Female Softball Players (by Michael Sharpe) v. City of Victoria (No. 5), 2025 BCHRT 182
Date Issued: August 7, 2025
File: CS-000715
Indexed as: Female Softball Players (by Michael Sharpe) v. City of Victoria (No. 5), 2025 BCHRT 182
IN THE MATTER OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS CODE,
RSBC 1996, c. 210 (as amended)
AND IN THE MATTER of a complaint before
the British Columbia Human Rights Tribunal
BETWEEN:
Female Softball Players (by Michael Sharpe)
COMPLAINANTS
AND:
City of Victoria
RESPONDENT
REASONS FOR DECISION
APPLICATION TO SET ASIDE ORDERS TO ATTEND
RULE 31(3)
APPLICATION TO RECONSIDER A DECISION
RULE 36
Tribunal Member: Robin Dean
Counsel for the Complainants: John S. Heaney
Counsel for the Respondent: Thea Hoogstraten
I INTRODUCTION
[1] This decision is about whether I should order former and current elected officials of the City of Victoria [the Officials] as well as the City’s Chief Administrative Officer [the CAO] [collectively, the Proposed Witnesses] to attend and testify at the hearing of this complaint. It is also about whether I should reconsider my decision denying the Complainant’s application to amend the complaint.
[2] Because I am not persuaded that the current witnesses on the City’s list are more knowledgeable alternatives than the Officials and the CAO and because the Proposed Witnesses’ evidence may be relevant, I deny the City’s application opposing the issuance of the orders to attend.
[3] In terms of the reconsideration, I find that it is not necessary to reopen my amendment decision in order to permit the amendment. The primary reason for denying the amendment application was the proximity to the hearing, which was later adjourned. Subject to timeliness concerns, the Complainant could have amended the complaint after the adjournment as of right. Therefore, the only issue before me now is timeliness. In considering this issue, I conclude that the amendments allege a timely continuing contravention and allow the Complainant to amend the complaint. Accordingly, the City may amend its response to the complaint within 21 days of receiving this decision: Rules of Practice and Procedure, Rule 24(5).
II BACKGROUND
A. The Complaint
[4] On February 10, 2020, Michael Sharpe, acting as representative of a class, filed this human rights complaint alleging that the City of Victoria discriminated against a class of people now defined as:
All female softball players registered with the Beacon Hill Baseball Softball Association who have played at Pemberton Park since the start of the 2019 season and/or currently play at Pemberton Park [the Players].
[5] The Beacon Hill Baseball & Softball Association provides baseball and softball programs for the City’s children. The Complainant says 100% of the Association’s softball players are female. The Association contracts with the City to use parks for its programming. In 2016, the Association decided to focus its softball program in Pemberton Park. It asked the City to approve and support work to change the baseball field at Pemberton Park into a softball field, and to upgrade the facilities. After phase one of those upgrades was completed, the process stalled at phase two. At this phase, the Association’s priority was to install a “skinned infield” and a batting cage. The City did not initially approve this work. For the 2019 and 2020 seasons, the Association’s softball players played at Pemberton Park without a skinned infield and batting cage.
[6] The Complainant alleges that the City’s conduct in response to the Association’s requests related to Pemberton Park deprives the Players of opportunities to play softball at a competitive level and develop in a sport where Canadian women excel internationally. He says the conduct stands in contrast with the City’s approvals for upgrades and facilities used for baseball, a sport for which he says 96% of the Association’s players are male. He alleges that the disparities, and the impacts on the Players, are discrimination based on sex, in violation of s. 8 of the Human Rights Code.
B. Relevant Procedural History
[7] The Complainant filed his witness list on April 2, 2024. It did not include the Proposed Witnesses. On May 7, 2024, the City asked the Complainant if he intended to apply for orders that the Officials attend and, on June 12, 2024, asked for an updated witness list. The City followed up with the Complainant two more times to ask about the Complainant’s intentions vis-à-vis the Officials. On July 23, 2024, the Complainant said he would be seeking orders to attend.
[8] On September 11, 2024 the Complainant filed an application to amend the Complaint, which I denied.
