did not want to go to work. Ms. Knowles was smoking more cannabis to cope.
[79] In its investigation, WorkSafeBC concluded that Joe’s abuse amounted to a significant workplace stressor. As a direct result of his conduct, and the employer’s failure to respond, Ms. Knowles’ psychologist diagnosed her with adjustment disorder with mixed anxiety and depressed mood.
[80] In the months immediately following the end of Ms. Knowles’ employment, she was completely disabled from working. Due to the sudden loss of income before her WorkSafeBC claim was approved, she became homeless for about six months. For part of that time, she was staying in a shelter where her child could not be with her. She was depressed, and crying frequently. She stopped talking to her friends and family. She did not leave the shelter except to go to the food bank. She increased her medication to treat her anxiety and depression. She explains that the discrimination, and loss of her employment, shattered her self-respect.
[81] For Ms. Knowles, the most significant and lasting impact of the discrimination was its effect on how she was able to parent her child. As Joe’s conduct took an increasing toll on her mental health, she was unhappy and angry. She says that sometimes that anger was passed on to her child. After she left Ontime, Ms. Oman observed that Ms. Knowles’ poor mental health made parenting “a lot harder”, because she was always crying and upset. Today, Ms. Knowles observes that her child can be quick to anger, and she blames herself because of how she was at home during and after her employment at Ontime.
[82] It took Ms. Knowles two years to find stable employment again. By the time of the hearing, she was doing much better. But reliving the events throughout this process, including the hearing, re-triggered her anxiety and stress. She still found it difficult to remember or talk about these incidents over five years later.
[83] Considering these factors, I am satisfied that an award of $35,000 is appropriate to compensate Ms. Knowles for injury to her dignity, feelings, and self-respect. This amount accounts for the seriousness of the discrimination, and its profound impact on Ms. Knowles. It also considers that not all of the impacts flowed from Joe’s discriminatory conduct; some of it was caused by bullying and harassment that did not engage the protections of the Code. This amount is in the range of what the Tribunal has ordered in other cases where the complainant was sexually harassed in employment and lost their job: see e.g. Curken ($25,000); Ms. K v. Deep Creek Store and another, 2021 BCHRT 158($35,000 for sexual harassment); Basic v. Esquimalt Denture Clinic and another, 2020 BCHRT 138 ($25,000); and Araniva v. RSY Contracting and another (No. 3), 2019 BCHRT 97 ($40,000).
V CONCLUSION
[84] I have found that Ms. Knowle’s complaint of retaliation in violation of s. 43 of the Code is not justified. It is dismissed: Code, s. 37(1).
[85] I have found that Ontime discriminated against Ms. Knowles in her employment based on her sex, in violation of s. 13 of the Code. I make the following orders:
a. I declare that Ontime’s conduct contravened s. 13 of the Code: Code, s. 37(2)(b).
b. I order Ontime to cease the contraventions and refrain from committing the same or similar contraventions: Code, s. 37(2)(a).
c. I order Ontime to pay Ms. Knowles:
i. $29,591.51 as compensation for wages lost because of the discrimination: Code, s. 37(2)(d)(ii).
ii. an amount, to be verified by Ms. Knowles based on her tax records, to compensate her for the tax consequences of receiving a lump sum payment of wages: Code,s. 37(2)(d)(ii).
iii. $39.16 as compensation for expenses incurred because of the discrimination: Code,s. 37(2)(d)(ii).
iv. $35,000 as compensation for injury to her dignity, feelings, and self-respect: Code,s. 37(2)(d)(iii).
v. Prejudgment interest on the wage loss and expense awards, based on the rates set out in the Court Order Interest Act.
vi. Post judgment interest on all awards based on the rates set out in the Court Order Interest Act.
Devyn Cousineau
Vice Chair
[1] $17,499.64 (Health Authority) + $12,149.28 (second employer)