[9] On November 15, 2024, the Complainant confirmed that he would be filing Form 8s for the Proposed Witnesses, including the Officials and the CAO.
[10] On November 20, 2024, I convened a prehearing conference to discuss hearing readiness as the hearing was set for January 2025. At that time, the Complainant advised the Tribunal that he intended to request the orders to attend for the Proposed Witnesses. I ordered that the Complainant submit the orders to attend along with descriptions of the nature of the Proposed Witnesses’ evidence by November 28, 2024. In a letter to the Tribunal dated November 28, 2024, the Complainant set out a list of questions for the Proposed Witnesses and enclosed the Form 8s. The proposed list of questions is Appendix “A” to this decision.
[11] At the November 20, 2024 prehearing conference, the City indicated its intention to oppose the orders to attend, and I set a submissions schedule for the application opposing the issuance of the orders to attend. The City filed its application opposing the issuance of the orders on December 12, 2024.
[12] Concurrently, the Complainant made an application to adjourn the January 2025 hearing dates on the basis that the Complainant intended to judicially review my decision not to allow the complaint amendments. The Complainant also made an application for further document disclosure.
[13] Given the outstanding applications and the close proximity to the winter holidays, I adjourned the hearing dates. In particular, I determined that I required oral submissions on the application opposing the issuance of the orders to attend, which could not be scheduled before the hearing. Further, time was required to determine the disclosure application and to comply with any orders that might be made. The hearing will now commence on October 20, 2025.
[14] On March 18, 2025, the Complainant applied for reconsideration of my amendment decision.
[15] On May 28, 2025, I convened a prehearing conference to hear the parties’ oral submissions on setting aside the orders to attend.
[16] This decision addresses both the reconsideration application and the application opposing the issuance of the orders to attend.
III Analysis and DECISION
A. Application Opposing the Issuance of the Orders to Attend
[17] Rule 31(3) of the Tribunal’s Rules contemplates setting aside an order to attend upon request explaining why the evidence sought is not relevant or admissible or why compliance with the order would result in undue hardship for the witness.
[18] Regarding the Complainant’s list of questions, the City says that the evidence sought from the Proposed Witnesses is irrelevant and inadmissible. It does not argue undue hardship but says that City officials would have little time left for governing if they were required to show up at every hearing and court proceeding based on questions such as those proposed by the Complainant.
[19] While I acknowledge the City’s position that some of the questions the Complainant intends to ask the Proposed Witnesses may be irrelevant to the discrimination analysis, I do not propose to go through each question one by one at this stage of the proceedings. For the following reasons, I am satisfied that the Proposed Witnesses may have relevant, admissible evidence that could facilitate the just and timely resolution of this complaint. I will deal with any objections to specific questions as they arise at the hearing of this matter.
[20] Turning to the arguments before me, the City first says that the Complainant has provided inadequate particulars to justify the issuance of the orders, relying on a decision of this Tribunal, Cucek v. British Columbia (Ministry of Children and Family Development) (No. 2), 2004 BCHRT 4. In Cucek, the Tribunal set aside a summons for then Minister of State Linda Reid because the Complainant provided inadequate information for the Tribunal to determine the relevance of Minister Reid’s evidence. The Tribunal explained at para. 74:
…[T]he Complainant has stated “she too made promises of a variation of the Lovaas treatment. We would like her to give evidence on that as well”. The Complainant does not provide any information with respect to whom the promise was made, when it was made, where it was made, or any other circumstances surrounding the alleged promise which would link it to the particulars of the complaint. Furthermore, whether or not such a promise was made will not assist me in determining whether the allegation of discrimination is made out. I agree with the Respondent that there is insufficient information to show that the evidence of Minister Reid may be relevant to the complaint.
[21] Here, the Complainant has provided a lengthy list of questions. I disagree with the City that this is inadequate information to determine possible relevance. It is different from Cucek where the complainant provided a two-sentence explanation as to why she wanted Minister Reid to testify. The questions may not be a description of anticipated testimony, but they do allow insight into what the Complainant hopes to discuss with the Proposed Witnesses and whether that discussion will assist the Tribunal in determining if the allegation of discrimination has been made out.
[22] Second, the City argues that the Proposed Witnesses’ evidence is irrelevant. It relies on the Tribunal’s decision in Belusic obo Canadian Federation of the Blind v. City of Victoria and another (No. 4), 2020 BCHRT 197. There, the Tribunal found that the City discriminated against transit users with impaired vision by relocating certain bus stops from the curb to islands in the middle of the road. The “floating bus stops” were created to accommodate a bike lane running between the curb and the islands.
[23] Relevant to the decision currently before me, the Tribunal set aside an order to attend that had been issued to Lisa Helps. At that time, Lisa Helps was the mayor of Victoria.[1] The Tribunal determined that Mayor Helps’ evidence about comments she made on a radio broadcast had little, if any, probative value. The Tribunal did not reproduce the Mayor’s comments in Belusic, but explained at para. 15 of Appendix 1:
The language the Mayor used in the interview suggests an acknowledgement of the issues raised in the Complaint and a commitment to improve things however the issue in the Complaint is whether the City discriminated by omission by not doing so adequately. I do not view the Mayor’s comments as having much, if any, probative value respecting that issue.
[24] I find that Belusic presents a different situation to the one here. In Belusic, the Complainant wished to question then-Mayor Helps on her comments in the radio broadcast, which were likely not probative to the issues before the Tribunal because her comments were simply an acknowledgement that the floating bus stops were an issue. It is my understanding that the Complainant here wishes to question the Proposed Witnesses on their involvement in the decision-making process, including how the impugned decisions were made and what considerations went into the decision to fund improvements for baseball, but not softball. I am satisfied that these areas of questioning may be relevant, not only to discrimination but also to justification.
[25] Next, the City says that there are other, more knowledgeable witnesses on their list, who can provide the same evidence as the Proposed Witnesses. In particular, the City intends to call evidence from:
a. Thomas Soulliere –Deputy City Manager and former Director of Parks, Recreation and Facilities. Mr. Soulliere handled the Association’s requests for improvements to Pemberton Park. The City says he can speak to the relevant considerations as well as the role of city council in that process;
b. Derrick Newman – Director of Parks, Recreation and Facilities and former Assistant Director of Construction and Facilities Management. Mr. Newman worked with the Complainant and was aware of conversations about improving Pemberton Park; and
c. Jeff Brehaut – Manager of Recreation Services. The City says that Mr. Brehaut handled the Association’s requests and the lease relationship between the Association and the City for Pemberton Park. Mr. Brehaut was involved in the communications between the Association and the City.
The City says that these individuals [the City Witnesses] were more directly involved in the process of approving any Association requests for softball improvements at Pemberton Park, and therefore the evidence of the Proposed Witnesses is not necessary. I am not persuaded that this is the case.
[26] When asked if the City Witnesses were the decision makers, the City responded that the answer to the question was complicated. I understand from the City’s submissions that the City Witnesses were the ones on the ground dealing with any requests around improvements. However, I also understand from the City’s submissions that City Council and CAO were involved at some level in the decision making. As I understand it, the Proposed Witnesses were involved at least in budgeting discussions that directly impacted whether improved amenities at Pemberton Park would be approved. There is also some indication that Council held meetings to discuss the Association’s requests. While there is still some opacity around the exact mechanisms of approval at play here, that is partially what the Complainant wishes to explore with the Proposed Witnesses. If the Proposed Witnesses are not compelled, I foresee an issue arising around understanding the full scope of what happened to lead to this discrimination complaint, which could have implications for both the Complainant’s and Respondent’s cases. In short, I am not persuaded that the Proposed Witnesses’ particular knowledge could be obtained from the City Witnesses.
[27] Finally, the City argues that the testimony of the Proposed Witnesses cannot bind the City and is therefore of no probative value. For the following reasons, I am not persuaded by the City’s argument.
[28] The City relies on Murray Purcha & Son Ltd. v. Barriere (District), 2018 BCSC 427. In Murray, the petitioner for judicial review sought to introduce an elected councillor’s evidence as to what happened during an in camera meeting of the District of Barriere’s council when awarding a contract for winter road maintenance: Murray at paras. 1-2. The Court quashed the subpoena that had been issued to the councillor to testify at the judicial review. In doing so, the Court noted that the municipal respondent could act only by resolution or bylaw under the Community Charter: Murray at para. 24. In Murray, the court noted that many different reasons might lie behind the decision to vote for a resolution or bylaw, relying on Agnew v. Ontario Assn. of Architects, 1987 CanLII 4030 (ON SC) and Broda v. Edmonton (City), 1989 CanLII 3341 (AB KB).
[29] In Agnew, the court outlined why tribunal members and judges are not compellable to testify as to their decisions and how they reached their decisions. In Broda, Agnew’s reasoning was extended to municipal councillors when decision-making as a quasi-judicial body.
[30] I have two main difficulties with the City’s position.
[31] First, the context in which the court’s statements in Murray arose was a municipality’s exercise of authority in awarding a contract for winter road maintenance and a petition for judicial review in relation to that award. The City does not explain how the principles applied in the context of a judicial review, which is a review on a record of decision, apply to the hearing of a human rights complaint, which is engaged in fact finding.
[32] Second, none of the cases that have been provided to me involved disputes under the Code. As I read the decisions relied on by the City, the principal basis on which they turn is a common law privilege, alternately called judicial immunity or absolute privilege: Murray at para. 14. The Tribunal has found that this common law principle is not equally applicable in the human rights realm, as it is in civil litigation, because of the Code’s quasi-constitutional status: Madadi v. British Columbia (Ministry of Education), 2012 BCHRT 380 at para. 72.
[33] I am not satisfied that judicial immunity applies to municipal councillors in this particular context; therefore, I do not allow the City’s application on this basis. My decision does not preclude the City from developing its argument at the hearing about the evidence’s relevance and weight. But I decline to prematurely decide the evidence is inadmissible based on an argument that relies on a decision from a completely different context without explaining how that decision should apply in the context before me.
[34] Because I am not persuaded by the City’s arguments on its application opposing the issuance of the orders to attend, the orders to attend will issue.
B. Application to Reconsider the Amendment Application Decision
[35] The Complainant applies for reconsideration of the amendment decision. The City says it would be unfair to reconsider it. I do not agree.
[36] First, it is not clear that it is necessary to re-open the amendment decision. Generally speaking, once the Tribunal decides an issue, the decision is final, and the Tribunal’s jurisdiction is “spent”: Fraser Health Authority v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Tribunal, 2014 BCCA 499 at para. 160, upheld on this point in 2016 SCC 25. The amendment decision here was final only with regards to my conclusion that the amendment application was made too close to the hearing to be fair and just. Once the hearing was generally adjourned, the Complainant could have amended his complaint, again subject to the timeliness of the amendments, Rule 24(4), without raising a concern about the finality principle.
[37] However, even if it were necessary to re-open the amendment decision, I would do so on the ground that fairness and justice require it. The basis for the decision – which was procedural in nature and itself based on considerations of fairness – did not exist after the hearing was adjourned. The consequence of the decision was to deny a significant amendment to the complaint. In these circumstances, treating the amendment decision as a final decision not to permit the amendment would be unfair.
[38] However, I must now decide the timeliness issue raised by the City. In the amendment application process, the parties argued about the timeliness of the amendments, but it was unnecessary for me to address these arguments. Now that the reason for the initial denial of the amendment application has fallen away, only timeliness remains to be determined.
[39] Generally, the timeliness of amendment allegations is assessed based on the date the original complaint was filed, not the date the amendment was filed: Oostlander v. The Owners, Strata Plan LMS2891 and others, 2024 BCHRT 141 at para. 34; Sun v. Vancouver City Savings Credit Union, 2024 BCHRT 9 at para. 14 (reconsidered on other grounds); Ashton v. BC Ministry of Children and Family Development and another, 2017 BCHRT 202 at para. 26. The Complainant filed the complaint on February 10, 2020. Any allegations that occurred more than one year before February 10, 2019, are untimely, unless they form part of a continuing contravention with a timely allegation.
[40] The allegations in the Complainant’s amendment span from the start of the 2016 softball season to the end of the 2018 softball season. There is no dispute that these events occurred more than a year before the Complainant filed the complaint. These allegations are therefore late-filed unless they are part of continuing contravention under s. 22(2) of the Code. The burden is on the Complainant to establish a continuing contravention: Dove v. GVRD and others (No. 3), 2006 BCHRT 374 at para. 21.
[41] To qualify as a continuing contravention, an untimely allegation of discrimination must be anchored by at least one timely allegation of discrimination: Code, s. 22(2). Without a timely allegation of discrimination, any other untimely allegations of discrimination are late-filed, and the Tribunal must assess them as such under s. 22(3) of the Code: School District v. Parent obo the Child, 2018 BCCA 136 at paras. 43-44.
[42] But the continuing contravention analysis does not end there: Mohr v. Power Flagging & Traffic Control Inc. (Power Earth) and others, 2024 BCHRT 275 at para. 42. A continuing contravention also requires either:
a. allegations of repeated, discrete, discriminatory events, of a similar character and occurring with sufficient frequency; or
b. an ongoing state of affairs, where discriminatory structures or conditions continue to exist over time:
Dove (No. 3) at paras. 17-19; School Districtat paras. 68-70; Rush v. Fraser Health Authority (No. 2), 2024 BCHRT 13 at para. 60.
[43] Some complaints are a hybrid of both types of continuing contraventions: Kirchmeier obo others v. University of British Columbia, 2017 BCHRT 86 at para. 57; Rush at para. 60.
[44] Accounting for these requirements, I conclude that the Complainant alleges a continuing contravention. He alleges both repeated instances of discrimination and ongoing discrimination, anchored by timely allegations. In arriving at this conclusion, I have considered the City’s arguments that the Complainant’s allegations are dissimilar.
[45] I am satisfied that the Complainant’s allegations are similar and connected by a common thread: the Complainant alleges that there were repeated requests for updated softball amenities at Pemberton Park dating back to 2016 and through to 2019, which the City’s elected and non-elected officials did not approve, while there were approvals for upgrades and facilities used for baseball.
[46] Relying on para. 21 of Dove (No. 3), the City argues that it is not enough to allege an ongoing history of discrimination. Rather, it says, the Complainant must make sufficient allegations of fact to establish a continuing contravention. In my view, the Complainant does more than simply allege ongoing discrimination dating back to 2016.
[47] The Complainant’s amendment form states:
From 2016 to the present day, the Association has made repeated and reasoned written efforts to persuade the Respondent – as Pemberton Park’s owner, licensor, regulator, and funder – to join the Association in its expressly equality-seeking project to beginning [sic] to eliminate the disparity between the field, amenities, and opportunities available to the 100 percent female softball players versus those available to the ninety-five percent male baseball players.
[48] At Appendix A of the amendment application, the Complainant provides particulars, or further details, related to this allegation of discrimination. It provides dates, the names of who was involved, and the nature of the requests made. These particulars, which I find are sufficient to establish a continuing contravention, are included at Appendix B of this decision.
[49] The City argues that I should consider whether there are significant and unexplained gaps between the allegations. In the case of repeated, discrete discriminatory events, significant and unexplained gaps between the events may weigh against a finding that the allegations form a continuing contravention: Dove (No. 3) at paras. 18-19; Tuson v. The Board of Education of School District No. 5 (No. 4), 2020 BCHRT 195 at paras. 146-147. I am not persuaded that the gaps here weigh against finding a continuing contravention. If there are gaps, they appear to correspond to the back and forth between the City and the Association as well as the natural gap between softball seasons. Given this, I do not view these gaps as unexplained or substantial.
[50] I conclude that the Complainant’s amendment alleges a timely continuing contravention under s. 22(2) of the Code, and that the alleged continuing contravention goes back to the start of the 2016 softball season. The amended allegations are not late-filed. Therefore, it is not necessary for me to assess whether to accept the amendments as late-filed under s. 22(3) of the Code.
IV Conclusion
[51] The amendments allege a timely continuing contravention. I allow the amendments to the complaint. Accordingly, the City may amend its response to the complaint within 21 days of receiving this decision: Rule 24(5).
[52] I deny the City’s application opposing the issuance of the orders to attend. The Complainant will submit revised orders to attend with the new hearing dates and times within 14 days of receiving this decision. The orders to attend will then issue.
Robin Dean
Tribunal Member
Appendix “A”
1. Are there any established Council or Respondent policies in place or created since 2016 that might touch on the BHBSA or Sharpe requests for Pemberton Park amenities, including on their claim that baseball was played by 96% young men and softball by 100% young women?
- a. Advancing gender equality?
- b. Supporting youth?
- c. Supporting youth sports?
2. What is the process, the steps, by which the following decisions get made – generically:
- a. Land use approval of citizen requests re: parks or public land?
- b. Land use approval of park tenant’s requests? Budget line approval of citizen requests re: parks or public land?
- c. Budget line approval of park tenant requests?
3. How about the process of reviewing incoming communications from e.g. citizens or in this case park tenants whether directed to elected or non-elected officials or both?
- a. How do they get routed?
- b. To whom?
- c. Would someone be tasked to research, get background, write a briefing note or a memo, reply, or similar document?
- d. Who would typically do that actual work?
- e. Would analysis, options and recommendations be generated?
- f. Who would sign off before circulation to elected or senior non-elected officials?
- g. Who would any such memos or notes be circulated to?
4. Take us through the written letters and emails sent to the Respondent and its officials
- a. If it only goes to non-elected official would you ever see it? When? Why? Why not?
- b. Ever seen?
- c. Thoughts at the time?
- d. Discuss with anyone?
- e. Take any action yourself?
- f. Give any direction?
- g. Aware of any other councillor tasked with action, response, involvement?
- h. Aware of a record of Respondent approvals for Hollywood Park stadium? New stands in 2016? Field resurfacing? City proposal to divert girl’s softball away from Pemberton Park so the boys could play baseball there while Hollywood baseball field is resurfaced? Others?
- i. Aware of the role of grant and parental money and parental labour in improving Hollywod Park baseball stadium?
- j. Aware of the role of grant and parental money and parental labour in advocates’ request for Respondent support for Pemberton?
5. Take through output – written communications from Respondent officials, e.g. Soulliere “deferrals” in 2016 and 2017. Others? Are these statements of policy or intent?
- a. What do you understand parks director to be saying?
- b. He has a budget in that current fiscal?
- c. Does he have discretion to say, e.g., this year 2016 Hollywood stands nd only next year 2017 anything to do with Pemberton?
- d. If yes, from where?
- e. If no, is he acting on the directions of a policy maker, of council?
- f. Acting on an express line item for Pemberton Park decided by council in the annual parks budget?
6. Same nature of questions as above for then-Mayor Helps letter advocating for Pemberton Park works in pursuit of grants from Little League.
7. When council votes to give direction to stff to research a topic and bring back information and options to consider or to support decision making …
- a. What usually leads to such a decision or direction? Councillors discuss together?
- b. What is council’s expectation?
- c. Who does the work?
- d. How does council know it is being done?
- e. How long would you normally expect the report back time to be?
8. An example – January 2020 unanimous council decision directing staff to investigate skinning Pemberton infield and to report back?
- a. Recall the origin, providence of this resolution?
- b. How does such an item get on the council agenda? Sponsor? Who asks for what?
- c. Do you know whose initiative it was to get on the agenda?
- d. You were aware of the lobbying effort? What did you know/
- e. Did a report and options come back from staff?
- f. What else were advocates lobbying for apart from skinned infield? Recall?
- g. Did you personally believe there might be a gendered element to the Hollywood-Pemberton disparity?
- h. Recall any conversations you had in lead up to vote?
- i. How did this item get on the agenda? Recall?
- j. Did an item referring to any other express requests: batting cage, stands, buildings ever make it on the agenda?
- k. If yes, when? What happened next?
- l. Show any 2021 parks comms about skinning – what was the ultimate outcome?
- m. Got built into parks budget? Expressly, with own line item when budget was being developed and passed? Or in director’s discretion?
- n. Know advocates’ response (delay season get done in 2021?)
- o. Decision to do only in 2022 – whose?
Appendix “B”
On July 14, 2016, then-Association President Alan Thomas met with Respondent recreation staff member Sarah Madelung to discuss the Association’s intention to, and its desire for the Respondent’s assistance with, make improvement to the softball program and the Pemberton facilities to provide softball players with a playing experience and opportunities comparable to those enjoyed by Association baseball players.
On July 21, 2016, Thomas emailed Madelung thanking her for the July 14 meeting and, as she requested, attached a document outlining the Association’s plans for Hollywood and Pemberton.
On July 29, 2016, Respondent parks director Thomas Soulliere reported on the Pemberton Diamond to members of the Respondent council in a briefing note
On November 15, 2016, Thomas, Sharpe, then-Association Board VP Tak Niketas (who along with Sharpe had been designated by the Board as the Association’s infrastructure liaison with the Respondent) met with Madelung to discuss the Association’s infrastructure proposals, including a skinned softball infield at Pemberton and the other Pemberton items in Thomas’ July 21, 2016 plan sent to Madelung.
On November 24, 2016, Sharpe sent a copy of the Association’s Little League Softball grant application to the mayor and council and Madelung seeking the Respondent’s official support, noting that the application is “for $40-$50k in grant funding for infrastructure repairs and upgrades at Pemberton Park for the 2017 season at which time Pemberton will be a stand-alone girls softball park”.
The grant application details are those from Thomas’s July 21, 2016 plan, including a skinned field needing $2,500 in budget and to be performed with parent labour, and adding a batting cage and machine at $4,777 and a new scoreboard.
In the last week of November 2016, Mayor Lisa Helps and then-councilors Chris Coleman and Margaret Lucas wrote official letters of support of “(the Association’s) application for a Little League Softball Program Grant for improvements to Pemberton Park”.
On March 1, 2017 Sharpe and Niketas met with Madelung at Pemberton to report that they had received a $25,000 grant and to underline the Association’s desire for Respondent approval so that the Association could go ahead with its first priority – the skinned infield – and other Pemberton improvements.
On March 8, 2017 Sharpe and Thomas met with Respondent officials Jeff Brehaut and Derrick Newman to continue to press the Association’s case for the Respondent’s approval of the skinned infield to be supported by the $25,000 Little League grant and parent labour.
On March 10, 2017, Sharpe sent an email to Soulliere expressing the Association’s frustration with the Respondent’s approach to the Pemberton improvements given that the $25,000 Little League grant awarded with the support of the mayor and two councilors was time-sensitive and available only for Pemberton softball improvements. Sharpe underlined parents’ concerns that their daughter-players were experiencing gender discrimination.
On March 30, 2017, Sharpe, Niketas, and Association president Alan Thomas met with Soulliere, Brehaut and Newman at the Respondent’s yard and the Association continued to make its case for the skinned infield and other Pemberton improvements.
From May 2017 to November 2018, the Association agreed with the Respondent’s direction to use the Little League grant money for a first phase of Pemberton improvements – dugouts, spectator seating and fencing – on the Respondent’s commitment that this would be just a first phase and a skinned infield and batting cage phase would follow thereafter.
On November 26, 2018, Sharpe, Niketas and Yudi Lee, another VP on the Association Board, met with the Respondent’s Jeff Parker-Francis. The Association continued to make its case for the skinned infield and batting cage. Sharpe also wrote Parker-Francis that day to advise the Respondent that the Association had ended its affiliation with Little League for the purposes of softball and was joining Softball BC, which both gave its players an opportunity to play against 12 other teams in the Greater Victoria Area but also, more than ever, required that the Pemberton softball diamond be skinned and laid out according to Softball BC’s regulations.
On December 21, 2018, Sharpe, Niketas and Lee meet with Parker-Francis at Pemberton to discuss the Association’s case for the skinned infield and batting cage.
On July 18, 2019 Sharpe and Niketas met with Newman at Pemberton to discuss the Association’s case for the skinned infield and batting cage.
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[1] Former Mayor Helps is also one of the Complainant’s Proposed Witnesses.